Chapter VI: After Withdrawal--Boer Comments

On the morning of 25th January Sir Redvers Buller went over to see Sir Charles Warren and decided to assume command and to withdraw to the south side of the Tugela. Then General Warren ‘made his retirement memorable for speed and orderliness,’ and by 8 A.M. on 27th January ‘the force was concentrated south of the Tugela, without the loss of a man or a pound of stores.’ That the retirement was effected without molestation by the Boers is evidence that the capture of Spion Kop had surprised them and the week’s fighting and bombardment had demoralised them.

But if the retirement from Spion Kop was a surprise to Sir Charles Warren and to Sir Redvers Buller, it was equally so to the Boers. Mr. Bennet Burleigh tells us:

‘In the morning, after daybreak, the enemy could scarcely credit
their senses that our soldiers had left the hill-top. “Where are
the soldiers?” the few Boer scouts who rode forward under the white
flag asked our surgeons and ambulance men. “Gone!” “What for?”
And subsequently it leaked out from several of them that they had
thought the position was lost and they had begun trekking.’

It is interesting to note the views of those on the Boer side. For instance, in the article in the ‘United Service Magazine,’ giving the diary already referred to of a Boer officer, we find the following observations:

‘The English had employed the night (23rd to 24th January) in
making some wide but low shallow trenches, with corresponding
parapets of stones, earth, and sods to shelter behind.... These
trenches had been established more or less in the centre of the
plateau, which was a fatal blunder, this being the very spot where,
in the circumstances, a concentrated artillery fire would tell with
the deadliest effect.

‘The fight dragged on until the evening, and the position was
not recaptured. Those Federals who left the hill at dark thought
that the effort to dislodge the English had been a failure--that
the fight was lost. It seemed a Platrand fiasco over again,
notwithstanding the fine work done by the Federal artillery, and
the fact that the retaking of a position like Spion Kop was an
easier task than the storming of a defence like Platrand.

‘The night of the 24th to the 25th was one of confused and chaotic
panic, which strongly savoured of the beginning of a rout. In the
estimation of many the hour of hasty retreat had no doubt sounded,
and horses’ heads were turned Ladysmithwards without waste of time.
It was expected that the English would make an attack in force
next morning, or perhaps in the night, but the demoralisation was
so great that no regular watches were kept all along the line of
defence in the proximity of Spion Kop. Here and there, it is true,
some determined fellows clubbed together with the resolve to have
one more trial the next morning, but there is no doubt that if
the British had attacked that night the Federals would have made
but poor resistance at the utmost, and that their rout would have
been a matter of course. Had the English only held the Spion Kop
in force until the morning, a second struggle, weakened as the
Federals were, would have meant an heroic effort, a short fight,
and the success of the English.

‘It was with feelings of blended wonder and thankfulness that some
of the Pretoria men and some Free Staters under Commandant Cronje,
on climbing the Kop at daybreak, found it tenanted only by corpses
and some wounded. Lo! the English had gone! Was it possible? It
might be a trap! But no, it was the truth: no soldiers, with the
exception of the harmless dead and crippled Khakis, were in sight.
The incredible news spread.

‘The exultation of the foreigners at the new gift of victory made
to the Federals by English incompetency was great. The remarks
uttered in different languages may be condensed in the words of a
German officer whose critical judgment was short and to the point:
“Wahrhaftig! Dummheit gegen Unwissenheit.” (“Truly, stupidity
against ignorance.”) The Boers, hardly knowing what exultation
means, were less loud and less given to criticise, but the
astonishment they manifested was a censure not to be gainsaid....
Why the English abandoned the Kop in the night from the 24th to
the 25th is for me and many others somewhat of a mystery.’

Mr. Raymond Maxwell, in the Boer ambulance, records in his diary:

‘_January 24th._--It was rumoured last night that Kimberley had
fallen, but this is most likely spread about owing to the critical
position at Upper Tugela.

‘Fighting began to be very heavy at Upper Tugela early this
morning, and a very big affair is going on. At mid-day news came
that the English had occupied Spion Kop, a high ridge to the left
of the Boer positions, and completely commanding them, during the
night. The Boers stormed the hill at daylight, and got to the
ridge, and then fearful fighting began at practically point-blank
ranges. Our artillery and pom-poms were posted so as to shell the
top, and the English are suffering severely, though still sticking
to the position. After sundown news came that somewhere about
1,000 troops were taken prisoners on the top. At dark the burghers
decided that they had had enough of it, and retired and left the
troops in possession of the Kop. Wild rumours are flying about,
and everything is beginning to point to a general retirement on to
Ladysmith, or possibly to the Biggarsberg. It is even said that the
Upper Tugela laagers have begun to pack up and prepare to trek.
Boers killed said to number forty.

‘Owing to the confusion it is impossible to get authentic news.
Two light carriages arrived to-day to transport my wounded, but no
mules were sent to drag them.

‘_January 25th._--All the morning the excitement has been terrible.
This evening news came that for some inscrutable reason the English
retired from Spion Kop the night of the fight or early this
morning. The burghers are wild with delight, and are now beginning
to claim a great and glorious victory. The English have suffered
heavy losses, and then go and throw up a hard-won position--a
position which practically meant the relief of Ladysmith. From it
they could have flanked all the Lower Tugela positions, i.e. if the
burghers had remained in them to be flanked. Between Spion Kop and
Ladysmith is country easy to negotiate, with good roads and good
enough water. With Spion Kop and the Acton Homes positions being
held, it would have been possible to make use of the Van Reenen
main road to bring the convoys up. Goodness only knows what will
happen now, though they still hold the Thaba Nyama ridges and may
be able to break through from there.

‘Prisoners number 250, mostly Lancashire Fusiliers. The Boer
loss is 200 certain, and an uncertain number unaccounted for.
The English loss must have been very heavy, as our artillery was
playing on to them all the time. General Woodgate is said to have
been killed.

‘The rumour of Kimberley’s surrender is now denied.

‘_January 26th._--It now appears that the English made a great
blunder in the manner in which they took up their positions on the
top of the hill. They surprised and drove off the Boer picket, and
then started to intrench. Instead of intrenching along the front
ridge, they threw up trenches in the middle of the top; and varying
from fifty to 150 yards from the edge. The Boers were thus enabled
to climb up their side of the hill without being fired on, and as
soon as they reached the ridge the positions of the two forces were
equal, or, rather, the Boers had the better of it, as the English
artillery could not get at them.

‘If the trenches had been at the front edge, not a Boer could have
got up, as the ascent is very, very steep.

* * * * *

‘_January 31st._--I rode over and saw the schanzes, trenches,
&c., of our men, and the English at Thaba Nyama. The two
positions extend for a long way, nearly parallel to each other.
The Boer positions consisted of long isolated trenches dug in
the bare veldt, and for Boer positions were undoubtedly weak and
unsatisfactory. The English had schanzed the long ridge for a great
distance. The schanzes were beautifully made, and in many places
were compartments large enough to hold three men lying down. The
distance between the positions varied from 1,000 yards in some
places to 1,800 in others. In front of the English left was a sort
of kloof. Between one edge of this and the schanzes was a flat of
about eighty yards. Between the other edge and a long Boer trench
was an open slope of about 100 yards. For some reason the English
would jump out from the schanzes in batches of twenty-five or
thirty men, and make a run for the kloof, and it was while doing
this that most of the English were shot. If they had waited till
dark, as many men as required could have got into the kloof without
any risk, and then a night attack or a rush on the trench could
have been made at daylight. This was what the Boers were afraid
of for five or six days. The country at the back of the trench is
often rolling veldt, affording no cover for any retiring force, and
if an attack had been made the Boers would have had to have stopped
and made a fight of it. There were millions of empty cartridges
lying about, and also several unburied soldiers.

‘_February 2nd._--I rode up to the top of Spion Kop and had a
good look round. General Botha had obtained a twenty-four hours’
armistice, so that the English dead might be properly buried, as
our men had to hold the position and the stench was too dreadful.

* * * * *

‘In some places the English trenches were just behind one another,
and quite parallel, and in the flurry and excitement of the fight
it would be surprising if some of the men in the front trenches
were not shot from behind. From the Kop we could also see Chieveley
and Ladysmith, and the people in the latter must have been able
to see the fight and the Boer retreat, and what they must have
suffered the next day, when it dawned on them that the English were
not going to hold the position after having won it, can be easily
imagined.’