Chapter XIII: Letter 19: April 1941 from the Office for Jewish and Masonic Problems (6)

The committee will form in all the local groups and support localities such committees whose names shall be known only to the district committee. The members of the sub-committees shall report to the district committee the names of those Party members and other Germans who buy from Jews. The district committee will publish articles whose content is such that it will point out to the miscreant members of the nation the shamefulness of their deed, and will make them aware of the shame to which they would be subjected if they were proceeded against publicly. This article must be arranged so that only the addresses of those involved, the business and the time in which he made the purchase will be given. The article should bear no signature and will be posted on various posting spots. Further the committees have to secure female clerks from Jewish stores, who can then very easily name those who purchase in Jewish shops. This demands some caution and has to be done with the greatest secrecy. The names of these clerks shall in no case be mentioned. Negotiations are to be undertaken with the association for the employed middle class so that it will prepare the means for this action and will assume the responsibility of finding a new job in another shop of equal importance in case the clerk loses her job. Her name must not be given, only the number.

The district directorate will point out in all gatherings of members or in all public gatherings that the Jew in all countries is again carrying on a low attack which is greatly harmful to Germany. It must be made clear to the masses that no German may buy from a Jew. It is also to be demanded of the Party membership that it constantly bring this to the attention of its friends and acquaintances. The Party membership must go so far in the interest of the nation that it cease friendship with best acquaintances if the latter continue to purchase from Jews. It must go so far that no German will speak to a Jew if it is not absolutely necessary, and this must be particularly pointed out.

German girls who go with Jews are to be made cognizant of the shamefulness of their actions. A member of our party must, in no way, have anything to do with such a person.

Heil Hitler
Signed: Bang
Gau-Propagandaleiter

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 375-PS

TOP SECRET

Berlin, 25 August 1938
General Staff of the 5th Section (German Air Force)
(Genstb. 5. Abteilung)
No. 28/38. TOP SECRET (G-2)
_For Commanders only_ [_CHEF-SACHE_]
THROUGH OFFICER COURIER ONLY

Subject: Extended Case Green [GRUEN--code for Czechoslovakia.] Estimate of the Situation with Special Consideration of the Enemy.

A. _Initial Political Situation_:

1. The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the Case Green.

It is presumed that France will only decide upon war if _active military assistance by Great Britain_ is definitely assured.

2. The Soviet Union will probably side immediately with the Western Powers.

3. It is _not_ expected for the moment that other states will intervene against Germany.

_The Dutch-Belgian area_ assumes in this connection much more importance for the prevention of the war in Western Europe than during the World War. This mainly as an advanced base for the air war.

4. _The United States of America_ will immediately support the fight of the Western Powers with strong ideological and economic means.

5. _Italy, Nationalistic-Spain, Hungary and Japan_ are regarded as benevolent neutrals.

B. _Initial Military Situation_:

1. The French-Czechoslovakian treaty provides for military assistance only in the case of an _unprovoked_ attack. At least an agreement of the French and British views as to the legal aspect has to be achieved. If only for _political reasons_ we have to consider the 2nd day as the earliest possible day of war on a European scale. In cast of a 24 hour ultimatum it would be the 3rd day.

2. It is further assumed that the actual commencement of hostilities will only take place after the French armed forces _have been tactically deployed_. That means within the fourth to eighteenth day. This to

a. use the deployment as a means of political pressure,

b. and to be able to deploy the troops undisturbed.

3. _The war aim of the Entente Powers_ is to be considered as the overcoming of Germany through attacking its war economy. With other words through a _long_ war.

4. The following are possible methods of operation for the French army:

a. to man and hold the Maginot-line,

b. to march into Belgium and the Netherlands at the beginning of the war with the aim of occupying the Ruhr-territory.

_All suppositions support the first alternative._

5. _The French Air Force_ will probably attack both economic and German Air Force targets as well as military and communication objectives. Thus no concentrated effect will be achieved at any one place.

6. The _French Navy_ will probably cooperate through operations with the _British sea power_ to supplant the North Sea blockade. The aim will be the maintenance of naval predominance in the Atlantic and the Western Mediterranean.

7. The _British Air Force_ is assumed to be committed from English bases against the Rhine-Westphalia industrial area and the North Sea ports. Sooner or later the Belgium-Dutch neutrality will be violated.

A _camouflaged aircraft reporting network_ in Belgium and the Netherlands has to be taken into account from the first day of the war. No transfer to France on the part of the British Air Force need be expected at the beginning of the war. Equally it is held to be out of the question for any large parts of the British armed forces to be transferred to France.

8. Provision seems to have been made for the use of North French ground organizations during the _course of the war_ at least by part of the attacking British Air Forces.

The existence of a relatively large number of civilian airfields in Belgium and the Netherlands seem to indicate the intention of moving advanced elements of the air defenses of London (light fighters and reconnaissance aircraft) into this area after a while.

9. Thanks to the expected neutrality of Poland, the active _participation of Soviet Russia_ will be largely restricted to the prosecution of the war in the Baltic.

Furthermore, air attacks against East Prussia and the Baltic coast are to be anticipated and occasional raids on Berlin are regarded as possible.

10. The basic assumption in respect to _our own prosecution of the war_ is that two war plane air forces will be available in the West at the beginning of hostilities. There will be five war plane air forces in all after three to four weeks. The aim will be to bring about a decision by the defeat of the Western powers.

C. _Task of the German Air Force_:

The German Air Force has at present not all the forces necessary to seek a decision by attacking the enemy's war economy with the aid of the navy. The prime responsibility of the German Air Force in the present situation must be to help the armed forces immobilized opposite a fortified front to achieve operational freedom.

D. _Enemy War Plane Forces_:

1. The _French Air Force_ will have on the 1st October some 640 war planes in the front line units on French home territory of which not more than 120 to 150 attain a modern standard of performance. Available reserves total about 320 obsolete war planes.

There are another 150 obsolete war planes in North Africa for use in colonial war or against Southern Italy.

It is assumed that the French home war plane units will be deployed for the most part in the known areas of Eastern France at the beginning of the war. They will be employed against various targets (air force targets, industrial and communications targets, military installations, Army targets) in the operational area as well as in depth according to the capabilities of their personnel and equipment.

Any transfer of more than insignificant forces to Czechoslovakia is regarded as outside the range of practical possibilities, as is the concentrated commitment of large formations against the armies fighting in Czechoslovakia.

2. _The British war plane force_ will consist of some 850 war planes on October 1st of which 300 to 350 can be regarded as modern. The majority of the front line aircraft as well as some 200 to 300 reserve aircraft can be described as only conditionally serviceable in the face of modern defences.

Due to their inadequate range the present British war plane formations are _not_ in a position to carry on a _vigorous_ air war from their home bases only without violating sovereign Dutch or Belgian territory.

Even if Dutch and Belgian neutrality is ignored only the modern war planes need to be taken into account as a serious threat to the Ruhr.

A transfer of British Air Forces to Northern France is to be expected at the earliest, after several weeks of war.

If the French Army Command decides to march through Belgium and the Netherlands the immediate influx of British fighters into this area becomes probable.

Heavy attacks against the North Sea ports by carrier based aircraft need not be reckoned with:

_a._ because the equipment and training of these aircraft is designed to fit them for specific naval tasks;

_b._ because aircraft carriers, due to their vulnerability, will be committed in the North Sea only for very pressing reasons, which do not exist in this instance.

On the other hand occasional attacks by coastal aircraft forces against targets on the North Sea coast are feasible and probable.

E. _Enemy Aircraft Industries_:

1. The first aircraft put into mass production as a result of the expansion of _French military aircraft industry_ during the years 1934 to 1938 are at present rolling off the assembly lines. At the moment the aero-engine factories are lagging behind with deliveries.

In August 1938 forty single-engined and thirty twin-engined military aircraft were delivered to the French Air Forces. It must be assumed that these figures will be increased during the coming months to 100 aircraft a month, 50 single-engined and 50 twin-engined.

A further moderate increase in production is possible and to be expected from spring 1939 on.

2. _In Great Britain_ existing plants have been extended since 1936 with the aid of State funds and the effect on the armament situation will begin to make itself felt increasingly from 1939 on. If the present plans will be observed the program will be completely carried out by 1941.

Present production (August 1938) is estimated at some 200 aircraft of _all types_ (commercial and military aircraft) a month. It must be noted that the import of training aircraft and long-range reconnaissance aircraft from the United States and Canada is intended.

3. _North American aircraft industry_ (United States and Canada) is at the moment fully occupied. No notable expansion has yet taken place but is possible. A possible expansion would have no practical effects in 1939.

250 aircraft of _all types_ (commercial and military) a month for the home and foreign market may be stated as the present production rate. Appreciably more aircraft engines are manufactured.

F. _Position with regard to preparation of target data_:

1. It is proposed to supply units on or before 5th October with the following _target data for France_:

_a._ Air Force (airfields, air parks and equipment depots, air force fuel dumps). About 90% of existing installations are included.

_b._ _Fuel Supply._

100% of the refineries are included and 60% of the total storage capacity (including the above-mentioned Air Force fuel dumps).

_c._ _Ammunition Supply._

An estimated 70% to 80% of the total productive capacity of explosive and gunpowder factories and 17 large supply dumps (main ammunition depots and ammunition depots, Army and Air Force) are included.

_d._ _Power Supply._

All the large power plants are included.

_e._ _Key Industries._

In particular the Paris aero-engine industry has been included.

_f._ _Targets in the Paris area._

Further target data, particularly for essential industrial targets, are accumulating currently.

In addition, command authorities will receive maps of the tactical situation and of target groups on or before the above-mentioned date.

2. Basic target maps of British ground organization (airfields) are approximately 90% ready. They have been passed on to Air Force Group 2 for printing and for the adding of sectional excerpts of maps. They have been ordered to be ready by 15 September.

As far as essential industrial targets are concerned, work has been carried out on the food and crude oil supply systems and docks in the London and Hull areas (basic target maps, sector maps, partially covered also by aerial and ground panoramas).

These will be reproduced after the ground organization targets have been printed. They cannot be expected to be ready before 20 October.

Tactical maps and target maps of London and Hull will be issued to the command authorities prior to the end of September.

3. The basic target maps of the Air Force objectives for _Belgium and the Netherlands_ are ready for printing. Reproduction and distribution (including sector maps) will probably be possible only during October.

4. In general it must be emphasized that, unlike Czechoslovakia, there are relatively very few aerial photographs of Western European targets available.

G. _Recommendations for our own Prosecution of the Air War._

1. A negative answer must be given to the question as to whether it is appropriate to postpone the massed commitment of our striking power until the spring. The _balance of force_ would probably have altered by that time to our disadvantage due to further progress of French and British aircraft industry and imports from North America.

2. From a _climatological_ point of view the autumn offers _our_ forces greater prospect of success than the enemy, due to our relatively good training in instrument flying.

3. As our forces must be regarded as small, even if we accept the figure of 5 air forces as a basis, the task can only be fulfilled by concentrated blows directed against the enemy's weakest points.

For this purpose choice of targets must be made with the greatest care and must be restricted to the decisive points.

4. As long as only _2 air forces_ are available prosecution of the war on the _basis of gaining time is advisable_. This is seen in attacks against the enemy _air forces_ in the airfields where they are deployed in Eastern France, with a view to prevent complete aerial predominance by the enemy.

_Attacks on Paris_ should only be carried out as a reprisal, especially as the air defences in and around Paris are strong. Such attacks must however be possible at all times.

Direct _cooperation with the Army_ is only considered desirable if the enemy deploys or advances in such strength as to endanger the Western German fortifications by a break through or out-flanking.

Support for the Army will be supplied in this case by attacks:

_a._ against transports, troop concentrations and movements,

_b._ against enemy war planes, should these cooperate with his armed forces in great numbers.

Should there be danger of a penetration of the Western fortifications, a further measure would be to concentrate _fighter forces_ scattered in the West on the decisive ground front.

Attacks against objectives in the _British Isles_ are to be regarded as unjustifiable in view of the small numbers of our combat forces.

Should the enemy remain on the defensive in the ground war and withdraw with his war plane forces to the West there will be no urgent reason for us to commit our own forces. In this case it would seem better to save our forces until reinforcements arrive.

5. As soon as _strong forces_ are freed for the prosecution of the war in the West, operations in the air must be directed without delay at _reaching a decision_.

It would seem possible to achieve this end by attacking:

_a._ fuel refineries and dumps;

_b._ gunpowder and high explosive factories, _main ammunition depots and ammunition depots_;

_c._ the most important parks handling imports which are also centers for the transfer and reshipment of fuel and ammunition.

Thus the enemy's fuel and ammunition supply system for his ground and air forces would be paralyzed or at least curtailed to an intolerable degree.

Assuming that the individual groups of targets are one after the other successively attacked until eliminated it would appear that by the use of 5 air forces a sufficient measure of success could be achieved to enable the Army to break through the enemy's fortified front.

_No_ large-scale operations against targets in _the British Isles_ could be carried out in addition to this task.

Everything should however be prepared to make _reprisal attacks_ against London possible at any time.

Considering the strength of the air defences in and around London success in such attacks is only likely if _strong_ forces are committed.

In addition occasional _harassing attacks_ against targets in South and Southeast England may be worthy of consideration, particularly if the weather enforces a lull in France. A secondary aim of such attacks would be to pin down strong defence forces in Great Britain.

6. Should still stronger war plane forces--at least 3 air forces--be available after the French targets had been successfully attacked, they might be committed to advantage in attacks against the _food supply of Great Britain_, notably of London. It must however be emphasized that it is only regarded as possible to achieve decisive successes if considerably stronger forces are committed and if the western ports are also subjected to air attacks.

H. _Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and Navy_:

1. The use of the Condor Legion against the refineries in Bordeaux and possibly against those in Marseilles would valuably supplement our attacks of the French fuel supply system.

2. The ammunition situation has to be rendered precarious for the enemy as soon as possible. Therefore the armed forces should accompany the air attacks against the ammunition supplies with synchronized offensive thrusts. Special attention should be directed towards the ammunition supplies stored in the Maginot Line itself and accessible to air attack.

3. The Navy should hamper _imports_ through the French Atlantic ports to as great an extent as is compatible with its other tasks and the forces available. Especially for some 2-3 months at the beginning of the attack against the fuel supply of France.

4. Belgium and the Netherlands would, _in German hands_, represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be carried out and how long it would take. In this case it would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great Britain.

Signed: For: WOLTER

1 inclosure
_Distribution_:
Chief of German Air Force Operations Staff
General Staff/5th Section (Draft)
1. copy with 1 inclosure
2. copy with 1 inclosure

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 376-PS

SECRET

FUEHRER'S H.Q.
29/10/40

Major (General Staff) Freiherr von Falkenstein
[Addressed to an unspecified General] "Chefsache"

In order to supplement today's telephone conversation of 10:00 A.M. I take the liberty of submitting to you a brief resume of the military questions current here for _your personal information_ before I go on leave. Major Queisner, my deputy, is informed of the questions touched on here and can supply further information if necessary.

The exception is Gibraltar, General Warlimont having requested that all inquiries be made to him, as this territory is regarded as a particularly ticklish business.

1. At the moment no intervention in Greece is intended. Nor for the moment is anything to be undertaken with regard to Crete.

2. The question of _beginning preparation_ in Libya in _conjunction with Italy_ is to be examined in the light of a report by General Ritter von Thoma, which will be received during the next few days.

In the light of this report a proposal is to be submitted to the Fuehrer by Field Marshal Keitel with regard to strength required, date of offensive, etc. Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal Badoglio will then meet in mid-November and will settle details. Large-scale preparations should not be expected before then.

The Quartermaster-General (Colonel Langemeyer) has been informed by us of the necessity for timely disposal of special war material, equipment and clothing.

3. No orders respecting Case East [Fall Ost] have been given and no orders are to be expected at the moment.

At the moment the Russian action against Rumania is dismissed as a trifling matter.

Transports to Rumania are proceeding according to plan as ordered by the Fuehrer and are not to be speeded up.

4. No activity should be expected at present on the part of Spain. The conversation between the Fuehrer and Franco therefore covered only economic collaboration and long-term developments.

The Gibraltar affair should not however be lost to mind though it will have to be treated with extreme care.

The Army will shortly send a small reconnaissance staff [Erkundungsstab] to Spain where it will cooperate with Admiral Canaris: this has been authorized by the Fuehrer. The GAF will request permission to participate on its own account.

There will be further orders from the Armed Forces Supreme Command; the details requested in tele-printer message 00 926/40 are required for this purpose.

5. The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present:--

_a._ No other operational commitment,

_b._ Portuguese neutrality,

_c._ Support of France and Spain.

A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF.

Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself from Ic Kurferst (C. in C. GAF Rear Hq.). I would like to ask Colonel Schmidt to arrange that he be supplied with the information he desires.

6. C. in C. Armed Forces Norway has expressed fears that as a result of the Order: Armed Forces Supreme Command, Armed Forces Operations Staff/Abteilung L. No. 35 331/40 top secret and Chefsache dated 22/10/40 greater activity on the part of the British will develop against Norway, and has requested naval and air force reinforcements. The question of moving Stuka Staffeln was touched upon. I expressed my opinion that Stuka units had at present to prepare for other tasks, but would however request that the matter be further examined.

7. General von Boetticher has made repeated reference, especially in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10, to the fact that in his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I pointed out that the matter was a specifically GAF one, but have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own merits.

[Signed] Falkenstein.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 382-PS

_WRITTEN STATEMENT BY
KORVETTENKAPITAN MOEHLE
DATED 19th JULY, 1945_

A. _Order of September, 1942_

In September 1942 (I can no longer recollect the exact date), the following W/T message was given to all U-boats and operational flotillas by the Commander in Chief U-boats in officers' cypher, i.e. Top Secret:--

1. "All rescue measures such as righting of capsized life-boats, going alongside, provisioning, towing to land, etc., are absolutely forbidden and must cease.

2. Previous orders concerning the rescue and taking prisoner of masters and chief engineers remain in force since their interrogation is of the highest importance to the High Command. Boats should rescue as many as they can carry.

3. All rescue measures contradict the most primitive demands of warfare that ships and crews should be destroyed.

4. You must be hard and remember that the enemy in his bombing attacks on German towns has no consideration for women and children."

This W/T message was without any doubt sent out at the instigation of the Commander in Chief U-boats himself, i.e. Grand Admiral Doenitz. In view of my knowledge of the way in which the Staff of the Chief Command U-boats worked, I consider it quite impossible that an order of such importance could have been given without his knowledge.

I do not know whether the order was given with the concurrence or at the instigation of the Supreme Command, i.e. the Fuehrer's headquarters, or at the instigation of the Fuehrer himself after one of his many conferences with Grand Admiral Doenitz.

As Senior Officer of the 5th U-boat Flotilla, it was my duty to pass on these instructions of Commander in Chief U-boats to Commanding Officers of U-boats which were leaving on their war patrols.

So far as concerns the order itself, it undoubtedly states, and in particular for those who know the manner in which Commander in Chief U-boats is wont to give his orders, that the High Command regard it as desirable that not only ships but also their crews should be regarded as objects of attack, i.e. that they should be destroyed; at that time German propaganda was continually stressing the shortage of crews for enemy merchant ships and the consequent difficulties. I too understood this order in that way.

Had the point of view of the High Command been otherwise the order would undoubtedly have been expressed in different words. It would then only have stated that for reasons of security rescue measures were to cease and this order would have been passed as a normal secret W/T message. It was perhaps even the intention that this order could be interpreted in two ways and the reason may be that in the first place, it contravenes international laws of warfare and secondly, that it was an order which must give rise to serious conflicts of conscience in commanding officers.

It was very difficult for me as senior officer of the Flotilla to ask for clarification of this order from the Commander in Chief U-boats since while I was senior officer (15.6.41-5.5.45) I could only, owing to lack of time, visit the Commander in Chief U-boats four or five times. I could not discuss this order with officers on my staff as all messages in officers' cypher might only be received by me. I was moreover of the opinion that commanding officers who were uncertain as to the meaning of this particular point always had the opportunity (an opportunity which they often took on other points) to obtain a clear understanding of this point when they went for their instructions to the staff of Commander in Chief U-boats itself; these instructions by the staff of the Commander in Chief U-boats were for the great part given by very young officers with much more recent operational experience than I had--the officers on Commander in Chief U-boats' staff changed frequently. Generally speaking, with very few exceptions, commanding officers received their instruction from the staff of Commander in Chief U-boats after I myself had given them their instructions. Commanding officers were generally speaking in much closer personal contact with these young staff officers than they were with myself as senior officer of a purely transit flotilla. There were many commanding officers whom I only saw and got to know for a few days in Kiel while they were fitting their boats out for operations.

Having given considerable thought to the whole of this matter I now remember that during one of my visits to Commander in Chief U-boats' staff in the winter of 1942/3 or the summer '43, one of the staff officers, Korvettenkapitaen Hessler or perhaps more likely Korvettenkapitaen Kuppisch, with whom because of very close ties of friendship I used to converse intimately as long as he was Commander in Chief U-boats' staff, told me of the following occurrence (whether I broached the subject or how the matter came up I can no longer remember).

A type VII boat (500-tonner) reported in her war log that when outward bound from a base in France, she met far out in the Bay of Biscay a raft with five enemy airmen, but was not able to take them on board owing to shortage of room (she had a complement of 54 and carried full provisions for 14 weeks). The boat therefore proceeded without taking any notice of the survivors.

This action of the U-boat was vehemently denounced by the Commander in Chief U-boats' staff. It was stated that she would have acted more correctly in destroying this raft since it was highly probable that the enemy air crew would be rescued by the enemy and in the meantime might once more have destroyed a German U-boat.

This occurrence made the views of the Commander in Chief U-boats clear to me.

As concerns making the order known to commanding officers: the order was always passed on during a commanding officers' conference while their boats were having their final overhaul or while they were being fitted out in Kiel for operational patrols; during these conferences I passed on to commanding officers once again all important orders about the equipping of their boats, procedure on departure, in home waters and while in convoy to Norway. Operational orders were not given by the flotilla; they were always given by the Commander in Chief U-boats himself or by Captain U-boats West on his behalf.

I was wont to pass on this controversial and serious order with more or less the following words:--"I have now to inform you of a High Command order concerning conduct towards survivors. It is a very ticklish matter. Commander in Chief U-boats in September 1942 gave the following order in an 'officers only' signal ( ... the exact words of the order were then read out)."

Since I am myself in my innermost conscience in disagreement with this order, I was very glad that in most cases commanding officers raised no queries and I was therefore relieved of any further discussion on this point.

Sometimes however queries were raised and I was wont to answer somewhat as follows:--

"I will explain the viewpoint of the High Command, which gave this order, by reference to the following event": I then mentioned the example of the Type VII boat in the Bay of Biscay together with the explanation and viewpoint expressed to me by Commander in Chief U-boats' staff. I then went on to say, "Gentlemen, you must yourselves decide what is compatible with own consciences. The safety of your own boat must always remain your prime consideration."

Since the introduction of total underwater war ("Schnorchel"), I have in this connection in various ways further stated that commanding officers were in a much easier position in this respect since they had no occasion to surface and that the order was therefore illusory for them. They had to keep clear of everything which was not worth the firing of a torpedo.

I also remember that many commanding officers after the order of September 1942 had been read said, "That is quite clear and unequivocal however hard it may be". Had this order been given to me as a commanding officer I would have taken note of it in silence but in practice would always have been able with a clear conscience not to carry it out since I consider I would endanger my own boat by acting in this way, (i.e., by shooting at life-boats).

If therefore U-boat commanding officers state that they had received from me the order to destroy life-boats, this does not correspond with the facts, but they received from me quite insufficiently clearly expressed instructions from the High Command together with my personal views thereon.

Before the order of September 1942 was issued I never discussed this difficult question at a commanding officers' conference and the subject of conduct towards survivors was never broached.

B. _Conduct Towards Neutral and Hospital Ships_

On this matter, which I treated together with what has gone before, I gave commanding officers the following directions:

There was an express order of the High Command, and Commander in Chief U-boats was adamant on this point and would relentlessly pursue the breach of it by court martial (i.e., he insisted on the order being strictly obeyed), that no neutral or Red Cross ship might be molested even if the enemy misused neutral flags or the Red Cross.

The political results of sinking a neutral were much more serious than would have been the usefulness of the tonnage sunk.

I told commanding officers for their guidance in doubtful cases--in bad visibility, when neutral markings were not distinct, etc.--that it was better to allow five enemy vessels to go free than to sink one neutral.

So far as concerns the stopping and examination of neutrals, an order was made in January 1944 that in particular Spanish and Portuguese steamers in the North and Central Atlantic were to be stopped and examined for contraband and members of enemy nations of military age. I told commanding officers "Don't touch them. Stay underwater. You are endangering yourselves too much by that because you will certainly be reported by wireless and we know from experience that when such examinations are made watchfulness is liable to suffer. You are only exposing yourself to the danger of being surprised. If a ship carries neutral markings let it go by unscathed."

Objection was often made that German hospital ships had often been destroyed by the enemy, as German propaganda had stressed for years. My answer was: That does not matter, however unpleasant it may be. The order of the High Command is decisive and binding. Politics come before warfare.

C. _Rendering of Reports_

There was an order--I do not remember whether it was in the form of a written or verbal instruction--that no events during a war patrol which contravened established international agreements should be entered in the war log. I believe that the reason for this order was that eight copies were made of war logs and were available to many authorities; there was always the danger therefore that events of this nature would become known and it was undoubtedly undesirable for reasons of propaganda that this should be so.

Events of this nature were only to be reported if asked for when commanding officers made their personal reports; these were invariably made after every patrol to Commander in Chief U-boats or later in certain instances to Captain U-boats.

I also gave the commanding officers instructions on this point.

To conclude, I can only stress that the order of September 1942 appeared to me personally to go too far and I am in total disagreement with it at heart. As a serving officer I had however to carry out the command to pass on this order to commanding officers for their instruction.

During the long time that I was senior officer of the Flotilla no single commanding officer mentioned to me that he could not reconcile obedience to this order with his conscience and that he was therefore unable to carry it out.

An order of this nature was never given by me, i.e. on my own initiative, and could not be given by me since, had I exceeded my authority in so serious a way, I would immediately and without question have been relieved.

[signed] MOEHLE
Korvettenkapitaen

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 386-PS

Berlin, 10 Nov 1937

NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei
on 5 Nov 37 from 1615-2030 hours

Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. BLOMBERG

The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von FRITSCH

The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h. c. RAEDER

The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING

The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. NEURATH

Oberst HOSSBACH

The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today's conference was of such high importance, that its further detailed discussion would probably take place in Cabinet sessions. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided NOT to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences of his 4-1/2 years in Government; he desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.

The Fuehrer then stated:

The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation, and its propagation. This is, consequently, a problem of space.

The German nation is composed of 85 million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form a homogeneous European racial body which cannot be found in any other country. On the other hand, it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If no political body exists in space, corresponding to the German racial body, then that is the consequence of several centuries of historical development, and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation [Volkstum] at its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in Austria and Czechoslovakia is just as little possible as the preservation of the present state in Germany itself. Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about 1-3 generations.

Before touching upon the question of solving the need for living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.

Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows:

A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but NOT total autarchy can be attained:

1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials autarchy is feasible.

2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can NOT.

3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.

4. Edible fats--possible.

B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite "NO".

The general increase of living standards, compared with 30-40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand for an increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increase in demands, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is _not_ possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could NOT be avoided.

The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalization is impossible in a continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but NOT a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.

_Participation in World Economy._ There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do NOT offer any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18) an industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonize again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonization; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, the economic need will also drive Germany to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.

The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. It is a pronounced military weakness of those States who base their existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are ruled by Britain, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in Geneva and in satisfied States. Should the security of our food position be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is NOT a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect in one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root, has for this purpose the most favorable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times--Roman Empire, British Empire--has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.

The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.

German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strongpoints overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.

England is NOT in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer be expected. Any resistance on England's part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are NOT in British hands, e.g. Angola. French favors would probably be of the same nature.

A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well-armed. The Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakable. Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; since the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient Rome.

Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possessions only allied with other States and NOT by its own power. How could England alone, for example, defend Canada against an attack by America or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by Japan.

The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect.

_a._ Ireland's tendency for independence.

_b._ Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her half-measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilize the nonfulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against Britain.

_c._ The weakening of the British position in the Far East by Japan.

_d._ The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which--by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius--expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the Abyssinian War is a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the Mohammedan world.

It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland is 9:1, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must NOT allow the level of our population to become too low.

France's position is more favorable than that of England. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless we have to take the following into our political considerations as power factors:

Britain, France, Russia and the adjoining smaller States.

The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great for Silesia, and Bismarck's wars against Austria and France had been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870 had prevented Austria from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions "when" and "how". In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.

_Case 1. Period 1943-45._ After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The re-arming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically concluded. Our material equipment and armaments are modern, with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of "special weapons" cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.

In comparison with the re-armament, which will have been carried out at that time by the other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943/45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do NOT possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a "point of weakness in the regime". Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.

What the actual position would be in the years 1943-1945 no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice than to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

_Case 2._ Should the social tensions in France lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against Germany, then the time for action against Czechoslovakia has come.

_Case 3._ It would be equally possible to act against Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war against another State, that it cannot "proceed" against Germany.

For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would hardly be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia's desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards the North or the West.

Once Czechoslovakia is conquered--and a mutual frontier, Germany-Hungary is obtained--then a neutral attitude by Poland in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with Poland remain valid only as long as Germany's strength remains unshakeable; should Germany have any setbacks then an attack by Poland against East Prussia, perhaps also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into account.

Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943-45, then the behavior of France, Poland and Russia would probably have to be judged in the following manner:

The Fuehrer believes personally that in all probability England and perhaps also France have already silently written off Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors in the non-participation of England in a war against Germany. The British attitude would certainly NOT remain without influence on France's attitude. An attack by France without British support is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without England's support, it would also NOT be necessary to take into consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would have as consequence the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally, we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia's defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from Czechoslovakia and of 1 million from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany militarily and politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and the possibility of re-constituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 Divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.