Chapter VI: 165 (2)

The enemy had started registration by aeroplane, which caused other observers than sentries to be on the watch. And then it was seen that the Germans were wearing steel helmets instead of the usual soft caps. The aerial activity increased, and soon heavy enemy fire was opened between Mœuvres and Bourlon. The registration on the 56th Divisional front was followed by slow, steady bombardment, which increased, until about a quarter to ten a heavy barrage crashed down on the whole front. It was obvious that an attack was impending, and the S.O.S. rockets were sent up.

The enemy barrage, which consisted of light howitzers, field guns, and trench mortars, was particularly heavy on the blocks in the captured communication trenches. Gradually the German guns lifted, and at 10.15 a.m. the enemy swarmed forward to the attack.

A glance at the map will show the precarious position, not only of the 56th Division and neighbouring units, but of the whole of the Third 197 Army troops engaged in the salient. South of the salient the Germans were through our lines, and if they broke through in the north an unparalleled disaster would be inflicted on the British Army. The Germans tried hard. During the day no less than five set attacks were launched, the heaviest with eleven lines of infantry advancing in succession to the assault. We wish to emphasise the position of the IV and III Corps and the general situation in the salient, for if the 56th Division failed to stand fast (and we know they could not be called fresh troops) the fate of the two Corps was sealed. On no portion of the front attacked could the Germans hope to gain a greater success than on the part held by the 56th Division.

The intricate nature of the Hindenburg Line, although it afforded the attackers cover for assembly close up to the troops of the 56th Division, had its disadvantages. Small bodies of defenders could inflict incalculable loss and, though surrounded, could break up the attack so that it only trickled through feebly; but, of course, they must be good men.

The 56th proved themselves once more to be good men. The German storming parties were most cleverly supported by their trench mortars and field artillery. A deluge of shells descended on the posts holding the blocks in the communication trenches, and the enemy infantry supplemented the bombardment with rifle grenades. The artillery lifted slowly, and as it moved so the infantry, assembled at the other side of the blocks, leapt out on the parapet and attempted to rush the defending post. At the same time other infantry advanced over the open from the main trenches.

With such a short distance between opposing troops one might well 198 suppose that this form of attack would succeed. It was sudden, it was confusing, inasmuch as Germans appeared everywhere. But the men of the 56th Division showed the most astonishing, the most praiseworthy calmness. The training of the division in the new organisation, with platoons composed of rifle, bombing, rifle grenadier, and Lewis-gun sections, combined with the coolness of the men now bore fruit. Volleys from the rifle grenadier sections shook the Germans as they emerged from their trenches; the riflemen picked off individuals who were getting too close; Lewis guns, sited to sweep enemy avenues of approach, sent streams of bullets into the mass of the enemy; and where the Germans succeeded in reaching the trenches they had to deal with the bombers.

In the tremendous battle that followed, the Stokes mortar batteries supported their comrades in exemplary fashion. The most striking individual work of all that was done by these batteries was that carried out by Corporal Macintosh, of the 168th Battery. This corporal had done extraordinarily good work on the 24th, but on this occasion he surpassed his previous record. Captain Crawford writes of his utter disregard for his personal safety, of his standing exposed, not only to the fire of artillery and trench mortars, but the more deadly sniper, calmly directing the fire of his gun where it was most urgently needed. And what of Private Woods?

“Private Woods had been forced to withdraw his gun from its
original position, and in doing so he lost the stand. He
took up a new position with another gun, and carried on 199
firing incessantly; and later, when the stand of his gun was
giving way through excessive firing, continued to use the
primary ammunition on the enemy whilst holding the barrel of
the gun between his legs.”

The Germans attacked with the greatest determination, and pressed forward with a multitude of men. Posts all along the front line were gradually surrounded, but the grim, steadfast fierceness of the men of the 56th Division was doing its work. The enemy losses were appalling. The losses of the 56th Division were great, and where gaps occurred the enemy slipped through. They appeared in the front line (the support line of the Hindenburg front system), on the right, in the centre, on the left. Hard fighting had reached the second line of the Queen’s Westminsters and the 2nd Londons. Col. Pank, of the 8th Middlesex, was in his headquarter dug-out, situated in the support line (German front line), when he was told the enemy was in the front line; he ordered his runners, signallers, everybody to man the trench outside, and, leading the way himself, clambered out of one entrance to the dug-out while the Germans threw bombs down the other. Col. Pank slipped down the communication trench which ran to the old German outpost line, and gathering together the first men he could find of his support company, with a supply of bombs led them back to attack.

The London Scottish were on the extreme left, holding the old German front line through Tadpole Copse and across the Inchy road, and therefore a continuation of the 8th Middlesex second line. Col. Jackson was suddenly startled by finding the enemy in his line. But the fierce attack led by Col. Pank shook the enemy, and though the 200 London Scottish had their hands fairly full on their front and left flank, they dealt with the party in their trench. Col. Pank then cleared the whole of his section of the old German front line. This was the point of deepest penetration by the enemy, and was reached somewhere about one o’clock.

We must point out that dug-outs in this line were far from comfortable quarters. Their positions were naturally known to the Germans and they were continually bombarded with enormous trench mortars, said to be 12-inch. In the expressive language of the Cockney, they were “bumped” from morning to night. To get some idea of the effect of these engines on those in the dug-outs, we need only say that each explosion extinguished all the candles and left the occupants in darkness.

The Kensingtons had been sent up to Barbican, the sunken road in No Man’s Land, as reinforcements, but in view of the uncertainty of the position they were ordered to remain there.

One cannot hope to give a detailed account of attack and counter-attack in this mass of trenches. Every hour brought a new situation, now in our favour, now against us. The Queen’s Westminsters and the 2nd Londons had suffered severe casualties. Everywhere the line stood firm in the old German front line. Two companies of the London Rifle Brigade had reinforced the Queen’s Westminsters, and three companies of the Queen Victoria’s Rifles had gone to the 2nd Londons. Practically the whole of the 169th Brigade was engaged, and gradually they wore down the German attack.

The message “Am holding on--hard pressed” came by pigeon and runner 201 with distressing frequency. The Rangers were put under the orders of the 169th Brigade. The remaining battalions of the 167th Brigade and the 5th Cheshires were marching towards the battle. The S.O.S. was signalled by the London Scottish at 4 p.m. At 6 p.m. fierce bombing was still going on in all trenches forward.

The position was that the 169th and 168th Brigades held the old German front line with blocks in all the communication trenches running to the second line. The Queen’s Westminsters (in touch with the 2nd Division on the right), 2nd London, and 8th Middlesex, on whom the greatest weight of the attack had fallen, had lost the old German second line; the London Scottish, faced with the flank of the German attack, but nevertheless a hotly pressed attack, had lost no ground.

On this day the Divisional Artillery had fired on S.O.S. lines continuously from soon after ten in the morning until six at night. A number of fleeting targets and enemy batteries were also engaged with good results. The Germans attempted to press forward with their batteries; in fact, they believed they were going to break through, and the batteries could be seen galloping into action. On one occasion, about 1 p.m., a brigade of three German 77-mm. batteries raced into the open, and were engaged so swiftly by the 280th Brigade R.F.A. that only one battery was able to get off a round before being knocked out. As usual the 56th Divisional Artillery supported the gallantry of the infantry with equal gallantry and determination.

The German counter-battery fire had increased rapidly every day from the commencement of the operations, gas being used chiefly at night. 202 But at no time did it reach anything like the same intensity as was experienced on the Ypres front, or even on the Somme. Hostile aircraft were very active, flying low over the front line and battery positions during the latter part of the battle; and on two or three occasions they hindered batteries in the open by machine-gunning their crews when they were firing on S.O.S. lines.

On the right of the 56th Division, and on the west side of the canal, the 6th Brigade (2nd Division) stood firmly in line with the 56th. The attack on the east of the canal fell on the 99th Brigade of the 2nd Division and the 140th Brigade of the 47th Division, holding the crest of the ridge running from Bourlon Wood to the Bapaume-Cambrai road. The attack came on, time after time, only to be hurled back by the fire of the guns and the machine guns, and the fine fighting of the infantry. Full-strength attacks were delivered at 9.30 a.m., 11.25 a.m., and at 2.30 p.m., but the enemy gained nothing more than a few advanced posts, and an advance of about 300 yards near Bourlon Wood.

The situation in the morning had been a precarious one, indeed the greatest anxiety prevailed throughout the day. The Guards Division had stopped the German rush on the south side of the salient during the early afternoon, but if the 56th, 2nd, and 47th Divisions had not stood firm on the northern side, the Third Army would have suffered a heavy defeat. There were some frantic telegrams sent at times. At 10.30 a.m. the 2nd, 47th, 59th, and 62nd Artillery were ordered to be prepared to move their guns from the Graincourt Valley, and to have their teams up in readiness, but these same guns did fearful execution. 203 The 47th Division reported at 11.35 a.m.: “Waves attacking over crest F21 (Fontaine) held up by our barrage, which is very accurate. Our guns have broken up concentration on E16 (west of Bourlon Wood). Dense waves moving along crest E to W. Our guns apparently drawing them.”

But the relief felt by the General Staff found expression in a booklet entitled _The Story of a Great Fight. (Being an account of the operations of the 47th, 2nd, and 56th Divisions in the neighbourhood of Bourlon Wood and Mœuvres, on the 30th November, 1917.)_ We can only give extracts which concern us:

“The 56th Division had been in line prior to the British
attack of the 20th November, in which its right brigade had
taken part, and since that date had captured and held about
a mile of the Hindenburg Line west of Mœuvres, including
Tadpole Copse. Almost constant fighting had taken place in
this area since our attack, and the division, which at one
time had been holding a front of 11,000 yards, had already
been subjected to a very severe strain.... The story of the
subsequent fighting on the Bourlon-Mœuvres front is one so
brimful of heroism that it deserves to take its place in
English history for all time. The most determined attacks of
four German divisions, with three other German divisions in
support, were utterly crushed by the unconquerable
resistance of the three British divisions in line. The 30th
November, 1917, will be a proud day in the lives of all
those splendid British soldiers who, by their single-hearted
devotion to duty, prevented what would have become a serious
situation had they given way.... At 9.20 a.m. the enemy had
been seen advancing from the north towards the Canal du
Nord, and subsequently attack after attack was delivered by 204
him on both sides of the canal against the 6th and 169th
Infantry Brigades. South of Mœuvres the enemy succeeded in
gaining an entry, but was driven back by a bombing attack
after heavy fighting.... From Mœuvres westward to Tadpole
Copse a desperate struggle was taking place for the
possession of the Hindenburg Line, in the course of which
the enemy at one time reached the Battalion Headquarters of
the 8th Middlesex Regt., attached to the 168th Brigade, 56th
Division. Here the German infantry were stopped by the
gallant defence of the officer commanding the battalion,
who, with the assistance of his headquarters staff, held off
the enemy with bombs until further help was organised and
the trench regained. Though much reduced in strength by the
fighting of the preceding days, and hard-pressed by superior
forces, the troops of the 168th and 169th Brigades beat off
all attacks. Queen’s Westminsters, London Scottish, and the
men of the 1/2nd Bn. London Regt. and 1/8th Bn. Middlesex
Regt. vied with one another in the valour of their
resistance.... At the end of this day of high courage and
glorious achievement, except for a few advanced positions,
some of which were afterwards regained, our line had been
maintained intact. The men who had come triumphantly through
this mighty contest felt, and rightly felt, that they had
won a great victory, in which the enemy had come against
them in full strength and had been defeated with losses at
which even the victors stood aghast.”

The survivors will at least agree that when General Headquarters took the trouble to print anything of this sort it had been well earned.

During the night of the 30th November reliefs took place. On the 169th Brigade front the London Rifle Brigade relieved the Queen’s Westminsters and the 3rd London (attached) relieved the 2nd London. 205 On the 168th Brigade front the Rangers relieved the London Scottish and the 1st London the 8th Middlesex. The Queen’s Westminsters and the 2nd London, being the most worn troops, were sent into the divisional reserve at Louverval, while the rest occupied the old British line. The reliefs were not complete until 5 a.m. on the 1st December.

At about 3.30 p.m. the enemy commenced a heavy bombardment of the trenches held in the Hindenburg Line and the S.O.S. went up. From movement noticed beforehand on the north-west of Tadpole Copse it seemed likely that he would attack again, but the attempt, if it was to be made, was crushed by the artillery.

On the night of the 1st December the 51st Division started to relieve the 56th, but, so as not to involve the 51st Division until the following night, the front line was not relieved before the night of the 2nd December.

Gen. Dudgeon makes some interesting remarks on the battle:

“Although up to Z day the rôle of the division was to attack
with Tanks over the open, the fighting which developed was
almost entirely trench fighting with bombs. No shortage of
bombs occurred, but the men employed at the divisional dump
(eleven men) worked day and night detonating, and at one
time the Divisional Artillery Column echélon had to be drawn
on.

It was found that pigeon messages were very slow, probably
owing to the season of the year. Trench wireless sets were
used with success from positions within 200 yards of the
enemy, being erected only at night and dismantled by day. 206
The reliable method of communication was by runner from the
captured trenches to our old line, viz. over about 2,300
yards of No Man’s Land, and a series of relay posts was
arranged.

The 168th Brigade, with the help of, on an average, two
companies 1/5th Cheshire Regt. and one battalion 167th
Brigade (occasional help), dug a communication trench ...
(about 1,500 yards). This trench, being rather in line with
the Inchy road, was somewhat subject to shell fire. 169th
Brigade also, with the help of one company of Pioneers and
one Field Company, dug a trench ... (1,300 yards), which was
less shelled. The Barbican and Houndsditch provided some
shelter, but in most cases reinforcements and supplies had
to go over the open in full view of Mœuvres, from which it
was impossible to obtain concealment.”

During these operations the 56 machine guns in the division (two companies of 16 guns and two companies of 12 guns) were used as follows: With each infantry brigade, 8 guns; in Divisional Pool, 32 guns. The 32 guns of the pool were employed on the 20th inst. in barrage work outside the divisional area to cover the attack of the 36th and 62nd Divisions. They returned to divisional control on the night of the 20th November. On the 21st and subsequent days the headquarters of the Divisional Pool were in a central position in Beaumetz.... On subsequent days the guns in the pool were used for protection of the flank (a maximum of 10 guns were employed on this); protective barrage on the Hindenburg Line and on the Hindenburg Support; machine-gun defence behind the infantry.

We have mentioned the word “mystery” with regard to the battle of 207 Cambrai and the handling of the cavalry. Though they fought on foot with the best at Bourlon Wood and Villers Guislan, there seems to have been some hesitation on the first day of the battle. It is, however, debatable whether they could have done much. Of the other mysteries the success of the Germans on the southern side of the salient is one. Early in the proceedings General Sir O’D. Snow, commanding the VII Corps, is reported to have placed his fingers on a map at the point of Twenty-two Ravine, and said, “If I were a German, I should attack there”! No attempt was ever made to reinforce divisions before the German counter-attack, although the Army was aware that one was threatened. And this brings us to another mystery. Sir Douglas Haig repeats several times in his dispatch a suggestion that he had a very limited number of troops at his command. But we know that he had the offer of French troops. He closes his account of the fighting on the 30th November by recording--

“my obligation to the Commander-in-Chief of the French
Armies for the prompt way in which he placed French troops
within reach for employment in case of need at the
unfettered discretion of the Third Army Commander. Part of
the artillery of this force actually came into action,
rendering valuable service; and though the remainder of the
troops were not called upon, the knowledge that they were
available should occasion arise was a great assistance.”

One naturally asks the question: “What would have happened if French troops had been used even as late as the 21st November?” If they were still too far away, there were undoubtedly British divisions quite 208 close up and quite fresh which could have been used to press the first great advantage gained, and the French would still have been in hand as a reserve.

Casualties from the 20th November to the 3rd December were 9 officers killed, 202 other ranks killed, 43 officers and 1,003 other ranks wounded, 17 officers and 352 other ranks missing.