San Francisco Relief Survey; the organization and methods of relief used after the earthquake and fire of April 18, 1906

Chapter XIX: Section II: , as has been explained, the registration was not

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representative of the total body of refugees within its boundaries.

The number of persons registered as having been provided with shelter was but a part of the whole. The estimated number of persons who were living in shacks and barracks on June 1 was 40,000[71] according to the census taken by General Greely; 42,000 according to the Southern Pacific Railroad; 39,000 according to a computation made for this Relief Survey.[72] Of this last number, 34,000 were in tents, 5,000 in barracks and rough shacks. There was a slight increase in the camp population in late May and in June, due to the return of refugees from Oakland and other points, but apart from this accretion the camp population was subject to slight variation.

[71] It must be borne in mind that the figures taken from the first
registration covered but a part of the camp and shack population.

[72] Computation made on the basis of the number of tents issued by
the army, the proportion of tents obtained from other sources and in
use at the end of June, and the average number of persons to the tent.

The first of June a San Franciscan wrote to _Charities and the Commons_[73] an account of conditions, which gives a picture of what life in the camps meant to some of the refugees:

“The courage and energy of the population of San Francisco in the face
not only of disaster but of extreme terror and sudden homelessness has
not been exaggerated, but to a great many the full effect of the
strain is not even yet apparent. The discomforts of living, in spite
of adequate relief, are very great. Wind and fog--for the weather has
been unusually cold for a month, dust unspeakable, cooking out of
doors in camps and streets, lack of water for toilet appliances, the
incessant boiling of water and milk for fear of fever, absence of
light and means of transportation for some time--in short, the total
uprooting of all the ordinary habits of life, is bearing more and more
heavily on the women and children. Schools are closed, thus turning
thousands of children literally into the ruined streets. It is now
proposed to have a vacation school in Golden Gate Park for the
children in camps there, but this is only a very small part of the
whole number.

“And for those who stay by the city much of this discomfort will go on
for several months to come. That under such circumstances men and
women become apathetic and lose pride and self-respect when they can
no longer endure the strain of petty hardships, is not surprising.
Archbishop Riordan, on his way to the scene of the disaster, is said
to have predicted, as the worst effect of it, the deterioration of
health and character which would be its inevitable result upon those
who are not of the exceptional stuff of which heroes and pioneers are
made.”

[73] Smith (Coolidge), Mary Roberts: Relief Work in its Social
Bearings. _Charities and the Commons_, XVI: 311 (June 2, 1906).

THE OFFICIAL CAMPS

The army had control of some camps from the beginning and gradually assumed charge of others until 21[74] camps were under military discipline. These camps became known by the rather misleading title of “permanent camps.” The first to be brought under army control were four situated in the Presidio, three in Golden Gate Park, one in Harbor View, and one in Lobos Square.

[74] For complete list of official camps, dates of opening and
closing, and maximum population, see Appendix I, p. 404.

During May the Franklin Square camp, those at Fort Mason, and at 19th and Minnesota Streets were taken over by the army. Early in June the camps in Jefferson Square, Lafayette Square, Mission Park, Duboce Park, Hamilton and Washington Squares were added, and in July, Alamo Square, Precita Park, and Columbia Park. Each camp was in charge of a camp commander, who according to the size of the camp, had on his staff clerks, foremen, laborers, and a nurse for the hospital department.[75] One or two of the larger camps had a camp carpenter. Plumbing and carpentry for the smaller camps were done by mechanics from headquarters.

[75] See Part I, pp. 90-91.

Cottages

CAMP NO. 9, LOBOS SQUARE]

During July and August the tents in the permanent camps were floored. Buildings were put up in each camp containing latrines and wash and bath-houses with hot and cold running water.

The unofficial camps, whose moral and sanitary condition was very unsatisfactory, harbored a large number of refugees. As late as September 1, 1906, their estimated population was from 10,000 to 15,000. The Finance Committee had tried to have the campers move into the official camps, but had failed because the police department, which was the only authority that could eject, was unwilling to remove any large number of persons. The police, of course, reflected the attitude of the general public, which seems to have classed as official, though it was not recognized as such by the Finance Committee, a large independent camp, which was a private business venture, renting land to refugees on which they might erect their own tents. General Greely, as has been described,[76] had tried to induce removal to the official camps. The importance of having all camp life under military discipline can be readily appreciated when one considers how difficult under any auspices it would be to give sanitary and moral protection to a large body of persons living under abnormal conditions.

[76] See Part I, p. 44.

The three essentials for camp tenants laid down as rules by General Greely were decency, order, and cleanliness. The camp commanders tried to get rid of the disorderly element as far as they could without causing hardship to others. When a person was ejected from one camp all other camps were notified and he was not allowed to enter any of them.

The following statement of the number of ejectments from May, 1906, to January, 1908, shows that there was constant attention to this problem. The dashes which appear in the columns representing ejectments, opposite June, 1906, and February and March, 1907, indicate that no ejectments were reported for these months, though it is probable that ejectments which were not reported occurred in the months mentioned and in the months between January, 1908, and the close of the relief work.

TABLE 23.--EJECTMENTS FROM CAMPS DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE RELIEF WORK, BY MONTHS

Reasons for ejectments, as stated by the camp commanders, and the number of ejectments for each reason or group of reasons, are shown in Table 24.

TABLE 24.--REASONS FOR EJECTMENTS FROM CAMPS DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE RELIEF WORK

CAMP NO. 20, HAMILTON SQUARE]

Table 25 shows the total population of the official camps for each month from May, 1906, to June, 1908, inclusive.

TABLE 25.--POPULATION OF OFFICIAL CAMPS, EXCLUSIVE OF INGLESIDE MODEL CAMP, FROM MAY, 1906, TO JUNE, 1908, INCLUSIVE

(The figure given for each month is the maximum daily total)

Although the data available for determining the character of the camp population are incomplete, from the weekly reports of the camp commanders we can derive figures which probably represent a fair average of the conditions. It appears that from September to December, 1906, about 39 per cent of the persons sheltered were men, about 31 per cent women, and about 30 per cent children. Approximately 55 per cent of the members of the camp population were at work. The proportion of persons who were at work was about 89 per cent among the men, about 39 per cent among the women, and about 25 per cent among the children.

The large percentage of men who were working is worthy of notice. There were numerous complaints during the existence of the camps that these were harboring a large number of idle, shiftless men. Those who offered such criticisms failed to take into account that there is even in normal times a considerable percentage of unemployed men who spend much of their time in public places. A part of the apparently well and able-bodied were in reality incapable of much work, and others though apparently unemployed were night workers. When the haunts of the idle were covered with ashes, it is hardly strange that they should have been found in numbers in the public parks and squares.

In Chapter 1 the story has been told of the need felt for making some permanent provision for the refugees before the oncoming of the rainy season. The Corporation, after making a careful study of the situation in the camps, decided to adopt a separate cottage plan for temporary as well as for permanent housing, except in one locality, South Park, whose limited area gave no space for separate cottages.

On August 1, 1906, the care of the camps passed from the army to the Department of Camps and Warehouses.[77] From then until June 30, 1908, when the last camp was closed, that department had entire charge of maintenance. The Department of Lands and Buildings was responsible for the construction of the cottages built to replace the tents. The first of August, 1906, the Corporation made public its plan to build cottages[78] and let the contracts for the erection of buildings. Building began September 10, and on the sixteenth 20 cottages in Hamilton Square were completed. At least two or three months, however, intervened before any considerable number of houses could be made ready for the refugees. Before completing its work the Department of Lands and Buildings had installed in the public squares for use in connection with the 5,610 cottages which it had built, 667 patent flush closets, 247 hoppers, over six miles of gas and water pipe and over five miles of sewer pipe; also the necessary fittings, which included 325 galvanized sinks, with faucets and traps, and 624 gas brackets.[79]

[77] See Part I, p. 26.

[78] See Part IV, p. 217.

[79] See Part IV, p. 221.

Thus for the period of approximately six months those who had no resources to build found house room as best they might. Many difficulties were met by those who controlled the funds. Building had had to be delayed because of the extraordinary amount of work involved in supplying food, clothing, water, sanitary protection, and temporary shelter. The pressure on the relief machinery seemed to tax its utmost capacity. When it was necessary to push rebuilding plans, additional machinery and more workers had to be provided.

In the official camps the refugees had in large measure been supplied with tents free of charge. As the time came for the removal of tents and temporary shacks and the substitution of wooden buildings, the question was raised, who would be entitled to their use, and on what terms? Cottages were assigned by the camp commanders, first, to those in the official camps; second, to those in shacks and tents outside; third, to those still in the city who were living in cellars and similar places, including those who were receiving shelter from friends, and those who were citizens but were living outside the city. Some who had not been burned out, but needed to be better housed, received cottages and moved them for permanent use to lots which they owned or leased.

For seven months the people had been furnished with tents free of charge, but when the change was made to the wooden cottages, it was thought best to charge a nominal rental.[80] The argument was that to give everything and ask nothing in return, on the one hand killed the self-respect of the efficient class and on the other gave opportunity to the idle to shirk all civic and social responsibility; that the no-rent policy had brought about serious economic disturbances, and its continuance would prepare the way for yet more serious trouble.

[80] See Part IV, p. 222, for explanation of miscarriage of plan.

Finally, it was foreseen that the abnormal real estate conditions which had made it possible for the homeless to secure shelter, would not be relieved until those living in camp cottages should seek and be able to secure quarters elsewhere. Accordingly, it was definitely decided that as fast as buildings were made available in the camps, they should be leased to refugees by camp commanders at nominal rates. A special form of lease was provided which, theoretically, each applicant was compelled to sign before occupying a cottage.

The San Francisco Relief and Red Cross Funds, a corporation, was the lessor; and the refugee, the lessee. The lease was in effect a contract of purchase, for it provided that the tenant should become the owner of the cottage if he paid his rent to August 1, 1907. In general the applicant agreed to pay a specified rent and gas rate per month, to comply with all rules and regulations of the camp department and the camp commanders. He agreed not to assign his lease to another nor sublet without written consent. He agreed furthermore to vacate the house at the expiration of his lease unless through full payment of all rents and charges he had acquired ownership. In that event he agreed to remove the house from the camp at his own expense before August, 1907. Failure to remove meant to forfeit ownership. When on account of ill-health or other disability a person was not able to pay rent, the camp commander notified the Rehabilitation Committee.

The shelter furnished by the army and the Finance Committee was with few exceptions on public land. When the Corporation was ready to build cottages it asked the park commission for permission to use certain parks and squares. The commission having no power to give the authority agreed, on August 17, 1906, to ignore the occupation of parks and squares, on the understanding that such use was for a period of not more than one year; the cottages were then to be removed as rapidly as possible.

The parks and squares were the most suitable places in which to give temporary shelter. The damage and loss to the city from their use were insignificant, and in the camps policing and sanitation were supplied. There would have been rivalry among owners of land to secure the camps, and consequent charges of favoritism, graft, etc. The parks and squares were well situated with reference to the centers of industry and the building operations. Throughout the work the park commissioners co-operated with the Relief Corporation and rendered valuable assistance. To have followed the suggestion of the committee on housing the homeless to establish but one encampment, would have been very unwise. In the summer following the disaster many persons were hindered from becoming self-supporting because of their remoteness in Golden Gate Park from centers of work.

The camp in South Park, already spoken of as unique in character, consisted of nineteen two-story tenement buildings and a one-story bath-house and laundry building. Some of the buildings were divided into 16 suites of two rooms each and the others into 12 tenements of two rooms each. The total number of rooms was 656. The maximum population was 648. They had adequate fire protection and the occupants were required to take part regularly in a fire drill. There was steady demand for the rooms, by reason of the nearness of the camp to the shipping and manufacturing districts. The tenements were full almost all the time.

CAMP NO. 28, SOUTH PARK]

REMOVAL FROM THE CAMPS

The terms of the contract signed by applicants fixed, in large measure, the conditions under which cottages could be removed from the camps and become the permanent property of their owners.[81] Whenever a person proved to the Department that he had purchased or leased a lot in the city and county of San Francisco, he was permitted at his own expense to move his house.

[81] See Part IV, pp. 222 and 232.

In June, 1907, the park commissioners requested the Relief Corporation to clear the public squares of cottages by August 17. Clearing the squares and parks of these cottages proved to be a difficult task, for many occupants sought delay on the ground of being unable to secure other quarters. In a few cases the persons had either to be evicted or to have the houses pulled down over their heads. On account of the poverty of many occupants, and in order to secure better sanitary supervision while the fear of bubonic plague lasted, the camp at Lobos Square was retained after the others had been abandoned. It was used by the poorest of the refugees from other camps, as well as by its own unusual number of dependents. This camp was not entirely abandoned till June 30, 1908.[82]

[82] For population of the camp April, 1908, see Part I, p. 29.

Cottages to the number of 5,343 were removed from the camps, all but a few to be used as dwellings. Real estate firms which applied to purchase cottages to establish them in groups on their own lots were refused by the Department on the ground that any such arrangement would tend to perpetuate camp life; lacking superintendence and control, such camp life would be worse than that which then existed. Despite the action of the Department, however, large vacant lots were sub-divided and rented to individual owners of cottages.[83] Seventy-four of the cottages were given to philanthropic agencies and were installed by them in various parts of the city for use as club rooms or for similar purposes.

[83] See Two Cottage Settlements, Part IV, p. 234 ff.

The work of the Associated Charities in moving and repairing cottages deserves special mention. The Corporation arranged with the Associated Charities to move from the camps the cottages belonging to widows with children and to families having incapacitated breadwinners. The moving of cottages, which began in July, 1907, was not ended until the latter part of June, 1908.[84] The amount of work accomplished at a cost comparatively small shows excellent business management. The greater part of the work of moving, installing, and repairing the cottages was done by unemployed carpenters, plumbers, and laborers. “Considering the number of cottages moved and made habitable, we have had very few complaints as to the workmanship,” is noted in a report of the Associated Charities,--a comment that could not be made in connection with many houses erected by the regular contractors.

[84] The total number of cottages moved or repaired by the Associated
Charities was 703, at an expenditure of $55,963.50 or an average of
$79.61 per cottage. The appropriation for this work allowed for a
maximum expenditure of $150 per cottage.

The efforts being made by families permanently to own homes are shown by the following figures: The number of cottagers buying lots was 208; paying ground rent, 447; owning own property, 30; given one month’s rent to move from camp but present condition unknown, 18. Total, 703.

Under the supervision of the Associated Charities the 208 families buying lots bid fair, according to reports given in 1908, to own them in the immediate future. It is doubtless true that but for the direction of the society these families never would have seriously considered owning a house and lot.

From August 1, 1906, to June 30, 1908, there is accurate information from which to determine the cost of the camps. During this period 7,171,522 days’ shelter was furnished at a cost of $884,558.81 for construction of cottages and of $453,000.04 for maintenance, a total of $1,337,558.85, a daily per capita cost of 18.7 cents. The daily per capita cost of maintenance was 6 cents. No allowance is here made for the value of the tents in use from August 1 till they were replaced by the cottages, but their value is more than offset by that of the cottages when they were vacated.[85]

[85] For total expenditures of all departments for housing, see Table
64, p. 220.

For the whole period of the relief work, the cost of the camps was as follows:

TABLE 26.--COST OF CAMPS DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE RELIEF WORK

Value of shelter furnished by the army as reported by
General Greely $421,195.08
Paid by Finance Committee for shelter up to August 1,
1906 187,056.56
Paid for sanitation of camps and city up to August 1,
1906 155,473.60
Cost of building camp cottages and tenements after
August 1, 1906 884,558.81
Paid by Department of Camps and Warehouses, for
maintenance after August 1, 1906 453,000.04
-----------
Total $2,101,284.09

In addition to the shelter furnished at Ingleside and the Relief Home, an estimate of 11,000,000[86] days of shelter for the entire relief period may be given, a figure that is probably too small. From it we get an average daily per capita cost of 19.1 cents.

[86] Estimated number of days of shelter from April 18, 1906, to
August 1, 1906, 3,828,478.

The apparently greater cost of shelter for the early period is due possibly to too low an estimate of the number of days’ shelter furnished outside of official camps. It must be kept in mind that the disbursements given above include all disbursements for sanitation and for medical care in the camps, and also that the residents of the camps included a large proportion of aged, infirm, and dependent persons. The actual cost would be reduced if it were possible to deduct the value of the tents and cottages at the time they ceased to be used.

What is astounding in this story of giving shelter to a great displaced city population of 250,000[87] souls is not the number of days that shelter had to be provided or the sum total of cost. The astounding fact is that when Camp Lobos, the last stamping ground of the residuum,[88] was closed to refugees on June 30, 1908, the number of persons that had to be cared for by the Associated Charities and the Relief Home was so small. In June, 1906, 40,000 persons were living at the expense of the relief funds in camps and shacks; two years later, leaving out of consideration those who had been given shelter at Ingleside, only 703 had to be aided by charitable agency to obtain permanent shelter.

[87] 200,000 is the number given for persons burned out of house and
home. The difference is accounted for by the number made homeless
because of loss of income and because of the homes made temporarily
uninhabitable by the earthquake.

[88] See Part VI, p. 357, and Part V, p. 305 ff., for number that had
to be taken care of permanently. The small number who left the
almshouse to seek shelter in the camps is also noted in Part VI.

This section may well be closed by a brief and necessarily inadequate statement of the social work undertaken in connection with the camp life. Four important settlements were swept to ashes by the fire,--the South Park Settlement, a pioneer work in San Francisco, the Telegraph Hill Neighborhood Association, the Nurses’ Settlement, and the Columbia Park Boys’ Club. The residents of each showed, as did the Associated Charities, their power of readjusting their work to meet the new demands for service. They transferred their activity to the camps where they, as well as groups of other volunteers, tried to improve social conditions.

Various organizations of women co-operated also to help carry on the work of the sewing center at the Hearst Grammar School, which was established the middle of May by the representative of the American National Red Cross, in connection with its employment bureau. Here volunteers met and distributed garments and taught women and girls to sew, giving materials to some in exchange for their work on garments, which were distributed to other refugees. The work grew so that sewing circles were opened in various camps and other suitable places, which furnished proper clothing and gave employment and instruction to women and girls. By July, 1907, over 75,000 garments had been made in the 75 centers that had been established in camps, churches, public schools, and settlements. The work itself had been brought under the Corporation as a part of its Department of Relief and Rehabilitation, and had been given the name of Industrial Bureau, with Lucile Eaves as director, Rev. D. O. Crowley as adviser, and six seamstresses on salary. Miss Eaves, formerly head worker of the South Park Settlement, had been in charge of the sewing circles before the incorporation of the San Francisco Relief and Red Cross Funds. There is no account of expenditures made for this work to August 1, 1906. After that date the Corporation expended $37,895.70. The two largest items of expenditure were $28,521.09 for dry goods and other supplies and $4,464 for service.

Temporary social halls were built at the expense of the Corporation to be used by residents of the camps as meeting places and by social workers for kindergartens, day nurseries, reading rooms, sewing classes, and improvement clubs, for religious meetings, for lectures, and for concerts.

The story of the quick recovery of the settlements themselves and of how, awaiting the building of new quarters, they by makeshifts got the people together, cannot be told here. To show in a measure what it meant to the social worker to find himself suddenly bereft of all the means to serve his end, the following paragraphs written by a probation officer are given:

“On the morning of April 20, practically every vestige of the three
years’ work of the juvenile court had vanished.

“Our office was cleaned out; little piles of delicate white ash
represented our records, compiled with such care and toil. Where the
detention home stood was a heap of tangled scrap iron. Three out of
five of our officers were homeless. Our probationers were scattered to
the four winds of heaven. Fortunately, none of the children in
detention was injured; during the first day of the fire they were
safely conveyed to a sand-dump camp at the western edge of the city.”

6. SAFEGUARDING HEALTH

Sanitation was at once recognized to be a pressing problem. As has been told, latrines were quickly built in the camps and in other parts of the city, and a large force of plumbers was kept at work to repair leaks in sewers so as to prevent the seepage of sewage into the water supply. Citizens were ordered to boil all drinking water and the authorities took charge of all milk as soon as it was delivered to the city. Sanitary orders were cheerfully obeyed. “Obey the Sanitary Law or be shot” tacked on a partially wrecked house showed that some of the refugees held to a pioneer code. That they did so, and that the authorities were alert, the excellent health record of the months that followed bears testimony. The sanitary problem was to a small degree lessened by the fact that with the terror of the earthquake and fire in their eyes, the vicious and parasitic classes fled from the city; to a large degree by the fact that nature was kind in giving conditions that were peculiarly favorable to life in the open.

To put emphasis on sanitation was an essential. Colonel G. H. Torney,[89] of the army medical department, was placed in charge of all sanitary work, both of the camps and of the city. By April 28 a medical officer had been assigned to each of the six military districts.[90] This officer assigned inspectors to make daily inspections of the camps in his district, to keep a close watch for infectious diseases, and to see that there was a large force of scavengers. The expense of the work was borne by the army and was drawn from the Congressional appropriation.

[89] Later appointed Surgeon General of the United States Army.

[90] See Part I, p. 11.

Because of the army’s efficiency during the first few weeks there was no serious outbreak of disease, though there was for a short time a fear that smallpox might become epidemic. As long, however, as the city authorities permitted groups of people to live in isolated camps proper sanitary supervision was impossible. The greatest danger was from the flies and from the use of water drawn in the early days from wells and other unusual sources of supply. As soon as possible sterilizers were installed in the camps and weekly tests made of the water used in each.

Early in May a physician named by the city authorities was stationed at each district headquarters to have charge of all health regulations and to be subject to the orders of Colonel Torney.

The services of the army officers were retained to make reports on conditions until the middle of May, when the division into sanitary districts was abandoned and Colonel Torney’s duties were changed so that he might become chief sanitary officer of permanent camps under General Greely, the division commander. An army medical officer was then assigned to each official camp. He was responsible for the sanitation of his camp, but not for territories beyond its boundaries. He could be called upon to advise the civil authorities who were responsible for the final removal of all camp garbage and refuse after it had been taken from the camps designated to places outside camp limits.

The board of health, acting under orders of the Executive Commission, appointed a health corps which was paid by the Finance Committee of Relief and Red Cross Funds and subject to the direction of the camp commander. The personnel of the corps under the board of health in each camp consisted, varying according to the camp population, of one to two surgeons, one to four nurses, a pharmacist, and from two to ten laborers. There were for service at large one surgeon, two dentists, two sanitary inspectors, one pharmacist, six laborers, and two chauffeurs. The total number in the corps was: surgeons, 24; nurses, 26; dentists, 2; laborers, 89; inspectors, 2; pharmacists, 15; chauffeurs, 2.

Taking into account the character of the camp population, a considerable part of which was of the class that does not understand the need of sanitary precautions, the freedom from epidemic during the first few months is remarkable. A report of the medical department of the army shows that 30 cases of typhoid fever occurred in April, 55 in May, and 10 up to June 23, 1906. As the average number of cases per month reported by the city to the state board of health for the two years previous to the fire was only 12, there is apparently an increase of this disease during April and May. The 30 cases which developed in April must have been due to infection previous to April 18, so that unless the statistics of either the army or the city board of health are incorrect, an increase of this disease must have threatened before the fire. Of the 95 cases which developed between April 18 and June 23 only five developed in official camps. Of smallpox there were 123 cases between April 18 and June 23. Five of these were reported by the board of health as camp cases, but none of them originated in official camps under army control.

In October and November, 1906, there was a decided increase in the number of cases of typhoid fever, the bureau of hospitals alone having charge at one time of 155 cases. The patients came from camps, official and unofficial, and from houses. The epidemic, if it can be called such, was found to be carried not by contaminated milk or water but by flies. The sanitation methods of the board of health had not been good enough to protect the refugees in the various camps. The board of health, therefore, not the Department of Camps and Warehouses, was responsible for the number of typhoid fever cases.

The care of the sick was a minor problem of the relief work. The number of persons seriously injured by the fire and earthquake was but 415. Most of the hospitals stood outside the burned section, and though some of them suffered heavy damage by the earthquake, no demand had to be made for hospital facilities that could not be met fairly adequately. Some of the sick were immediately cared for in neighboring communities, and by the army in its hospitals at the Presidio and at Fort Mason, and in a field hospital established in Golden Gate Park.[91] At one time during the summer following the disaster many of the city hospital beds were vacant, even though numerous chronic cases became hospital charges when relatives and friends were no longer financially able to provide for them.

[91] The establishment of a field hospital in Golden Gate Park is a
good instance of the great care that was taken to be prepared for
whatever emergency might arise.

The physicians and nurses who came immediately after the disaster to San Francisco to offer their services could not be utilized, as the demand for medical and nursing service was not greater than could be supplied by local physicians and nurses. A party of fourteen nurses that came from Seattle soon after the disaster reported for duty at five o’clock one afternoon. “Have you return transportation?” asked the chairman of the committee that received them. “Yes,” was the answer. “Well, there is a train which starts for Seattle tomorrow morning at nine o’clock,” was the laconic order.

In this incident we see the need of a clearing house of information to be established as one of the very first agencies in a large work of relief. It would in this case have prevented the sending of unnecessary nurses and physicians and would have saved expense. More important, however, would have been its service in standardizing the methods of record keeping and in preventing overlapping of work of the various departments.[92]

[92] See Some Lessons of the Relief Survey, p. 369 ff.

There was immediate need of medical supplies to replace the stock destroyed by fire. But the sub-committees on drugs and medical supplies and on care of the sick and wounded, appointed by the Citizens’ Committee, could find little to do in those early days after the disaster, as the army practically took charge of the distribution of the medical supplies and was using the California Red Cross as its agent. This branch of the Red Cross not only cared for some of the sick directly, but did much more important work in collecting information as to the needs of the sick and as to the condition of the hospitals throughout the city.

The Finance Committee, acting early in May on the advice of Colonel Torney, established 26 free dispensaries which were supplied by the army with drugs and other medical supplies. It was careful not to compete with retail trade, so closed any dispensary near which a retail drug store was later opened. The Finance Committee also appointed early in May a committee on hospitals and authorized it to make payments to designated hospitals for the care of destitute patients. The hospitals which were to receive payments from the relief funds were at first named by the board of health, later by the Finance Committee itself, which made selection of six hospitals. An executive officer, a physician, was appointed to pass on the eligibility of the patients who applied for free care and to determine the time of discharge of each from the hospital.

In July this executive officer, whose title was that of supervisor of accredited hospitals, served under direction of the Executive Commission; but after August 1 he was subject to the Corporation, an arrangement which held until July 1, 1908, when the Bureau of Hospitals of the Department of Relief and Rehabilitation was closed. The Associated Charities was then given authority by the Corporation to send destitute patients directly to the hospitals. The Corporation reimbursed the hospitals for care given. The hospitals selected to receive patients whose care was paid for from the funds were changed from time to time.

The value of the compensation to hospitals was at first equivalent to $13 or $14 a week for each patient. On July 18 the Executive Commission had fixed the maximum rate of $2.00 per day without supplies. This was to cover cost of operations and attendance. It had remained in force until the Bureau of Hospitals was closed.

The Bureau’s records, which are inadequate in some respects, show that the highest number of hospital cases for one week, 276, was reached during the period of the typhoid epidemic. Later reports show an average of about 212 patients per week from August, 1906, to September, 1907. Of the patients sent to hospitals through the Bureau 10 per cent were children, 35 per cent men, and 55 per cent women.

The financial report of the Corporation shows that the total cost for the care of the sick to May 29, 1909, was $344,165.07. In addition, food, medical supplies, and furnishings were given to hospitals to the value of $97,670.16. Of the $344,165.07, there was expended previous to August 1, 1906, $107,396.43. The sum of $278,070.76 was paid directly to hospitals for the care of patients, on presentation of vouchers, while the balance of $66,094.31, though not paid directly to the hospitals, was expended in various ways for the benefit of the hospital patients. Between August 1, 1906, and June 1, 1909, $231,110.46 was paid directly to hospitals for the care of patients. This latter sum, less $1,960.25 which cannot be distributed, represents 134,373 days of hospital care at an average cost of $1.71 per patient per day. The average rates of the different hospitals varied from $1.07 to $2.00.

Although the rates paid by the relief funds were often less than the actual cost to the hospitals of caring for patients in normal times, it was to the advantage of the hospitals to care for the sick, many of whom they would have had to take in any case. The volume of business helped to lower the per capita cost of maintenance. It was also an incentive to the directors to increase their facilities and to private benefactors to give money toward their support.

7. RELIEVING THE JAPANESE AND CHINESE

The Japanese asked for very little relief, in part because many had difficulty in speaking English, but more generally because all were aware of the anti-Japanese feeling of a small but aggressive part of the community; this in spite of the fact that Japan contributed directly to the local committee and through the American National Red Cross nearly a quarter of a million dollars.

On April 20, independent relief associations were formed by Japanese residents in San Francisco and Oakland, but on the same day they wisely united under the name Japanese Relief Association to care for practically all their fellow countrymen.

The Japanese Relief Association estimated the number of their countrymen made destitute by the fire to be over 10,000, which is about 3 per cent of the total number of persons made dependent for short or long periods of time. On July 6, 1906, not over 100 Japanese were receiving assistance from the Relief and Red Cross Funds. Of these about 50 were receiving shelter only, in Lafayette Square, and 50 were receiving help at relief stations. That is, the Japanese constituted not more than one-half of 1 per cent of the bread line and about a quarter of 1 per cent of the population of the official camps. Even at the beginning the number receiving help from the Relief and Red Cross Funds was probably not much greater. The Relief Survey estimates that the total value of relief of all kinds furnished by the army and the Finance Committee to Japanese did not exceed $3,000. Among the 30,000 or more persons who applied for rehabilitation, there was not one Japanese. Their own relief association, assisted by Japanese throughout the state, within ten days after the disaster sent between 7,000 and 8,000 of them to places outside of San Francisco. On July 6 some of these had returned and the number of Japanese refugees then in the city was estimated by the association to be 4,000, two hundred of whom it was supplying with provisions.

China contributed $40,000 to the San Francisco Relief and Red Cross Funds for the general work of relief.

There is not much information available about the Chinese. They probably received altogether more food than the Japanese and they certainly received more in the way of shelter, yet the total value of all aid given them was relatively insignificant. Like the Japanese, and for the same reasons, they did not ask for much. At the beginning a separate camp was established for them,--Number 3, in the Presidio reservation. The population of this camp on May 8, 1906, was 186. Later, when cottages were built in Portsmouth Square, on the border of Chinatown, 37 out of the 153 cottages were assigned to Chinese. Not over 140 applications for rehabilitation were made by Chinese. About half of the number were assisted at an average expenditure of about $70. Nearly all these cases were brought to the notice of the Committee by social workers, as only a few Chinese applied voluntarily for relief. Ten thousand dollars is a liberal estimate of the value of relief given to the Chinese.

III

QUESTIONS OF FINANCE

1. CLAIMS

The word “claim” as used in the relief accounting was applied to anything from a time check for a day’s work to a ten thousand dollar demand for goods seized, a usage that arose from the fact that for the first few days, when there was no available cash, many obligations were incurred that were a proper charge on the relief funds though not authorized by the Finance Committee.

Some claims were made by those who suffered a change of sentiment toward contributing relief. During the hours of urgent need men donated their goods, workmen gave their labor, and professional men, their services, who when later they saw the size of the relief funds could not resist the insidious craving to have a share of the big whole. There is the instance of men belonging to one of the building trades who did work for which they expected no pay but later were not satisfied to take the $4.00 a day offered as payment by the Finance Committee. They demanded $6.00 because other men were receiving that amount for a day’s work. Business houses within and without the city evinced the same spirit.

Day by day the flood of claims swelled. Claimants and their attorneys laid siege to the Finance Committee and tried by bribes and threats of lawsuits to collect their claims. A large force of clerks and a special committee were kept hard at work trying to learn the merits of the claims. The Finance Committee itself day after day was compelled, instead of discussing necessary relief measures, to give the greater part of its sessions to the hearing or to the discussion of these claims.[93]

[93] See Sixth Annual Report American National Red Cross, 1910, p.
160.

The circumstances of seizure had varied. Often when the fire was almost upon a store somebody would assume authority and break it open to give the stock to the people. In such a case the stock would have been destroyed by fire and there was no justice in the claim for seizure except where the owner as a consequence lost insurance. Irresponsible individuals who had no connection with relief committees had seized goods and impressed vehicles. Those who suffered loss through such lawless acts were unfortunate, but they had no real claim to reimbursement from the relief funds.

The same may be said of the individuals, the business houses, and the transportation companies whose goods were stolen, not seized, from freight cars and warehouses. Many claims for regrettable losses which might have been legitimate if brought against state, city, or person, were unjust when brought against the relief funds. Fraudulent attempts were also made to collect from the relief funds for losses that had no connection with the relief work and for losses that had never occurred. It was a perplexing problem to deal with these thousands of claims, the difficulties of which were increased by the insistence of those with the least valid claims.

The last report of the Department of Bills and Demands dated March 16, 1907, gives the following figures:

TABLE 27.--DISPOSAL OF CLAIMS ACTED UPON BY THE DEPARTMENT OF BILLS AND DEMANDS, TO MARCH 16, 1907

===================================+======================
Disposal of claims | CLAIMS PRESENTED
+-------+--------------
| Number|Amount claimed
-----------------------------------+-------+--------------
Claims rejected as a whole | 1,164 | $451,369.59
Claims cancelled, withdrawn, etc. | 101 | 13,269.54
Claims donated | 18 | 10,528.20
Claims approved in whole or in part| 9,669 | 2,242,003.00
-----------------------------------+-------+--------------
Total |10,952 | $2,717,170.33
-----------------------------------+-------+--------------

TABLE 28.--PAYMENTS UPON CLAIMS ACTED UPON BY THE DEPARTMENT OF BILLS AND DEMANDS, TO MARCH 16, 1907

After March 16, 1907, a few long pending and new claims were paid. Some law suits had been settled, and a few were still pending against the Corporation when this report was prepared.

It thus appears that the trustees of the relief funds paid over a million and a half dollars for expenditures, many of which they had not authorized and were unable to control. They tried to pay only such part of the claims as represented supplies and service used in relief work. Just claims were cut down as a rule, so that a comparatively small number of claims were paid in full.

In deciding the merits of claims the supervising and judicial committees appointed sub-committees of experienced men to supplement their own technical knowledge. Many claims for liquor destroyed by soldiers and citizens were presented, but the Finance Committee decided to pay no liquor claims. The enormous disbursements for automobile service and for transportation of supplies were made chiefly in payment of emergency claims. Claims of various sorts were paid by the War Department out of the Congressional appropriation of $2,500,000. Other claims were paid by the state. As the Relief Corporation could get no information about such claims it is possible that there were duplicate payments.

2. SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING--A NOTE

The accounting system of the Relief and Red Cross Funds has been criticized because it did not readily yield information as to the amounts expended for various purposes, and because it was complicated. The first seems a fair criticism, for contributors to funds and the public in general are more interested in the cost of various forms of relief than in the state of the appropriations. The system of appropriations to the departments for different purposes was based on carefully prepared budgets. It was good for controlling expenditures and for keeping a check on departments and bureaus. For those not directly connected with the work, additional information in simple form might easily have been given. The intricacy of the accounting, however, seems justified by the results. It was devised to make the handling of the money as secure as possible. So far as the local auditors and the auditor of the War Department have been able to discover there was only one transaction that looked like misappropriation of money. About $1,000 received by a camp employe from certain authorized sales was for a short time kept back. The apparent shortage, easily detected by the accounting department, was made good.

Considering the extraordinary conditions under which the work was organized, such a showing is remarkable. When men undertake the thankless task of handling a large relief fund, if they have a keen sense of responsibility and a realization of the difficulties ahead they will wish to disburse the fund through a system which is as safe as possible. It is worth while for them not only to prevent misappropriation but even the appearance of it. The employes of such a committee will find satisfaction, when accused of graft and stealing,--an accusation suffered many times by the San Francisco workers,--in showing their accusers just how the money is guarded and that it is impossible for them to steal. A system that insures such security is worth the extra cost.

3. THE CONTROL OF DONATIONS

As a result, primarily, of the publication of sensational stories in the press of the country, the plans of the Corporation were at times seriously embarrassed by the withholding of funds by eastern committees and by the possible danger of those funds being dispensed by independent agencies.

The studies in rehabilitation show that the suspension of grants on August 20, 1906, the period of arrested progress, had a serious effect upon the rehabilitation work. It caused a change of relief policy so that families given grants in one period were treated differently from those in another. It meant for many families a long wait from August 20 to the middle of October when the embargo was lifted. The Corporation had worked out a wise, comprehensive program on the basis of estimated income and then suddenly had to question whether the income might not be $3,000,000 less. Inevitably every department suffered from uncertainty and hesitation. The results of such an intolerable condition were more clearly perceived in rehabilitation than in the other work, but what the withholding of funds meant in reduced efficiency would be hard to estimate.

The two most important funds, those of Massachusetts and the New York Chamber of Commerce,[94] were eventually transferred, the latter with the restriction that it be used for business rehabilitation. Only a number of small funds were permanently held, but the harm was done. The warning should be heeded in future disasters. It is possible for a relief committee, when its work is hardest, to be tied up because of a few newspaper stories which may or may not have foundation in fact.

[94] Action of the New York Chamber of Commerce taken October 2, 1906,
and transmitted in the form of a resolution to the San Francisco
Relief and Red Cross Funds.--The resolution provided for the transfer
of $500,000 to the Corporation “to be devoted by said Corporation for
the purposes and uses of making grants of money or its equivalent, to
individual sufferers from the disaster for purposes of rehabilitation,
in such sums and by such methods as its Rehabilitation Committee may
approve; and that no part of it should be used for the payment of any
pending claims or obligations incurred prior to such transfer of
funds, or for the maintenance of camps, or for ordinary emergent
relief, or for the erection of barracks or cottages, or for the
maintenance of persons therein, it being assumed that the contribution
already made from this fund ($267,500) and the sum subscribed in other
ways will enable the Corporation to accomplish these necessary and
worthy objects.”

The investigator sent by the Massachusetts committee because of the newspaper stories, after investigation cordially endorsed the work of the Relief Corporation and made but few criticisms.

What is the remedy? It cannot be too plainly stated that there must be only one relief committee or corporation.[95] There must be no division of responsibility for distribution. If there must be reform it must be within the relief corporation itself. If one of the eastern committees in command of large funds had set up its own agency in San Francisco, it would have been guilty of improper trusteeship. That much is evident. The suggestion has been made that the committees in charge of the larger funds should each have had a representative on the Finance Committee. Mr. Bicknell, for instance, came first to San Francisco as the representative of the Chicago Commercial Association and the Mayor’s committee funds. But such representation would not include the smaller fund committees. A more inclusive plan is desirable. The gradual strengthening of the American National Red Cross seems to point the way. The Red Cross should become so fully recognized as the national agency for all disaster funds that it should eventually, in any given case, receive all funds not sent directly to a local committee. Its relation to local committees will be strengthened and it can be relied upon to suggest and whenever necessary push changes in relief measures. In San Francisco and each subsequent disaster of any proportions, the American National Red Cross has been represented by its expert agents. Its strength has been materially increased by the appointment of a permanent director. The withholding of funds once subscribed for a particular disaster should become an impossibility as the status of the national agent is recognized.

[95] See Sixth Annual Report American National Red Cross, 1910, p.
156. See also section on The Incorporation of the Funds, Part I, p. 25
ff. of this volume.

We have alluded to one form of restriction, that of requiring that a specified fund be used for a specified form of rehabilitation. Such restriction must of course be accepted after an effort has been made, and has failed, to persuade the forwarding committee to lift the restriction. But restrictions upon relief in kind are doubly dangerous and ill-advised. In the San Francisco disaster the “flour” episode gives an apt illustration. Certain forms of food were donated in quantities in excess of the needs. These were flour, potatoes, and condensed milk, all three of them valuable forms of food in an emergency. The potatoes, as it was the end of the season, did not keep well in large masses and the refugees, living in tents or in basements or attics, had little room for storage. Besides, the universal practice in San Francisco and the vicinity where fresh vegetables can be bought the year round, is to buy in small quantities from day to day or week to week and not store in the fall for winter use. The Finance Committee, unable to dispose of the potatoes to refugees, decided to sell the surplus stock. The sale does not appear to have been made, perhaps because they were unsaleable. At any rate large quantities spoiled and had to be thrown away.

It was natural to think that condensed and evaporated milk would be necessities of prime importance. They were valuable, but on account of local conditions were not needed in great quantities. The supply of milk from the ranches outside the city was not much diminished by the earthquake. By confiscation and by arrangement with dealers an abundant supply of fresh milk was secured for distribution to the refugees.

Many committees throughout the country sent flour as the most useful form of food. It came so fast that for lack of warehouses in which to store it (practically all city warehouses having been burned) part of it was put aboard three transports and in the army warehouses, and finally a vast quantity was stacked up in the open air. The transports were not adapted to preserving flour in good condition so they could not long be used as storehouses. The Finance Committee, confronted by the problem of finding storage for the vast supply received, and knowing that it was several times as much as could be reasonably distributed, decided on May 17 to sell 4,000,000 pounds. This was vigorously objected to by the Minneapolis committee which had sent 15 per cent of the 16,000,000 pounds received. It insisted that its flour should be distributed,--the very flour sent, not flour purchased later with cash from the sale of Minneapolis flour. This episode led to newspaper publicity and protests. The lesson is, that restrictions upon relief in kind are unsatisfactory and embarrassing and should always be placed upon a discretionary basis. The Minneapolis committee claimed that title to its flour had been transferred to the destitute of San Francisco, not to the Red Cross or to the Finance Committee, who were apparently to be considered solely as the servants of distribution. The position is an impossible one in which to place a self-respecting committee.

Many donors of money gave specific directions as to the use to which they wished it put. There was the man who sent $1.00 with a request to hand it to some worthy sufferer and let him report to the donor; and there was the refugee who, after he had found employment elsewhere, sent a small sum, more than enough to pay for the three days’ rations he had received in the bread line, with the request that the balance be given to a soldier who had been kind to him. Jewelers sent money for jewelers, artists for artists, teachers for teachers, physicians for physicians, the people of one town for their fellow townsmen in San Francisco.

Money was also sent to individuals connected with the relief funds to be applied to specific purposes. Fortunately, there were enough unrestricted funds available to assist all classes and carry out the intent of all donors. It was not necessary to open a special account for each of these trusts.

No actual restriction as to the purpose of expenditure, imposed either by donors directly or by the custodians of large funds, was in itself onerous to the relief authorities, but the circumstances attendant upon the remittance of restricted funds caused more or less embarrassment during nearly the whole period of the relief work.

PART II

REHABILITATION

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San Francisco Relief Survey; the organization and methods of relief used after the earthquake and fire of April 18, 1906Chapter XIX: Section II: , as has been explained, the registration was not

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