Chapter VI: The Loss of Normandy (2)

Having gained possession of Bayeux and Caen, the king marched upon the strong castle of Falaise. But at this moment he temporarily lost the powerful support of the count of Maine. “At the request of the Normans,” it is not said of what Normans, Helias of La Flèche withdrew from the contest; and Henry found his forces so weakened that he was obliged to abandon the attack upon Falaise until the following year. Some desultory fighting occurred, however, in which one of the king’s knights, Roger of Gloucester, was mortally wounded by a shaft from a crossbow.[117] Almost simultaneously, apparently, with the operations about Falaise, Robert and Henry attempted to make peace. In the week of Pentecost (21-28 May), they met in conference at the village of Cintheaux near Falaise and endeavored for two days to arrive at an agreement. But the king was prepared to offer no terms which the duke could accept, and the negotiations were broken off.[118]

There was, indeed, no good reason why Henry should have made peace, except to gain time while he reëquipped himself for the completion of the enterprise upon which he had embarked. The sources speak specifically only of the conquest of Bayeux and of Caen during the campaign of 1105. Yet it is certain that the extension of the king’s domination through the influence of English gold and through the voluntary surrender of numerous minor strongholds had gone much further than this.[119] Eadmer, writing of the situation as he himself saw it in Normandy in July 1105, was able to say that almost all Normandy had been subjected to the king. The power of the duke had been reduced to such a point that hardly any one obeyed him or rendered him the respect due to a prince. Almost all the barons spurned his authority and betrayed the fealty which they owed him, while they ran after the king’s gold and silver and surrendered towns and castles on every side.[120] Yet with all his success, Henry was unable to complete the conquest of Normandy in a single campaign. Even hogsheads may be drained, and the method of waging war with gold and silver, as well as with the sword, had been costly. Before completing his task, he found it necessary to return to England and replenish his supplies.[121]

But before returning to England, Henry had a diplomatic problem of great importance to solve. Since 1103 Anselm had been living in exile, and the investiture controversy had been in abeyance. But the archbishop had at last grown restive and had decided to resort to the extreme measure of excommunicating the king. Rumor of the impending sentence spread throughout France, England, and Normandy, and caused not a little uneasiness.[122] In the midst of his struggle for Normandy with Robert Curthose, Henry could not but view this new danger with grave concern; and he never showed to better advantage than in the broad and statesmanlike way in which he met the crisis. Through the mediation of Ivo of Chartres and of the king’s sister, Countess Adela of Blois, a conference was arranged between him and the archbishop, to be held on 22 July at Laigle on the Norman frontier. There he received Anselm with the utmost courtesy, and, since he was in no position to drive matters to a rupture, he showed himself sincerely desirous of arriving at an amicable adjustment. Anselm, too, was disposed to compromise; and they were soon able to agree upon the broad lines of a final settlement of the long controversy. Messengers were despatched to Rome by both the king and the archbishop to secure the ratification of the Holy See.[123] The details of a formal concordat had yet to be arranged; but friendly relations were now completely restored between Henry and Anselm, and the ecclesiastical crisis was averted. In August[124] the king returned to England, “and what he had won in Normandy continued afterwards in peace and obedient to him, except those who dwelt anywhere near Count William of Mortain.”[125]

In point of fact, William of Mortain and Robert of Bellême appear to have been almost the only really powerful barons in Normandy who still supported the duke, and the loyalty even of the Bellême interests could probably have been shaken had the king so desired. Before Christmas Robert of Bellême paid a visit to England and sought an interview with the king. It would be hazardous to infer that he, too, was contemplating a desertion of the ducal cause; but whatever his mission, he failed to accomplish it, and, departing from the king’s Christmas court ‘unreconciled,’ he returned to Normandy.[126]

It was not long before the king had a more important visitor from beyond the sea. Early in 1106 Robert Curthose himself crossed the Channel, and, in an interview with the king at Northampton, besought him to restore the conquests which he had won from him in Normandy.[127] The duke must have felt his situation almost desperate, yet it is difficult to imagine what inducements he expected to offer, or how, in the light of his past experience, he could have dreamed of gaining a concession or any consideration from his unscrupulous brother. Henry could well afford to be obdurate, and he returned a flat refusal to the duke’s demands. Robert withdrew in anger, and returned to his duchy;[128] and Henry wrote immediately to Anselm, who was still in Normandy, announcing his own crossing for 3 May following. It is not quite easy to see why he should have stated in his letter that Robert had parted with him amicably,[129] but the ways of diplomacy are often obscure.

Robert Curthose now knew beyond all question what he had to expect, and, as formerly in the crisis of his struggle with William Rufus, he sought aid from without. If the unsupported statement of William of Malmesbury may be accepted, he appealed to his overlord, the king of France, and to Robert of Flanders in a conference at Rouen;[130] but the far-seeing diplomacy of Henry I had anticipated him,[131] and he was able to obtain no assistance.

Meanwhile, Henry had completed his preparations for a second invasion of Normandy, and “before August”[132] he crossed the Channel. He landed without opposition, but soon afterwards, apparently, an attempt was made to take him in an ambush. Abbot Robert of Saint-Pierre-sur-Dives, the notorious simoniac, entered into a secret compact with the duke and some of his barons at Falaise to betray the king into their hands. Then, while Reginald of Warenne and the younger Robert d’Estouteville, with a considerable body of knights, installed themselves in the fortress which the abbot had constructed within the precincts of his monastery, he paid a visit to the king at Caen and treacherously agreed to surrender the fortress to him, at the same time advising him to come quietly with but a few knights to take it, in order to avoid giving the alarm. But Henry did not ride blindly into the trap that was set for him. Placing himself at the head of a force of seven hundred horse, he came suddenly upon the monastery at daybreak after an all night’s ride; and, as soon as he had apprised himself of the true situation, he launched an instant attack, burned both the monastery and the fortress, and took Reginald of Warenne, Robert d’Estouteville, and many of their men captive. Reënforcements on their way from Falaise saw the conflagration and turned back in flight. The attempted ambush had been turned into a notable royal victory. The treacherous Abbot Robert was also taken. Thrown across a horse ‘like a sack,’ he was brought before the king, who expelled him from the land with the declaration that, if it were not for his sacred orders, he would have him torn limb from limb.[133]

As we have noted, the duke’s power was in the main confined to scattered strongholds such as Falaise and Rouen.[134] Through the open country Henry was able to move about practically at will. He went to Bec and had a cordial interview with Anselm (15 August). Much progress had been made towards the settlement of the investiture controversy since their meeting at Laigle the year before, and they were now completely reconciled. Anselm returned to England disposed to give the king his full support.[135] Every moral obstacle now seemed removed from Henry’s path.[136]

Meanwhile, or soon after,[137] the king began operations against the castle of Tinchebray. Adopting the well known expedient of the siegecraft of the period, he erected a counter fortress against the place, and installed in it Thomas de Saint-Jean with a garrison of knights and foot soldiers. Thereupon William of Mortain, lord of Tinchebray, collected forces which were more than a match for Thomas de Saint-Jean and his men, and threw food and necessary supplies into the stronghold.[138] But by this time the king had been powerfully reënforced with auxiliary troops from Maine and Brittany, under the command of Helias of La Flèche and of Alan Fergant,[139] and he began the siege of Tinchebray in earnest.[140]

Robert Curthose, now reduced to desperate straits, and urged on by the importunity of William of Mortain,[141] decided to stake all on the issue of a battle in the open.[142] Collecting all his forces, he marched upon Tinchebray and challenged the king to raise the siege or prepare for battle.[143] Again, as at Alton in 1101, the two brothers stood facing one another, about to engage in a fratricidal struggle. But again there were negotiations. Certain men of religion, the venerable hermit Vitalis among them, intervened to prevent the conflict.[144] The king, as always, was careful to justify himself before the public eye; and, if we can trust our authority, he offered terms of peace. Protesting loudly that he was actuated by no worldly ambition, but only by a desire to succor the poor and to protect the suffering church, he proposed that the duke surrender to him all the castles in Normandy and the whole financial and judicial administration of the duchy, reserving for himself one half of the revenues. Henry, on his side, would undertake to pay the duke, out of the English treasury, an annual subsidy equal to the other half of the Norman revenues; and, for the future, Robert might revel in feasts and games and all delights, in perfect security and in freedom from all care. Such terms, if indeed they were ever really proposed, were in themselves an insult. And, moreover, the duke had already had bitter experience of Henry’s devotion to treaties. The monk of Saint-Évroul, therefore, becomes quite incredible when he would have us believe that Robert laid these proposals seriously before his council, and insinuates that he was inclined to accede to them. In any case, the duke’s supporters rejected them with violent language, and negotiations were broken off.[145] Both sides now prepared for battle.

The sources are by no means clear, or in perfect accord, as to the exact disposition of the forces in the battle of Tinchebray; but the general plan of the engagement is clear,[146] as is also the very considerable numerical superiority which the king enjoyed.[147] The forces on either side were composed of both mounted knights and foot soldiers;[148] and, so far as it is possible to say from the evidence, they were arranged in columns of successive divisions, called _acies_, drawn up one behind another.[149] William of Mortain commanded the vanguard of the ducal forces, and Robert of Bellême the rear.[150] It is not clear what position the duke held in the battle formation.[151] Our information as to the disposition of the royal forces is fuller, but confusing. The first division, or _acies_, was composed in the main of foot soldiers from the Bessin, the Avranchin, and the Cotentin—probably under the command of Ranulf of Bayeux[152]—but they were supported by a considerable body of mounted knights. The second division, under the immediate command of King Henry, was likewise made up of both mounted knights and men fighting on foot, the latter in this case being the king in person and a considerable number of his barons who had dismounted in order to give greater stability to the line.[153] A further division of some sort may have been placed in reserve in the rear.[154] Most important of all, the auxiliary knights from Maine and Brittany, under the command of Helias of La Flèche and Alan Fergant, were stationed on the field at some distance to one side[155] in readiness for a strategic stroke at the proper moment.

The action was opened by William of Mortain, who charged at the head of Robert’s vanguard;[156] and for a time the ducal forces gained a considerable advantage and pushed the royal van back at several points. But they were unable to gain a decision; and while the opposing forces were locked together in a great mêlée of hand-to-hand encounters, the Bretons and the Manceaux charged impetuously from their distant position, and, falling upon the flank of the ducal forces, cut them in two and wrought great havoc among the foot soldiers.[157] Robert of Bellême, seeing which way the battle was going, saved himself by flight; and the forces of the duke thereupon dissolved in a general rout.[158]

Robert Curthose was captured by Waldric, the king’s chancellor, who, though a cleric, had taken his place among the knights in the battle.[159] The Bretons captured William of Mortain and were with some difficulty persuaded to surrender their prize to the king. Robert d’Estouteville, William de Ferrières, William Crispin, Edgar Atheling, and many others were also taken prisoners.[160] Henry pardoned some, including the Atheling, and set them at liberty, but others he kept in confinement for the rest of their lives.[161] A considerable number of the duke’s foot soldiers had been slain, and many more had been captured.[162] But the casualties among the king’s forces had been negligible. “Hardly two” of his men had been killed, while “only one,” Robert de Bonebos, had been wounded.[163] The battle had been joined at about nine o’clock in the morning, probably on the 29th of September[164] 1106. It had lasted “barely an hour,”[165] yet it deserves to rank among the decisive battles of the twelfth century, for it had settled the fate of Normandy and of Robert Curthose.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Ordericus, iv, p. 116.

[2] “Nec simul, sed separatim variisque temporibus, de multimodis violatae fidei reatibus implacitavit.” Ordericus, iv, p. 161.

[3] _Ibid._, pp. 167-168. He died on the way. For Ivo’s flight from Antioch during the First Crusade, see _supra_, p. 107, n. 88.

[4] Ordericus, iv, pp. 161, 167.

[5] “Diligenter enim eum fecerat per unum annum explorari, et vituperabiles actus per privatos exploratores caute investigari, summopereque litteris annotari.” _Ibid._, pp. 169-170; cf. Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 50.

[6] Probably the Easter court at Winchester. _A.-S. C._, _a._ 1102.

[7] Ordericus, iv, p. 170; cf. Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 50.

[8] _A.-S. C._, _a._ 1102; Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 51.

[9] Ordericus, iv, pp. 161, 169-177; cf. _A.-S. C._, _a._ 1102; Florence of Worcester, ii, pp. 49-50; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 234; William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, pp. 472-473; Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, pp. 445-446. For a much fuller account of the expulsion of Robert of Bellême, and for its significance in English history, see Freeman, _William Rufus_, ii, pp. 415-450.

[10] Ordericus, iv, pp. 177-178; Florence of Worcester, ii, pp. 50-51; William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, p. 473.

[11] Ordericus, iv, p. 178.

[12] _Ibid._, p. 98.

[13] Cf. William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, p. 473; Ordericus, iv, p. 177.

[14] Ordericus, iv, pp. 171-172.

[15] _Ibid._, p. 172.

[16] Ordericus, iv, pp. 176, 177.

[17] _Ibid._, pp. 178-179.

[18] _Ibid._, p. 179.

[19] Ordericus Vitalis gives the date of these events as “mense Iunio,” probably 1103. The nuns of Almenèches were dispersed, Abbess Emma with three of her associates taking refuge at Saint-Évroul. It is not improbable that Ordericus got much of his information from her. _Ibid._, pp. 179-180; cf. pp. 182-183.

[20] Ordericus, iv, p. 180. Exmes was in the keeping of Mauger Malherbe, who had been placed there by Roger de Lacy, the duke’s _magister militum_.

[21] _Ibid._, pp. 180-181.

[22] _Ibid._, pp. 181-182.

[23] Ordericus, iv, p. 192; cf. pp. 162-163, 200. The terms of the treaty are not recorded, except that apparently the duke conceded to Robert of Bellême “the castle of Argentan, the bishopric of Séez, and the forest of Gouffern.” Inasmuch as the duke had originally made this grant before the expedition against England in 1101 (_supra_, p. 127 and n. 30), it seems evident that at some time during the struggle with Bellême he had revoked it, and that now, upon making peace, he was obliged to restore it or confirm it. Ordericus charges repeatedly that in making this peace without consulting Henry I, the duke acted in direct violation of the treaty of Alton. Ordericus, iv, pp. 162, 192, 200.

[24] _Ibid._, p. 192.

[25] He died on 12 January, probably in 1103. _Ibid._, ii, p. 407; iv, pp. 183, 185. Robert of Torigny gives the date of his death as 9 January 1099. _Chronique de Robert de Torigni_, ed. Léopold Delisle (Rouen, 1872-73), ii, p. 154. But this is clearly an error, since he was present at the dedication of the church of Saint-Évroul in October 1099, and since he was at Winchester in August 1100, when Henry I seized the royal treasure after the death of William Rufus.

[26] Ordericus, iv, p. 185; _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 290.

[27] _Supra_, pp. 76, 78.

[28] _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 290; Ordericus, iv, p. 186.

[29] Ordericus, iv, pp. 186-187.

[30] _Ibid._, p. 187; _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, pp. 290, 308.

[31] Ordericus, iv, p. 190.

[32] Ordericus, iv, p. 191.

[33] _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 285; Ordericus, iv, p. 78; William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, p. 461; Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 438.

[34] _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 285.

[35] _Ibid._; Ordericus, iv, p. 78; Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 438.

[36] Ordericus Vitalis (iv, p. 184) says she died ‘in Lent,’ probably in 1102. Cf. William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, p. 461; _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 285.

[37] Ordericus, iv, pp. 184-185. Her tomb in the nave of the great church was covered with a slab of white marble bearing her epitaph, which has been preserved in Ordericus Vitalis.

[38] _G. R._, ii, p. 461.

[39] Ordericus, iv, pp. 184, 473.

[40] “Vixit autem in Normannia parvo tempore, invidia et factione quorumdam nobilium feminarum decepta.” _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 285.

[41] Ordericus, iv, pp. 161-162; Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 448.

[42] _Ibid._, pp. 448-449; Ordericus, iv, p. 162; _A.-S.C._, _a._ 1103; Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 52; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 234.

[43] Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 449.

[44] The foregoing details have been drawn from Ordericus (iv, pp. 162-163) and from Wace (_Roman de Rou_, ii, pp. 449-454), the only writers who report this episode with any fulness. They are not in complete accord, yet on the whole they confirm and support one another to a remarkable degree. Ordericus endeavors to justify the king at every point. Wace, on the other hand, sees the king’s action in its true light, but he adds many details which are probably imaginative. Ordericus makes no mention of the part played by the queen; but Wace makes this a leading feature of the episode. Can this be mere embroidery on the brief statement of William of Malmesbury: “Porro ille, quasi cum fortuna certaret utrum plus illa daret an ipse dispergeret, sola voluntate reginae tacite postulantis comperta, tantam massam argenti benignus in perpetuum ignovit; acclines foeminei fastus preces pro magno exosculatus; erat enim eius in baptismo filiola”? _G. R._, ii, p. 462.

[45] _Ibid._, p. 474. The same notion finds expression in Wace, not as a fact, but as a current opinion. _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 448.

[46] Even Ordericus Vitalis cannot conceal it.

[47] _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 451.

[48] Ordericus, iv, p. 163.

[49] Haskins, pp. 286-287, no. 3.

[50] Cf. _supra_, p. 127, and n. 30.

[51] _Supra_, p. 144.

[52] Ordericus, iv, p. 192.

[53] _Infra_, pp. 161-164.

[54] Ordericus, iv, p. 215; _Gallia Christiana_, xi, instr., col. 155.

[55] Ordericus, iv, p. 116. Bishop Fulcher died 29 January 1102.

[56] _Ibid._, pp. 116-117; Ivo of Chartres, _Epistolae_, no. 157, and cf. no. 149, in _H. F._, xv, pp. 134, 131.

[57] _Ibid._, no. 157.

[58] Ordericus, iv, p. 117.

[59] Ivo of Chartres, _Epistolae_, no. 157, in _H. F._, xv. p. 134.

[60] _Ibid._

[61] Ivo of Chartres, _Epistolae_, no. 157, in _H. F._, xv, p. 134.

[62] _Ibid._, no. 153.

[63] _Ibid._, no. 157.

[64] _Ibid._; Ordericus, iv, p. 117.

[65] Ivo of Chartres, _Epistolae_, no. 153, in _H. F._, xv, p. 133.

[66] _Ibid._, no. 157; Ordericus, iv, p. 117.

[67] Ivo of Chartres, _Epistolae_, no. 154, in _H. F._, xv, pp. 133-134.

[68] It does not appear that the duke was seriously involved in the ecclesiastical controversy over Thorold, the appointee of William Rufus to the see of Bayeux after the death of Bishop Odo. On 8 October, apparently 1104, Pascal II wrote to the clergy and people of Bayeux announcing the condemnation of Thorold because, among other things, he had failed to keep his promise to King Henry not to receive investiture from Duke Robert: “Pro his igitur omnibus pro fide etiam non accipiendi a Normannorum comite honoris aecclesiastici ante conspectum Anglici regis data depositionis in eum erat promenda sententia.” “Lettre inédite de Pascal II,” ed. Germain Morin, in _Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique_, v (1904), pp. 284-285. But the execution of the sentence was delayed for a long period, and the Pope satisfied himself that Thorold had not received investiture from the duke. _Epistolae Paschalis_, in Migne, clxiii, col. 188. Thorold was deposed, however, upon other grounds, apparently in 1107. Ordericus, iv, p. 18; Morin, in _Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique_, v, pp. 286-288. For an exhaustive discussion of all that is known and for many conjectures about Thorold, see Wilhelm Tavernier, “Beiträge zur Rolandsforschung,” in _Zeitschrift für französiche Sprache und Litteratur_, xxxvii, pp. 103-124; xxxviii, pp. 117-135; xxxix, pp. 133-151. Tavernier believes that Thorold was the author of the _Chanson de Roland_.

[69] _Epistolae Paschalis_, in Migne, clxiii, col. 81.

[70] “Nosti quia eidem comiti debemus auxilium pro laboribus quos in Asianae Ecclesiae liberatione laboravit. Idcirco volumus ut, si necdum inter eos pax composita est, te satagente, nostris nuntiis intervenientibus, componatur.”

[71] _Infra_, pp. 168-169.

[72] A letter discovered by Wilhelm Levison in the British Museum (Harleian MSS., 633) and published in _Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde_, xxxv (1909), p. 427. Reprinted by Léopold Delisle, in _Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes_, lxxi, p. 466.

[73] _Supra_, p. 122.

[74] _Infra_, p. 180.

[75] Thomas Rymer, _Foedera_, ed. Record Commission (London, 1816-69), i, p. 7, _ex originali_, but incomplete and fragmentary; _Liber Niger Scaccarii_, ed. Thomas Hearne, 2d ed. (London, 1771), i, pp. 7-15. The original, though very badly damaged, is still extant in the Public Record Office. The document itself is dated 10 March at Dover; and a reference in Eadmer (p. 146) seems to fix it in the year 1103. Cf. J. M. Lappenberg, _Geschichte von England_ (Hamburg, 1834-37), ii, pp. 240-241; Freeman, _Norman Conquest_, v, pp. 850-851; Henri Pirenne, _Histoire de Belgique_, 3d ed. (Brussels, 1909), i, p. 102. The treaty of 1103 is but one of a series of similar agreements beginning with the original grant of a money fief by the Conqueror to Count Baldwin V (William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, p. 478) and extending to the reign of Henry II (_Foedera_, i, pp. 6, 7, 22; _Liber Niger_, i, pp. 7-34). All these agreements, and especially the one of 1103, are being studied by Dr. Robert H. George in a work on the relations of England and Flanders. Harvard doctoral dissertation, 1916.

[76] _Infra_, pp. 164, 165, 167, 172, 174-175.

[77] _Supra_, pp. 145-146.

[78] Ordericus, iv, pp. 187, 418; v, p. 4; _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 307.

[79] _Supra_, pp. 145-146.

[80] _Supra_, p. 140.

[81] Ordericus, ii, p. 404, n. 6.

[82] _Ibid._, iv, p. 198; _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 327.

[83] Ordericus, iv, pp. 198-199.

[84] Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, pp. 455-459; cf. p. 444.

[85] William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, pp. 473-474; _A.-S. C._, _a._ 1104; Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 53; Henry of Huntingdon, pp. 234-235; _Chronicon_, in _Liber de Hyda_, p. 307; cf. Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 445.

[86] _A.-S. C._, _a._ 1104; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 234.

[87] Ordericus, iv, p. 199. No other writer mentions the journey of Henry I to Normandy in 1104; and it is not clear that Ordericus is wholly trustworthy at this point, though his testimony is too specific to be rejected. He treats the campaigns of 1105 and 1106 together in a most confusing manner.

[88] Ordericus, iv, pp. 199-201.

[89] _Ibid._, pp. 201-202.

[90] Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 470. He tells the story with much picturesque detail. He is in the main confirmed by Ordericus, iv, pp. 203-204.

[91] Ordericus, iv, p. 214.

[92] _Ibid._, p. 206.

[93] _Ibid._, pp. 203, 206, 219, 401; Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 469.

[94] Ordericus, iv, pp. 219, 401.

[95] _Ibid._, pp. 203, 222-223.

[96] _Ibid._, p. 206.

[97] Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, pp. 461-463.

[98] Ordericus, iv, p. 204; _A.-S. C._, _a._ 1105; cf. Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235; Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 53.

[99] Ordericus, iv, p. 204.

[100] Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, pp. 460-461.

[101] Normandy now becomes the _solum natale_ of King Henry!

[102] Ordericus, iv, pp. 204-210.

[103] “Omnes igitur ferme Normannorum maiores illico ad regis adventum, spreto comite domino suo, et fidem quam ei debebant postponentes, in aurum et argentum regis cucurrerunt, eique civitates castra et urbes tradiderunt.” Eadmer, p. 165; cf. Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 54.

[104] Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 460.

[105] Ordericus, iv, p. 210.

[106] _Ibid._; Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 461.

[107] Ordericus, iv, pp. 214-215. A charter in favor of St. Mary of Bec, attested by Hugh d’Envermeu “in obsidione ante Archas,” not improbably belongs to this year, and indicates that military operations were undertaken against Arques. Round, _C. D. F._, no. 393.

[108] _Supra_, p. 159.

[109] Ordericus, iv, p. 219; _Annales de Saint-Aubin_, in _Recueil d’annales angevines et vendômoises_, ed. Halphen, p. 44; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235; _Versus Serlonis de Capta Baiocensium Civilate_, in _H. F._, xix, pp. xci, xciii. On this poem and its author see the exhaustive study by Heinrich Böhmer, “Der sogenannte Serlo von Bayeux und die ihm zugeschriebenen Gedichte,” in _Neues Archiv_, xxii, pp. 701-738.

[110] Ordericus, iv, p. 219.

[111] _Versus Serlonis_, in _H. F._, xix, p. xciv.

[112] Ordericus, iv, p. 219; Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 54; _Annales de Saint-Aubin_, in Halphen, _Annales_, p. 44; Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 471.

[113] _Versus Serlonis_, in _H. F._, xix, pp. xci ff.; Ordericus, iv, p. 219; Wace. _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 471; cf. Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 54. Wace’s account of the siege of Bayeux is elaborate, and credits the city with a long and stubborn resistance. But in the absence of all evidence to this effect in the other sources, and in the face of the positive testimony of the poet Serlo, an eyewitness, that the defence was weak and cowardly on the part of both garrison and inhabitants, Wace’s view cannot be accepted.

[114] Ordericus, iv, pp. 219-220; Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, pp. 473-479; cf. Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235; William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, pp. 462-463. Wace gives an elaborate account of the conspiracy, which is perhaps worth summarizing. Thierry, son of Ralph Fitz Ogier, and several other citizens of Caen had been ambushed and captured by Robert of Saint-Rémy-des-Landes at Cagny in the Hiémois while travelling home from Argences; Robert of Saint-Rémy had taken his prisoners to Torigny and sold them for a great price to Robert Fitz Hamon; who, in turn, surrendered them to the king, in exchange for the grant of Caen as a fief to be held by himself and his heirs forever. The king was delighted over the acquisition of these prisoners, “riches homes de Caan nez,” for he saw in them the possibility of gaining Caen without striking a blow. A convention was quickly agreed upon. Henry promised to free the prisoners and to enrich them with lands and goods; and they undertook to deliver Caen into his hands. And to seal the bargain, they gave hostages, “filz e nevoz de lor lignages.” Great precautions were taken to deceive “la gent menue”;

Kar se la povre gent seust
Que l’ovre aler issi deust,
La li reis Caan nen eust,
Que grant barate n’i eust,

though many prominent burgesses were involved in the conspiracy, and treason was spreading far and wide throughout the city before the duke got wind of it. Then, with the king’s men from the Bessin close at hand, and desertion general among the citizens, Robert had no choice but to flee by the Porte Milet to the Hiémois, leaving his baggage behind to be ransacked at the gate.

[115] Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 478; William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, p. 463.

[116] Ordericus, iv, pp. 219-220; cf. Wace, _Roman de Rou_, ii, p. 476.

[117] Ordericus, iv, p. 220; William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, p. 475. The fact that the attack upon Falaise belongs to the campaign of 1105 is definitely established by a charter of donation by Roger to St. Peter’s, Gloucester: “Anno Domini millesimo centesimo quinto, Rogerus de Gloucestria miles, a pud Waleyson graviter vulneratus…” _Hist. et Cart. S. Petri Gloucestriae_, i, p. 69.

[118] Ordericus, iv, pp. 220-221.

[119] _A.-S. C._, _a._ 1105: “and almost all the castles and chief men there in the land became subject to him”; cf. Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235.

[120] Eadmer, p. 165.

[121] “Rex enim ipse a Normannia digressus, quia earn totam eo quo supra diximus modo sibi subiugare nequierat, reversus in Angliam est, ut, copiosiori pecunia fretus rediens, quod residuum erat, exhaeredato fratre suo, subiiceret.” _Ibid._, p. 171; cf. Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 54.

[122] Eadmer, p. 166.

[123] Eadmer, pp. 165-166; cf. G. B. Adams, _History of England from the Norman Conquest to the Death of John_ (London, 1905), pp. 141-142.

[124] Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235; _A.-S. C._, _a._ 1105.

[125] _Ibid._, _a._ 1105.

[126] _Ibid._, _a._ 1106.

[127] _Ibid._, _a._ 1106; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235; Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 54. The place of the interview is further established by Henry’s letter to Anselm which ends: “Teste W. Cancell. apud Northamptonem.” _Epistolae Anselmi_, bk. iv, no. 77, in Migne, clix, col. 240.

[128] References as in n. 127, _supra_.

[129] _Epistolae Anselmi_, bk. iv, no. 77, in Migne, clix, col. 240.

[130] _G. R._, ii, p. 463.

[131] Cf. _supra_, pp. 155-156.

[132] _A.-S. C._, _a._ 1106; Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 54; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235. Though Henry’s original intention had been to cross at Ascension (3 May) (_Epistolae Anselmi_, bk. iv, no. 77, in Migne, clix, col. 240), it is clear from the _Chronicle_ that he was still in England at Pentecost (13 May). The phrase ‘before August’ used by the sources would seem to point to a crossing in the latter part of July.

[133] Ordericus, iv, pp. 215, 223-224; _Annales de Wintonia_, in _Annales Monastici_, ii, p. 42. The chronology of Ordericus is confused. Abbot Fulk, predecessor of the simoniac Robert, is said to have died at Winchester 3 April 1105. _Gallia Christiana_, xi, instr., col. 155; Ordericus, iv, p. 19, and n. 2; p. 215, and n. 2. Henry’s destruction of the abbey must, therefore, be referred to 1106, since it would have been impossible for Abbot Robert to have gained possession of the monastery and to have erected a fortress in it while Henry was still in Normandy in the previous summer, the king having returned to England in August. This conclusion is confirmed by the Annals of Winchester: “MCVI. Hoc anno rex in Normanniam duxit exercitum, et veniens ad Sanctum Petrum super Divam, abbatiam redegit in pulverem, et centum homines et eo amplius interfecit.”

[134] Cf. _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 283: “Rex autem Henricus, non diutius hoc ferens, maximeque indigne ferens, quod frater suus ita paternam hereditatem, ducatum scilicet Normanniae, dissipaverat, quod, preter civitatem Rothomagensem, nichil pene in dominio haberet; quam etiam forsitan alicui ut cetera dedisset, si hoc sibi licitum propter cives ipsius fuisset.” This is doubtless an exaggerated statement, but it is not without significance.

[135] Eadmer, pp. 182-183; Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 55.

[136] The Pope was clearly no longer supporting the crusader against the king. William of Malmesbury goes so far as to say that Pascal wrote to Henry urging him on to the fratricidal conflict. _G. R._, ii, p. 474.

[137] The operations before Tinchebray, such as they are described, must have extended over a considerable period before the decisive battle, which was fought on or about 29 September.

[138] Ordericus, iv, pp. 224-225.

[139] _Ibid._, pp. 229-230; letter of a priest of Fécamp to a priest of Séez, in _E. H. R._, xxv, p. 296; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235; Dom Morice, _Preuves_, i, col. 129; cf. William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, p. 478. Henry of Huntingdon mentions the presence also of Angevins, but this is probably an error.

[140] Ordericus, iv, p. 225; _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 283; _A.-S. C._, _a._ 1106; Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 55; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235.

[141] Ordericus, iv, p. 225.

[142] William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, p. 463: “ad bellum publicum venit, ultimam fortunam experturus.”

[143] Ordericus, iv, p. 225; cf. letter of Henry I to Anselm, in Eadmer, p. 184; _A.-S. C._, _a._ 1106; Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 55; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235; William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, p. 475; _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 283.

[144] Ordericus, iv, pp. 226-227.

[145] Ordericus, iv, pp. 227-228. Henry did not fail to propitiate the Almighty. He released Reginald of Warenne from prison—to the great satisfaction of William of Warenne, his brother, who now became a more enthusiastic royal supporter than ever—and made a vow to rebuild the church which he had burned at Saint-Pierre-sur-Dives. _Ibid._, p. 229. The Hyde _Chronicle_ is doubtless in error in stating that Reginald of Warenne was captured at Tinchebray and later released at the request of his brother. _Liber de Hyda_, p. 307.

[146] See Appendix F.

[147] It is hardly worth while to discuss the numbers engaged in the battle, since mediaeval figures are not to be relied upon. Cf. _E. H. R._, xviii, pp. 625-629. The estimate of the priest of Fécamp (_E. H. R._, xxv, p. 296), placing the king’s forces at 40,000 and the duke’s at 6000, of which 700 were knights, is doubtless an exaggeration. It is good evidence, however, of the king’s numerical superiority, which is also indicated by Henry of Huntingdon (p. 235). Ordericus Vitalis grants that the duke was inferior to the king in knights, but asserts that he had more foot soldiers.

[148] _E. H. R._, xxv, p. 296; Eadmer, p. 184; Ordericus, iv, pp. 226, 230; cf. _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 283; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235.

[149] See Appendix F.

[150] Ordericus, iv, p. 230.

[151] The statement of J. D. Drummond that he held the foot soldiers in reserve in the distant rear behind the forces of Robert of Bellême (_Kriegsgeschichte Englands_, p. 40), is based upon pure conjecture. C. W. C. Oman (_Art of War_, p. 379), adopting the view of a line formation, asserts, equally without authority, that Robert Curthose held the centre between William of Mortain and Robert of Bellême.

[152] “primam aciem rexit Rannulfus Baiocensis; secundam Rodbertus comes Mellentensis; tertiam vero Guillelmus de Guarenna.” Ordericus, iv, p. 229. It certainly is impossible to reconcile this statement completely with the letter of the priest of Fécamp, but perhaps the leadership of the first division may be accepted.

[153] Letter of the priest of Fécamp, in _E. H. R._, xxv, p. 296: “In prima acie fuerunt Baiocenses, Abrincatini, et Constantinienses, omnes pedites; in secunda vero rex cum innumeris baronibus suis, omnes similiter pedites. Ad hec septingenti equites utrique aciei ordinate”. Also Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235: “rex namque et dux, et acies caeterae pedites erant, ut constantius pugnarent.”

[154] Ordericus, iv, p. 229.

[155] _Ibid._, pp. 229-230: “Cenomannos autem et Britones longe in campo cum Helia consule constituit”; letter of the priest of Fécamp, in _E. H. R._, xxv, p. 296: “preterea comes Cenomannis et comes Britonum Alanus Fregandus circumcingentes exercitum, usque ad mille equites, remotis omnibus gildonibus et servis”; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235.

[156] Ordericus, iv, p. 230. But cf. Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235: “dux Normanniae cum paucis multos audacissime aggressus est, assuetusque bellis Ierosolimitanis aciem regalem fortiter et horrende reppulit. Willelmus quoque consul de Moretuil aciem Anglorum de loco in locum turbans promovit.” This statement would seem to give some color to Oman’s view of a line formation, but it is not convincing in the face of other evidence. Cf. Appendix F.

[157] Ordericus, iv, p. 230; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 235; cf. Dom Morice, _Preuves_, i, col. 129.

[158] Letter of the priest of Fécamp, in _E. H. R._, xxv, p. 296; Henry of Huntingdon, pp. 235-236; Ordericus, iv, p. 230; cf. _A.-S. C._, _a._ 1106; Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 55; William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, p. 475; _Chronicon_, in _Liber de Hyda_, p. 307.

[159] Ordericus, iv, p. 230; cf. _E. H. R._, xxv, p. 296; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 236; Eadmer, p. 184; _A.-S. C._, _a._ 1106; Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 55; William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, p. 463; the same, _G. P._, p. 116; _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 283; _Chronicon_, in _Liber de Hyda_, p. 307. On Waldric the Chancellor see H. W. C. Davis, in _E. H. R._, xxvi, pp. 84-89.

[160] Ordericus, iv, pp. 230-231; _E. H. R._, xxv, p. 296; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 236; Eadmer, p. 184; Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 55; _A.-S. C._, _a._ 1106; William of Malmesbury, _G. R._, ii, p. 475; _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 283; _Chronicon_, in _Liber de Hyda_, p. 307.

[161] Ordericus, iv, p. 231.

[162] _Ibid._, p. 230; Eadmer, p. 184. Robert of Torigny places the number of slain among the duke’s forces at “vix sexaginta.” _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 284.

[163] _E. H. R._, xxv, p. 296; cf. Eadmer, p. 184; _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_, in William of Jumièges, p. 284; _Chronicon_, in _Liber de Hyda_, p. 307.

[164] _E. H. R._, xxv, p. 296: “iii kal. Octobris hora tertia.” The date usually given by modern writers is 28 September. Le Prévost, in Ordericus, iv, 228, n. 2; Davis, _Normans and Angevins_, p. 129; Adams, _History of England from the Norman Conquest to the Death of John_, p. 145; Le Hardy, p. 164; Fliche, _Philippe Iᵉʳ_, p. 311. It is based upon the authority of the _Anglo-Saxon Chronicle_ (_a._ 1106), which is copied by Florence of Worcester (ii, p. 55), and upon the _Chronicon Breve Fontanellense_ (_H. F._, xii, p. 771). But, in view of the explicit statement of the priest of Fécamp, 29 September is probably the correct date. William of Malmesbury (_G. R._, ii, p. 475) confusingly dates the battle “sabbato in Sancti Michaelis vigilia.” Michaelmas in 1106 fell upon Saturday. A further variation is introduced by Robert of Torigny, who dates the battle 27 September. _Interpolations de Robert de Torigny_ in William of Jumièges, p. 284.

[165] _E. H. R._, xxv, p. 296.