Chapter IV: Boer Demoralisation--Tactical Importance of Spion Kop

Before relating the capture of Spion Kop and the events of 24th January, it will not be amiss to see how the other side regarded the British operations up to this time, and what importance they attached to the position of Spion Kop; and, further, how far it was tactically sound to occupy the hill in the circumstances.

In the diary of Mr. Raymond Maxwell, published in the ‘Contemporary Review’ of March 1901, we have the daily notes of a busy doctor in the Boer ambulance, who jots down shortly any scraps of information he hears about the operations going on. The doctor was not a Boer, nor even a naturalised burgher of the Transvaal, but a British subject who for three years had practised as a medical man in the Transvaal and, when war became imminent, was asked to take the place of his colleague, Dr. Everard, who was down with malaria, in charge of a Boer ambulance, until Dr. Everard should be well enough to relieve him. As refusal meant expulsion and the loss of all his property, he consented to act, considering that at any rate under the Red Cross flag he was in a neutral position. His diary, which extends from 28th September 1899 to 20th February 1900, when Dr. Everard was well enough to relieve him, is instructive and illuminating, and from it we quote the following extracts, made during some of the days we have been considering:

‘_January 20th._--The English are now trekking for Acton Homes,
and have occupied Mount Alice, on which they have posted artillery
to cover the advance. A patrol from the Pretorian commando was
surprised and cut off--forty-eight killed, wounded, and missing.

‘The two forces are now getting into touch, and the English are
evidently going to try and obtain the Thaba Njama (Black Mountain)
ridge.

‘_January 21st._--Severe fighting going on. The English have got
on to the ridge, and have put up schanzes all along it, and at
some points are only eight hundred to nine hundred yards from our
trenches. Our men are beginning to get very jumpy and nervous,
as their trenches are lying mostly in open rolling country, and,
according to many of the Burghers, could be rushed. There has been
continuous rifle fire from the various schanzes and trenches all
day. Two Ermelo men have been killed and five wounded. Total Boer
casualties up there, so far, are sixty. The English artillery
is magnificent, so much so that our guns can only be worked at
intervals.

‘_January 22nd._--All eyes are now directed to the Upper Tugela,
and there is no doubt affairs there are becoming critical. The
strain of the continuous fighting is beginning to tell on the
Burghers, more especially as there are every day more or less
casualties in the trenches. The Burghers get into the trenches
before daylight, and then have to remain in them till they are
relieved the next morning before daybreak. The country is too open
and exposed for them to leave the trenches, unless it is dark.
Moreover, they are expecting a rush some morning early, or a night
attack.

‘_January 23rd._--Excitement everywhere is intense, and if things
continue like this for a few days longer, the Boers will break
and run. Things are hanging in the balance, and the officers and
burghers are looking more anxious now than when retreating through
Weenen. The English have only to win through our trenches to the
Ladysmith-Van Reenen road, i.e. about one mile of open rolling
country, and then Ladysmith is practically relieved.

‘Owing to the Boer trenches not being “cast-iron” positions, and
chiefly because they have no good back door to them, the Boers do
not like them, and I verily believe the English are going to break
through at last. The wear and tear and strain of the last two days’
fighting is telling very much on the burghers.’

Here we have evidence that Sir Charles Warren’s plan of advancing step by step after periods of continuous bombardment was demoralising the Boers, and that another day or two of such bombardment would have enabled the British to rush the Boer trenches with success.

A writer of a paper entitled ‘Pages from the Diary of a Boer Officer,’ by another of them, contributed to the ‘United Service Magazine’ of February 1902, says, in reference to the importance of Spion Kop:

‘The centre and key of the line of defence was Spion Kop, a
flat-topped hill, which through its height dominated all the
federal positions.... Besides being the central position this
hill was the key of the federal line of defence and thus most
important--the taking and the holding of Spion Kop by the English
meaning the defeat of the Republicans and the relief of Ladysmith.’

With regard to the question--Was it tactically right to capture this hill?--said by both sides to be the key of the position, it seems an absurd question to ask; for if the advance could have been accomplished without taking it, it could not rightly be called the key of the position. Nevertheless, some critics have maintained that its capture was a blunder, and that, had it not been abandoned, our chances of success would have been no greater.

Sir Charles Warren has discussed this question in one of his contributions to the ‘National Review’ in 1901 on ‘Some Lessons from the South African War,’ and it will not be out of place to quote his views on the subject which are given in the following extract:

‘_The Capture of a Hill._--Commanding sites in the vicinity of
contending troops must always attract attention, because there is
a natural impulse in man to strive for the higher ground. Recent
criticisms, however, have rather deprecated this longing and have
minimised the advantages the higher ground presents from a failure
to comprehend the principles which govern the subject.

‘It is quite true that in the defence of flat-topped hills, such as
are found in South Africa, it is difficult to obtain a good fire
down the steep slopes from trenches running along the edge or outer
crest, without partly exposing the defenders. It is also admitted
that strong positions can be taken up in gently swelling low ground
with good glacis, or flat surfaces, for frontal fire; but the
command of view from the summits of hills, and the immunity from
being seen, must for a long time to come be powerful factors in the
choice of defensive lines.

‘The Boers, with a shrewdness and skill which smacks somewhat of
European military aid, have, in cases where practicable, taken
advantage of both conditions, by holding the outer edges, or
crests, of flat-topped hills lightly, and by placing their main
trenches about a mile behind on the hill’s comparatively flat
surface. They thus derived all the advantage of the smooth glacis
for frontal fire, while they had command of view without being seen
into, could not in many instances be touched by long-range guns,
and in a great measure debarred the attack from using field guns
against them, because the only positions they could be placed in
were under rifle fire.

‘For example, we may refer to the two Boer positions in front of
Potgieter’s and Venter’s Spruit. The former was strongly situated
in the low swelling ground north of the Tugela, but it could be
seen into and bombarded by long-range guns at 7,000 yards, at a
height of some 600 feet above it, and from as many field guns
as could be brought together at 3,500 yards in the lowland north
of the Tugela. The Venter’s Spruit position, on the other hand,
extending from the Rangeworthy farm round by Acton Homes, and
thence into the Drakensberg, was quite as strongly situated on
the swelling ground of the comparatively flat hill-top; but it
also possessed the enormous advantage that the hills on which it
was situated were over 1,000 feet above the Tugela, and thus it
could not be seen into or dominated by our long-range guns, and
with difficulty could field guns be brought against it: moreover,
from it could be seen the movements of our troops. The main camps
of the enemy were behind Spion Kop and Acton Homes, and were thus
nearer the western position than the eastern. It is not too much to
say that, had there been a high hill or a balloon in the vicinity
overlooking the Venter’s Spruit position as Zwart Kop does that of
Potgieter’s, the great strength of that position would have been
more fully appreciated.

‘Let us now consider the advantage of occupying hills in the line
of the advance of an attack. They are obvious, both on account
of the command of view they afford of the enemy’s position, and
because they screen from view and from fire a portion of the
attack; but it is to be noted that the reverse slopes only of those
hills can be securely held, not the flat summits. The only case in
which it may be generally disadvantageous to hold a hill is when it
is in such proximity to the enemy’s lines that it can be taken in
reverse or all round by the enemy’s fire.

‘A most conspicuous instance of the secure holding of a hill within
the enemy’s lines occurred on 24th February, after the failure of
the attack on the isolated position of Hart’s Hill. During the
retirement the 1st Battalion Durham Light Infantry kept possession
of a nook or kloof on the side of that hill which could not be
reached by the enemy’s fire, and from which neither rifle fire nor
shell could dislodge them. To the eye from afar they seemed to be
in a perilous position, but they were secure.

‘The holding of such a position is not alluded to in our drill-book
or in tactical works, nor is it likely to be in favour with book
tacticians for a long time to come; it is of too practical a
character--the natural outcome of our troops returning to primitive
ways and instinctively securing a position they could hold under
stress of severe fire. The tactics of the future must eventually
recognise the importance of the method of holding a hill, for it
was by clinging to the reverse slope of hills that we were enabled
to relieve Ladysmith with so comparatively small a loss when
advancing against a superior force.

‘It was in this manner that we held our ground against superior
numbers on the hills above Venter’s Spruit from 17th to 25th
January 1900. Sir R. Buller describes our troops on this occasion
as perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill, admitting
of no second line, and in his telegram of 27th January he says,
“The actual position held was perfectly tenable.” Mr. Winston
Churchill describes the position as follows: “The infantry had
made themselves masters of all the edge of the plateau, and the
regiments clustered in the steep re-entrants like flies on the
side of a wall.” All through our advance on Ladysmith the reverse
slopes of hills we captured sheltered our forces.

* * * * *

‘Let us consider Spion Kop as a hill on the line of our
advance--was its capture likely to be advantageous or not?

‘The summit at its southern extremity (the highest point of all the
range) outflanked and could see down into our position at Three
Tree Hill, and though just out of rifle range this was an undoubted
advantage to the enemy. Moreover, it was higher by about 150 feet
than any portion of the enemy’s lines, and could enfilade their
trenches at long rifle range, and could see into their works, and
also dominate their camps to the north.

‘Evidently it was a desirable position for either side to hold; but
while the enemy could not (according to their mode of fighting)
put guns upon it, it could, if in our possession, be so utilised.
Our guns, placed on the lower slopes, could search out some of the
enemy’s guns behind the Rangeworthy hills, and guns placed on the
summit (as they might have been ultimately) would have forced the
enemy to retire from the Rangeworthy position, not necessarily
altogether, but to take up a new position they had prepared further
to the east. It was thus desirable as a possession if it were not
an absolutely necessary objective in our advance.’

Captain Holmes Wilson in his ‘Relief of Ladysmith’ states that only the passive occupation of Spion Kop was contemplated, that ‘the passive occupation of Spion Kop could never have led to anything,’ that Spion Kop should not have been occupied unless it was intended to make at the same time a general advance along the whole line, and that ‘the mere fact of going to the top of a high hill cannot constitute a tactical success as long as the enemy’s moral courage lasts; when, however, the movement draws the fire of the whole of the opposing army it is more likely to end in a disaster than in defeat.’

These statements of Captain Wilson bristle with misapprehensions and misconceptions, and may be resolved into seven points on which explanations are necessary.

(1) As to the advantages or disadvantages of holding a hill in
the line of advance of an attacking force, the advantages are:
(_a_) that the hill may give command of fire and a view of part
of the enemy’s line; (_b_) that it cannot so readily be seen into
or commanded by fire; and (_c_) that it gives protection from the
enemy’s fire to troops properly placed behind it. The disadvantages
arise when the hill projects so far into the enemy’s line that it
can be taken in flank or in reverse by the enemy’s fire.

(2) The advantages of the occupation of hills during the war are
exemplified in the following: Rangeworthy, Mount Alice, Zwart Kop,
Hussar Hill, The Gomba, Monte Christo, Llangwani, Colenso Hills,
Hart’s Hill, and Pieters, with many others. In all these cases the
hill was more or less exposed, but there were not such strenuous
endeavours on the part of the Boers, and the British troops had
learnt their lesson and knew how to dispose of themselves.

(3) Had Spion Kop been within the enemy’s line of defence so that
the enemy could fire along its front or into its front, i.e. get a
fire on it of an arc of 180° or more, a passive occupation could
not have been carried out, and a general advance would have been
required. But Spion Kop was actually within the British line. The
arc of the enemy’s fire directed on Spion Kop did not exceed 100°,
i.e. not more than on any other position we held in our advance.
The statement that it drew the fire of the whole Boer army is
ludicrously impossible. The whole rifle fire of the enemy at short
range was confined to an arc of about 100°, and could not have been
from more than about 500 Boers. At long ranges it was confined to a
hill in one direction at 2,000 yards distance. The guns that could
fire on to it were from (i) a position in front of Three Tree Hill,
(ii) east of Spion Kop, (iii) hill behind Spion Kop. Spion Kop was
perfectly tenable, quite as tenable as any of the hills already
named. The only difference was that in the case of Spion Kop the
troops were all new, in the other cases they had learnt their
severe lesson. It is impossible to compare the action of the troops
on Spion Kop with their action subsequently.

(4) Spion Kop is not abnormally high. It is 1,500 feet above the
Tugela, while the general line of Boer trenches on the Rangeworthy
hills is about 1,200 to 1,300 feet above the Tugela. Spion
Kop, when it was occupied by us, was about 150 feet above the
point--400 yards distant, occupied by the Boers. The Spion Kop
range shelves down gradually to the east. It is about 500 feet
above Three Tree Hill, and 500 to 600 feet above the neck, where it
becomes steep. It is not a very formidable hill. It is about the
height above the Tugela that the Rock gun at Gibraltar is above the
level of the sea; but then the point where the ascent was commenced
was 400 feet above the Tugela, and carts could go some 400 feet
higher, so that the climb at most was only 700 feet, or half the
height of Gibraltar. A man in good condition could walk up and down
several times during the day without fatigue. There was nothing
formidable in the climb.

(5) The statement that the passive occupation of Spion Kop could
not lead to anything is not borne out by the facts. The troops on
Spion Kop had already outflanked the Boer position, and the Boer
camp at the front of the hill had to be moved.

(6) Moreover, it is incorrect to say that only a passive occupation
of Spion Kop was contemplated. The occupation of Spion Kop was
necessary before an advance could take place, but when it was
captured the advance could be made, and would have been made if the
hill had not been abandoned.

(7) The position occupied by the troops on the top of Spion Kop
is described elsewhere, and was, no doubt, wrong. The inner crest
should have been occupied in the first instance.

To sum up:

(1) There are decided advantages in the occupation of a hill in
line of the advance to attack, if it be not abnormally high.

(2) The advantage was practically shown by the occupation of hills
in similar positions to Spion Kop all through the war.

(3) Spion Kop was advantageously placed for occupation.

(4) It was not abnormally high.

(5) A passive occupation of it was sufficient at first, and in
itself caused the Boers to shift their camp and turned their
positions.

(6) The passive occupation would have given place to an active one
on the following day, when the Boers could not have held their
trenches.

(7) The position was one that should have been held.