Chapter XIX: Appendix: Ii.61 (2)

“My first impression on reading these letters in the _Times_ is one
of disappointment that the point at issue between these two experts
has not been more closely confined to the comparative merits of
side-armor _versus_ cellular-deck armor, but that their attention
has been directed to this feature of design only as connected with
a particular type of ship, namely, the _Collingwood_, which vessel
is a hybrid, or cross between the two systems of protection to
buoyancy, and therefore not truly representative of either. Mr.
White’s defence of the unarmored ends of the _Collingwood_ is so
far unsatisfactory that it treats of a very imperfect development
of the cellular-deck mode of protection, and therefore he is not an
exponent of the real merits of this system.

* * * * *

“I am quite aware that the main point at issue between these two
distinguished naval architects has been more closely confined to
the question of stability than to that of flotation as displayed in
the design of the _Collingwood_, and in this scientific view of the
case I do not feel competent to offer any opinion, except to point
out that the cellular-deck principle _per se_ does not involve any
such danger as regards stability as is produced by the top weight
of a central citadel. Mr. White acknowledges that this top weight
will capsize his ship if deprived of the buoyancy afforded by the
unarmored ends, and on this danger point Sir Edward Reed fixes his
sharpest weapon of attack.

* * * * *

“The great issue at stake is how the weights available for the
protection of buoyancy and for gun defence are to be distributed to
the best advantage for defensive purposes, and in order to discuss
Sir Edward Reed’s opinions in a concise form I will deal with the
question solely as concerning the use of side-armor of less than
twelve inches, beyond which limit of thickness I will, for the
sake of argument, admit its practical advantages; and looking to
the demand for increased speed and coal-carrying capacity, it does
not appear probable that if combined with adequate gun protection,
and if of sufficient depth, an all-round belt of thicker than
ten inches can be carried by any vessels of war except those of
much greater displacement than the _Collingwood_ class. I feel
justified, however, in discussing the question on this basis,
because Sir Edward Reed includes in his category of approved
armored ships our recent belted cruisers, having a narrow belt of
ten inches maximum thickness, and takes credit for having induced
the Admiralty to abandon their original intention of cellular-deck
water-line protection in this class of war-ship in favor of this
thin armor-belt.

“The relative value of these two systems of water-line protection,
namely, an all-round belt _versus_ a raft body, must not only be
ruled by the displacement decided upon for each class of vessel,
and by the power of the gun which has to be encountered, but by
such tactical expedients as can be resorted to in battle, as being
those best suited to the known offensive and defensive properties
of the combatants.

“Looking at this disputed question entirely from the point of view
of an artillerist and a practical seaman, I can perceive very great
tactical advantages to be obtained by the adoption of the mode of
protection proposed as a substitute for obsolete armor, and I view
with much regret the one-sidedness of the conclusions arrived at by
the opponents of this system, and the disparaging terms in which
it is sought to turn it into ridicule, such as ‘doubtful devices’
and ‘useless contrivances,’ etc., because they indicate prejudice
and a want of mature consideration of the incidents of naval
battles. I cannot, also, help observing that while, on the one
side, prophesying the most fatal consequences to ensue from what is
called ‘stripping ships of armor,’ on the other side no admission
is made of the disastrous results which must follow from placing
reliance on such a delusive defensive agency as an armor-plate
known to be penetrable by guns certain to be encountered; and
in order to support this theory we are called upon to believe
that gunners will be so excited in action or so unskilful that
in no case will they hit the large object aimed at, namely, the
water-line of an adversary passing even at close quarters on
their beam, but I shall refer to this feature of assumed impunity
hereafter.

“Sir Edward Reed’s comparative remarks on the effect of shot-holes
as between the two systems of defence are of the same one-sided
character, notwithstanding the evidence of the fractured condition
of armor-plates subjected to experimental firing; and it is
almost apparent that in decrying the one mode of protection he
has lost sight of the fact that a ten-inch armor-plate is all
that will stand between the life and death of a ship—that is
to say, between one well-directed shell and the magazines and
boilers—which plate can be easily penetrated and smashed up by
the guns which similar vessels will assuredly carry if so invited.
Also, in referring to the baneful effects of raking fire and shell
explosion inboard, the assumed inferiority is misplaced because
one prominent advantage of the cellular-deck system is that by
economizing weight at the water-line it enables the bow and stern
to be armor-plated—a matter of the highest tactical importance
as a defence against raking fire, which is unobtainable in a
belted ship of the same displacement, at least without entailing
a considerable reduction of the thickness of armor on the belt.
This feature of end-on defence is not only an essential element of
safety, but must prove most effective as enabling a combatant to
close his adversary at an advantage, and enforce the bow-to-bow ram
encounter, or compel him to resort to a stern fight, or otherwise
to pass him at such close quarters as will insure direct hits
and depressed fire at the water-line belt, and by these tactics
the opportunities for riddling the raft body will be few and far
between.

“I may also express the opinion that for repairing damages in a
raft-bodied ship at the water-line far more efficacious means can
be resorted to than the ordinary shot-plugs, and that the use of
cork bags for closing shot-holes in the coffer-dam sides, if they
are open at the top, is far from being an unreasonable or ‘stupid
contrivance,’ as it is called, considering that, as a general
rule, the perforations through thin plating would not be ragged or
extensive. Sir Edward Reed’s wise suggestion to make the outer skin
of the coffer-dam of two-inch steel plates would render machine-gun
fire of little avail. The injurious effects of shell fire would,
I reckon, be far more fatal if the projectile exploded in passing
through the ten-inch belt than if it burst at some distance inboard
after penetrating thin plating. I think it will be admitted without
dispute that this feature of design must be governed to a great
extent by tactical considerations, the object sought for being
to secure out of a given weight of steel the greatest amount of
fighting vitality consistent with the power of manœuvring available
between skilful antagonists. This view of the case is especially
applicable to single actions at sea, when a clever tactician
will select his mode of fighting according to the offensive and
defensive properties known to be possessed by his opponent, and in
this respect an armor-plated bow and stern will afford enormous
advantages, both for attack and defence, if the plating is extended
as high as the upper deck.

“In fleet actions the ram and torpedo will require more attention
than the gun attack, and that feature of battle introduces another
disputed point, namely, the limit of size of ship; but that
question is outside the scope of the present discussion, and I
shall conclude my arguments by a strong expression of opinion that,
as gunpowder has so completely mastered the pretensions of outside
armor protection, the direction in which prudence leans towards
defensive properties in future designs for ships-of-war is that
of deflection rather than of direct resistance, and that in this
respect science has not reached its utmost limit of invention.

“The prevailing disposition to regulate the power of the gun by the
size of the vessel is, I consider, a great mistake, seeing that
the additional weight of a powerful gun is not inadmissible, even
in such vessels as our belted cruisers, and looking to the strong
inducement held out by the continued use of armor-plating, even of
such moderate thickness as ten inches. In the splendid steamers
purchased from the mercantile marine, which are being armed with
light guns only, one 25-ton gun would greatly add to their fighting
power, but the cause of this omission may probably be found in the
answer to the question, Where are the guns?”

The following reply appeared in the _Times_ (London) of May 1, 1885:

“SIR.—The letter of Admiral Sir George Elliot ... deals ably and
candidly with a subject of such fundamental importance to our navy
that I venture to offer a few observations upon it.

“I am glad to see that the gallant admiral separates his case and
the cellular or raft-deck system from any connection with the
_Collingwood_ or _Admiral_ type of ship, but I regret that he has
treated my criticisms of that kind of ship just as if I had applied
them in the abstract to the system which he advocates. This is
not fair either to the gallant officer himself or to me, as will
presently appear.

“If Sir George Elliot will remove the cellular or raft-deck
question completely away from the very unsatisfactory and
unpleasant region of Admiralty practice, and let it be treated
upon its merits, while I shall still have to respectfully submit
to him some cautionary considerations, I shall also be prepared to
make to him some very considerable concessions. One thing I should
find it desirable to press upon him is the absolute necessity of
giving closer attention to the provision of stability. He treats
the subject mainly as a question of ‘buoyancy,’ and wisely so from
his point of view; but ‘stability,’ or the power of resisting
capsizing, comes first, and on this he declines to offer an
opinion. Again, when the gallant officer speaks of a ‘raft’ deck,
I would point out that this may be a very different thing from a
cellular-deck. The characteristic of a raft is that it is usually
formed of solid buoyant materials; you may make it of cellular
steel if you please, but in that case wherever injury lets in water
the steel so far ceases to be a raft, which helps to float its
load, and becomes a weight to help sink it. Now, cells formed of
thin steel do not upon the face of the matter appear to be safe
materials for a raft which is to be subject to the multitudinous
fire of small guns and the explosions of shells of all sizes. It
needs a very skilful artificer to build a safe floating raft of
thin steel for such a purpose, especially when regard is had to the
dangers of raking fire, against which bow and stern armor would not
sufficiently provide.

“Having expressed these cautions, I will go on to say that in my
opinion the main idea of your gallant correspondent, which he
has so long and so steadily developed, is nevertheless a sound
one, and one which has a great future. I do not, of course, for a
moment admit with him that the gun has yet mastered the armor. I
believe the _Dreadnought_, though of old design, would still fight
a good action against all ships now ready for sea, and have to fear
only a very exceptional, and therefore either a very skilful or
very fortunate, shot. The recent Admiralty ships, where they are
armored, are practically proof against almost every gun afloat.
Further, I have satisfied myself that if the existing restrictions
imposed upon us by the absence of floating docks adapted to receive
ships of great breadth were removed (these restrictions crippling
us to a most unfortunate degree), and if certain professional
conventionalities as to the forms of ships were set aside, it would
be perfectly practicable to build war-ships no larger and no more
costly than the _Inflexible_, with enough side-armor more than a
yard (three feet) thick to preserve their stability, and at the
same time made ram-proof and torpedo-proof. Meanwhile, of all the
vulnerable objects afloat, the recent guns themselves, by reason of
their absurdly long and slender barrels, left fully exposed to all
fire, are among the most vulnerable.

“Still, the raft-deck system has a wide field before it, and I am
quite prepared to admit that I believe in its practicability and in
its sufficient security for certain classes of vessels if properly
carried out. This it has not yet been in any single instance. Even
in the case of the great Italian ships, as in our own, there are
elements of weakness which would be fatal to the system in action,
but which are _not_ unavoidable. Allow me to assure Sir George
Elliot that I have largely and closely studied this subject, and
that my main objections to it are not objections of principle.

“If the raft-deck system is to be adopted, it must in my opinion
be carried out in a much fuller and more satisfactory manner than
hitherto, and with the aid of arrangements which I have for a long
time past seen the necessity of, and been engaged upon.

* * * * *

“To my mind the Admiralty, while protecting certain parts and
contents of their largest ships from injury from shell fire, have
made the fatal error of failing to protect the ship itself, which
contains them all, from being too readily deprived of stability
and made to capsize. The advocates of the alternative system must
not repeat this error, or, if they do, they must not expect me
to become their ally. On the other hand, if they will join me
in despising what are merely specious elements of safety, and
in demanding those which are real, if they will insist that our
principal and most costly ships at least shall be so constructed
as to keep afloat and upright for a reasonable length of time in
battle, in spite of any form of attack, so as to give their gallant
crews a fair chance of achieving their objects, they will not find
me averse to any improvement whatever. When a suitable opportunity
offers I shall be happy to show to Admiral Sir George Elliot
that he has not been alone in seeking to develop the cellular or
raft-deck system, and that it has, in fact, capabilities which
possibly he himself may not yet have fully realized.”

The same number of the _Times_ contains a reply to Mr. Reed’s letter of April 8, 1885, by Mr. White, mainly devoted to a refutation of certain charges of no interest to us, but containing the following paragraphs:

“I must refer to the passage in which Sir Edward Reed quotes a
description of the damage done to the _Huascar_ in her action with
the two Chilian iron-clads.

“This description seems to me one of the best possible
illustrations of a remark in my previous letter, that ‘the
_mitraille_ which is driven back into a ship when armor is
penetrated is probably as destructive as any kind of projectile can
be.’ Had the _Huascar_ not had weak armor, but light sides only,
the local injuries might have been less. The other case cited of
a shell which entered the unarmored stern of the _Cochrane_ shows
how little damage may be done when a projectile passes through
thin plating. At the bombardment of Alexandria there were many
such examples on board our ships, although it must be frankly
admitted that the engagement is no sufficient indication of what
shell fire may do. A good deal of use has been made of the single
case where a shell in bursting blew a hole ten by four feet in the
thin side-plating of the _Superb_. The case was quite exceptional,
whether it be compared with the other hits on the same ship or with
the injuries done to the unarmored sides of other ships. Moreover,
in that case exceptional injury is traceable to special structural
arrangements at the embrasure near the battery port, where the
shell struck. These cases do not prove that the light unarmored
structures in the _Admiral_ class are likely to be destroyed in
such a rapid and wholesale manner as has been asserted. Nor,
on the other hand, do they indicate conclusively what damage
shell-fire may do in future actions. On these points, as I have
before remarked, experiment might be made with advantage. But, on
the other hand, there is good evidence that armor so thin as to be
readily penetrable to many guns may be a serious danger, and that
armor over the vital parts of ships should be strong if it is to be
a real defence.

* * * * *

“In matters of ship design the constructors of the navy are
only the servants of the Board, and while they must take sole
responsibility for professional work, the governing features in
the designs are determined by higher authorities, among whom are
officers of large experience, both as seamen and gunners. And it
is certainly not the practice of the constructive department to
intrude themselves or their advice into matters for which neither
their training nor their experience fits them to give an opinion.

* * * * *

“I make no attempt to be either a sailor or a gunner, but am
content to seek information from the best authorities in both
branches. As the result of this study of tactics and gunnery, I
have been led to the belief that the sea-fights of the future are
not likely to be settled altogether or chiefly by the effects of
gun-fire. This is not quite the same thing as Sir Edward Reed
attributes to me when he says that ‘Mr. White thinks and speaks as
if naval warfare henceforth were to be merely a matter of dodging,
getting chance shots, and keeping out of an enemy’s way.’

“Nor do I think that the designers of the Italian war-ships will
indorse the description of their views and intentions, with which
Sir Edward Reed has favored us in his letter and elsewhere. I have
the honor of knowing his excellency Signor Brin (now Minister
of Marine) and other members of the constructive corps of the
Italian navy, and from their statements, including the powerful
publications of Signor Brin, ‘La Nostra Marina Militaire,’ I have
no hesitation in saying that in spending larger sums on single
ships than have ever before been spent, the Italian authorities
think, and are not alone in thinking, that they are producing the
most powerful fighting-ships afloat.”