Chapter XXII: Section L: 5th to 9th cy (1)

WNV--10th cy.
Foreign/Intelligence--11th cy.
Armed Forces, Transportation Ch.--12th cy.
German General with the Italian high command--13th cy.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 498-PS

TOP SECRET

The Fuehrer

No. 003830/42 g. Kdos. OKW/WFSt

Fuehrer HQ, 18 Oct. 1942
12 copies, 12th copy.

1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged, that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.

2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.

3. I therefore order:

From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the O.K.W. for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.

4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.

5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers who, in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations), are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after battles.

6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.

[signed] Adolf Hitler

_Distribution_: Copy No.

O.K.H. / Genst.d.H (High Command of the Army /
General Staff of the Army). 1
O.K.M. / Skl. (High Command of the Navy /
Naval War Staff). 2
Ob.d.L. / Lw.Fue.St. (C in C Air Force / Air
Force Operational Staff). 3
W.B. Norwegen (Armed Forces Commander,
Norway) 4
W.B.Sudeost (Armed Forces Commander,
Southeast) 5
Ob. West (C in C, West) 6
Geb.A.O.K. 20 (20th Mountain Army) 7
Ob. Sued (C in C, South) 8
Pz.Armee Afrika (Panzer Army Africa) 9
Rf.SS u. Chef d.Dtsch.Polizei (Reichsfuehrer
SS and Chief of the German Police). 10
OKW /WFSt (High Command of the Armed Forces
/ Armed Forces Operational Staff). 11-12

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 501-PS

Field Post Office Kiev, 16 May 1942
No 32704
B Nr 40/42

TOP SECRET

To: SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff [Handwritten:]
Berlin, Prinz-Albrecht-Str. 8 pers.
R/29/5 Pradel n.R
b/R

[Handwritten:] Sinkkel [?] b.R, p 16/6

The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While the vans of the first series can also be put into action if the weather is not too bad, the vans of the second series (_Saurer_) _stop completely in rainy weather_. If it has rained for instance for only one half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is only a question now whether the van can only be used standing at the place of execution. First the van has to be brought to that place, which is possible only in good weather. The place of execution is usually 10-15 km away from the highways and is difficult to access because of its location; in damp or wet weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be executed are driven or led to that place, then they realize immediately what is going on and get restless, which is to be avoided as far as possible. There is only one way left; to load them at the collecting point and to drive them to the spot.

I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans, such as one often sees on farm-houses in the country. The vans became so well-known, that not only the authorities, but also the civilian population called the van "death van", as soon as one of these vehicles appeared. It is my opinion, the van cannot be kept secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.

The Saurer-van which I transported from Simferopol to Taganrog suffered damage to the brakes on the way. The Security Command [SK] in Mariupol found the cuff of the combined oil-air brake broken at several points. By persuading and bribing the H.K.P. [?] we managed to have a form machined, on which the cuffs were cast. When I came to Stalino and Gorlowka a few days later, the drivers of the vans complained about the same faults. After having talked to the commandants of those commands I went once more to Mariupol to have some more cuffs made for those cars too. As agreed two cuffs will be made for each car, six cuffs will stay in Mariupol as replacements for group D and six cuffs will be sent to SS-Untersturmfuehrer Ernst in Kiev for the cars of group C. The cuffs for the groups B and A could be made available from Berlin, because transport from Mariupol to the north would be too complicated and would take too long. Smaller damages on the cars will be repaired by experts of the commands, that is of the groups in their own shops.

Because of the rough terrain and the indescribable road and highway conditions the caulkings and rivets loosen in the course of time. I was asked if in such cases the vans should be brought to Berlin for repair. Transportation to Berlin would be much too expensive and would demand too much fuel. In order to save those expenses I ordered them to have smaller leaks soldered and if that should no longer be possible, to notify Berlin immediately by radio, that Pol. Nr.------ is out of order. Besides that I ordered that during application of gas all the men were to be kept as far away from the vans as possible, so they should not suffer damage to their health by the gas which eventually would escape. I should like to take this opportunity to bring the following to your attention: several commands have had the unloading after the application of gas done by their own men. I brought to the attention of the commanders of those S.K. concerned the immense psychological injuries and damages to their health which that work can have for those men, even if not immediately, at least later on. The men complained to me about head-aches which appeared after each unloading. Nevertheless they don't want to change the orders, because they are afraid prisoners called for that work, could use an opportune moment to flee. To protect the men from these damages, I request orders be issued accordingly.

The application of gas usually is not undertaken correctly. In order to come to an end as fast as possible, the driver presses the accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing that the persons to be executed suffer death from suffocation and not death by dozing off as was planned. My directions now have proved that by correct adjustment of the levers death comes faster and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces and excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer noticed.

Today I shall continue my journey to group B, where I can be reached with further news.

Signed: Dr. Becker
SS Untersturmfuehrer

* * * * *

Reichs Security Main Office
Message Center

1900, 15 June 1942 [Handwritten:]
Riga E 2 II D 3a Maj Pradel
Message No 152452 R 16/6
Wiederhausen

Riga 7082--15-6-42--1855--BE
To Reichs Security Main Office--Roem. 2D3A--Berlin

TOP SECRET

_Subject_: S-Vans

A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way, arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia.

The three S-vans, which are there, are not sufficient for that purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5-tons). At the same time I request the shipment of 20 gas-hoses for the three S-vans on hand (2 Daimond, 1 Saurer), since the ones on hand are leaky already.

The commandant of the Security Police and
the Security Service
"Ostland"
Roem IT-126/42 GRS
Stamp: Signed: Truehe, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer
No 240/42
II D 3a 16 June 42
Procedure: [handwritten]
1. When can we count on having another S-van ready?
2. Are gas-hoses on hand, ordered or when to be delivered?
3. Request answer.

R 16/6

* * * * *

Reichs Security Main Office

II D 3a B Nr 240/42 Berlin, 22 June 1945

TOP SECRET

Stamped:
Message Nr 107903
Sent by message center
2016, 22 June 42

1. FS [?]
To the Commandant of the Security Police and
Security Service Ostland
Riga

_Subject_: S-Van

The delivery of a 5-ton Saurer can be expected in the middle of next month. The vehicle has been at the Reichs Security Main Office for repairs and minor alterations up to this time. 100 meters of hose will be supplied.

By order of

[signature as in heading]

2. Dissemination at once by II D 3a (9)
By direction

Rauff

* * * * *

Handwritten note:

Berlin, 13 July 1942

II D 3a (9)

_Nr I.Z. Widderhausen_ [?] for further action and attention to the note of 13 July 1942 on back page of telegram from Belgrad. For the reasons mentioned 5 sections of hose, each of 10 meters, can be supplied me.

By direction

[signature illegible]

* * * * *

Reichs Security Main Office

Stamps: 1003 9 Jun 1942

handwritten:
After return
immediate repair

II D 3a No 964/42

10 June 1942

R 10/6
Notify about repair
ND. Nr 144702
Belgrad No. 3116 9.6.42 0950--SOM

To: Reichs Security Office, Amt Roem 2 D 3 KL. A--Z. HD. V. Major Pradel--Berlin.

Subject: Special-van-Saurer
Preceding messages: None

The Drivers SS-Scharfuehrer Goetz and Meyer have fulfilled their special mission and could be ordered back with the van mentioned above. In consequence of a broken rear-axle-half, transportation cannot be made by car.

Therefore I have ordered the vehicle loaded and shipped back to Berlin by railroad.

Estimated arrival between 11th and 12th June 1942. The drivers Goetz and Meyer will escort the vehicle.

The commandant of Security Police and Security Service
Belgrad--Roem I--BNR 3985/42.
Signed: Dr. Schaefer, SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer

* * * * *

[Handwritten note back page]

II D 3a (2)
T.O.S. a Dr. SUKKEL

Berlin, 11 June 1942

For further action and immediate start of repairs. I request to be informed about arrival of vans.

By direction:

signed: Just
Berlin, 16 June 1942.

II D 3a (9)

_Note_

The vehicle arrived 16 June 1942 about 1300 h. After thorough cleaning the repairs will start immediately.

By direction

signed: [?]
Berlin, 13 July 1942.

II D 3a 9

1. Note: The S-truck Pol 71463 is ready.

2. Sent to the _motor-pool management T.F. Niederhausen_ for its information and further action.

By direction

signed: [?]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 502-PS

TOP SECRET

B 101
Enclosures 2
Berlin, 17 July 1941

Office IV

Regulations (directives) for the commandos of the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service, which are to be activated in Stalags.

The activation of commandos will take place in accordance with the agreement of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as of 16 July 1941 (see enclosure I). The commandos will work independently according to special authorization and in consequence of the general regulations given to them, in the limits of the camp organizations. Naturally, the commandos will keep close contact with the camp commander and the defense officers assigned to him.

The mission of the commandos is the political investigating of all camp-inmates, the elimination and further "treatment"

_a._ of all political, criminal or in some other way undesirable elements among them.

_b._ of those persons who could be used for the reconstruction of the occupied territories.

For the execution of their mission, no auxiliary means can be put at the disposal of the commandos. The "Deutsche Fahndungsbuch", the "Aufenthaltsermittlungsliste" and the "Sonderfahndungsbuch UdSSR" will prove to be useful in only a small number of cases; the "Sonderfahndungsbuch UdSSR" is not sufficient, because it contains only a small part of Soviet-Russians considered to be dangerous.

Therefore, the commandos must use their special knowledge and ability and rely on their own findings and self-acquired knowledge. Therefore, they will be able to start carrying out their mission only when they have gathered together appropriate material.

The commandos must use for their work as far as possible, at present and even later, the experiences of the camp commanders which the latter have collected meanwhile from observation of the prisoners and examinations of camp inmates.

Further, the commandos must make efforts from the beginning to seek out among the prisoners elements which appear reliable, regardless if there are communists concerned or not, in order to use them for intelligence purposes inside of the camp and, if advisable, later in the occupied territories also.

By use of such informers and by use of all other existing possibilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated among the prisoners, must succeed step by step at once. The commandos must learn for themselves, in every case by means of short questioning of the informers and eventual questioning of other prisoners.

The information of _one_ informer is not sufficient to designate a camp inmate to be a suspect, without further proof; it must be confirmed in some way if possible.

Above all, the following must be discovered:

All important functionaries of state and party, especially

Professional revolutionaries.

Functionaries of the Komintern.

All policy-forming party functionaries of the KPdSU and its fellow organizations in the central committees, in the regional and district committees.

All Peoples-Commissars and their deputies.

All former Political commissars in the Red Army.

Leading personalities of the state authorities of central and middle regions.

The leading personalities of the business world.

Members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence.

All Jews.

All persons, who are found to be agitators or fanatical communists.

It is not less important, as mentioned already, to discover all those persons who could be used for the reconstruction, administration and management of the conquered Russian territories.

Finally, all such persons must be secured who are still needed for the completion of further investigation, regardless if they are police investigations or other investigations, and for explanations of questions of general interest. Among them are all those especially, who because of their position and their knowledge are able to give information about measures and working methods of the Soviet-Russian State, of the communist party or of the Komintern.

In the final analysis, consideration must be given to the nativity in all decisions to be made. The leader of the Einsatz Kommando will give every week a short report by telephone or an express-letter to the Reichs-Security-Main-Office, containing:

1. _Short_ description of their activities in the past week.

2. Number of all definitely suspicious persons. (report of number sufficient)

3. Individual names of all persons found to be functionaries of the Komintern, leading functionaries of the party, Peoples-Commissars, leading personalities and Political commissars.

4. Number of all persons found not to be suspicious informers, with a short description of their position.

_A._ Prisoners-of-war.

_B._ Civilians.

On the basis of those activity reports the Reichs-Security-Main-Office will issue immediately the further measures to be applied. For the measures to be applied on the basis of this successive directive the commandos are to demand the surrender of the prisoners involved from the camp command.

The camp commandants have received orders from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, to approve such requests (see enclosure I).

Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the immediate vicinity of the camp. If the camps in the General-Government are in the immediate vicinity of the border, then the prisoners are to be taken for special treatment, if possible, into the former Soviet-Russian territory.

Should execution be necessary for reasons of camp discipline, then the leader of the Einsatz Kommando must apply to the camp commander for it.

The commandos have to keep lists about the special treatments carried out and must contain:

Current number.
Family name and first name.
Time and place of birth.
Military rank.
Profession.
Last residence.
Reason for special treatment.
Day and place of special treatment
(card file).

In regard to executions to be carried out and to the possible removal of reliable civilians and the removal of informers for the Einsatz-group in the occupied territories, the leader of the Einsatz-Kommando must make an agreement with the nearest State-Police-Office, as well as with the commandant of the Security Police Unit and Security Service and beyond these with the Chief of the Einsatz-group concerned in the occupied territories.

Reports of that kind are to be transmitted for information to the Reichs-Security-Main-Office, IV. A 1. Excellent behavior during and after duty, the best cooperation with the camp-commanders, and careful examinations are the duty of all leaders and members of the Einsatz-Kommando.

The members of the Einsatz-Kommando must be constantly impressed with the special importance of the missions entrusted to them.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 503-PS

Top Secret

High Command of the Armed Forces.
No 55 1781/42 g. K Chefs. W F St/Qu
F.H. Qu., 19 October 1942

Top Secret
By officer only 22 copies, 21st copy

Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and sabotage troops (_OKW/WFst No. 003830/42 top secret of 18 October 1942_) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.

_This order is intended for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands._

_The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the receiving bureaus._

The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible, for the return and destruction of all distributed pieces of the order and copies made thereof.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

By order of

Jodl

1 enclosure
(distribution list--over)
_Distribution list_:

General Staff of the Army--1st copy.

Chief of Ordnance and Commander of Replacement Army--2nd copy.

High Command of the Navy Sea Warfare Diary--3rd copy.

High Command of the Air Force command staff--4th copy.

Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in Norway--5th copy.

Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in The Netherlands--6th copy.

Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in the South-east--7th copy.

Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in The Eastern Territory (Ostland)--8th copy.

Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in the Ukraine--9th copy.

High Command West--10th copy.

High Command 20th Mountain army}--11th copy.
(GEB.) AOH 20) }

Commanding Officer of German }
troops in Denmark }--12th copy.
(Bfh. d. dt. Tr. in Denmark }

High Command South--13th copy.

Tank Army--Africa--14th copy.

German General in Headquarters of Italian Armed Forces--15th copy.

Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police and Main Bureau for Security Police--16th and 17th copies.

High Command of the Armed Forces:

Foreign Counter Intelligence--18th copy.

Armed Forces legal section (WR)--19th copy.

Armed Forces propaganda section (PR)--20th copy.

_Armed Forces Command Staff, Quartermaster inclusive file copy_--_21st copy_.

War Diary (KtC)--22nd copy.

* * * * *

Top Secret

By officer only

The Fuehrer and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces

18 K

I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare non-compliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and commanders the reasons for this decree.

As in no previous war, a method of destruction of communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been developed in this war.

In the east, this type of combat in the form of partisan warfare as early as last winter led to severe encroachment upon our fighting strength and cost the lives of numerous German soldiers, railroad workers, members of the labor corps [Organization Todt], the labor service, etc. It severely interfered with and sometimes delayed for days, the performance of transportation necessary for the maintenance of the fighting strength of the troops. By a successful continuation or perhaps even intensification of this form of war, a grave crisis in one or another place at the front might develop. Many measures against these horrible, as well as wily, sabotage activities have failed, simply because the German officer and his soldiers were not aware of the great danger confronting them and therefore in individual cases did not act against these enemy groups as would have been necessary in order to help the forward echelons of the front thereby the entire conduct of the war.

It was therefore in part necessary in the East to organize special units who mastered this danger or to assign this task to special SS formations.

Only where the fight against this partisan disgrace was begun and executed with ruthless brutality were results achieved which eased the position of the fighting front.

_In all eastern territories the war against the partisans is therefore a struggle of absolute annihilation of one or the other part._

As soon as the realization of this fact becomes the common knowledge of troops, they will regularly be able to cope with these occurrences in short order; otherwise their efforts achieve no decisive results and become purposeless.

Even though under a different name, England and America have decided upon a similar kind of warfare, while the Russian attempts to put partisan troops behind our front by land and only in exceptional cases uses air transportation to land men and to drop supplies, England and America use this method of warfare primarily by landing sabotage troops from submarines or pneumatic boats or by means of parachute agents. Essentially, however, this form of warfare does not differ from the activities of the Russian partisans. For it is the task of these troops:

1. to build up a general espionage service with the assistance of willing natives,

2. to organize troops of terrorists and supply them with the necessary weapons and explosives,

3. to undertake sabotage activities which by destruction of traffic installations, not only continuously disrupt our communications, but also, when things become serious, make troop movements absolutely impossible and eliminate our communications system.

Finally, these troops are to make attacks on war-important installations, in which, according to a scientifically worked out program, they destroy key works by dynamiting, thereby forcing whole industries into idleness.

The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the Homeland as well as bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.

Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can, according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they themselves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however, that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva agreements, especially since part of these elements are even criminals, liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate themselves through these activities.

England and America will therefore always be able to find volunteers for this kind of warfare, as long as they can truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life for them. At worst, all they have to do is to successfully commit their attack on people, traffic installations, or other installations, and upon being encountered by the enemy, to capitulate.

If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without exception, to the last man.

This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to be captured, expecting to be treated according to rules of the Geneva Convention. It must under all circumstances be ruthlessly exterminated.

The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces communique will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and exterminated to the last man.

I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subordinated to them as well as individual commanders not only to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry out this order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported without fail, or under circumstances--when there is danger in delay--to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammunition remains secure.

These are the reason for the issuance of this decree.

If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot immediately after interrogation.

(signed) A. Hitler

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 506-PS

Draft

WFSt/Qu (Verw. 1)
Nr 006580/44 g.Kdos

Fuehrer Headquarters, 22 June 1944

TOP SECRET

2 copies--1st copy

Reference: WR 2 f 10.34 (III/10) Nr 158/44 g.Kdos.-119/44 V--of

17 June 1944

Subject: Enemy agents--Fuehrer order 003830/42 g.Kdos/OKW /WFSt of 18 October 42

To: W R

WFSt agrees with the view taken in the letter of the Judge Advocate of the Army group with the Supreme Commander South-west of 20 May 44 (Br. B Nr 68/44 g.K.). The Fuehrer order is to be applied even if the enemy employs only _one_ person for a task. Therefore, it does not make any difference if several persons or a single person take part in a commando operation. The reason for the special treatment of participants in a commando operation is that such operations do not correspond to the German concept of usage and customs of (land) warfare.

By direction

initialled: W
3 inclosures [Warlimont]

* * * * *

[Following is an attached handwritten note]

Qu 2 W

All questions connected to the commando order (18 Oct 42) are to be handled according to a previous directive of Chef Qu at Qu 2 (W) page 2140, not at administration.

[initial illegible]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 508-PS

TOP SECRET

WFSt/Op (L)

Fuehrer's Headquarters November 21, 1942
5 copies, 5th copy

Subject: Landing of British Freight Gliders in Norway. [Illegible signature] 2/40/43

Note

Supplement to situation report OKW/WFSt/Op. 21 Nov. 42.

Air Force 5, G-2 Capt. S. Lilienskjold reports 21 Nov. by telephone to inquiry:

1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a British freight glider at Hegers in the night of November 11:

_a._ No firing on the part of German defense.

_b._ The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed after touching the ground, 7 man crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed, of the 17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Fuehrer order has been carried out.

2. In the same night a second freight glider landed East of Stavanger. 3 men of the crew were captured by the Norwegian police on November 21. They state that after it was detached the freight glider made a crash-landing at the Lyse Fjord in the night of Nov. 20; it had a crew of 16. Supposedly several dead and wounded. The landing occurred on the North shore of the Fjord, opposite the electric plant of Floerly (supplies Stavanger).

The plane has not yet been found. Each and every possible measure to find it and also to seize the other members of the crew has been initiated by the service district.

The towing plane has apparently returned to England. The radio communication was monitored by Air Fleet #5.

[signed] W
Went out Nov. 11, 42

_Distribution_:
Chief of Operational Staff of the Armed Forces (previous telephone
report).
Asst. Chief (Ktb).
Operations (Army).
Operations (Navy).
Operations (Air Force).

* * * * *

TOP SECRET

F. Amt. Ausl./Abw
Ag Ausl. Nr. 1951/42 gKdos Ausl. Chef
F XVI, E 1/e

Berlin, 4 December, 1942
3 copies, 1st copy

To: WFSt
For: Information
From: Abw III.

Subject: Fuehrer order of 18 Oct. 42, about treatment of enemy sabotage troops.

Attached copies of two teletype messages of the Norway counter intelligence are hereby forwarded, referring to the order contained in the last paragraph of the 2nd teletype order of the Military commander of Norway.

It is asked that it should be examined how far this order is compatible with the above discussed Fuehrer order.

By direction

[Illegible signature]
[Warlimont's initials] 8/12

* * * * *

Copy

TOP SECRET

1. Teletype to: O K W/Abw III F
_Subject_: Commando Raid.

On November 20, 1942, at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 km NE of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of wood without engine. Of the 17 member crew 3 are dead, 6 are severely the others slightly wounded.

All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve-insignia. Furthermore following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents, skiis and radio, exact number is unknown. The glider carried rifles, light machine guns, and machine pistols, number unknown. At present the prisoners are with the battalion in Egersund.

A second plane has crashed 5 km East of Helleland. It had a 6-man crew and is supposed to have towed the above glider.

The artillery officer of Stavanger is still at the scene of the incident. Further exact report follows; new annexes attached. The competent commander's staff (KDS) was immediately notified on the basis of the Fuehrer order. Foreign agency Norway, Nov. 20, 42, No. 34304/42

* * * * *

TOP SECRET III F

2. Teletype to: OKW/Amt Ausl./Abw III F
_Reference_: Our No 3/304/42 g.Kdos III F of 20 Nov 42.
Subject: Commando Raid.

Foreign service (AST) reports to above teletype:

Besides the 17 member crew, extensive sabotage material and work equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was absolutely proved. The 280th inf. div. ordered the execution of the action according to the Fuehrer's order. The execution was carried out toward the evening of Nov. 20. Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their names, ranks, and serial numbers.

The salvage of the sabotage material was performed by the commander's staff (Kds) of Stavanger. The 2nd aircraft mentioned in the above report is a two-engine plane and was probably the towing plane. It will be inspected. In the same night of the 19th to 20th Nov. a second glider plane was landed at the Lysefjord, 20 km East of Stavanger, 8 km East of the electric plant of Floerly. Until now 3 men, presumably English, were captured by the Norwegian police. The police are on the way to conduct a search for the plane. Supposedly dead and wounded lie around it. According to the statements of the prisoners, this freight gilder is supposed to have a 16-man crew. It is possible that this freight glider was towed by the same enemy plane which towed the glider found 15 km North East of Egersund. The armed forces commander of Norway was notified. Refer. at III Wi and Ag WNV/Fu, Oslo.

In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew, the armed forces commander of Norway (WBN) has issued an order to the district commanders, according to which the interrogations by G-2 and by BDS are important before the execution of the Fuehrer order; in case of no. 4 of the Fuehrer order the prisoners are to be handed out to the BDS.

Foreign agency (Ast) Norway, No. 3/304/42 III F. g.Kdos

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 509-PS

TOP SECRET

Telegraph Office: GWNOL

Date: 7 Nov. 1943

SSD WAQC 0183 7/11 1112 DGZ

To Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab/Roem I c GKDOS (TOP SECRET).

Subject: British Commando--Operation in Northwest.
Pescara, 2 Nov. 43.

3 commandos--special treatment--remaining 9 men wounded, in hospital.

OB SUED F.A. ROEM Ic Nr 7595/43 TOP SECRET

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 512-PS

TOP SECRET

SSD HOSX 4041 13/12 1400--OKW/WFSt

According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer order of 18th October (_CHEFS_), individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this measure was proven in the cases of Glomfjord, Two man torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane stavanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the saboteur was liquidated immediately and no clues were won; therefore, armed forces commander referred to above mentioned last sentence of the Fuehrer order (liquidation only after short interrogation).

The Red Cross and the BDS protested after the immediate carrying out of the Fuehrer order in the case of Egersund and intend for their part to bring up the whole question as a matter of principle.

WBN ROEM One A number 5409/42 GKDOS

TOP SECRET

14 December 1942
SSD--Telegram
[illegible pencil remarks]

To: Supreme Command Armed Forces Foreign Department.

For information: Commander Armed Forces Norway Supreme Command Armed Forces Counter Intelligence Service.

Reference: AG Ausl. number 1951/42 Top Secret of 4 December 1942. (Commander Armed Forces Norway I a number 5409/42 Top Secret of 13 December 1942).

Subject: Commando Operations.

It is reported that the armed forces commander Norway intends to spare individual saboteurs for the time being in order to have them interrogated. This intention corresponds to the last paragraph of the order OKW/WFSt/QU. number 551781/42 top secret _CHEFS_ of 19th October 1942.

OKW/WFSt/Qu (III)
Number 004872/42 Top Secret
W [Initialled Warlimont]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 526-PS

_WFSt/Qu (III)_
Subject: Saboteurs, Toftefjord.

10. 5. 1943

TOP SECRET

Notice

On the 30. 3. 1943 in Toftefjord (70° Lat.) an enemy cutter was sighted, cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10 prisoners.

Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetland Is.) by the Norwegian Navy.

_Armament_: 2 Colt--MG's, 2 mounted MG's, a small transmitter. In addition there were supposed to have been 4 MG's, 6 sub-machine guns and 1,000 kg of explosives on board.

_Captain of the Cutter_: Norwegian, Lt. Eskeland.

_Purpose_: Construction of an organization for sabotaging of strongpoints, battery positions, staff and troop billets and bridges.

_Assigner of Mission in London_: Norwegian, Maj. Munthe.

Fuehrer order executed by S.D. [Security Service].

_Wehrmacht Report_ of 6.4 announces the following about it:

In Northern Norway an enemy sabotage-unit was engaged and destroyed on approaching the coast.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 531-PS

Armed Forces Operational Staff
Qm (Adm. 1)
No. 006688/44 Top Secret

Fuehrer's Hq, 23 June 1944

TOP SECRET

3 copies--1st copy

Reference: Fuehrer Order No. 003832/42/OKW/WFSt of 18 Oct 42.

Subject: Treatment of Commando Men.

Conference memorandum

Supreme Command West reports by teletype message No 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 44:

The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried out according to the order referred to. With the large-scale landing achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred to directs in number 5 that enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits of normal combat operations (large-scale landing operations and undertakings) are not to be treated according to numbers 3 and 4. It must be established in a form easily understood by the troops how far the concept "within the limits of normal combat operations, etc." is to be extended. The view of the Supreme Command West is as follows:

A. The commitment of air-borne troops and commandos effected in Normandy falls clearly under number 5.

B. It is likewise not to be contested that paratroop units or groups set down further to the rear are connected with the large-scale landing operation effected, if they have the mission of breaking supply lines or carrying out deceptive maneuvers etc. The German combat soldier will not always be able, during battle, to decide whether it is a question of sabotage groups parachuted down or larger air-borne operations in closer or more distant connection with a landing from the sea already carried out or still being carried out.

C. As a result of the large turn-over of troops in the area of the Supreme Command West, especially recently, it is possible that a considerable number of soldiers are ignorant of the order referred to, which dates from more than 1-1/2 years ago. For Germans from foreign countries (Volksdeutsche) and foreign nationalities the differentiation in the treatment of prisoners will hardly be able to be made clear due to language difficulties. A further reproduction of the order in the present situation, where cases of losses must be considered, is held by Supreme Command West to be a false course of action. Considerable reprisals against our own prisoners must be expected if its contents become known.

D. The application of number 5 for all enemy _soldiers in uniform_ penetrating from the outside into the occupied western areas is held by Supreme Command West to be the most correct and clearest solution. On the other hand an order of the chief office for Reich security to the commander of the SIPO (Security Police) and the SD (Security Service) in Paris has decided that numbers 3 and 4 of the order referred to are to be applied in the future the same as before in the case of uniformed parachutists committed in groups. A conversation with representatives of the higher SS and police fuehrers in France and of the commander of the SIPO and SD in Paris gave the result that according to the opinion of all concerned the difficulty lies in the determination of the "limits of normal combat operations". As a solution it was agreed to set a line (e.g. Seine from the mouth to Rouen-Argentan-Avranches) North of which number 5, inland of which numbers 3 and 4 apply. This solution also must be called incomplete, since the combat situation can at any time bring the necessity of extending this line to other coastal areas as well. In case of a large-scale aerial landing in the interior such boundaries cannot be drawn anymore at all. _Supreme Command West requests, therefore, that, in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS, the decision be made, that, in view of the new situation, number 5 is to be applied in the whole occupied Western area._

_Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff:_

1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after the enemy landing in the west.

2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect, that the order is not valid for _those_ enemy soldiers in uniform, who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of the beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender. Our troops committed in the immediate combat area means the divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to and including corps headquarters.

3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases enemy personnel who have fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD, upon whom it is encumbent to determine whether the commando order is to be applied or not.

4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando undertakings of 18 Oct 42 along with the above explanation.

Proposal:
Attached teletype message.
signed: WARLIMONT

Distribution:

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces--1 copy through Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces Operational Staff.

Ktb, 2 copies.

Qu--Draft, 3 copies.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 532-PS

WFSt/Qu (Verw. 1)

24 June 1944

TOP SECRET

5 copies, 1st copy

SSD--Telegram.

To 1. Supreme Command West.

By mail to 2. Chief of General Staff, Army.

By mail to 3. Supreme Command of the Air Force/Air Force Staff Headquarters.

By mail to 4. Supreme Command Navy/1 Skl.
By mail to 5. Reichsfuehrer SS Command Staff.
By mail to 6. Military Commander, France.
By mail to 7. Supreme Command of Armed Forces/WR.

Authority: 1. Order of the Fuehrer no. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18 Oct 42/OKW/WFSt.

2. Telegram Supreme Command West no. 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 44.

Subject: Treatment of Commandos.

1. Standard operating procedure to (1) will be fully maintained.

2. Numeral (5) refers to enemy soldiers in uniform who are captured in open combat by own troops stationed in the immediate combat zone of the beachhead or who surrender. "Own troops stationed in the immediate combat zone" applies in this sense to those of combat divisions on line as well as reserves up to and including general staffs.

3. In cases of doubt enemy personnel falling into our hands alive will be turned over to the SD, which will be responsible for the examination as to whether the order concerning commandos is applicable or not.

4. Accordingly, the paratroop saboteurs dropped by the enemy over Britanny will be treated as commando personnel, since this area is not at present an immediate combat zone. It is immaterial in this case whether the paratroopers dropped wear uniform or civilian clothes. The number of paratroopers captured in Britanny will be included in the daily report currently. In this respect an annex to the armed forces report of 7 October 1942 has already been published to the effect that such criminal elements should be massacred in combat.

(_Remark_: Enclosures of the order of the Fuehrer of 18 October 1942 as well as the further order regarding the treatment of Commando personnel of 25 June 1944 are attached. The latter mentions also paratroopers under number (2).)

_Distribution_: [signature illegible]

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces through Chief of the WFSt Qu (Entw.).

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 537-PS

Draft

The Fuehrer's Headquarters, 30 July 1944

_The High Command of the Wehrmacht_
009074/44 g.k./WFSt/Qu.(Verw.1)

TOP SECRET

re: _Treatment of members of foreign "Military Missions", captured together with partisans._

In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest members of foreign so-called "Military Missions" (anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as stipulated in the special orders regarding the treatment of captured partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as PWs but in conformity with the Fuehrer's order the elimination of terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942 (OKW/WFSt. 003830/42 g.Kdos).

This order shall not be transmitted to other units of the armed forces via the High Commands and equivalent staffs and is to be destroyed after being read.

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

KEITEL

_Distribution_:

High Comd S/E--1st copy.
High Comd S/W--2nd copy.
General Staff of the Army--3rd copy.
OKM/SKl.--4th copy.
OKL/Lw.Fu.Stb.--5th copy.

Reichsfuehrer--and Chief of the German Police--Staff RF--Attention Major General and Major General of the Waffen SS Rhode, also for RSH--6th copy.

OKW/AWA--7th copy.
/Chief PWs--8th copy.
WR--9th copy.
WFSt/W.Pr.--10th copy.

Op. (H-L-M)--11th copy.
Org.--12th copy.
Ktb.--13th copy.
Qu. (Draft)--14th copy.
Reserve--15-25 copies.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 551-PS

WFSt/Qu! (Verw. 1)

Chef OKW--[in pencil]

of

[initial] J

26 June 1944

TOP SECRET [Rubber Stamp]

5 copies--1st copy
Checked before Release }
Chef WFSt } [in pencil]
Remark 1 }
_OB._ _WFSt_ } [in pencil]

_KR_--_Teletype_
To 1. Supreme Commander West.
2. Chief of Army General Staff.
3. OKL/Lw Fu Stab.
4. OKM/1.Skl.
5. Reichsfuehrer SS--Command Staff.
6. Military Commander, France.
7. Military Commander, Belgium/Northern France.
8. Armed forces Commander, Netherlands.
9. OKW/WR.
10. Supreme Commander Southwest [in pencil].

_Reference_: 1. Fuehrer Order No. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18 Oct 1942 OKW/WFSt.

2. Teletype Supreme Commander West No. 1750/44 Top Secret of 23 June 1944 (only to OKW/WFSt).

_Subject_: Treatment of Kommando Participants.

1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the order of the Fuehrer on the destruction of terror and sabotage units of 18 Oct 1942 remains fully in force.

Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in the most forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the corps commands, according to #5 of the basic order of 18 Oct 1942, remain exempted.

2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they are to be turned over to the SD.

3. All troops committed outside the combat area of Normandy are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and sabotage units briefly and succinctly according to the directives issued for it.

4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily how many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The number is to be published daily in the armed forces communique to exercise a frightening effect, as has already been done toward previous Kommando undertakings in the same manner.

[Initial] W [Warlimont]
[signature] Keitel
_OKW/WFSt/Qu. (Verw. 1)_
Nr. 006688/44 Top Secret

_Addition for Supreme Commander_ }
_Southwest_ }
Similar action is to be taken in the} [Written by hand]
Italian theater of war. }
[initial] J [Jodl]

_After forwarding_:
Qu (Verw. 1) Simultaneously teletype--1st copy.
Op (H)--2nd copy.
Op (M)/(L)/Ktb.--3rd copy.
VO Foreign--4th copy.
VO W Pr--5th copy.

Copy was sent on 18 Aug to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 553-PS

Memo secret 7/4
(Annex 2 to H.Dr.g.l
Page 7 current 1910.4)
High Command of the armed forces
WFSt. (Org.1) amt. AUSL.ABW/ABT ABW.III
Nr. 8725/7. 42 g. (IIIb 2) Berlin, 4 August 1942

SECRET

_Combatting of single parachutists_, 4 Aug. 1942.
Unaltered reprint 1943
Reference: OKW/WFSt/ABt.L (II) Nr. 1858 geh.v. 10.8.40

I. In case of enemy landings by air, a difference has to be made between:

A. Parachute troops and airborne landing troops committed to fighting activities.

B. _Single_ parachutists and small groups of parachutists who are dropped in order to execute missions of sabotage, espionage, terror or disruption.

to _a_ The combatting of enemy airborne forces is the exclusive mission of the armed forces according to the reference orders. to _b_ For combatting _single parachutists_. In alteration of fig. 7 v.a. the following is decreed:

1. In territories (Reich territories and occupied territories) the combatting of _single parachutists_ is the mission of those agencies of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service [SD] designated as executive; in this matter it is immaterial whether the parachutists are in uniform or civilian clothes.

2. To what extent armed forces and agencies of the armed forces should be committed for these missions is to be decided directly by the district commanders [Wehrkreisbefehslhaber] or by territorial commanders [territorialen Befehlshaber] endowed with the powers of district commander with the competent agencies of security police and SD.

3. So far as single parachutists are captured by members of the armed forces, they are to be delivered to the nearest agency of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, without delay; simultaneously reports must be made to the competent intelligence agency. The same procedure is also valid for combat action directed against parachute troops or airborne-landing troops, in case the troops realize that they have to do with saboteurs or spies. If it should be discovered that the parachutists brought to security police by armed forces, or captured directly by members of the police are soldiers, the SS Reich leader and Chief of the German Police will take care that they will be transferred to the competent air forces agencies after the completion of the necessary inquiry.

4. Reports concerning confirmed single parachutists are to be submitted without delay to the nearest agency of the Chief of Security Police and of the SD, simultaneously informing the counter intelligence agency in charge which immediately has to forward the report to district command headquarters commander as well as the airforces command. Moreover, in principle fig. 4 of the reference order is applicable.

5. In territories not mentioned in fig. 1, present regulations remain valid (transfer to secret field police).

II. With regard to the use of objects captured or discarded, in the case of parachutists, as far as these items are sabotage materials, or radio equipment, a supplementary order to fig. 9 v. a. is decreed:

1. Captured sabotage material to be delivered to the nearest security police agency and SD.

The army will dispose of sabotage material captured by troops in the Eastern theater. With regard to further utilization of sabotage material delivered or reverting to the Security Police, agreements made between the Chief of Security Police and SD and foreign section of counter intelligence remain valid.

2. Captured radio equipment, including the directions for operations, code-material, voice material (Sprach-Material) in plain and in code text, are to be delivered immediately via local counter intelligence agencies to OKW (Ag WNV Fu III) for use. The agencies concerned will be informed of results. After a completion of investigations the captured radio equipment will again be at disposal, if needed. If further use of captured radio equipment is considered by either counter intelligence or Security Police, then the delivery of the equipment might be omitted, upon agreement each time with Ag. WNV/Fu III, however, in this case photostatic copies of the directions for use, the code keys, etc., as well as technical descriptions of the equipment are to be forwarded quickly to Ag-WNV/Fu III.

The Chief of High Command of the Armed Forces
KEITEL

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 556-2-PS

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
Fuehrer Hq September 8, 1942

The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be erected in the area of Army Group West make it necessary that in the occupied territory all available workers should be committed and should give the fullest extent of their productive capacities. The previous allotment of domestic workers is insufficient. In order to increase it, I order the introduction of compulsory labor and the prohibition of changing the place of employment without permission of the authorities in the occupied territories. Furthermore the distribution of food and clothing ration cards to those subject to labor draft should in the future depend on the possession of a certificate of employment. Refusal to accept an assigned job, as well as abandoning the place of work without the consent of the authorities in charge, will result in the withdrawal of the food and clothing ration cards. The GBA [Deputy General for Arbeitseinsatz] in agreement with the military commander as well as the Reich Commissar, will issue the corresponding decrees for execution.

A Hitler
[initialled] K [Keitel]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 556-13-PS

Note for the files

1. On 4 January 1943 at 8 P.M. Minister Speer telephones from the Fuehrer Headquarters and communicates that on the basis of the Fuehrer's decision, it is no longer necessary to give special consideration to Frenchmen in the further recruiting of specialists and helpers in France. The recruiting can proceed with emphasis and sharpened measures.

2. Commissar-General Schmidt with the Reich Commissar in Holland just telephones on 5 January 1943 at 5:20 P.M. and explains that on the basis of Armament Action 1943 he must achieve more recruiting in Holland.

3. He has been criticized by the armament Commissions regarding the endangering of German contracts in Holland proper due to labor shortage.

I told him that no attention would be paid these criticisms.

He has already taken the same attitude and in the future will take the appropriate action.

For Information

(signed) SAUCKEL

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 579-PS

Weimar, 5 January 1943
The District Commissar in Riga--Employment Office
Section [Fachgebiet] 2 (Commitment of work)
Riga, 6 July 1942

File note

_Subject_: Commitment of Jews.

here: cooperation with the administration offices of the armed forces.