Chapter XI: Appendix: Extracts From Despatches8

A

FROM FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR

Army Headquarters, South Africa, Camp,
Dekiel Drift, Riet River: 13th February, 1900.

My Lord,--I have the honour to submit, for your Lordship’s information, despatches from General Sir Redvers Buller, describing the advance across the Tugela River on the 17th and 18th January, 1900, and the capture and evacuation of the Spion Kop position on the 23rd and 24th January, as well as certain minor operations between the 19th and 24th January on the right or eastern line of advance.

2. The plan of operations is not very clearly described in the despatches themselves, but it may be gathered from them and the accompanying documents themselves that the original intention was to cross the Tugela at or near Trichard’s Drift, and thence by following the road past ‘Fair View’ and ‘Acton Homes,’ to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop, the Boer position in front of Potgieter’s Drift being too strong to be taken by direct attack. The whole force, less one brigade, was placed under the orders of Sir Charles Warren, who, the day after he had crossed the Tugela, seems to have consulted his General and principal Staff Officers, and to have come to the conclusion that the flanking movement which Sir Redvers Buller had mentioned in his secret instructions was impracticable on account of the insufficiency of supplies. He accordingly decided to advance by the more direct road leading north-east, and branching off from a point east of ‘Three Tree Hill.’ The selection of this road necessitated the capture and retention of Spion Kop, but whether it would have been equally necessary to occupy Spion Kop, had the line of advance indicated by Sir Redvers Buller been followed, is not stated in the correspondence. As Sir Charles Warren considered it impossible to make the wide flanking movement which was recommended, if not actually prescribed, in his secret instructions, he should at once have acquainted Sir Redvers Buller with the course of action which he proposed to adopt. There is nothing to show whether he did so or not, but it seems only fair to Sir Charles Warren to point out that Sir Redvers Buller appears throughout to have been aware of what was happening. On several occasions he was present during the operations. He repeatedly gave advice to his subordinate commander, and on the day after the withdrawal from Spion Kop he resumed the chief command.

{{3. In his note[9] on Sir Charles Warren’s report,
accompanying despatch of 30th January 1900,[10] Sir
Redvers Buller expresses a very adverse opinion on the
manner in which Sir Charles Warren carried out the
instructions he had received. Without a knowledge of the
country and circumstances it is difficult to say whether
the delay, misdirection, and want of control, of which
Sir Redvers Buller complains, were altogether avoidable;
but, in any case, if he considered that his orders were
not being properly given effect to, it appears to me
that it was his duty to intervene as soon as he had
reason to believe that the success of the operations
was being endangered. This, indeed, is admitted by
Sir Redvers Buller himself, whose explanation of his
non-interference can hardly be accepted as adequate. A
most important enterprise was being attempted, and no
personal considerations should have deterred the officer
in chief command from insisting on its being conducted
in the manner which, in his opinion, would lead to the
attainment of the object in view, with the least possible
loss on our side.}}

As regards the withdrawal of the troops from the Spion Kop position, which, though occupied almost without opposition in the early morning of the 24th January, had to be held throughout the day under an extremely heavy fire, and the retention of which had become essential to the relief of Ladysmith, I regret that I am unable to concur with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion in ordering the troops to retire. Even admitting that due preparations may not have been made for strengthening the position during the night, reorganising the defence, and bringing up artillery--in regard to which Sir Charles Warren’s report does not altogether bear out Sir Redvers Buller’s contention--admitting also that the senior officers on the summit of the hill might have been more promptly informed of the measures taken by Sir Charles Warren to support and reinforce them, I am of opinion that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft’s assumption of responsibility and authority was wholly inexcusable. During the night the enemy’s fire, if it did not cease altogether, could not have been formidable, and, though lamp signalling was not possible at the time, owing to the supply of oil having failed, it would not have taken more than two or three hours at most for Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to communicate by messenger with Major-General Coke or Sir Charles Warren, and to receive a reply. Major-General Coke appears to have left Spion Kop at 9.30 P.M. for the purpose of consulting with Sir Charles Warren, and up to that hour the idea of a withdrawal had not been entertained. Yet almost immediately after Major-General Coke’s departure Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft issued an order, without reference to superior authority, which upset the whole plan of operations, and rendered unavailing the sacrifices which had already been made to carry it into effect.

On the other hand, it is only right to state that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft appears to have behaved in a very gallant manner throughout the day, and it was doubtless due, in a great measure, to his exertions and example that the troops continued to hold the summit of the hill until directed to retire.

5. The conduct of Captain Phillips, Brigade-Major of the 10th Brigade, on the occasion in question, is deserving of high commendation. He did his best to rectify the mistake which was being made, but it was too late. Signalling communication was not re-established until 2.30 A.M. on the 25th January, and by that time the naval guns could not have reached the summit of the hill before daybreak. Major-General Coke did not return, and Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft had gone away. Moreover, most of the troops had begun to leave the hill, and the working parties, with the half company of Royal Engineers, had also withdrawn.

6. It is to be regretted that Sir Charles Warren did not himself visit Spion Kop during the afternoon or evening, knowing as he did that the state of affairs there was very critical, and that the loss of the position would involve the failure of the operations. He was, consequently, obliged to summon Major-General Coke to his headquarters in the evening in order that he might ascertain how matters were going on, and the command on Spion Kop thus devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft; but Major-General Coke was not aware of this. About midday, under instructions from Sir Redvers Buller, Sir Charles Warren had directed Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to assume command on the summit of the hill, with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, but this order was not communicated to Major-General Coke, who, until he left the position at 9.30 P.M., was under the impression that the command had devolved on Colonel Hill, as senior officer, after Colonel Crofton had been wounded. Omissions or mistakes of this nature may be trivial in themselves, yet may exercise an important influence on the course of events; and I think that Sir Redvers Buller is justified in remarking that ‘there was a want of organisation and system which acted most unfavourably on the defence.’

7. The attempt to relieve Ladysmith, described in these despatches, was well devised, and I agree with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that it ought to have succeeded. That it failed may, in some measure, be due to the difficulties of the ground and the commanding positions held by the enemy--probably also to errors of judgment and want of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren. But whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be ascribed to the disinclination of the officer in supreme command to assert his authority and see that what he thought best was done, and also to the unwarrantable and needless assumption of responsibility by a subordinate officer.

8. The gratifying feature in these despatches is the admirable behaviour of the troops throughout the operations.

I have the honour to be, My Lord,

Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant,
ROBERTS, _Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa_.

B

FROM GENERAL SIR REDVERS BULLER TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

(_Through Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief, Cape Town._)

Spearman’s Hill: 30th January, 1900.

Sir,--I have the honour to report that General Sir Charles Warren’s Division having arrived at Estcourt, less two battalions, 10th Brigade, which were left at the Cape, by the 7th January, it moved to Frere on the 9th.

{{I attach a copy of Natal Army Orders of the 8th
January,[11] giving full particulars of the intended move
and organisation of the force.}}

The column moved as ordered, but torrents of rain fell on the 9th, which filled all the spruits, and, indeed, rendered many of them impassable for many hours. To forward supply alone took 650 ox wagons, and as in the 16 miles from Frere to Springfield there were three places at which all the wagons had to be double spanned, and some required three spans, some idea may be formed of the difficulties, but these were all successfully overcome by the willing labours of the troops. {{I attach a statement of the supply trains.}}

The 4th Brigade reached Springfield on the 12th, in support of the mounted troops who had surprised and seized the important position of Spearman’s Hill, commanding Potgieter’s Drift, on the 11th.

By the 13th all troops were at Springfield and Spearman’s Hill, and supply was well forward.

On the 16th, a reserve of 17 days’ supply having been collected, General Sir C. Warren, in command of the 2nd Division, the 11th Brigade of the 5th Division, the Brigade Division Royal Field Artillery, 5th Division, and certain corps troops, including the Mounted Brigade, moved from Springfield to Trichard’s Drift, which is about six miles west of Potgieter’s.

{{I attach a copy of the orders[12] under which Sir C.
Warren acted, and enclose his report of his operations
(C).}}

On the night of the 23rd, General Warren attacked Spion Kop, which operation he has made the subject of a special report. On the morning of the 25th, finding that Spion Kop had been abandoned in the night, I decided to withdraw General Warren’s force; the troops had been continuously engaged for a week, in circumstances entailing considerable hardships, there had been very heavy losses on Spion Kop. General Warren’s dispositions had mixed up all the brigades, and the positions he held were dangerously insecure. I consequently assumed the command, commenced the withdrawal of the ox and heavy mule transport on the 25th; this was completed by midday the 26th; by double spanning the loaded ox wagons got over the drift at the rate of about eight per hour. The mule wagons went over the pontoon bridge, but all the mules had to be taken out and the vehicles passed over by hand. For about seven hours of the night the drift could not be used as it was dangerous in the dark, but the use of the pontoon went on day and night. In addition to machine guns, six batteries of Royal Field Artillery, and four howitzers, the following vehicles were passed: ox wagons, 232; 10-span mule wagons, 98; 6-span, 107; 4-span, 52; total, 489 vehicles. In addition to these, the ambulances were working backwards and forwards evacuating the sick and wounded.

By 2 P.M., the 26th, all the ox wagons were over, and by 11.30 P.M. all the mule transports were across and the bridge clear for the troops. By 4 A.M., the 27th, all the troops were over, and by 8 A.M. the pontoons were gone and all was clear. The troops had all reached their new camps by 10 A.M. The marches averaged for the mounted troops about 7 miles, and for the infantry and artillery an average of 5 miles.

Everything worked without a hitch, and the arrangements reflected great credit on the Staff of all degrees; but I must especially mention Major Irwin, R.E., and his men of the Pontoon Troop, who were untiring. When all men were over, the chesses of the pontoon bridge were so worn by the traffic that I do not think they would have lasted another half hour.

Thus ended an expedition which I think ought to have succeeded. We have {{suffered heavily (for casualty return, _see_ K), very heavy losses, and}} lost many whom we can ill spare; but, on the other hand, we have inflicted as great or greater losses upon the enemy than they have upon us, and they are, by all accounts, thoroughly disheartened; while our troops are, I am glad and proud to say, in excellent fettle.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,
REDVERS BULLER,
_General Officer Commanding_.

C

FROM LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR CHARLES WARREN TO
THE CHIEF OF THE STAFF

Hatting’s Farm: 29th January, 1900.

Sir,--I have the honour to make the following report on the operations on the north side of the Tugela, west of Spion Kop, from the 17th to the 27th of January, 1900:--

1. On the 8th January field orders were published constituting the 10th Brigade of the 5th Division a Corps Brigade, and placing the 4th Brigade in the 5th Division. The 5th Division thus constituted marched from Frere on the 10th instant, arriving at Springfield on the 12th instant.

2. On the 15th January I received your secret instructions to command a force to proceed across the Tugela, near Trichardt’s Drift, to the west of Spion Kop, recommending me to proceed forward refusing my right (namely, Spion Kop), and bringing my left forward to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop. This move was to commence as soon as supplies were all in, and the 10th Brigade (except two companies) removed from Springfield Bridge to Spearman’s Hill.

3. I was provided with 4 days’ rations, with which I was to cross the Tugela, fight my way round to north of Spion Kop, and join your column opposite Potgieter’s.

4. On the 15th January I made the arrangements for getting supplies, and moved the 10th Brigade on the following day; and on the evening of the 16th January I left Springfield with a force under my command, which amounted to an Army Corps (less one brigade), and by a night march arrived at Trichardt’s Drift, and took possession of the hills on the south side of the Tugela.

5. On the 17th January I threw pontoon bridges across the Tugela, passed the infantry across by ponts, and captured the hills immediately commanding the drift on the north side with two brigades commanded by Generals Woodgate and Hart. The Commander-in-Chief was present during part of the day, and gave some verbal directions to General Woodgate.

The Mounted Brigade passed over principally by the drift, and went over the country as far as Acton Homes, and on the following day (18th) had a successful action with a small party of Boers, bringing in 31 prisoners.

During the night of the 17th, and day of the 18th, the whole of the wagons belonging to the force were brought across the Tugela, and the artillery were in position outside of Wright’s Farm.

6. On the 19th two brigades advanced, occupying the slopes of the adjoining hills on the right, and the wagons were successfully brought to Venter’s Spruit.

In the evening, after having examined the possible roads by which we could proceed, I assembled the General Officers and the Staff, and the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, and Commanding Royal Engineer, and pointed out to them that of the two roads by which we could advance the eastern one, by Acton Homes, must be rejected, because time would not allow of it, and with this all concurred. I then pointed out that the only possible way of all getting through by the road north of Fair View would be by taking 3 or 4 days’ food in our haversacks, and sending all our wagons back across the Tugela; but before we could do this we must capture the position in front of us.

7. On the following day, 20th January, I placed two brigades and six batteries of artillery at the disposal of General Sir C. F. Clery, with instructions to attack the Boer positions by a series of outflanking movements (copy of instructions herewith[13]), and by the end of the day, after fighting for 12 hours, we were in possession of the whole part of hills, but found a strongly entrenched line on the comparatively flat country beyond us.

8. On the 21st the Boers displayed considerable activity on our left, and the Commander-in-Chief desired me to move two batteries from right to left. At a subsequent date, during the day, I found it impossible to proceed without howitzers, and telegraphed for four from Potgieter’s. These arrived early on the morning of the 22nd, and the Commander-in-Chief, arriving about the same time, directed me to place two of these howitzers on the left, two having already been placed on the right flank. I pointed out to the Commander-in-Chief that it would be impossible to get wagons through by the road leading past Fair View unless we first took Spion Kop, which lies within about 2,000 yards of the road. The Commander-in-Chief agreed that Spion Kop would have to be taken. Accordingly that evening orders were drawn up giving the necessary instructions to General Talbot Coke to take Spion Kop that night, but, owing to an absence of sufficient reconnaissance, he requested that the attack might be put off for a day.[14]

9. On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, the attack on Spion Kop was decided upon, and Lieut.-Colonel àCourt, of the Headquarters Staff, was directed by the Commander-in-Chief to accompany General Woodgate, who was detailed to command the attacking column. The account of the capture of Spion Kop is given in another report.

10. On the morning of the 25th January the Commander-in-Chief arrived, decided to retire the force, and assumed direct command. The whole of the wagons of the 5th Division were got down to the drift during the day, and were crossed over before 2 P.M. on the 26th January.

11. The arrangements for the retirement of the 5th Division were exceedingly well got out, and the retirement was made in good order during the night of the 26th, the whole of the troops crossing to the south side of the Tugela before daylight, and the wagons were packed, and the troops bivouacked near the spruit about 2 miles to the east of the pontoon bridges. About 10 P.M., previous to the retirement, heavy musketry was heard to the north of our position, which has been attributed to a Boer commando thinking we were going to make a night attack.

{{12. I append reports[15] from Lieut.-General Sir C.
F. Clery, K.C.B., on the operations conducted by him
on the 20th, 21st, and 22nd, also from Major-General
Hildyard, C.B., for his operations on those dates.

13. I propose to forward as soon as possible a more
detailed report of the movements of brigades and units,
and acts of individuals.}}

C. WARREN, _Lieut.-General,
Commanding 5th Division_.

D

SIR REDVERS BULLER’S MEMORANDUM ‘NOT
NECESSARILY FOR PUBLICATION.’

{{Spearman’s Camp: 30th January, 1900.

Secretary of State,--In forwarding this report[16]
I am constrained to make the following remarks, not
necessarily for publication:

I had fully discussed my orders with General Warren
before he started, and he appeared entirely to agree
that the policy indicated of refusing the right and
advancing the left was the right one. He never, though,
attempted to carry it out. From the first there could be
no question but that the only practicable road for his
column was the one by Fair View. The problem was to get
rid of the enemy who were holding it.

The arrival of the force at Trichard’s was a surprise
to the enemy, who were not in strength. Sir C. Warren,
instead of feeling for the enemy, elected to spend two
whole days in passing his baggage. During this time
the enemy received reinforcements and strengthened
his position. On the 19th he attacked and gained a
considerable advantage. On the 20th, instead of pursuing
it, he divided his force, and gave General Clery a
separate command.

On the 21st I find that his right was in advance of
his left, and that the whole of his batteries, six, were
crowded on one small position on his right, while his
left was unprotected by artillery, and I had come out
to tell him that the enemy on that flank had received a
reinforcement of at least 2,500. I suggested a better
distribution of his batteries, which he agreed to, to
some extent, but he would not advance his left, and I
found that he had divided his fighting line into three
independent commands, independent of each other and
apparently independent of him, as he told me he could not
move any batteries without General Clery’s consent.

The days went on. I saw no attempt on the part of
General Warren either to grapple with the situation or
to command his force himself. By the 23rd I calculated
that the enemy, who were about 600 strong on the 16th,
were not less than 15,000, and General White confirmed
this estimate. We had really lost our chance by Sir C.
Warren’s slowness. He seems to me a man who can do well
what he can do himself, but who cannot command, as he
can use neither his Staff nor subordinates. I can never
employ him again on an independent command.

On the 19th I ought to have assumed command myself;
I saw that things were not going well--indeed, every
one saw that. I blame myself now for not having done
so. I did not, because I thought that if I did I should
discredit General Warren in the estimation of the troops;
and that if I were shot, and he had to withdraw across
the Tugela, and they had lost confidence in him, the
consequences might be very serious.

I must leave it to higher authority whether this
argument was a sound one. Anyhow, I feel convinced that
we had a good chance on the 17th, and that we lost it.

REDVERS BULLER, _General_.}}

E

FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, NATAL,
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR

(_By the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Cape Town_)

Spearman’s Hill: 30th January, 1900.

Sir,--In forwarding Lieut.-General Sir C. Warren’s report on the capture and evacuation of Spion Kop, I have the honour to offer the following observations. {{The figures in my report refer to those in margin:--}}

1. Sir C. Warren is hardly correct in saying that he was only allowed 3½ days’ provisions. I had told him that transport for 3½ days would be sufficient burden to him, but that I would keep him filled up as he wanted it. That he was aware of this is shown by the following telegram which he sent on the day in question. It is the only report I had from Sir C. Warren:--

(Sent 7.54 P.M. Received 8.15 A.M.)

‘Left Flank: 19th January.

‘To Chief of the Staff,--I find there are only two roads by which
we could possibly get from Trichard’s Drift to Potgieter’s, on
the north of the Tugela--one by Acton Homes, the other by Fair
View and Rosalie; the first I reject as too long, the second is a
very difficult road for a large number of wagons, unless the enemy
is thoroughly cleared out. I am, therefore, going to adopt some
special arrangements which will involve my stay at Venter’s Laager
for 2 or 3 days. I will send in for further supplies and report
progress.

‘C. WARREN.’

The reply to this was that 3 days’ supply was being sent.

2. I went over to Sir C. Warren on the 23rd. I pointed out to him that I had no further report and no intimation of the special arrangements foreshadowed by this telegram of the 19th; that for four days he had kept his men continuously exposed to shell and rifle fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill; that the position admitted of no second line, and the supports were massed close behind the firing line in indefensible formations, and that a panic or a sudden charge might send the whole lot in disorder down the hill at any moment. I said it was too dangerous a situation to be prolonged, and that he must either attack or I should withdraw his force. I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance from his left. He said that he had the night before ordered General Coke to assault Spion Kop, but the latter had objected to undertaking a night attack on a position the road to which he had not reconnoitred, and added that he intended to assault Spion Kop that night.

3. I suggested that as General Coke was still lame from the effects of a lately broken leg, General Woodgate, who had two sound legs, was better adapted for mountain climbing.

4. As no heliograph could, on account of the fire, be kept on the east side of Spion Kop, messages for Sir C. Warren were received by our signallers at Spearman, and telegraphed to Sir C. Warren; thus I saw them before he did, as I was at the signal station. The telegram Sir C. Warren quotes did not give me confidence in its sender, and, at the moment, I could see that our men on the top had given way, and that efforts were being made to rally them. I telegraphed to Sir C. Warren: ‘Unless you put some really good hard-fighting man in command on the top you will lose the hill. I suggest Thorneycroft.’

{{5. This is a mistake. _See_ =A= in Sir C. Warren’s
report. Colonel àCourt was sent down by General Woodgate
almost as soon as he gained the summit.}}

6. I have not thought it necessary to order any investigation. If at sundown the defence of the summit had been taken regularly in hand, entrenchments laid out, gun emplacements prepared, the dead removed, the wounded collected, and, in fact, the whole place brought under regular military command, and careful arrangements made for the supply of water and food to the scattered fighting line, the hills would have been held, I am sure.

7. But no arrangements were made. General Coke appears to have been ordered away just as he would have been useful, and no one succeeded him; those on the top were ignorant of the fact that guns were coming up, and generally there was a want of organisation and system that acted most unfavourably on the defence.

It is admitted by all that Colonel Thorneycroft acted with the greatest gallantry throughout the day, and really saved the situation. Preparations for the second day’s defence should have been organised during the day, and have been commenced at nightfall.

As this was not done, I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion.

Our losses, I regret to say, were very heavy, but the enemy admitted to our doctors that theirs were equally severe, and though we were not successful in retaining the position, the losses inflicted on the enemy and the attack generally have had a marked effect upon them.

I cannot close these remarks without bearing testimony to the gallant and admirable behaviour of the troops: the endurance shown by the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Middlesex Regiment, and Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry was admirable, while the efforts of the 2nd Battalion Scottish Rifles and 3rd Battalion King’s Royal Rifles were equally good, and the Royal Lancasters fought gallantly.

I am writing to catch the mail, and have not any particulars yet to enable me to report more fully on details.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,
REDVERS BULLER.

F

REPORT BY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR CHARLES WARREN, K.C.B.,
UPON THE CAPTURE AND SUBSEQUENT EVACUATION OF SPION KOP

_Capture and Evacuation of Spion Kop_

Chief of the Staff,--I make the operations against Spion Kop in a separate report, because they did not enter into my original plans.

Under the original instructions of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, of 15th January, 1900, I was to act as circumstances required, but, according to instructions, was generally to continue throughout refusing my right, and throwing my left forward until I gained the open plain north of Spion Kop.

[Sidenote: 1]

Upon the 19th of January, on arrival at Venter’s Laager, I assembled all the General Officers, Officers Commanding Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers of Divisions, and Staff Officers together. I pointed out to them that, with the three and a-half (3½) days’ provisions allowed, it was impossible to advance by the left road through Acton Homes. In this they unanimously concurred. I showed them that the only possible road was that going over Fair View through Rosalie, but I expressed my conviction that this could not be done unless we sent the whole of our transport back across the Tugela, and attempted to march through with our rations in our haversacks--without impedimenta.

The hills were cleared on the following day, and very strong entrenchments found behind them. The Commander-in-Chief was present on the 21st and 22nd January, and I pointed out the difficulties of marching along the road, accompanied by wagons, without first taking Spion Kop.

Accordingly, on the night of the 22nd, I ordered General Coke to occupy Spion Kop. He, however, desired that the occupation might be deferred for a day in order that he might make a reconnaissance with the Officers Commanding battalions to be sent there.

[Sidenote: 2]

On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, and told me that there were two courses open--(1) to attack, or (2) to retire. I replied that I should prefer to attack Spion Kop to retiring, and showed the Commander-in-Chief my orders of the previous day.

[Sidenote: 3]

The Commander-in-Chief then desired that I should put General Woodgate in command of the expedition, and detailed Lieut.-Colonel àCourt to accompany him as Staff Officer.

The same evening General Woodgate proceeded with the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Royal Lancaster Regiment, a portion of Thorneycroft’s Horse, and half company Royal Engineers, supported by two companies of the Connaught Rangers and by the Imperial Light Infantry, the latter having just arrived by Trichardt’s Drift.

The attack and capture of Spion Kop was entirely successful. General Woodgate, having secured the summit on the 24th, reported that he had entrenched a position and hoped he was secure, but that the fog was too thick to permit him to see. The position was rushed without casualties, other than three men wounded.

[Sidenote: A]

Lieut.-Colonel àCourt came down in the morning and stated that everything was satisfactory and secure, and telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief to that effect. Scarcely had he started on his return to headquarters when a heliogram arrived from Colonel Crofton (Royal Lancaster). The message was: ‘Reinforce at once, or all lost. General dead.’

He also sent a similar message to headquarters. I immediately ordered General Coke to proceed to his assistance, and to take command of the troops. He started at once, and was accompanied by the Middlesex and Dorsetshire Regiments.

I replied to Colonel Crofton: ‘I am sending two battalions, and the Imperial Light Infantry are on their way up. You must hold on to the last. No surrender.’

This occurred about 10 A.M.

[Sidenote: 4]

Shortly afterwards I received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, ordering me to appoint Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to the command of the summit. I accordingly had heliographed: ‘With the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, I place Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft in command of the summit, with the local rank of Brigadier-General.’

For some hours after this message I could get no information from the summit. It appears that the signallers and their apparatus were destroyed by the heavy fire.

I repeatedly asked for Colonel Thorneycroft to state his view of the situation. At 1.20 P.M. I heliographed to ascertain whether Colonel Thorneycroft had assumed command, and at the same time asked General Coke to give me his views on the situation on Spion Kop. Still getting no reply, I asked whether General Coke was there, and subsequently received his view of the situation (copy attached). He stated that, unless the artillery could silence the enemy’s guns, the men on the summit could not stand another complete day’s shelling, and that the situation was extremely critical.

At 6.30 P.M. I asked if he could keep two battalions on the summit, removing the remainder out of reach of shells; also whether two battalions would suffice to hold the summit. This was in accordance with a telegram on the subject sent me by the Commander-in-Chief. Later in the evening I made arrangements to send two (naval) 12-prs. and the Mountain Battery Royal Artillery to the summit, together with half company Royal Engineers (and working parties, two reliefs of 600 men each), to strengthen the entrenchments and provide shell covers for the men. I may here mention that the 17th Company Royal Engineers proceeded at the same time as General Woodgate’s force, and were employed until daylight upon the entrenchments, then upon road making and water supply.

Sandbags were sent up early on the 24th instant.

While Colonel Sim was, with this party, ascending the hill, he met Colonel Thorneycroft descending, having evacuated the position. {{For the remainder of the account of the proceedings I attach the reports made to me by Colonel Thorneycroft[17] and by General Coke,[18] together with reports on the supply of food and water rendered by officers thus engaged. The supply of ammunition was ample.}}

I wish to bring to notice that I heard from all but one expression of the admirable conduct and bravery shown by officers and men suffering under a withering artillery fire on the summit of the slopes, and also of those who, with so much endurance, persisted in carrying up water and food and ammunition to the troops during this day.

[Sidenote: 5]

During the day a Staff Officer of the Headquarters Staff was present on the summit, and reported direct to the Commander-in-Chief.

At sunset I considered that the position could be held next day, provided that guns could be mounted and effective shelter provided. Both of these conditions were about to be fulfilled, as already mentioned.

In the absence of General Coke, whom I ordered to come to report in person as to the situation, the evacuation took place under orders, given upon his own responsibility, by Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft. This occurred in the face of the vigorous protests of General Coke’s Brigade-Major, the Officer Commanding the Middlesex Regiment, and others.

[Sidenote: 6]

It is a matter for the Commander-in-Chief to decide whether there should be an investigation into the question of the unauthorised evacuation of Spion Kop.

CHARLES WARREN, _Lieut.-General_.

G

{{FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL A. W. THORNEYCROFT,
THORNEYCROFT’S MOUNTED INFANTRY, COMMANDING ON SPION KOP,
TO THE CHIEF STAFF OFFICER TO GENERAL SIR C. WARREN.

Camp, Trichard’s Drift: 26th January, 1900.

Sir,--On the night of the 23rd January, 1900, I
rendezvoused with 18 Officers and 180 men, Thorneycroft’s
Mounted Infantry, 2nd Bat. Lancashire Fusiliers, 2nd
Bat. Royal Lancaster Regiment, and half company Royal
Engineers, the whole under the command of General
Woodgate. At 9 P.M. we started to march to the top of
Spion Kop. I led the way with a small advanced party,
crossed the dongas and advanced up the hill; on reaching
the first plateau the force closed up in formation,
and went on again. As the front broadened I got the
Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry into line, right across
the hill, and the remainder followed in successive lines
up the last slope, when we were suddenly challenged. I
had ordered the men to lie down when challenged; they
did so. The Boers opened fire from magazines. When I
thought that they had emptied their magazines I gave the
order to charge; an officer on my left gave the order to
charge also, and the whole line advanced at the double
and carried the crest line at 4 A.M., when I halted and
reformed the line. There were about ten men wounded
altogether. Orders were immediately given by General
Officer Commanding to form a trench and breastwork. There
was a mist on the hill, and in the darkness and mist it
was difficult to get the exact crest line for a good
field of fire, and the boulders made it difficult to
dig, but we made a rough trench and breastwork. At 4.30
a few Boers came up and began firing. The men lined the
trench, but the picquets in front replied to the fire,
and firing ceased for a time. The Boers then returned
with strong reinforcements from their camp, which lay
concealed in a hollow on the side of the hill, and which
was obscured in the mist; we sent out men in front to
enable them to get a better field of fire; with two lulls
in the firing the mist rose about 8 A.M., when the rifle
fire on both sides became heavy and the Boers opened fire
from three guns and a Maxim-Nordenfelt. The shrapnel fire
was very accurate and burst well, sweeping the whole
plateau. General Woodgate was wounded early in the action
and Colonel Blomfield assumed command, but he, too, was
wounded. At this time I was directing the movements
of the Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry, and sent out
reinforcements to the firing line which was in advance
of the trench; word was sent to me that General Sir C.
Warren had heliographed that I was to assume command. I
sent out more men to the flanks as the Boers were working
round, and the replacing of casualties gradually absorbed
all the men of the force. The firing became hotter on
both sides, the Boers gradually advancing; twice the men
charged out from the entrenchments in the centre and
kept them back, but at length the entrenchment became
the firing line in the centre (the left maintained their
advanced position).

The Boers closed in on the right and centre. Some
men of mixed regiments at right end of trench got up
and put up their hands; three or four Boers came out
and signalled their comrades to advance. I was the
only officer in the trench on the left, and I got up
and shouted to the leader of the Boers that I was the
Commandant and that there was no surrender.

In order not to get mixed up in any discussion I
called on all men to follow me, and retired to some
rocks further back. The Boers opened a heavy fire on us.
On reaching the rocks I saw a company of the Middlesex
Regiment advancing, I collected them up to the rocks, and
ordered all to advance again. This the men did, and we
re-occupied the trench and crest line in front.

As the companies of the Middlesex arrived I pushed
them on to reinforce, and was able to hold the whole
line again. The men on the left of our defence, who were
detached at some distance from the trench, had held
their ground. The Imperial Light Infantry reinforced
this part. The Boers then made a desperate endeavour to
shell us out of the position, and the fire caused many
casualties. The Scottish Rifles came up, and I pushed
them up to the right and left flanks as they arrived.
There was some discussion at this time as to who was
in command, and the Officer Commanding Scottish Rifles
said he would go and see General Talbot Coke, who was
reported to be at the foot of the hill, to get orders.
Up to this I had issued the orders, but as I only got
a verbal message I did not understand that I had the
temporary rank of Brigadier-General. I continued to
direct operations while the Officer Commanding Scottish
Rifles went to see General Talbot Coke. General Coke said
that Colonel Hill was in command, but I could not find
him. The heavy fire continued, and the Boers brought a
gun and Maxim-Nordenfelt to bear on us from the east,
thus sweeping the plateau from the east, north, and
north-west, and enfilading our trenches. The men held
on all along the line, notwithstanding the terrific
fire which was brought to bear on them, as the enemy’s
guns (which now numbered five and two Nordenfelts) were
absolutely unmolested. When night began to close in I
determined to take some steps, and a consultation was
held. The Officer Commanding Scottish Rifles and Colonel
Crofton were both of opinion that the hill was untenable.
I entirely agreed with their view, and so I gave the
order for the troops to withdraw on to the neck and
ridge where the hospital was. It was now quite dark, and
we went out to warn all to come in. The enemy still kept
up a dropping fire. The regiments formed up near the
neck, and marched off in formation, the Scottish Rifles
forming the rear guard. I was obliged, owing to want of
bearers, to leave a large number of wounded on the field.

In forming my decision as to retirement I was
influenced by the following:--

1. The superiority of the Boer artillery, inasmuch as
their guns were placed in such positions as to prevent
our artillery fire being brought to bear on them from the
lower slopes near camp, or indeed from any other place.

2. By my not knowing what steps were being taken to
supply me in the morning with guns, other than the
mountain battery which, in my opinion, could not have
lived under the long-range fire of the Boer artillery,
and their close-range rifle fire.

3. By the total absence of water and provisions.

4. By the difficulty of entrenching on the top of hill,
to make trench in any way cover from artillery fire with
the few spades at my disposal, the ground being so full
of rocks.

5. Finally, I did not see how the hill could be held
unless the Boer artillery was silenced, and this was
impossible.

Lieutenant Winston Churchill arrived when the troops
had been marched off.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,
ALEC. THORNEYCROFT, _Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry_.}}

H

{{REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL TALBOT COKE, OFFICER
COMMANDING 10TH BRIGADE

_Attack on Spion Kop, 23rd, 24th, 25th January, 1900_

Pontoon Bridge: 25th January, 1900.

In accordance with your orders, General Woodgate
assumed command of the column for the night attack, and
settled his rendezvous near the Royal Engineer bivouac,
for 7 P.M., 23rd instant. I bivouacked on the hill upon
which the Connaught Rangers’ picquets are south of Three
Tree Hill.

The first shots were fired at 3.40 A.M.

The valley between my position and Spion Kop, and also
the top of that feature itself, was enveloped in mist
until about 8 A.M., when it could be seen that our force
held the schanzes on the summit. Shortly after it was
seen to be exposed to a frontal fire from rifles, and to
shell fire from its left front.

In accordance with orders communicated to me by you, to
send a battalion to reinforce, a signal message was sent
to the Imperial Light Infantry, which occupied a covering
position towards Wright’s Farm, to proceed at once to
support, moving by the right flank of the kop. The 2nd
Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment was ordered to the place
vacated by the Imperial Light Horse.

The position of Spion Kop was now seen to be exposed
to a cross fire of artillery, and by your instructions I
sent the Middlesex Regiment in support.

About 11.10 A.M., in consequence of the regrettable
news about General Woodgate, at your order I proceeded
to the kop myself. On arrival there, I found the track
leading up very much congested, and, from information
received, I formed the opinion that too many men were
getting into the trenches and stone cover above, and
becoming exposed to the artillery fire; I accordingly
checked reinforcements. Soon after this, on my way
up, an urgent message was received from Colonel Hill,
who commanded at this time on the right, calling for
reinforcements, as his line had actually fallen back
before, and lost some prisoners to the Boers, who were
pressing on in front. I accordingly sent up the rest of
the Imperial Light Infantry available.

I now met Major Bayly, a Staff Officer, from the 4th
Brigade, who informed me that an urgent message for help
had been received from Colonel Crofton, who commanded on
Spion Kop after General Woodgate was wounded. General
Lyttelton had accordingly despatched the Scottish Rifles
as an actual reinforcement, and a battalion of the King’s
Royal Rifles against the hill to the north-west of Spion
Kop. It was on the further slope of this hill that one of
the Vickers-Maxim guns was placed. (This battalion worked
its way some distance up the hill, but its action did not
materially affect the situation.)

I now again received an urgent appeal for support, this
time for the centre and left. I sent the Scottish Rifles.

I now had only as a reserve Bethune’s Mounted Infantry
and the Dorsetshire Regiment. These I retained and they
were not engaged at the actual front.

The shell fire was most galling, and was aimed not
only at the summit, but at the crest of the spur leading
up, along which reinforcements and parties bringing back
wounded had to pass. The fire came--

1. From field guns firing shrapnel and common shell,
situated, as I endeavoured to point out in a signal
message to you, north-west of our position.

2. From a Vickers-Maxim, in about the same direction.

3. From a similar gun to the north-east.

All these were beyond the effective rifle fire, and
our supporting artillery on and about Three Tree Hill
and on the Dragoon’s Maxim position apparently could
not see them; consequently they poured, unchecked, an
uninterrupted cross fire on to our position from about 8
A.M. till dark--ten hours.

Losses were very heavy, owing to the numbers
necessarily assembled to hold back the Boer frontal
attack, established under cover, and in which they showed
gallantry in pushing forward to our lines. Colonel
Crofton was now reported wounded, and the command of the
troops in front devolved on Colonel Hill, Commanding 10th
Brigade.

So the situation continued until 6 P.M., when I wrote
a report and despatched it to you by Colonel Morris,
A.A.G. (I request that this document, to save labour,
may be attached). I first showed this to Colonel Hill,
and he concurred, even taking exception to my reference
to a retirement. I had no doubt that the infantry, which
had so gallantly held its own all day, would be able to
continue to do so when the shell fire abated at nightfall.

I accordingly went back to my reserves, having
personally handed over command at the summit to Colonel
Hill.

About 9.30 P.M., in consequence of your orders, I left
for your camp, leaving a Staff Officer (Captain Phillips)
behind. The narrative must now be his.

About 11.30 P.M. this officer, who was sleeping, was
awakened by the sound of men moving, and found a general
retirement proceeding.

He allowed no one to pass after this, stopped the
Scottish Rifles, and collected a large number of
stragglers of the Dorset, Middlesex, and Imperial Light
Infantry. Bethune’s Mounted Infantry and the bulk of the
Dorsets remained in position as posted in support to the
front line. The other corps had gone down the hill.

He then published memorandum attached,[19] to all
commanders, except Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, who had
gone on; but they did not act upon it, urging that they
had had distinct orders from Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft,
who, as far as I knew, was only assisting Colonel Crofton
in a portion of the front line, to retire.

We now held the spur to within about 300 yards of the
summit, but the summit itself was evacuated. Signal
communication could not be established at the moment, as
the lamp which the signalling officer counted upon ran
out of oil, and some time was lost in obtaining another.

About 1.30 A.M. a person, not by his speech an
Englishman, was brought in on suspicion by a picquet. He
made a statement to the effect that a naval gun would
shortly be brought up, and requested that it might not be
fired on. This was the first intimation of any naval gun
coming to Spion Kop.

About 2.20 A.M. a naval officer reported that he
had one 12-pr. gun below Spion Kop, near the donga on
the west. He said he had orders to take this up to
the summit. When asked whether he could do so before
daylight, he said he could not. As it would be impossible
to move the gun in any line after daybreak, on account
of hostile fire, he was told to stand by in a place of
safety. Signalling communication was now opened, and the
attached message[20] sent.

As Captain Phillips got no instructions, about 2.30
A.M. he ordered vehicles back to a place of safety.
All regimental wagons had been sent across by the
Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General (B), 5th Division.

Shortly after 4 A.M., there still being no orders, and
a mass of transport, small-arm ammunition carts, &c.,
at the donga, steps were taken to cover this passage,
and, with the concurrence of the Officer Commanding
Dorsetshire Regiment, and Officer Commanding Scottish
Rifles, certain dispositions were made with the latter
battalion and about half the former. The other half of
the Dorsetshire Regiment were employed in carrying away a
large number of boxes (about 80) of small-arm ammunition,
brought back from the front and elsewhere.

The Imperial Light Infantry, Middlesex, and
Thorneycroft’s had apparently gone home. Bethune’s were
dismissed.

It was now light, and Boer ‘sniping’ commenced. Captain
Phillips reported to me at the donga, about 4.45 A.M.,
when I was in possession of your order as to the pontoon
crossing.

TALBOT COKE, _Major-General,
Commanding Right Attack_.}}

K

{{CASUALTIES

+------------+----------------+-----------------+--------------------+
| | | Officers | Men |
| Date | ---- +-----------------+--------------------+
| | |Killed |Killed |
| | | Wounded | Wounded |
| | | Missing| Missing|
+------------+----------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------+------+
| January | | | | | | | |
|17th to 20th| 5th Division | 1 | 12 | -- | 26 | 178 | -- |
|20th | 2nd ” | -- | 8 | -- | 4 | 102 | 2 |
|21st | 2nd ” | 1 | 8 | -- | 13 | 131 | 5 |
|22nd | 2nd ” | -- | 1 | -- | 1 | 19 | 1 |
|23rd | 2nd ” | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 14 | -- |
|24th | 2nd ” | 1 | 1 | -- | 4 | 12 | -- |
|24th | 5th ” | 21 | 22 | -- | 139 | 388 | 279 |
|24th | 4th Brigade | 6 | 11 | 6 | 32 | 120 | 2 |
|25th | 2nd Division | -- | -- | -- | -- | 10 | -- |
|26th | 2nd ” | -- | -- | -- | -- | 3 | -- |
|21st, 22nd, | 5th ” | -- | 1 | -- | 1 | 33 | -- |
| 23rd, 25th,| | | | | | | |
| 26th, 27th | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-------+------+
| | Totals | 30 | 64 | 6 | 221 | 1,010 | 289 |
| | | \-----><-----/ | \------><--------/ |
| | | 100 | 1,520 |
|23rd |General Barton’s| | | | | | |
| | force is not | | | | | | |
| | included in | | | | | | |
| | above. He lost | 1 | 1 | -- | 4 | 5 | 11 |
|20th |Lost by General | | | | | | |
| | Lyttelton, not | | | | | | |
| | shown above | -- | 1 | -- | 2 | 13 | 1 |
| | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-------+------+
| | | 1 | 2 | -- | 6 | 18 | 12 |
| | | \-----><----/ | \------><-----/ |
| | Grand Totals | 103 | 1,556 |
|Losses on | | | | | | | |
| 24th | | 28 | 34 | 6 | 175 | 520 | 281 |
| (included | | \-----><-----/ | \-------><------/ |
| above) | Totals | 68 | 976 |
+------------+----------------+-----------------+--------------------+

There are said to have been 243 buried on Spion Kop, so no doubt
many of those shown missing were killed.}}

INDEX

Abyssinia, 31

àCourt, Lieut.-Colonel, 117, 139, 140, 175, 215, 221, 224

Acton Homes, 72, 73, 77-81, 85-90, 93-97, 100, 110, 111, 120, 126,
165, 178, 179, 204, 213, 223

Admiralty, 27, 29, 30

Akaba, 26-28

Alcester, Lord, 29

Anderson, Lieut., 4

Arabi, 28

Arabia Petræa, 25, 32

Atkins, Mr. J. B., 84, 98

Bangor, N. Wales, 2

Barkly, Sir Henry, 12

Barton, Major-General, 237

Bastion Hill, 87, 99, 100, 107, 110, 111

Bayly, Major, 233

Baynes, Bishop, 83, 106

Bechuanaland, 2, 18-20, 32-35, 61

Belmont, 58

Berber, 39

Besant, Sir Walter, 4, 7

Biggarsberg, 164

Bloemfontein, 12

Bloemhof, 20

Blomfield, Colonel, 140, 229

Botha, General Louis, 167

Brand, President, 12, 13

Bridgnorth Grammar School, 2

British Association, 44

Buller, Sir Redvers, 55, 56, 60-62, 66-72, 74, 75, 78, 80-83, 85,
86, 95-99, 106, 108-117, 128, 136, 138, 142, 144, 147, 158,
159, 169-172, 175-180, 183-188, 192, 193, 195, 197-200,
203-209, 211, 215, 218, 222

Burleigh, Mr. Bennet, 85, 107, 137, 140, 157, 159

Burma, 46

Burton, Lieut., 28

Byng, Colonel, 107

Cairo, 40

Cambridge, Duke of, 14, 23, 30, 41

Cape Town, 12, 14, 35, 55, 60

Carlow, 2

Charrington, Lieut., 26, 27

Chatham, 2, 4, 24, 53

Chelmsford, Lord, 20

Cheltenham College, 3

Chief Commissioner of Police, 40, 41

Chieveley, 60, 63-66, 70, 78, 168

Childers, Right Hon. H. C. E., 40

Churchill, Mr. W. S., 80, 101, 107, 128, 155, 189, 231

Clarke, Sir Andrew, 32

Clery, Sir C. F., 62, 65-68, 84, 85, 103-106, 110, 135, 198, 215-218

Clydesdale, 88

Coke, Major-General Talbot, 112, 113, 116, 117, 135-137, 141-145,
148-151, 153, 154, 157, 173-175, 184, 187, 188, 192, 206, 207,
215, 220-227, 230, 232, 236

Colenso, 57, 60, 62, 66, 76, 79, 84, 90, 99, 100, 131, 189

Colesberg, 59

Colonial Office, 20

‘Contemporary Review,’ 119

Cornforth Hill, 18

Cradock, 12

Crimean War, 2

Crofton, Colonel, 140, 141, 143, 146, 152, 196, 208, 224, 225, 230,
233-235

Cronje, 162

Daniels Kuil, 17

Debe Nek, 16

Dekiel Drift, 203

Delagoa Bay, 14

Diamond Fields, 12

Diamond Fields Horse, 16, 17

Dooner, Lieut., 193

Doorn Kloof, 76, 77, 90

-- Kop, 63

Dordrecht, 15

Douglas, 59

Dover, 9

Drakensberg Mountains, 89, 98, 126

Dublin, 2

Dufferin, Lord, 39

Dundonald, Lord, 107

Durban, 56, 62

Egypt, 25, 27, 32

Election Address, 37, 38

Enfield, 10

Ermelo, 121

Eslin, 58

Estcourt, 62, 66

Everard, Dr., 120

Fair View, 77, 81, 86, 88, 92-95, 97, 101, 104, 110, 111, 199, 204,
214, 217, 219, 223

Ford, Commandant, 18

Forster, Right Hon. W. E., 32

Fort Canning, 48

French, Major-General, 59

Frere, 62-66, 76, 209, 212

Frere, Sir Bartle, 14, 192

Gaika War, 16, 23

Gatacre, Major-General, 57

Gibraltar, 2, 4, 133

Gill, Captain, 25-27

Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., 28

Gomaperi, 18

Gordon, General C. G., 31

Goshenland, 33

Griqualand West, 2, 11-23, 25, 32

Grobelaar’s Kloof, 76

Groote Hoek, 81, 86-88, 90, 93, 94, 97, 111, 199

Grove, Sir George, 4

Guildford, 4

Hadendowa Arabs, 39

Hanwell, Captain, 193

Harrismith Pass, 79, 89, 98, 100

Hart, Major-General, 65, 72, 73, 84, 92, 105, 107, 108, 112, 218

Hatting’s Farm, 212, 215

Haydon, F. M., 4

-- S., 4

Haynes, Lieut., 28

Hewett, Sir W., 26

Hicks-Beach, Sir M., 23, 24

Hildyard, Major-General, 62, 65, 66, 74, 84, 107, 112, 215, 216

Hill, Colonel, 146, 149, 152, 153, 174, 194, 196, 208, 230, 233-235

Hongers Poort, 179

Hospital Sangar, 145, 152

Hughes, M. A., 1, 2

-- W., 2

Irwin, Major, 211

Isandhlwana, 19

Jamestown, 15

Jerusalem, 4, 7, 8, 9

Jubilee, Queen’s, 41

Kaal Kafirs, 17, 18

Kaffraria, 16

Kalahari Desert, 22

Keate-Award, 19

Kennedy, Quartermaster-Sergeant, 28

Khartoum, 31

Kimberley, 12, 14, 18-20, 56, 57, 163, 165

King William’s Town, 17

Kitchener, Lord, 60

Kruger, President, 33-36

Ladysmith, 55-57, 61, 62, 65-67, 69, 75, 77, 78, 80, 84, 88, 95-100,
107, 122, 123, 129, 160, 164, 168, 170-172, 179, 205, 208

Lancers Hill, 76, 77

Lanyon, Sir O., 12, 17, 18, 21, 22

Litako, 21

Llangwani, 131

Look-out Hill, 80

Lyttelton, Major-General, 73-75, 80, 83, 84, 143, 175, 233, 237

Mafeking, 36

Majesfontein, 57

Majuba, 33, 59

Manyering, 18

Matthews, Rt. Hon. H., 40, 42, 43

Maxwell, Dr. R., 119, 163

Methuen, Lord, 34, 56, 58, 60

Middle Drift, 73

Mitchell, Sir C., 50

Mobilisation, 47, 48

Modder River, 57, 60

Mokolokue’s Mountain, 19, 22

Moteto, 18

Monte Christo, 131

Morosi’s Mountain, 21

Morris, Colonel A. W., 192, 234

Moses Wells, 26

Mount Alice, 66, 77, 85, 120, 131

‘Murray’s Magazine,’ 42

Nakhl, 26, 28

Natal, 1, 55, 56, 61, 62, 70, 78, 85, 88, 101, 169, 192

‘National Review,’ 75, 124

New Forest Manœuvres, 53

Oliver’s Hoek, 89

Oppenheim, Mr., 173

Orange Free State, 11-14, 25, 57, 78, 88-90, 97, 98, 112

Orange River, 13, 23

Paarde Kloof, 18, 21

Pahang, 46

Palestine, 4, 32

Palmer, Professor, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 39

Perak, 46

Perie Bush, 16

Phillips, Captain, 153-157, 207, 235, 236

Pieters, 76, 102, 131

Pilcher, Colonel, 59

Platrand, 160

Police, 40, 41

Porrit’s Drift, 65

Port Elizabeth, 12

Potgieter’s Drift, 62, 65-68, 70, 73-78, 80-82, 84, 85, 87-90, 95-99,
107, 115, 125, 126, 143, 169, 193, 194, 204, 209, 210, 212,
214, 219

Pretoria, 14

Pretorius Farm, 63-65

Prince of Wales, 41

‘Punch,’ 42-44

Ramsay, Professor, 3

Ramsgate, 54

Rangeworthy Hills, 73, 79, 87, 91, 92, 96-102, 126, 129-132, 199

Red Sea Littoral, 39

Rhodes, Rt. Hon. Cecil, 15

Riet River, 203

Roberts, Field-Marshal Lord, 57, 60, 81, 86, 97, 117, 158, 171, 196,
203, 208, 209

Robinson, Sir Hercules, 34

Rooi Grond, 36

Rosalie, 81, 86, 94, 95, 97, 101, 219, 223

Salisbury, Lord, 41

Sargent, Major H. N., 190

Scratchley, Sir Peter, 10, 11

Sekukuni’s Town, 21

Selangor, 46

Seymour, Sir B., 29

Seyolo, 16

Sheerness, 52

Sheffield, 37

Shoeburyness, 9, 10

Siam, 46

Sim, Lieut.-Colonel, 155, 157, 194, 196, 226

Singapore, 44, 49

Skiet’s Drift, 68, 76, 82

Smith, Sir Cecil, 51

Spearman’s Hill, 66, 69, 71, 74, 75, 209, 212, 217, 219, 220

Spion Kop, 67, 68, 72, 77, 80-82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 96,
98-101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 110-119, 123, 126, 129-135, 138,
139, 142-144, 147, 150, 156, 158-164, 167-174, 182-184, 186,
189, 190, 192-197, 200, 203-207, 210, 212, 214, 215, 219-227,
232-237

Springfield, 63-66, 69-72, 144, 209-213

Stanley, Colonel, 23

-- Dean, 5

Stellaland, 32

Stephenson, Captain, 29

Stormberg, 57

Straits Settlements, 44-47, 50

Suakin, 39, 40

Suez, 26, 29

Sugarloaf Hill, 87, 107

Syria, 25, 26

Tabi Ndoda, 16

Takoon, 18, 21

Tanglin, 48

‘Temple or the Tomb,’ 8

Thaba Njama, 120, 137, 165, 166

Thames District, 51, 52

Thorneycroft, Lieut.-Col. A. W., 136-138, 140, 142, 145-148, 150-158,
170-175, 184-189, 193-195, 205-207, 221-229, 231, 235, 236

Three Tree Hill, 104, 129, 132, 133, 138-141, 156, 189, 204, 232, 234

Tor, 27

Trafalgar Square, 40, 41

Transvaal, 32, 33, 36, 78, 90, 112, 119

Trichard’s Drift, 67, 69, 71, 72, 75, 78, 81, 85, 86, 90, 95, 100,
115, 150, 203, 210, 212, 213, 217, 219, 224, 227

Tugela, 1, 56, 62, 65-67, 69, 71, 72, 74-81, 87, 89, 92, 95, 99, 116,
118, 121, 125, 126, 132, 133, 159, 163, 164, 177, 178, 181,
203, 204, 212-216, 218, 219, 223

Underground Jerusalem, 5, 8

‘United Service Magazine,’ 123

Vaal Krantz, 76

-- River, 13, 17

Van Reenen’s Pass, 89, 113, 122, 165

Venter’s Laager, 73, 92, 93, 96, 180, 199, 219

-- Spruit, 93, 94, 125, 126, 128, 213

Villiers, Mr. J. E. de, 12

Waggon Drift, 84

Waltham Abbey, 10

Warren, Lieut.-General Sir C., Biographical Sketch, 1-54

Warren, Major-General Sir C., 1

-- Very Rev. John, 2

Waterboer, 11, 12

Weenen, 122

Wem Grammar School, 2

White, Sir George, 55, 56, 60, 218

Williams, Major E. J., 190, 191

Wilson, Captain Holmes, 130

-- Sir Charles, 4

Wolseley, Lord, 32

Wood, Lieut.-Colonel G. K., 150

Woodgate, Major-General, 72, 73, 84, 92, 116, 117, 135-141, 165, 181,
184, 185, 213, 215, 220, 221, 224, 226, 227, 229, 232, 233

Wright’s Farm, 72, 189, 213, 232

Zagazig, 27

Zanzibar, 14

Zoutspan Drift, 176

Zwart Kop, 77, 126

PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO. LTD., NEW-STREET SQUARE
LONDON

London: Smith Elder & Co. _Stanford’s Geog^l Estab^t London._]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Warren was promoted to be Captain on 20th October 1869.

[2] 11th November 1882.

[3] See reproduction.

[4] See pages 67 to 69.

[5] Potgieter’s Drift.

[6] Called Three Tree Hill.

[7] ‘London to Ladysmith viâ Pretoria.’

[8] N.B.--Black marginal line indicates that portions so marked were not published with the despatches, 1900.

[9] See D.

[10] See C.

[11] See pages 62 to 66.

[12] See pages 67 to 69.

[13] See page 103.

[14]

{{Hatting’s Farm: 30th January, 1900.

The Chief of Staff,--With reference to my report on the operations
on the Tugela, already forwarded, will you please attach the
accompanying addition?

C. WARREN, _Lieut.-General, Commanding 5th Division_.

Hatting’s Farm: 30th January, 1900.

I omitted to state that during the afternoon of the 22nd the
Commander-in-Chief proposed an attack upon the enemy’s position on
our left flank that night. I summoned at once the General Officers
available--namely, Generals Clery, Talbot Coke, and Hildyard.
General Clery, who was in command of the left attack, did not
consider it advisable to make this attack, because, if successful,
it would commit us to taking the whole line of the enemy’s
position, which he considered a hazardous proceeding, as we might
not be able to hold it. In this I concurred, more particularly as
it was evidently too late in the day to carry the operation out
effectively.

C. WARREN, _Lieut.-General, Commanding 5th Division_.

I continually proposed to General Warren that he should attack the
enemy’s right, which was _en l’air_ and not strong, and which it
was part of the original programme to try and turn, but I never
suggested doing this hurriedly or without adequate forethought and
preparation.--R. B.}}

[15] See pages 104 and 105 for substance of Sir C. F. Clery’s Report. The Report of Major-General Hildyard is not reprinted.

[16] C.

[17] See G.

[18] See H.

[19] See page 154.

[20] See page 156.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Section F in the Appendix is a reproduction of a Report by Sir
Charles Warren and has several sidenotes in the margin. The
Sidenote ‘A’ is referenced from section E. Sidenote ‘1’ appears
twice in one paragraph but is shown only once in this etext.

Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the
text and consultation of external sources.

Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.

Pg 120: ‘Thaba Mjama’ replaced by ‘Thaba Njama’.

Index: ‘Sarjent’ replaced by ‘Sargent’.
Index: ‘Van Renen’ replaced by ‘Van Reenen’.