Chapter XXIX: Section L: 5th to 9th cy (8)

Another result of the agreement was the appointment by the Fuehrer of Leopold as a member of the Staff of Hess. After a long, personal talk with Klausner, the Fuehrer appointed him as leader of the Austrian National Socialists, upon recommendation of Keppler. The relationship between Seyss-Inquart and Klausner was as follows: Seyss-Inquart acknowledged unconditionally the party leadership and actions taken by it; and he also acknowledged Klausner as the leader of the party. As a party member he was under the command of Klausner and received orders from him. But as a result of the agreement at Berchtesgaden and the statement the Fuehrer made to him during his state visit in Berlin, Seyss-Inquart was the personal trustee of the Fuehrer and directly responsible to him for the illegal NSDAP in Austria within the confines of his political sphere. Seyss-Inquart also acknowledged the free political initiative of the party leader of Austria.

The "Landesleitung" received word about the planned plebiscite through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the "Landesleitung" from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik and Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at 10 a.m. There it was decided that first, the Fuehrer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.

Negotiations with the government were not successful. Therefore they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with the instructions he received from the Fuehrer. On the 10th March all preparations for future revolutionary actions had already been made, and the necessary orders given to all units leaders. During the night of the 10th to 11th, Globocnik returned from the Fuehrer with the announcement that the Fuehrer gave the party freedom of action and that he would back it in everything it did. Rainer then gave the final instruction for Friday, the 11th of March, and explained that three situations might develop within the following days:

1st Case: The plebiscite will not be held. In this case, a great demonstration must be held.

2nd Case: Schuschnigg will resign. In this case, a demonstration was ordered in taking over the government power.

3rd Case: Schuschnigg will take up the fight. In this case, all party leaders were ordered to act upon their own initiative, using all means to capture the position of power.

Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the Gauleiters.

On Friday, 11 March, the minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in Vienna after a visit with the Fuehrer. After talks with Seyss-Inquart he went to see the chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. the "Landesleitung" had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fishboeck and Muehlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the proposal of the two ministers.

In regard to Rainer's proposal, von Klausner ordered that the government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400 hours, signed by legal political, "Front" men, including both ministers and also State Councillors Fishboeck and Jury, for the establishment of a voting date in three weeks and a free and secret ballot in accordance with the constitution.

On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had brought with him a leaflet, to be printed in millions of copies, and a telegram to the Fuehrer calling for help, were prepared.

Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a session of all ministers for 2:00 p.m. Rainer agreed with Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Fuehrer and the statement to the population at 3:00 p.m. and at the same time he would start all necessary actions to take over power unless he received news from the session of the ministers' council before that time. During this time all measures had been prepared. At 2:30, Seyss-Inquart 'phoned Rainer and informed him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and had recalled the plebiscite but that he had refused to call a new plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two ministers had resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered "No." Rainer informed the "Reichskanzlei" through the German Embassy, and received an answer from Goering through the same channels that the Fuehrer will not consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign. Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by Globocnik and Muehlmann; talks were had between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg: Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures the party wished taken. Rainer's answer: Reestablishment of the government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the party, and calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force. Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but very soon the announcement followed that everything might be threatened by the resistance of Miklas. Meanwhile word arrived from the German Embassy that the Fuehrer expected the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a national majority, the legalization of the party, and permission for the legion to return, all within the specified time of 7:30 p.m.; otherwise, German troops would cross the border at 8:00 p.m. At 5:00 p.m., Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by Muehlmann, went to the Chancellor's office to carry out this errand.

Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a government which included, blacks, reds and National Socialists, and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and therefore a weak and unpleasant political situation might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernette. Director of the cabinet Huber, Guide Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attache General Muffe, and the "Gruppenfuehrer" Keppler, who had arrived in the meantime, were also negotiating. At 7:00 p.m. Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations again. Situation at 7:30 p.m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a German invasion.

Gruppenfuehrer Keppler explained that the Fuehrer did not yet have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break out any moment because Rainer ordered the entire party to demonstrate at 3 o'clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the government palace in order to force the reconstruction of the government. The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8:00 p.m. the SA and SS marched in and occupied the government buildings and all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p.m. Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiters of Austria to take over power in all eight "gaus" of Austria, with the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all government representatives who try to resist should be told that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.

With this, the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the complete occupation of Austria within three hours and the taking over of all important posts by the party. * * *

The seizure of power was the work of the party supported by the Fuehrer's threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in the government. The national result in the form of the taking over of the government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual seizure of power by the party on one hand, and the political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other; but both factors may be considered only in the relation to the Fuehrer's decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently issued by the Fuehrer.

6.7.1939 Rainer e. h.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 829-PS

TOP SECRET

Copy

The Chief of the OKW
WFST. / Abt. L (IV/Qu)
Nr. 002060/41 g. Kdos.

F.H. Qu., 16 September 1941
40 copies, 32nd copy

_Subject_: Communist insurrection in the occupied territories.

1. Since the campaign against Soviet Russia started there have been communist insurrections everywhere in the territories occupied by Germany. The actions range from propaganda and assaults against single members of the armed forces to open revolt and spreading guerilla warfare.

It should be noted that this is a _mass movement which is centrally directed from Moscow_ and to which also the single and seemingly trifling incidents are to be ascribed occurring in areas which have been quiet so far.

Due to the manifold political and economic tensions in the occupied territories we must also expect _nationalistic and other groups_ to take advantage of the situation and to instigate difficulties for the German occupation troops by joining the communist insurrection.

This way an increasing _danger for the German conduct of the war_ arises which becomes apparent first by generally unsafe conditions for the occupation troops and already has led to troops being detached to the main centers of the unrest.

2. Previous measures to counteract this general communist insurrection have proved inadequate.

The Fuehrer has now ordered that _everywhere the most drastic means_ are to be employed in order to quench the movement within the shortest time possible.

Only in this manner which has always been employed successfully by great nations in the history of their conquests quiet can be restored.

3. The following _directives_ are to be observed:

_a._ In each case of _revolt_ against the German occupation force _Communist sources_ are to be suspected regardless of what the individual circumstances are.

_b._ To nip the plots in the bud the most drastic means are to be employed immediately at the first provocation in order to make the authority of the occupation force prevail and to prevent further spreading. Attention should be paid to the fact that a human life in the countries concerned often means nothing and only by unusual severity can a deterrent effect be achieved. In these cases the life of one German soldier must be atoned for by the death sentence for 50 to 100 communists, as a rule. The manner of execution shall further increase the deterrent effect.

The opposite procedure to use relatively mild punishment first and to do with the threat of more severe action as a deterrent is not in accordance with these principles and therefore should not be employed.

_c._ The _political relationships_ between Germany and the respective country in question are irrelevant for the attitude of the military occupation authorities.

To the contrary, it is to be considered and emphasized by propaganda that striking with energy will also liberate the native populations from communist criminals and result to their benefit.

Clever propaganda of this kind consequently will not cause undesirable reactions of the friendly parts of the population on account of the severe measures against the communists.

_d._ _Native men_ will generally be a failure in the execution of such measures of force. Their strengthening brings an increased danger for our own troops and therefore must not be allowed.

However, prizes and rewards should be lavishly offered to the population in order to ensure its cooperation in a suitable way.

_e._ If as an exception _court martial_ is to be opened in connection with communist revolts or other offenses against the German occupation force, the most drastic penalties are to be imposed.

In such cases the death penalty only can be an actual means having deterrent effect. Particularly acts of espionage and sabotage and attempts to join a foreign army are, as a rule, to be punished with death. Also in cases of bearing arms without permission the death sentence is to be imposed in general.

4. The _commanders in the occupied territories_ see to it that these principles are made known to all military offices without delay which have to deal with communist acts of revolt.

Certified /s/ Keitel
[signature illegible]
M.V.J.

_Distribution_:

Commander of Armed Forces South-East
[W. Bfh. Suedost] 1st copy

with additional copies for Commander
Serbia 2nd copy

with additional copies for Commander
Salonika-Aegean Sea 3rd copy

with additional copies for Commander
Southern Greece 4th copy

with additional copies for Commander
Crete 5th copy

Commander of Armed Forces Norway 6th copy

Commander of Armed Forces Netherlands 7th copy

Commander of Armed Forces Eastern Territory 8th copy

Commander of Armed Forces Ukraine 9th copy

Plenipotentiary for the Armed Force with the Reich
Protector in Bohemia and Moravia 10th copy

High Command of the Army--OKH (operational
sec.) 11th copy

[O.Qu.IV] 12th copy

(Gen. Qu.) with additional copy for 13th copy

Mil Cdr. France 14th copy

Mil. Cdr. Belgium and Northern France 15th copy

Mil. Cdr. in the Gouv. Gen. 16th copy

Chief of Armament and Cdr. of Reserve 17th copy
with add. copy for Cdr. German Troops in Denmark 18th copy

Chief of Air Force (General Staff) 19th copy

Chief of Navy [OKM] Chief of naval operations
[SKL] 20th copy

Armistice Commission [W.St.K.] Wiesbaden 21st copy

Foreign Office, attention ambassador [?] Ritter 22nd copy

Verfuegungsstab Frankfurt/Oder } via L II 23rd copy

Verfuegungsstab Breslau } 24th copy
_OKW_:

Operational Staff of the Armed Forces [WFST] 25th copy

Abt. L 26-32nd copy

WPr. 33rd copy

Office Ausl./Abw. 34th copy

Counterintelligence Abw. III 35th copy

Foreign department Abt. Ausl. 36th copy

Economic Armament office 37th copy

AWA 38th copy

WR 39th copy

Liaison-office [V.O.] at Gen. Gouv. Cracow 40th copy

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 833-PS

SECRET

High Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 2 February 1942.

_Foreign office/Intelligence/Intell. Dept. III No. 570/1.42 g (ZR/ III C 2_

Subject: Prosecution of crimes against the Reich or the occupying forces in the occupied territories

Wehrm. High Command
7 Feb. 1942
_No. 221 / 42 g_
_further_:
to: 149/10 10

_Reference_: None
_Inclosures_: 3

In the enclosure are transmitted

1. a decree of the Fuehrer and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of 7.12.41

2. an executory decree of the same day

3. a circular of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command of 12.12.41

The decree carries a basic innovation. The Fuehrer and commander in chief of the armed forces commands that crimes of the specified sort committed by civilians of the occupied territories are to be punished by the pertinent courts martial in the occupied territories _only_ when

(_a_) The sentence calls for the death penalty

_and_ (_b_) the sentence is pronounced within 8 days after the arrest.

Only when both conditions are met does the Fuehrer and commander in chief of the armed forces hope for the desired deterrent effect from the conduct of punitive proceedings in the occupied territories.

In other cases in the future the accused are to be secretly brought to Germany and the further conduct of the trial carried on here. The deterrent effect of these measures lies

(_a_) in allowing the disappearance of the accused without a trace,

(_b_) therein, that no information whatsoever may be given about their whereabouts and their fate.

This decree brings only insignificant changes of their activity to the intelligence [Abwehr] agencies. Now as before the intelligence agencies determine the time for the arrest of the espionage and sabotage suspect. However, in conjunction with establishment of the time it must however be considered now that previous to the arrest evidence fully sufficient for the conviction of the perpetrator must if possible be on hand, for further investigation hardly comes into question after the seizure, since a sentence must take place within 8 days, or on the other hand further investigation _on the spot_ by confrontation is made impossible by the evacuation of the prisoners to Germany. Therefore contact should be made with the pertinent military court previous to the arrest in order to check on the question as to whether or not the collected evidence suffices.

When in the opinion of the pertinent court martial and/or the military commander an immediate conviction on the spot is not possible, and the perpetrators are therefore to be evacuated to Germany, the intelligence agencies will inform Reich security headquarters [Reichssicherheitshauptamt] in Berlin SW 11, Prinz Albrecht-Str. 8, attention of Herr Kriminaldirektor Fischer, directly, with a statement of the exact number of prisoners and the groups that belong together according to the circumstances of the individual case. Insofar as in individual cases the superior commander has an urgent interest in the conviction by a Wehrmacht court, this will be brought to the attention of Reich security headquarters. A copy of the whole report to Reich security headquarters is to be sent to the Foreign Office/Intelligence, Intelligence Department III.

The Reich security headquarters will determine a state police office, depending on accommodation possibilities, which will take over the prisoners. This state police office makes contact with the proper intelligence office and arranges the details of the evacuation, particularly if it will be handled by the secret military police, military police, or by the Gestapo itself, as well as manner and place of transfer of subjects.

The decree of the Fuehrer is to be applied, to begin with, only in the occupied western territories (Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, and Northern France, France).

The intelligence agencies must make report to the chief of staff on the above regulations decreed by the foreign office intelligencer.

For the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command
Signature: CANARIS
_Distribution_:

To (Intelligence III) 127
_For information_:
West (Armed Forces Operational staff.) 1
WR 15

Foreign Office Intelligence Z, ZR 2

Foreign Department 1

Intelligence III

W, H, M, Air
FPdW, F, C, C1, C2, each 1 9

Wi 1

U 2

Reich Security Headquarters,
Department IV E,
attention of Kriminaldirektor Fischer 1

Original 1

Supply 40
----

200
====

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 835-PS

SECRET

High Command of the Armed Forces
_14 n 16.18 WR_(_1/3_)

Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76 2 September 1944
Telephone Local 218191
Long distance 218091

Refer to file number date and content.

To the German Armistice Commission re letter of 10.8.44 Az. 630/44.

_For information to: OKW/WFSt/Qu/Verw.1_, WFSt/Foreign Office Group.

_Concerns_: Status of Political Prisoners.

_Reference_: Fuehrer decree of 30.7.44 (OKW/WFSt/Qu 2/Verw.1 Nr. 009169 g.K.) and decree OKW of 18.2.44 (_WFSt/Qu 2/Verw.1 Nr. 009169 g.K._) WR 1/3 Nr. 79/44 g.K.

Conforming to the decrees, all non-German civilians in occupied territory who have endangered the security and readiness for action of the occupying power by acts of terror and sabotage or in other ways are to be surrendered to the security police and to the security service (SD). Only those prisoners are excepted who were legally sentenced to death or were serving a sentence of confinement prior to the announcement of these decrees. Included in the punishable acts which endanger the security or readiness of action of the garrison power are also those of a political nature. The declaration of the senior office of the SS [Protection Corps] and Police with the Military Commander of France that he cannot answer questions about political prisoners during Anglo-American operations, includes therefore all political prisoners in the occupied French territories seized recently or to be seized in the near future.

The treatment of prisoners who are condemned according to the decree of the Fuehrer of December 7, 1941 OKW/WR (I/3/4 14 n 16 Nr. 165/41 g) and who have no communication with the outer world, will soon be discussed with all interested officers.

By order

Sig. Dr. Lehmann
For correctness
BDC--OKW--1643 [Signature illegible.]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 837-PS

SECRET

National Socialist German Labour Party

Fuehrer's Deputy.

The Brown House,
Munich-33, February 3rd 1939

SECRET

_Order No. 5/39 g_

(Not for Publication)

Subject: National league of Germans abroad [Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum in Ausland] and the German Eastern League [Bund Deutscher Osten]

The Director of the Agency for Racial Germans [Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle] SS-Gruppenfuehrer Lorenz, has instigated on my behalf the following new ruling for questions affecting racial work and work in the border country.

1. The National League of Germans abroad [VDA] is the association responsible for national work beyond the frontiers. At the head of the association, the new statutes of the VDA provide for a League Directorate consisting for the most part of leading party members in place of an independent League Director, whose office has been cancelled. Professor Karl Haushofer (Gen. ret.) has taken over the chairmanship of this Directorate. Party member Paul Meike is business manager of the League Directorate of the VDA and in this capacity he combines membership of the department of the Agency for Racial Germans with managing the VDA on lines which are in accordance with the instructions of the Director of the Agency for Racial Germans. Thus the VDA can no longer take action on its own which affects the whole association. The VDA is organized into State Associations [Landesverbaende], which correspond in area to the Gaue of the NSDAP.

2. The German Eastern League [BDO] is the association responsible for work on the border country. SS-Oberfuehrer Dr. Behrends, the deputy of the Director of the Agency for Racial Germans, is charged, until further notice, with its direction. Party Member Hoffmeyer is the responsible manager of the German Eastern League. He directs its business affairs according to the instructions of the Director of the Agency for Racial Germans, and is a member of the staff of the Agency for Racial Germans. The BDO is organized into State Groups, whose regional borders correspond to those of the "Gaue" of the NSDAP.

3. All other associations for racial work and work in the border country (Patriotic Associations) [Heimattreue Verdaende] etc., are alternately transferred, according to their activities, to the associations mentioned under 1 and 2. The managers of VDA and BDO are commissioned to take the necessary measures for the incorporating of these associations.

4. The VDA is solely responsible for racial work beyond the frontiers. I herewith forbid the Party, its organizations and affiliated associations from all racial work abroad. The only competent body for this task is the Agency for Racial Germans, and the VDA as its camouflaged tool. Within the Reich the VDA, generally speaking, is responsible only for providing the means for racial work beyond the frontiers. The VDA must be supported in this in every way by the Party offices. Any outward appearance of a connection with the Party is, however to be avoided.

5. The BDO is at the disposal of the Gauleiters of the frontier "Gaue" for political duties on the frontiers. In addition, the establishment of a frontier territory bureau [Granzlandamt] for the following "Gaue" has been agreed to, in cases where such a bureau is not already in existence:

East Prussia,
Pomerania,
Mark Brandenburg,
Silesia,
Sudetenland,
Bavarian Ostmark,
Upper Danube,
Lower Danube.

In all other "Gaue," special frontier territory bureaux or representatives would be superfluous and are therefore not to be established. Should they already exist, they are to be dissolved.

The activity of the BDO and the VDA is to be supported in every way by the Party offices. The National Socialist leadership of both associations will ensure energetic cooperation on their part in all tasks assigned to them by the NSDAP. Their nature is determined by considerations of foreign policy, and the associations must bear this in mind when representing them in public.

Signed: R. HESS

Certified
[signed] Witt
(WITT)

_Distribution_: II d

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 838-PS

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS' PARTY

The Deputy of the Fuehrer

The Brown House, Munich 33, 3 June 1939

Stabsleiter

Circular No. 122139

Subject: Adherents to Christian Science who are members of the Party

In decree No. 51/1939, dated 6 March 1939 the deputy of the Fuehrer has forbidden that members of the Party be followers of Christian Science due to the outspoken international connections of Christian Science and he decreed that wherever double-membership exists it will have to be annulled immediately.

I request that the leaders of the organizations of the Party issue the necessary decree within the realm of their jurisdiction and also make sure that no double-membership of Christian Science and of party organizations exist.

I also request of the leaders of the affiliated organizations to make sure by issuing decrees that within their realm of jurisdiction members of the Christian Science will not hold official positions. I have no objection for members of the affiliated organizations to be members of the Christian Science.

Signed: M. Bormann

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 840-PS

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS' PARTY

The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Brown House, Munich 33, 14 July 1939
Regulation No. 140/39

Subject: Admission of Clergymen and Students of Theology into the NSDAP

In my regulation No. 24/37 dated 9 February 1937 I have decreed that in order to avoid the penetration of contrasts of ecclesiastical-political nature into the movement and to avoid the suspicion of a one-sided attitude for or against an existing denomination, the admission of members of the clergy into the Party is to be avoided. It turned out that the nonadmission of members of the clergy into the Party is not sufficient for the purpose in question.

In his regulation No. 34/39 on the lifting of the restriction of memberships dated 10 May 1939 the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP has done justice to this experience by decreeing that clergymen, _as well as other fellow Germans who are also closely connected with the church_, cannot be admitted into the Party.

_In addition to this I decree that in the future Party members who enter the clergy_ or who turn to the study of Theology have to leave the Party. This decree does not affect those students who are matriculated mainly in other factors and, not intending to become clergymen later attend only some lectures of the theological faculties.

Signed: for
BORMANN

Attested:
[Signature illegible]
_Distribution_: IV b

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 841-PS

SECRET

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN LABOR PARTY

Fuehrer's Deputy Chief of the Staff
Brown House, MUNICH 33, the 17 Jan. 1939

ORDER NO 1/39 SECRET

Subject: _Jews_.

Upon proposal of Field-Marshal Goering, the Fuehrer has made some basic decisions concerning the Jewish problem. I make these decisions known to you in the enclosure and request that you observe to take these directives under all circumstances.

Signed: M. BORMANN

_1 Enclosure_
_Distribution_: III b
Certified
Signed: [illegible]

* * * * *

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER FIELD-MARSHALL
GOERING
Commissioner for four year plan
Berlin, 28. Dec. 1938

Upon my proposal, the Fuehrer made the following decisions concerning the Jewish problem:

A

_I. Housing of Jews_

1. _a._ The tenant protective law, as a rule, is not to be abrogated for the Jews. On the contrary, it is desired, if possible, to proceed in particular cases in such a way that the Jews are quartered together in separate houses insofar as the housing conditions allow that.

_b._ For this reason the aryanizing of the house ownership _is to be postponed until the end of the total aryanization_, that is to say, for the present the aryanizing of houses has to be carried out only where in individual cases urgent reasons exist. The aryanizing of industries, businesses, agricultural estates, forests, etc., is to be considered as urgent.

2. Use of sleeping and dining cars is to be forbidden to the Jews. At the same time, no special Jewish compartments to be established. As well, the use of trains, street cars, suburban railways, underground railways, busses, and ships can not be prohibited to the Jews.

3. Only the use of some public establishments, etc., is to be prohibited to the Jews. In this category belong the hotels and restaurants visited especially by party-members (for instance: Hotel Kaiserhof--Berlin; Hotel Vierjahreszeiten--Munich; Hotel Deutscher Hof--Nurnberg; Hotel Drei Mohren--Augsburg, etc.). The use of bathing establishments, some public places, bathing resorts, etc. can be prohibited to the Jews; also medicine baths, so far as they are prescribed in particular cases by physicians, may be used by Jews, but only in such ways that no offense is created.

II. Jews who were officials and have been pensioned are not to be denied their pensions. Investigations though have to be made as to whether these Jews can get along with a reduced allowance.

III. The Jewish welfare organizations are not to be aryanized or abolished so that the Jews do not become a public charge, but may be supported by Jewish welfare organizations.

IV. Jewish patents are property, and as such have to be aryanized. (A similar procedure toward Germany was carried out by U.S.A. and other countries during World War I).

B

_Mixed Marriages._

I. 1. _With children_ (part Jews 1st class)

_a._ If the father is a German and the mother a Jewess, this family may stay in the future in its present lodging. The regulations for exclusion of Jews are not to be applied to such families as far as their housing is concerned.

In these cases, the property of the Jewish mother can be transferred to the German husband, or to the mixed children.

_b._ If the father is a Jew and the mother a German, such families also, are not to be moved for the present into Jewish quarters, because the children (part Jews 1st class) in the future, must serve in the labor service and the armed forces, and must not be exposed to Jewish propaganda. Concerning the property, one must for the present proceed in such a way that it can be completely or partly transferred to the children.

2. _Without children._

_a._ If the husband is a German and wife a Jewess, the provisions of 1_a_ are valid accordingly.

_b._ If the husband is a Jew, and the wife a German, these childless couples are to be proceeded against as if they were full-blooded Jews. The husband's property can not be transferred to the wife. Both, husband and wife can be moved into the Jewish houses or Jewish quarters.

Especially in case of emigration such married couples are to be treated as Jews, as soon as an increased emigration is gotten under way.

II. If a German wife divorces a Jew, she reenters the German racial community and all disadvantages for her discontinue.

Signed: GOERING

Certified copy
[Signature illegible]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 842-PS

THE KREISLEITER
To The Area Staff Leaders [Gaustabsamtsleiter]
Party member SELLMER, NURNBERG

LAUF (PEGNITZ), December 30, 1940

In addition to my last report on the situation, I report the following:

The district physician of Hersbruck, Dr. Loeffler, informs me that in Schupf near Kainsback (formerly Kreis Hersbruck) a young farmer, by the name of Koch, was turned over to an institution for sterilization, because of epileptic attacks.

A few weeks ago he wrote to his mother that he was feeling fine, and that she should send him some smoking tobacco. His mother wrote him in return that he should come back soon, as he is badly needed on the farm. It is remarked here that the young Koch was of great help to the mother Koch, a farmer's widow, as he managed the farm practically all by himself.

A week later the widow was informed that her son had suddenly died, and that she could obtain the urn containing the ashes.

As the young Koch had been known also in his neighborhood for his industry, it is natural that this "violent death" has caused great indignation.

When I proposed to district physician Loeffler to send a master mason from Osternohe for a few weeks to the institution in Ausbach for observation of his mental condition, he declared he could not take this responsibility as he did not know if same would return alive. The doctor informed me also that it was known that the commission consisted of an SS-physician with several subordinate physicians and that the "patients" were not even being examined, but judged solely by the patient's existing records. As far as he knew families refuse to send their sick members to the institutions as they do not know whether they would see them again alive.

The district physician in Nurnberg had informed him of two cases in the city of Nurnberg, where charges of murder have been preferred by relations of such patients.

The Party has up to now received neither such complaints nor accusations.

Heil Hitler!
Signed: Walz
Kreisleiter

_Pencil and ink notes_:

"investigate"

"Dr. Guesbert" [?]

"The staff reports: No case is known. The authorities have been instructed how to act. 1-7-41."

"Party member Walz has been informed; Party member Dr. Hummel has been informed; Party member Dr. Breilig [?] has been informed."

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 847-PS

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Vossstrasse 6, Berlin W8, July 5, 1942
at present Fuehrer's Headquarters

All postal communication must be sent to the
Berlin address without exception.

RK. 9495 B

Please use the above chiffre in further communications.

To the Highest Authorities in the Reich, and to all departments directly subordinate to the Fuehrer

The Fuehrer has charged Reichleader Rosenberg in his capacity as delegate of the Fuehrer with the supervision of the entire spiritual and political education and schooling of the NSDAP, with the spiritual fight against the Jews and Freemasons as well as against all allied with them in their doctrinal opposition to National Socialism, as the instigators of the present war. For this purpose the Fuehrer has ordered that the staff of the Reichsleader Rosenberg shall have the right, in occupied territories under Military Government and in occupied Eastern territories under civil administration (this does not include the General Government) to search libraries, archives, lodges, and other political and cultural institutions of all kinds for suitable material for the fulfillment of his task, and to ask the competent army and police offices to confiscate the material thus procured for the implementation of the world doctrinal tasks of the NSDAP, and for later scientific research work of the university, whereby the police political files will remain with the police, all other documents however to be turned over to the staff of the Reichleader Rosenberg. The same request to be made by this staff in regard to all cultural goods which are the property or in the possession of Jews which do not belong to anyone, or whose owners cannot be determined. The measures on procedure about the collaboration with the Wehrmacht will be issued by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht in accordance with Reichleader Rosenberg. The necessary measures within the Eastern territories under German administration will be taken by Reichleader Rosenberg in his capacity as Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories.

I am giving notice of this, the Fuehrer's order, and request to support Reichleader Rosenberg in the fulfillment of his task.

Signed: Dr. Lammers

* * * * *

SECRET

Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
_Rk. 507 A g_

Please use this chiffre in all further communications

Vossstrasse 6, Berlin W8, July 16, 1942
Present field quarters. All mail to be sent
to the Berlin address without exception.
II 1C

II 1 C 791/42g, rec. 20 July 42

encl 1

To the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories

_Berlin W35_

Kurfuerstenstrasse 134

(Notes illegible)

_Concerning_: Fuehrer decree of March 1, 1942
To the letter of July 10, 1942-II 1 C 705/42g

The regulations of which you wish to be informed are contained in enclosed circular letter to the highest Reich authorities of July 5, 1942--Rk. 9495 B--which was also sent to you. A further copy of this circular is enclosed for your use.

Deputy

[signature illegible]

1. There is nothing to be done from here.
2. Mr. R.R. Guilleaume to be informed after his return (7 Aug).

[signature illegible]

[name illegible]
Please ask in the Registrar's Office
of the Reich Chancellery if the
Fuehrer's decree of 1 March 42 exists.
Apparently we have only been sent the
measures of procedure.

(initials illegible) 3 July

The Fuehrer's decree of 1 March is
enclosed. PR. 4 August.

The Reich Chancellery has received
the Fuehrer decree of 1 March 42,
as a copy from the Reichsleitung
Rosenberg. I asked for it there.

Pr. 31/7

Give first to Ministerialdirector
Dr. Runte with a request for his
acknowledgment.

LABS, 5 August
[illegible marks]

* * * * *

FUEHRER DECREE

Jews, Freemasons, and those allied with them in their world doctrinal conceptions are opponents of National Socialism and are the instigators of the present war directed against the Reich. The planned spiritual fight against these powers is a necessary war measure.

I have therefore, charged Reichsleader Alfred Rosenberg to carry out this task in accord with the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. His staff for the occupied territories has the right to search libraries, archives, lodges, and other world doctrinal and cultural institutions of all kinds for pertinent material and to have it confiscated for the world doctrinal task of the NSDAP and the later research work of the university cultural values which are the property or are in the possession of Jews, which do not belong to an owner, or whose owners cannot be determined, are subject to the same regulation. The measures on procedure about the collaboration with the Wehrmacht will be issued by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht in accord with Reichleader Rosenberg.

The necessary measures within the Eastern territories under German administration will be taken care of by Reichleader Rosenberg in his capacity as Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories.

Fuehrer Headquarters, March 1, 1942

To all administrative departments of the Wehrmacht, the Party, and the State.

Signed: Adolf Hitler

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 848-PS

GESTAPO

NURNBERG-FUERTH OFFICE

TELETYPE SECTION

Teletype No. 12309

Received 24 July 1938, 1515 hours from WF via GM
Dr. Berlin Nue 167 262 24 July 1938 1500 to Stapo Nurnberg--
Urgent--Transmit at once.

Subject: Bishop Dr. Sproll in Rottenburg
Reference: None

I request that the following text of a teletype just received here from Stuttgart be transmitted _at once by special messenger to Bayreuth_, Villa Wahnfried, to SS Brigadefuehrer Schaub, attention of SS Untersturmfuehrer Wuensche:

In connection with my report (special delivery of 23 July 1938) subject: Bishop Dr. Sproll of Rottenburg, I further communicate that the following teletype from the Gestapo office in Stuttgart just came in here:

"The Party on 23 July 1939 from 2100 on carried out the third demonstration against Bishop Sproll. Participants about 2,500-3,000 were brought in from outside by bus, etc. The Rottenburg populace again did not participate in the demonstration. This town took rather a hostile attitude to the demonstrations. The action got completely out of hand of the Party Member responsible for it. The demonstrators stormed the palace, beat in the gates and doors. About 150 to 200 people forced their way into the palace, searched the rooms, threw files out of the windows, and rummaged through the beds in the rooms of the palace. One bed was ignited. Before the fire got to the other objects of equipment in the rooms and the palace, the flaming bed could be thrown from the window and the fire extinguished. The Bishop was with Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg and the ladies and gentleman of his menage in the chapel at prayer. About 25 to 30 people pressed into this chapel and molested those present. Bishop Groeber was taken for Bishop Sproll. He was grabbed by the robe and dragged back and forth. Finally the intruders realized that Bishop Groeber is not the one they are seeking. They could then be persuaded to leave the building. After the evacuation of the palace by the demonstrators I had an interview with Archbishop Groeber who left Rottenburg in the night. Groeber wants to turn to the Fuehrer and Reich Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick anew. On the course of the action, the damage done as well as the homage of the Rottenburg populace beginning today for the Bishop I shall immediately hand in a full report, after I am in the act of suppressing counter mass meetings.

Gestapo Office Stuttgart."

In case the Fuehrer has instructions to give in this matter, I request that these be transmitted most quickly, best by telephone to Gestapo Office, telephone Berlin 12 00 40, attention of Regierung Assistant Freytag, so that corresponding instructions can be forwarded to Stuttgart.

Gestapo Office Berlin,

By direction,

Signed: DR. BEST

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 849-PS

Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs
GII 3990/38

Berlin W 8, Leipziger Strasse 3, 23 July 1938
Tel. 11 66 51
[Stamp]

Praesidium Chancellery
Entered 24 July 1938

RP 6575/38

Subject: Catholic Bishop Sproll in Rottenburg (wttbg.)
Ref: Letter of 22 July 1938
No. Er 41/38 III
3 enclosures

To the Minister of State and Chief of the Praesidium Chancellery in Berlin

The Catholic Bishop Dr. Sproll, as the only citizen of the city of Rottenburg and, as far as is known, as the only German bishop, did not take part in the plebiscite of 10 April. The absence from the plebiscite has evoked great and justified anger among the population. Apparently the bishop himself had a bad conscience and left town on the evening before the plebiscite for an unknown destination. Even on 10 and 11 April there were demonstrations at the bishop's residence in Rottenburg against the absent bishop. On 21 April Sproll returned to Rottenburg and on the same day there were renewed demonstrations in front of the bishop's palace. On 22 April Dr. Sproll again left Rottenburg in order to go to a Bavarian monastery.

As the bishop, since Hitler's rise to power, became prominent through a series of damaging sermons, the Governor of Wuerttemberg now came to the conclusion that Dr. Sproll, in the interest of preserving the state's authority and in the interest of quiet and order, could no longer remain in office. The Reich Governor had explained to the ecclesiastical board,

that he would no longer regard Bishop Sproll as Head of the Diocese of Rottenburg on account of his refraining from the election in the office; that he desired Bishop Sproll to leave the Gau area Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, because he could assume no guarantee for his personal safety; that in the case of the return of the bishop to Rottenburg he would see to it that all personal and official intercourse with him on the part of state offices as well as Party offices and the Armed Forces would be denied.

Moved by the reports from Wuerttemberg my Deputy, in my absence, directed the letter attached in copy G II 2277/38 2030 dated 5 May to the Foreign Office. In accordance with that the Foreign Office on 18 May turned to the German Embassy at the Vatican with the instruction that it should be urged on the Holy See to persuade Bishop Sproll that he should resign his Bishopric.

The bishop sojourning outside of his diocese had already received the instruction to return to his diocese. On 18 May Sproll quietly returned to Wuerttemberg and retired to St. Mary's Hospital in Stuttgart.

Since no answer to the instruction of 18 May had been received from the Embassy at the Holy See, on 1 July the settlement of the affair was again brought up in Rome. On 18 July the letter of the Foreign Office attached in copy--Pol III 1886 of 11 July--was received. Whether the affair has again been discussed with the Cardinal Secretary of State, as planned, is unknown to me.

In the intervening two months Bishop Sproll quietly resided in Stuttgart. On 15 July he returned to the Episcopal residence and on 16 July conducted a ceremonial divine service. On the evening of the same day there occurred among the population, aroused over the return of the bishop, great demonstrations before the ecclesiastical buildings of Rottenburg. On 18 July there were more even greater demonstrations. A report of the Reich Governor of 20 July is attached in copy. It is to be expected that on Saturday, 23 July, even greater mass meetings against continued remaining of the Bishop will be put on, so that Cardinal Bertram was impelled to send his telegram of 21 July to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.

The content and tenor of this telegram are such that I cannot recommend a favorable consideration of it. Not the demonstrating people aroused over the subversive attitude of the Bishop are turning against the State, but the Bishop by his incredible behavior against the State and folk-community has turned against the State. In my estimation measures are not sufficient here, which merely produce the condition prior to 10 April. I could only recommend a cessation of further demonstrations if the action of the German Embassy initiated at the Holy See is accompanied by success. If it is unsuccessful, the Bishop would have to be exiled from the land, or there would have to be a complete boycott of the Bishop by the authorities, as the Reich Governor in Wuerttemberg at that time announced to the ecclesiastical officials.

I would notify Cardinal Bertram correspondingly, in case the Fuehrer does not reserve the notification for himself.

signed: KERRL

* * * * *

Copy

Berlin W8, 5 May 1938
Reich and Prussian Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs
GII 2277/38

Subject: Catholic Bishop Sproll in Rottenburg, Wuerttemberg

The Catholic Bishop Sproll of Rottenburg (Wuerttemberg) on 10 April 1938, as the only non-voter of the Rottenburg District, aroused the greatest resentment of all racial Germans and especially gave to Catholic circles the worst example for their civic behavior. By his absence from the plebiscite, which is to be evaluated only as a demonstration, he moreover has violated the sense of the Episcopal oath of loyalty prescribed in Article 16 of the Reichconcordat.

The Bishop felt impelled to evade the just anger of the people and to leave his diocese. It is to be feared that upon his possible return and a possible appearance in public, even at church functions, renewed disorders and demonstrations would occur. It cannot be expected of the German police that they would protect a man who has not perceived his most primitive duties to people and Fuehrer, from the crowds of people who, in righteous wrath, are turning against this man. Also, it cannot be expected of the German authorities that they will carry on official business with a Bishop who in this manner has excluded himself from the folk-community. It is not to be expected that this Bishop can ever accomplish any more fruitful work in his diocese.

I therefore recommend that it be urged on the Holy See via the Apostolic Nuncio or via the German Embassy at the Vatican, to influence Bishop Sproll that he resign his Bishopric as soon as possible.

By direction

Signed: DR. MUHS
To the Foreign Office in Berlin

* * * * *

Copy

Copy (indicated)
Berlin, 11 July 1938
Foreign Office, Pol III 1886
_a._ Reference to the letter of 11 June--Pol III 1679
_b._ Reference to letter of 27 May 1938--II B 1-- / 574/38

The German Ambassador at the Vatican has discussed the matter of recalling Bishop Sproll with the Cardinal-Secretary of State. The Cardinal, who acted in a very reserved manner according to all appearance, did not approve the procedure of the Bishop, but remarked that according to reports he had received the participation in the plebiscite would be a voluntary act, nevertheless an offense against legal duties did not exist. The German Embassy reports, in addition, that in spiritual circles the behavior of the Bishop is designated as very inapt.

The German Embassy at the Holy See has been instructed to discuss the matter again with the Cardinal-Secretary of State.

Further information is reserved for the present.

By direction

Signed: Bismarck

To: _a._ Reich Governor in Wuerttemberg Gauleiter Murr, Stuttgart

_b._ Chief of the Security Police Berlin SW 11, Prinz-Albrecht-Str. 8

* * * * *

Copy

Reich Governor in Wuerttemberg
Stuttgart, 20 July 1938
Subject: Bishop Dr. Sproll
Enclosures: None

As I am informed, Monday evening a demonstration again occurred in front of the Episcopal Ordinariat. Several thousand people gathered in front of the Episcopal Ordinariat and chanting in unison gave expression to their resentment about the absence of the Bishop. There were no further excesses of any sort.

I am reporting on this incident with the request that everything be attempted to get a recall or transfer of the Bishop, for it is not to be assumed that tranquility will return to the people--even in the more remote area around Rottenburg--as long as Dr. Sproll officiates as Bishop.

To the Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, Berlin W 8, Leipziger Str. 3.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 862-PS

TOP SECRET

The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.

No. 22/40 top secret; Prague, 15 October 1940.

TOP SECRET

(through officers only)

Re: Basic political principles in the Protectorate
4 copies, 1st copy

TOP SECRET

(through officers only)

1 Annex
[Pencil marks]:
K [Keitel] 21/X
J [Jodl] Chief OKW
through Chief WFSt
W [Warlimont] 18/10

On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich Protector held an official conference in which State Secretary SS Lt. General K.H. Frank spoke about the following:

Since creation of the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the central authorities of Berlin have had difficulties about the solution of the Czech problem.

After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his view about the various plans in a memorandum. In this, three ways of solution were indicated:

_a._ German infiltration of Moravia and _reduction of the Czech nationality to a residual Bohemia_.

This solution is considered as unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in a diminished form, will continue to exist.

_b._ Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical solution, namely the deportation of all the Czechs. Therefore the memorandum comes to the conclusion that it cannot be carried out within a reasonable space of time.

_c._ _Assimilation of the Czechs_, i.e. absorption of about half of the Czech nationality by the Germans, insofar as this is of importance by being valuable from a racial or other standpoint [blut-und sonst wertmaessig Bedentunghat]. This will take place among other things, also by increasing the Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich territory (with the exception of the Sudeten German border district), in other words by dispersing the closed Czech nationality.

The other half of the Czech nationality must be deprived of its power, eliminated, and shipped out of the country by all sorts of methods. This applies particularly to the racially mongoloid part and to the major part of the intellectual class. The latter can scarcely be converted ideologically and would represent a burden by constantly making claims for the leadership over the other Czech classes and thus interfering with a rapid assimilation.

Elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be handled roughly and should be eliminated.

The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate.

After a discussion, the Fuehrer has chosen solution c (assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech problem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to be carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich Protectorate for years to come.

From the above no particular conclusions are drawn by the armed forces. This is the direction which has always been represented from here. In this connection, I refer to my memorandum which was sent to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July 1939, file number 6/39, top secret, entitled: "The Czech Problem." (Attached as annex).

The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.

Signed: FRIDERICI
Infantry Lt. General
_Distribution_:

OKW-L--1st Copy
OKH-O Qu V--2nd Copy
Chief H Ruest and Bd E-Ic.--3rd Copy
Draft--4th Copy

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 864-PS

TOP SECRET

L IV Berlin, 20 October 1939

Only copy
Written by officer 20 Oct.
[illegible initials]

Conference between the Fuehrer and Chief OKW

on the future shape of Polish relations

with Germany

(Evening of 17 October 1939)

1. The Armed Forces will welcome it if they can dispose of administrative questions in Poland.

On principle there cannot be 2 administrations.

2. Poland is to be made independent. She will neither be part of the German Reich nor a district administered by the Reich.

3. It is not the task of the Administration to make Poland into a model province or a model state of the German order or to put her economically or financially on a sound basis.

The Polish intelligensia must be prevented from forming a ruling class. The standard of living in the country is to remain low; we only want to draw labor forces from there. Poles are also to be used for the administration of the country. However, the forming of national political groups may not be allowed.

4. The administration has to work on its own responsibility and must not be dependent on Berlin. We don't want to do there what we do in the Reich. The responsibility does not rest with the Berlin Ministries since there is no German administrative unit concerned.