Chapter VIII: Separation of Races in Schools (2)
In 1869, persons of color were not admitted to the subdistrict schools of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania,[463] but this law was repealed in 1872.[464] An earlier statute of 1854 had provided for separate schools for Negroes where there were more than twenty in the district. The school directors of Wilkesbarre had united two districts, each having less than twenty colored children, and put up a school building for Negroes; but the court[465] held that this was in violation of the law of 1854. This law was repealed in 1881,[466] and it was thereafter unlawful to make any distinction whatever on account of race or color. The next year, it was held[467] that the school directors could not keep open schools for Negroes exclusively.
A West Virginia law[468] of 1865 required the boards of education to establish separate schools for Negroes where there were more than thirty children of that race in the district. But if the average daily attendance was less than fifteen for a month, the school should be discontinued for any period not exceeding six months. If there were less than thirty children in the district or the attendance was less than fifteen, the money should be reserved and used for colored education as the board thought best. A statute[469] of 1871 and the Constitution[470] of 1872 provided that white and colored persons should not be taught together. A separate school for Negroes must be established when the number in the district exceeds twenty-five. If less, the trustees of two or more districts may establish a joint school. The Supreme Court[471] of that State has held that the constitutional provision requiring separate schools does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the terms of the schools of both races must be of the same length. Thus, West Virginia is as strict as Virginia or any Southern State in separating the races in schools.
Wyoming has the following statute[472]: “When there are fifteen or more colored children within any school district, the board of directors thereof, with the approval of the county superintendent of schools, may provide a separate school for the instruction of such colored children.”
The statutes[473] of Arizona, until 1909, declared that no child should be refused admission to any public school on account of race or color. Last year, however, the school law of that Territory was amended[474] so as to give the board of trustees of school districts power, when they deem it advisable, to segregate pupils of the African from pupils of the white race and to provide all accommodations made necessary by such segregation, but the power to segregate shall be exercised only where the number of pupils of the African race shall exceed eight in any school district. This amendment was passed over the Governor’s veto by a two-thirds’ vote of the legislature.
The Constitutions of Colorado[475] of 1876 and of Idaho[476] of 1889 provide that no distinction or classification of pupils shall be made on account of race or color, and the judicial decisions of those States do not show any attempts by the school boards to draw color lines.
Separate schools were abolished by law in Massachusetts in 1857.[477] The present statute[478] declares that no child shall be excluded from a public school of any city or town on account of race or color. In practice, the matter is not entirely at rest in Massachusetts.
The law[479] of Michigan prohibits the segregation of the races in schools. Because of objections made by white students, two Negroes,[480] in 1908, were refused admission to the Grand Rapids, Michigan, Medical College, a private institution. The Negroes appealed to the State circuit court, which issued a writ of _mandamus_ compelling the school to admit them. When this was granted and they were accordingly admitted, thirty-four members of the junior class of the school “struck,” and the authorities suspended the class for a time. The Supreme Court[481] of Michigan later reversed the order granting the writ of _mandamus_, saying that a private institution of learning, though incorporated, has a right to say whom it will receive.
A statute[482] of Minnesota declares that a district shall not classify its pupils with reference to race or color, nor separate them into different schools or departments upon such grounds. The punishment for violation of this law by a district is a forfeiture of its share of the public school fund so long as the classification or separation continues. The Territory of New Mexico[483] makes it a misdemeanor for a teacher or school director to exclude any child on account of race or nationality, under penalty of a fine from fifty dollars to one hundred dollars and three months imprisonment, and being forever barred from teaching school or holding any office of profit or honor in the Territory.
The separation of the races in public schools is required by the Constitutions of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Complete separation is required by statute in all of the above-named States and, besides those, also in Arkansas, Maryland, and Delaware. A discretionary power is given to the school boards to establish separate schools in Arizona; in Indiana; in California, as to schools for Indians, Chinese, and Mongolians; in Kansas, in cities of over 150,000 inhabitants; and in Wyoming, in districts having fifteen or more colored pupils. The following States that once had separate schools now prohibit them: Illinois, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. In addition to these, separate schools are not allowed in Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. There are other States which have never seen fit to make any mention one way or the other of race distinctions in schools, either in statutes or court reports; so one is warranted in inferring that the schools are open to all. They are Connecticut, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Washington.
As has already been said, public education is distinctly a State function. The Federal government, in the main, has not undertaken to have anything to do with it, but Congress, by its exclusive jurisdiction, has supreme control over the public schools of the District of Columbia, and the provisions that it has made there for the separation of the races show in an interesting way the attitude of the national government upon the subject. A statute[484] of 1864 reads: “That any white resident of said county shall be privileged to place his or her child or ward at any one of the schools provided for the education of white children in said county he or she may think proper to select, with the consent of the trustees of both districts; and any colored resident shall have the same rights with respect to colored schools.
“That it shall be the duty of said commissioners to provide suitable and convenient houses or rooms for holding schools for colored children....” The commissioner might impose a tax of fifty cents _per capita_ upon the patrons of the school to aid in its support, but no child should be excluded because its parents or guardians could not pay the tax. The school fund was to be divided in proportion to the number of school children, regardless of race.
In 1890 an increase of the Federal appropriation[485] to schools was accompanied with the following proviso: “That no money shall be paid out under this act to any State or Territory for the support or maintenance of a college where a distinction of race or color is made on the admission of students, but the establishment and maintenance of such colleges separately for white and colored students shall be held to be a compliance with the provisions of the act, if the funds received in such State or territory be equitably divided as hereinafter set forth.”
SEPARATION IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS
Thus far, except in the matter of Berea College, the separation of the races in private schools only has been considered. Legislation as to private schools is comparatively meagre. A statute[486] of Florida of 1895 makes it a penal offence to conduct a school of any grade—public, private, or parochial—wherein white persons and Negroes are instructed or boarded within the same building, or taught in the same class, or at the same time by the same teacher. The punishment for violating the law by patronizing or teaching in such a school is a fine of from one hundred and fifty to five hundred dollars, or imprisonment from three to six months. A statute[487] of Tennessee of 1901 makes it lawful for any school, academy, or other place of learning to receive both white and colored pupils at the same time. It is unlawful for any teacher to allow them to attend the same school or to teach them together or to allow them to be taught together, under a penalty of fifty dollars for each offence and imprisonment from thirty days to six months. The most recent statute on the subject of private schools is that of Oklahoma in 1908. It is plainly modeled after the Kentucky law of 1904. Under the Oklahoma statute,[488] it is unlawful for a person, corporation, or association of persons to maintain or operate any college, school, or institution where persons of the white and colored races are both received as pupils for instruction. The person, corporation, or association that operates a school in violation of the statute is guilty of a misdemeanor, and may be fined not less than one hundred nor more than five hundred dollars. Each day such a school is kept open is a separate offence. One who teaches in such a school is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined from ten to fifty dollars for each day. One who goes to such a school as a pupil may be fined from five to twenty dollars for each day. It is not unlawful, however, for a private school to maintain a separate and distinct branch thereof “in a different locality.” The Kentucky statute, it will be remembered, required the separate branch to be, at least, twenty-five miles from the main school. The Oklahoma legislature declared that it was necessary “for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety” that this act take effect at once.
Florida, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Tennessee are the only States that expressly prohibit the teaching of white and colored persons in the same private school. Other States—as Georgia and Texas—declare that, if a school admits both races, it shall have none of the public school fund, saying, by implication, that one may operate a school for both races if he will give up his claim to State aid. On the other hand, Minnesota has enacted a statute to the effect that, if a school refuses to admit pupils of both races, it shall have none of the public school fund, thus saying, by implication, that it is not unlawful to conduct a private school exclusively for one race. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan to the effect that a private school may exclude Negroes even though the law of the State requires public schools to be open to all, regardless of race or color, has been considered.
EQUALITY OF ACCOMMODATIONS
In general, the “accommodations, advantages, and facilities” of schools for Negroes are to be equal to those for white children, but the requirement has, in many cases, been loosely construed. It has been held in Missouri[489] and Ohio,[490] for instance, that it is not an unjust discrimination for the colored children to have to walk farther to school than the white children. The Supreme Court[491] of Kansas in 1903 decided that uniformity of schools for white and colored children did not require equality of buildings. The court said: “True, for the accommodation of a numerous white population a much larger and more imposing school building is provided than that set apart for the few colored children in the district. This, however, is but an incidental matter, and necessarily unavoidable in the administration of any extended school system. School-houses cannot be identical in every respect; but parents cannot, on this account, dictate the one their children shall attend.”
The County Board of Education of Richmond County, Georgia, in 1880, established a high school for Negroes, but in 1897 it was discontinued for economic reasons, because the money to educate fifty or sixty Negroes in the high school would give the rudiments of education to two hundred of the four hundred young Negroes in the county who were crowded out. It was understood that the school would be re-opened as soon as economic considerations permitted. A Negro brought suit against the board for discrimination against his race in that the white high school to which the Board made contributions had not been closed also. The Supreme Court of that State held[492] that the Board had the right to establish or discontinue high schools when the interests and convenience of the people require it. There were more white children of the high-school grade than colored; therefore, the court argued, the Board was justified in continuing the white high school. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court[493] of the United States, which affirmed the decision of the State court. Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the opinion of the court, said: “... while all admit that the benefits and burdens of public taxation must be shared by the citizens without discrimination against any class on account of their race, the education of the people in the schools maintained by State taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States, and any interference on the part of the Federal authority with the management of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the land.”
In general, where separate schools are required, it is said that they must be equal for both races; but it has been held that it is not an unjust discrimination to build more imposing school-houses for the many white children than for the few colored children; to require the children of one race to walk farther to school than the other, or to maintain high schools for one race without doing so for the other. Only a very few States have escaped altogether the question of the separation of the races in schools. Even where the State statutes have declared point-blank by statute that there shall be no distinction on account of race or color, the suits that have arisen in those States show that the school boards have tried to evade the law.
DIVISION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL FUND
It is commonly believed that the Negro has had and is now getting much more than his share of the public school fund. It is said that the Negro is getting nearly half the money, while he is paying only a very small percentage of the taxes. Thus, the following is the estimate of Mr. J. Y. Joyner, Superintendent of Public Instruction of North Carolina: “Upon the most liberal estimate, it seems that in 1908 the Negroes received for the maintenance of their public schools in North Carolina about twice as much as they paid directly or indirectly for this purpose. I think that this is about in accordance with the experience and observation of those familiar with the administration of the public schools in North Carolina. My own opinion is that the white people pay, directly or indirectly, for the education of the Negro more rather than less than one dollar for every dollar that the Negro pays, directly or indirectly for that purpose.” Mr. J. D. Eggleston, Jr., Superintendent of Public Instruction of Virginia, estimates that the public school fund for Negroes in that State is $500,000, of which the Negro pays $87,000, or less than one-fifth.[494]
There have been fitful efforts from time to time to divide the public school fund in proportion to the amount of taxes paid by each race. The most recent and thorough-going effort[495] to have the school fund so apportioned was made by Ex-Governor James K. Vardaman, of Mississippi. But his effort, like that of those before him, came to naught. The white taxpayers of the South have not shown any very evident desire to withdraw their financial aid from the colored public schools. But there has been enough legislation on different phases of the question of the apportionment of the school money to deserve attention.
In Alabama,[496] in 1896, all poll tax money paid by colored persons went to the support of colored schools, and all that paid by white persons, to the support of white schools. The present Code apparently does not require this separation of taxes; but in the provisions for special tax districts[497] for school purposes, the law provides that the amount paid by whites and blacks shall be kept separate, presumably meaning that the funds arising from special taxation shall be apportioned according to the amount paid by each race. Though Delaware usually makes an annual appropriation for colored schools, nevertheless in 1875,[498] and again in 1887,[499] it provided for a tax of thirty cents on the hundred dollars upon the property of colored persons for the maintenance of colored schools.
The legislation of Kentucky with regard to the raising and apportionment of its public school fund has been unique. In 1866,[500] all capitation taxes paid by Negroes and, in addition, a tax of two dollars _per capita_ upon Negroes went toward the support of their paupers and the education of their children. In 1869,[501] a vote was taken upon the propriety of levying a tax of fifteen cents on the hundred dollars upon the property of white persons for the support of white schools exclusively. In 1873,[502] a property tax of twenty cents on the hundred dollars and a poll tax of one dollar were levied upon Negroes of McCracken County for the maintenance of their schools. The same method of taxation was adopted for Bowling Green[503] and Catlettsburg[504] and Garrard County.[505] As to the last-mentioned place, there was a provision that in the county white and colored school-houses must be not less than a half mile apart, and in towns not less than eight hundred feet. In Bracken County[506] a special tax of twenty-five cents on the hundred dollars was levied upon the property of whites for their schools, not applying to Negroes at all. The constitutionality[507] of this law was upheld by the Supreme Court of Kentucky on the ground that whatever benefits the Negro is entitled to under the school system he receives as a citizen of Kentucky, not as a citizen of the United States.
In 1874, the same State[508] provided for a uniform system of schools for Negroes. The sources of the revenue for the schools were (1) a tax of twenty cents on the hundred dollars upon the property of Negroes, (2) their poll taxes, (3) their dog taxes, (4) taxes on deeds, suits and licenses collected from colored persons, (5) fines, penalties, and forfeitures collected from them, (6) sums received from Congress, provided the apportionment to each colored child did not exceed that to each white child, and (7) gifts, donations, and grants. Colored school-houses must not be erected within one mile of a white school-house in the country and six hundred feet in towns. In 1880, Owensboro[509] was authorized to levy a tax of thirty cents on the hundred dollars and two dollars on the poll upon Negroes for colored schools, provided the Negroes voted to tax themselves for this purpose. This law was held[510] unconstitutional by the Federal district court in 1883, the court saying: “If taxes can be distributed according to color or race classification, no good reason why a division might not be made according to the amount paid by each taxpayer, and thus limit the benefits and distribute the protection of the laws by a classification based upon the wealth of the taxpayer. Such distribution would entirely ignore the spirit of our republican institutions and would not be the equal protection of the laws as understood by the people of the State at the time of the adoption of this (the Fourteenth) amendment.” The laws of Kentucky of 1874 were held[511] unconstitutional in 1885. In 1886, Elkton[512] was authorized to levy a tax of two dollars on the poll and ninety-five cents on the hundred dollars upon Negroes if they voted thus to tax themselves. Apparently the last act of legislation[513] with regard to the school fund in Kentucky was in 1904, when provision was made for a system of graded schools in cities of the fourth class, but the property or polls of one race were not to be taxed for the support of the schools of the other. A recent Kentucky case has held[514] that, after the regular public school fund of the State has been apportioned among the districts in proportion to the number of children regardless of race, then it is not improper for a district to supplement that fund by a tax on the property of white persons for the further support of white schools and upon the property of Negroes for their schools. Thus, it appears that Kentucky is honeycombed with the special tax districts wherein each race supports its own schools. Whether this arrangement is constitutional or not is still in doubt, as no square decision on the point has yet been rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States.
For some years North Carolina has been exercising the principle of local, special taxation to supplement the general public school fund. In several instances, about 1886, the communities levied the tax only upon the whites for the benefit of white schools, but this was held[515] unconstitutional by the State Supreme Court, and the attempt to thus distinguish between the races does not appear to have been made since. The courts of Kentucky and North Carolina are in conflict, due to the differences in the constitutions of those States, on the question of special taxation by each race for its own schools. The local tax districts in North Carolina have recently been increasing at the rate of about two a day, but the tax is levied upon colored persons as well as white, and all the schools share the benefits.
The Constitution of Texas[516] of 1866 provided that all taxes collected from Negroes should go to maintain their public schools, and that it should be the duty of the legislature to encourage schools among these people. This provision, however, does not appear in the later Constitution of Texas.
Thus, one sees that, here and there, particularly in Kentucky, there are precedents for a division of the school fund in proportion to the taxes paid by each race, but there has not been any general movement in this direction. One is justified in concluding that, although the Southern States stand steadfastly for race separation in both public and private schools, they do not desire a division of the public school funds except in proportion to the number of children of school age. It is true that there have been some local legislative acts looking in that direction, and a few sporadic political movements to the same effect; nevertheless, the fact that the local legislation has not become general since the Negro has been practically eliminated from politics and that the political movements have met with such scanty popular support show that the people are satisfied with the present arrangement as to the division of the school fund.
NOTES
Footnote 335:
Laws of Ky., 1904, pp. 181–82.
Footnote 336:
_The Outlook_, vol. 85, pp. 921–23.
Footnote 337:
_The Nation_, vol. 79, pp. 389–90.
Footnote 338:
94 S. W. 623 (1906).
Footnote 339:
Berea College v. Com. of Ky., 1908, 211 U. S. 45.
Footnote 340:
Pol. Code, 1906, sec. 1662.
Footnote 341:
Laws of Calif., 1880, p. 38; 1885, p. 100; 1891, p. 160; 1893, p. 253;
1903, p. 86. See also Laws of Calif., 1869–70, p. 838; 1909, extra
sess., p. 904.
Footnote 342:
President Roosevelt’s Message to Congress, December 18, 1906, with
Secretary Metcalf’s Report.
Footnote 343:
_The Outlook_, vol. 86, pp. 246–52.
Footnote 344:
Art. VI, par. 2.
Footnote 345:
_Harper’s Weekly_, vol. 51, p. 295; _Current Literature_, vol. 42, p.
237.
Footnote 346:
Raleigh, N. C., _News and Observer_, Feb. 13, 1909.
Footnote 347:
Boston _Evening Transcript_, Feb. 18, 1910.
Footnote 348:
_Ibid._, Feb. 15, 1907, p. 8, col. 7.
Footnote 349:
Laws of O., 1828–29, p. 73.
Footnote 350:
Williams v. Directors of Sch. Dist. No. 6, 1834, Wright’s Rep. (O.)
578.
Footnote 351:
Laws of O., 1847–48, pp. 81–83.
Footnote 352:
_Ibid._, 1848–49, pp. 17–18. See Curwen’s Revised Stat., II, pp.
1465–66.
Footnote 353:
Stewart v. Southard, 1848, 17 O. 402.
Footnote 354:
State v. City of Cincinnati, 1860, 19 O. 178, at p. 196.
Footnote 355:
Laws of O., 1852, p. 441.
Footnote 356:
Van Camp v. Board of Education of Logan, 1859, 9 O. S. 406.
Footnote 357:
Lane v. Baker, 1843, 12 O. 238.
Footnote 358:
Revised Stat., 1843, p. 314.
Footnote 359:
Lewis v. Henley, 1850, 2 Ind. 332.
Footnote 360:
59 Mass. (5 Cushing) 198 (1849).
Footnote 361:
Revised Stat., 1852, p. 115.
Footnote 362:
Art. XIII, sec. 1.
Footnote 363:
Art. XIV, sec. 256.
Footnote 364:
Laws of Ala., 1868, p. 148.
Footnote 365:
_Ibid._, 1878, p. 136.
Footnote 366:
_Ibid._, 1884–85, p. 349. See Code, 1907, I, sec. 1757.
Footnote 367:
Acts of Ark., 1866–67, p. 100.
Footnote 368:
_Ibid._, 1873, p. 423. See Kirby’s Digest, 1904, secs. 7536 and 7613.
Footnote 369:
Art. XII, sec. 12.
Footnote 370:
Laws of Fla., 1895, pp. 96–97. See General Stat., 1906, sec. 3810.
Footnote 371:
Laws of Ga., 1866, p. 59.
Footnote 372:
Art. VIII, sec. 1.
Footnote 373:
Laws of Ga., 1872, p. 69. See Code, 1895, I, sec. 1378.
Footnote 374:
Laws of Ky., 1869–70, I, p. 127.
Footnote 375:
Art. VI, sec. 187.
Footnote 376:
Laws of Ky., 1904, pp. 181–82. See Statutes, 1909, secs. 5606–10.
Footnote 377:
Title VII, art. 135.
Footnote 378:
Title VII.
Footnote 379:
Title VIII.
Footnote 380:
Laws of La., 1871, pp. 208–10.
Footnote 381:
_Ibid._, 1875, pp. 50–52.
Footnote 382:
_Ibid._, 1880, pp. 110–11.
Footnote 383:
Art. 248.
Footnote 384:
Laws of Md., 1870, pp. 555–56.
Footnote 385:
_Ibid._, 1872, p. 650. See Laws of Md., 1874, p. 690.
Footnote 386:
Pub. Gen. Laws, II, art. 77, secs. 124–27.
Footnote 387:
Laws of Miss., 1878, p. 103.
Footnote 388:
Sec. 207.
Footnote 389:
Code, 1906, sec. 4562.
Footnote 390:
Art. IX, sec. 2.
Footnote 391:
Laws of Mo., 1864, p. 126.
Footnote 392:
_Ibid._, 1868, p. 170.
Footnote 393:
_Ibid._, 1869, p. 86.
Footnote 394:
Art. IX, sec. 2.
Footnote 395:
Laws of Mo., 1889, p. 226. See Statutes, 1906, secs. 9774–76.
Footnote 396:
Art. IX, sec. 2.
Footnote 397:
Pub. Laws of N. C., 1901, p. 64.
Footnote 398:
_Ibid._, 1903, p. 756.
Footnote 399:
Revisal of 1905, II, sec. 4086. See Pell’s Revisal of 1908, sec. 4086.
Footnote 400:
Statutes, 1890, secs. 6464–72.
Footnote 401:
Laws of Okla., 1901, pp. 205–10.
Footnote 402:
Art. XIII, sec. 3.
Footnote 403:
Laws of Okla., 1907–08, pp. 694–95. See Statutes, 1908, secs. 6551–56.
Footnote 404:
Art. X, sec. 10.
Footnote 405:
Booker T. Washington, “The Story of the Negro,” 1909, Doubleday, Page
& Co., II, p. 38.
Footnote 406:
Art. XI, sec. 7. See Laws of S. C., 1896, p. 171, and Code, 1902, I,
sec. 1231.
Footnote 407:
Laws of Tenn., 1865–66, p. 65.
Footnote 408:
Art. XI, sec. 12.
Footnote 409:
Laws of Tenn., 1873, p. 46.
Footnote 410:
_Ibid._, p. 9. See Shannon’s Code, 1896, sec. 1451, and Supplement,
1897–1903, p. 843.
Footnote 411:
Art. VII, sec. 7.
Footnote 412:
Laws of Texas, 1876, p. 209.
Footnote 413:
_Ibid._, 1884, p. 40.
Footnote 414:
_Ibid._, 1893, p. 198.
Footnote 415:
_Ibid._, 1895, p. 29. See Sayles’s Civil Statutes, II, art. 3907, and
Supplement, 1897–1906, pp. 421–22.
Footnote 416:
Laws of Va., 1881–82, p. 37.
Footnote 417:
_Ibid._, 1895–96, p. 352.
Footnote 418:
Sec. 140. See Pollard’s Code, 1904, sec. 1492.
Footnote 419:
Laws of Calif., 1869–70, pp. 838–39.
Footnote 420:
Ward v. Flood, 1874, 48 Calif., 36.
Footnote 421:
Deering’s Code and Statutes, I, secs. 1669–71.
Footnote 422:
Wysinger v. Crookshank, 1890, 23 P. 54.
Footnote 423:
Laws of Del., 1879–81, p. 385.
Footnote 424:
_Ibid._, 1887–89, pp. 650–51, 655, and 658.
Footnote 425:
_Ibid._, 1891–93, p. 693.
Footnote 426:
_Ibid._, 1898–99, p. 193. See Del. Laws of 1852, as amended 1893, pp.
341 and 348.
Footnote 427:
Statutes, 1896, III, p. 3730, sec. 292.
Footnote 428:
Chase v. Stephenson, 1874, 71 Ill. 383.
Footnote 429:
People v. Board of Education of Quincy, 1882, 101 Ill. 308.
Footnote 430:
People v. Board of Education of Upper Alton, 1889, 21 N. E. 187.
Footnote 431:
People v. Mayor, etc. of City of Alton, 1899, 54 N. E. 421.
Footnote 432:
Raleigh, N. C., _News and Observer_, Nov. 29, 1906.
Footnote 433:
233 Ill. 542 (1908).
Footnote 434:
Boston _Evening Transcript_, Nov. 28, 1908, pt. 2, p. 9, col. 5.
Footnote 435:
Laws of Ind., 1869, p. 41.
Footnote 436:
Cory v. Carter, 1874, 48 Ind. 327, at pp. 362–63.
Footnote 437:
Laws of Ind., 1877, p. 124.
Footnote 438:
State v. Grubbs, 1882, 85 Ind. 213.
Footnote 439:
State v. Mitchell, 1883, 93 Ind. 303.
Footnote 440:
Clark v. Board of Sch. Dirs., 1868, 24 Ia. 266.
Footnote 441:
Smith v. Dirs. of the Ind. Sch. of the Dist. of Keokuk, 1875, 40 Ia.
518; Dove v. Ind. Sch. Dist. of Keokuk, 1875, 41 Ia. 689.
Footnote 442:
General Stat., 1868, chap. 18, art. 5, sec. 75.
Footnote 443:
Laws of Kan., 1876, p. 238.
Footnote 444:
_Ibid._, 1879, p. 163.
Footnote 445:
Reynolds v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1903, 72 P. 274; Williams v.
Board of Education of Parsons, 1909, 99 P. 216.
Footnote 446:
Board of Education v. Tinnon, 1881, 26 Kan. 1; Knox v. Board of
Education of Independence, 1891, 25 P. 616; Rowles v. Board of
Education of Wichita, 1907, 91 P. 88.
Footnote 447:
Letter from the Superintendent of Schools of Kansas to the
Superintendent of Schools of North Carolina. Raleigh, N. C., _News and
Observer_, Aug. 24, 1906.
Footnote 448:
Laws of Nev., 1864–65, p. 426.
Footnote 449:
State v. Duffy, 1872, 7 Nev. 342.
Footnote 450:
Laws of N. J., 1881, p. 186.
Footnote 451:
Pierce v. Union Dist. Sch. Trustees, 1884, 46 N. J. L. (17 Vroom) 76.
Footnote 452:
Raleigh, N. C., _News and Observer_, Feb. 18, 1906.
Footnote 453:
Dallas v. Fosdick, 1869, 40 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 249.
Footnote 454:
People v. Easton, 1872, 13 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 159.
Footnote 455:
People v. Gallagher, 1883, 93 N. Y. 438.
Footnote 456:
People v. School Board of Borough of Queens, 1899, 61 N. Y. Sup. 330.
Footnote 457:
Laws of N. Y., 1864, p. 1281.
Footnote 458:
_Ibid._, 1894, II, p. 1288.
Footnote 459:
_Ibid._, 1900, II, p. 1173.
Footnote 460:
Laws of O., 1878, p. 513.
Footnote 461:
_Ibid._, 1887, p. 34.
Footnote 462:
State v. Board of Education of Oxford, 1887, 2 O. Cir. Ct. Rep. 557.
Footnote 463:
Laws of Pa., 1869, p. 160.
Footnote 464:
_Ibid._, 1872, pp. 1048–49.
Footnote 465:
Com. v. Williamson, 1873, 30 Legal Intelligencer, 406.
Footnote 466:
Laws of Pa., 1881, p. 76.
Footnote 467:
Kaine v. Sch. Dirs., 1882, 101 Pa. S. 490.
Footnote 468:
Laws of W. Va., 1865, p. 54.
Footnote 469:
_Ibid._, 1871, p. 206; 1872–73, p. 391; 1881, pp. 176–77; 1901, pp.
159–60.
Footnote 470:
Art. XII, sec. 8.
Footnote 471:
Martin v. Board of Education of Morgan Co., 1896, 42 W. Va. 514;
Williams v. Board of Education of Fairfax Dist., 1898, 45 W. Va. 199.
Footnote 472:
Revised Stat., 1887, sec. 3947.
Footnote 473:
Revised Stat., 1901, secs. 2179 and 2231.
Footnote 474:
Laws of Ariz., 1909, pp. 171–72.
Footnote 475:
Art. IX, sec. 8.
Footnote 476:
Art. IX, sec. 6.
Footnote 477:
Acts and Resolves of Mass., 1854–55, pp. 674–75.
Footnote 478:
Revised Laws, 1902, I, p. 478. See Acts and Resolves of Mass., 1894,
p. 609; 1898, p. 453.
Footnote 479:
Compiled Laws, 1897, II, sec. 4683, p. 1478.
Footnote 480:
Raleigh, N. C., _News and Observer_, Nov. 22, 1908.
Footnote 481:
Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 1909, 120 N. W. 589.
Footnote 482:
Revised Laws, 1905, sec. 1403.
Footnote 483:
Laws of N. M., 1901, p. 147.
Footnote 484:
U. S. Stat. L., 191, chap. 156, secs. 16–17.
Footnote 485:
26 U. S. Stat. L., 417–18, chap. 841, sec. 1.
Footnote 486:
Laws of Fla., 1895, pp. 96–97.
Footnote 487:
Laws of Tenn., 1901, p. 9.
Footnote 488:
Laws of Okla., 1907–08, pp. 694–95.
Footnote 489:
Lehew v. Brummell, 1891, 15 S. W. 765.
Footnote 490:
State v. Board of Education of Cincinnati, 1876, 1 Weekly Law. Bul.
190.
Footnote 491:
Reynolds v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1903, 72 P. 274, at p. 280.
Footnote 492:
Board of Education of Richmond Co. v. Cummings, 1898, 29 S. E. 488.
Footnote 493:
175 U. S. 528 (1899).
Footnote 494:
Raleigh, N. C., _News and Observer_, Sept. 25 and Oct. 10, 1909. See
also _The World’s Work_, July, 1909.
Footnote 495:
_The International Year-book_, 1907, p. 545.
Footnote 496:
Code, 1896, secs. 3607–08.
Footnote 497:
Code, 1907, I, sec. 1858.
Footnote 498:
Laws of Del., 1875, pp. 82–83.
Footnote 499:
_Ibid._, 1887–89, pp. 147–48.
Footnote 500:
Laws of Ky., 1867, pp. 94–95.
Footnote 501:
_Ibid._, 1869, p. 7.
Footnote 502:
_Ibid._, 1873, p. 509.
Footnote 503:
_Ibid._, p. 238.
Footnote 504:
_Ibid._, pp. 193–94.
Footnote 505:
_Ibid._, pp. 554–55.
Footnote 506:
_Ibid._, adj. sess., pp. 471–72.
Footnote 507:
Marshall v. Donovan, 1874, 10 Bush (Ky.) 681.
Footnote 508:
Laws of Ky., 1873–74, pp. 63–66.
Footnote 509:
_Ibid._, local, 1879–80, I, pp. 257–59.
Footnote 510:
Claybrook v. Owensboro, 1883, 16 Fed. 297, at p. 302.
Footnote 511:
Dawson v. Lee, 1885, 83 Ky. 49.
Footnote 512:
Laws of Ky., 1885–86, I, pp. 877–91.
Footnote 513:
_Ibid._, 1904, pp. 129–31.
Footnote 514:
Crosby v. City of Mayfield, 1909, 117 S. W. 316.
Footnote 515:
Pruitt v. Gaston Co. Commissioners, 1886, 94 N. C. 709; Riggles v.
City of Durham, 1886, 94 N. C. 800.
Footnote 516:
Art. X, sec. 7.
Comments
Log in to leave a comment.
Race Distinctions in American LawChapter VIII: Separation of Races in Schools (2)
0%23 min left in chapter