Chapter II: 49 (2)

The 5th, 6th, and Guards Divisions on the left swept through all their 80 objectives--Morval and Les Bœufs were captured.

For some time the London Scottish were out of touch with the 5th Division, which had swerved too far to the right, but the complete success of the operations enabled the 56th Division to improve the position round Combles. By three o’clock in the afternoon the 4th London Regt. had two companies in the north end of Bouleaux Wood, and both the attacking battalions of the 168th Brigade had pushed out patrols towards Combles. Artillery observation officers reported to Gen. Hull that the enemy could be seen hurrying, in small parties, from Combles in an easterly direction.

A steady pressure was kept on the Germans in Bouleaux Wood. The centre of resistance here was round the derelict Tank on the left edge of the wood. The 1st London Regt. was on one side of the Tank and the enemy on the other. On the right the London Rifle Brigade and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles gave the enemy no rest in the sunken road and the trench leading to Combles.

By midnight the 168th Brigade had posts east of Combles, the 167th Brigade had cleared the lower end of Bouleaux Wood and got behind the Tank, and the 169th Brigade had captured all of the sunken road trench and the Combles trench. And at dawn an officer’s patrol of the 168th Brigade had met a French patrol on the east of Combles. The London Rifle Brigade had already entered the town at 3.30 a.m. and secured touch with the French there.

The line desired by Sir Douglas Haig had been captured and there was a momentary pause. The line held by the 56th Division at midday on the 26th was some 1,500 yards to the east of Combles. The 167th Brigade 81 were in the front line and in touch with the 5th Division and the French; the 168th Brigade were a short distance in rear, round about the railway cuttings; and the 169th Brigade were half in Combles and half to the west of it. The Germans were some distance away, holding what was known as Mutton Trench in force, and it was arranged that the 168th Brigade should attack with the assistance of five Tanks. But the Tanks failed to put in an appearance, and after waiting twenty-four hours, the Rangers were told that the attack was cancelled.

Meanwhile our Allies on the right had captured Frigicourt and had the hard nut of Sailly-Saillisel to crack. To assist them in securing this very important position, Sir Douglas Haig agreed to hand over the line as far as Morval, so on the 28th the division was relieved and marched for a few days’ rest to the neighbourhood of Ville-sur-Ancre and Meaulte.

* * * * *

The battle, however, still raged. Sir Douglas Haig was pushing the enemy hard:

“The success of the Fourth Army had now brought our advance
to a stage at which I judged it advisable that Thiepval
should be taken, in order to bring our left flank into line
and establish it on the main ridge above that village, the
possession of which would be of considerable value in future
operations.

Accordingly, at 12.25 p.m. on the 26th September, before the
enemy had been given time to recover from the blow struck by
the Fourth Army, a general attack was launched against
Thiepval and the Thiepval Ridge.... The attack was a
brilliant success. On the right our troops reached the
system of enemy trenches which formed their objective
without great difficulty. In Thiepval and the strong works 82
to the north of it the enemy’s resistance was more
desperate.... On the left of the attack fierce fighting, in
which Tanks again gave valuable assistance to our troops,
continued in Thiepval during the day and the following
night, but by 8.30 a.m. on the 27th September the whole of
the village of Thiepval was in our hands.”

The rest for the division, however, was not for very long. Reinforced, though hardly refreshed, the brigades began to move back to the line. On the 29th September the 167th Brigade was in Trones Wood, west of Guillemont, and the 169th in a camp near by. On the last night of September the latter brigade took over the line from the 6th Division, with the right in touch with the French, while the 167th relieved the 2nd Guards Brigade on the left.

The position taken over was outside Les Bœufs, in the trenches called Foggy and Windy. Battalions in line from the right were the Queen’s Westminsters, Queen Victoria’s, 1st Londons, and the 7th Middlesex. The orders were that they should send out patrols and occupy a line of posts over the crest of the ridge--the 169th Brigade posts A, B, C, D, and the 167th Brigade E, F, G, H, and K.

On October 2nd the 167th Brigade reported having joined up a line of posts, but we cannot make the map-readings given agree with what is known of positions in subsequent events. The country was more than ever devoid of landmarks--it was just a wide expanse of shell-holes in a dark brown, almost black, kind of earth--and no one knew either their own position or those of the enemy within a few hundred yards; and the few hundred yards were a matter of importance. Anyhow, the 83 line was not the line of posts, but probably near the line we have sketched on the left of 34. Touch was obtained with the 20th Division on the left.

Gen. Hull was now instructed that the Fourth Army would renew the attack on the 5th October, and that the XIV Corps would establish itself on a line from which the main Transloy defences could be attacked at a later date. The 56th Division would capture Hazy, Dewdrop, Spectrum, and part of Rainbow, and establish a line along the west crest of the ridge; the Division would then, as a second phase of the attack, establish a line on the forward slope of the ridge from which Le Transloy could be seen. The General ordered that the 169th Brigade should attack on the right, and the 167th Brigade on the left. [The battle of the Transloy Ridges, 1st-18th October.]

The weather became steadily worse and, though water is supposed to run downhill and the division was on the slope of a hill, the troops might just as well have been in the middle of a pond. No one could move, and the operations were postponed for forty-eight hours.

Assembly trenches were dug; and patrols reported the enemy some 200 yards on the farther side of the ridge. The objectives for the attack were well beyond the line of posts it had been hoped to occupy with patrols, and the 2/1st London and 1/1st Edinburgh Field Companies R.E., with two companies of the 5th Cheshire Regt., were given to the two brigades to consolidate what was gained.

The assault took place at 1.45 p.m. on the 7th October, and on the left was fairly successful. The 7th Middlesex, on the extreme left, 84 and the left company of the 1st London Regt. drove the enemy out of the northern half of Spectrum and part of Rainbow, where they joined with the 20th Division. The right company of the 1st Londons, however, was held up by machine-gun fire from Dewdrop and failed to reach that end of Spectrum.

The 168th Brigade fared badly on the right. Three battalions attacked in line--the London Scottish, the 4th London Regt., and the Rangers. Two machine guns were in the front line, for covering fire, and four others west of Les Bœufs, for indirect covering fire; there were also six Stokes mortars in Burnaby to put a barrage on Dewdrop. In some respects the attack was peculiar. As was so often the case, the direction of the attack was at an angle to our front, and the London Scottish, starting the assault from the right at 1.45 p.m., were followed by the 4th London Regt. at 1.47 and the Rangers at 1.49 p.m.; this was calculated to bring the three battalions into line by the time Dewdrop and the gun-pits were reached.

The leading company of the Rangers, on the left, was knocked out, before it had gone fifty yards, by machine guns in the northern end of Dewdrop, and the reserve companies of the battalion came under a very heavy barrage and did not succeed in carrying forward the attack. The remnants of this battalion lay out in shell-holes until dusk, when they returned to the original line.

The 4th London Regt., in the centre, met with much the same fate. The left company was annihilated, and the right company, managing to reach a patch of dead ground, lay down unable to move. The rear waves were met with intense artillery fire, but advanced most gallantly to the 85 line of the leading troops. From the dead ground attempts were made to outflank the gun-pits, from which the hostile machine-gun fire was directed, and small parties managed to work well round to the south.

The London Scottish advanced well for about 400 yards, and occupied the south gun-pits and the southern end of Hazy. The enemy at once attempted a counter-attack from the northern end, but this was driven off. But it was found that a wide gap existed between the right of the battalion and the French, who had attacked east instead of north-east, and small parties of the London Scottish were successively pushed out to fill the gap and get touch. At six o’clock they had succeeded in establishing a thin but continuous line in touch with our Allies. But the situation was a very difficult one. The enemy had received reinforcements in Hazy and the north gun-pits--from all appearances fresh troops--and both flanks of the London Scottish were in the air and exposed to the immediate presence of the enemy.

At 8.30 p.m. the German counter-attack developed, and, though heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy, he succeeded in forcing the London Scottish and the right of the 4th London Regt., which was creeping round the gun-pits, to retire to our original line.

The division, at nightfall, was left with a net gain of part of Spectrum and Rainbow. Gen. Hull then ordered a renewal of the attack on the next day, and sent up the London Rifle Brigade and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles to the 168th Brigade, and the Queen’s Westminster Rifles to the 167th Brigade.

The assault took place at 3.30 p.m. on the 8th October, and almost at 86 once Brig.-Gen. Freeth reported that the barrage was very feeble.

On the 168th Brigade front the attack was arranged this time so that it started simultaneously all along the line. The London Rifle Brigade on the right advanced steadily for about 500 yards, and again gained a foothold in Hazy. But the experience of the previous day was repeated. The northern gun-pits, with their garrison of machine-gunners, was held by the enemy, who poured a devastating fire into the left flank of the four advancing waves, and on this occasion there was fire from the right flank as well; the attack was in the main held up about fifty yards from Hazy, where a shell-hole line was established. The reserve company was sent forward to fill the gap which existed, as on the first attack, between us and the French.

The Queen Victoria’s Rifles and the 3rd London Regt., on the 167th Brigade front, failed to make any appreciable advance. Both Dewdrop and the south of Spectrum resting on the sunken road were strongly garrisoned, and the machine-gun fire was withering. At 10.30 p.m. all troops were withdrawn to the original line.

The position on the morning of the 9th was that we held Spectrum to the bend in the trench just south of the sunken road, and had a strong party of the Queen’s Westminsters in the sunken road. On the remainder of the front there had been no advance.

On these two days 84 prisoners of the 31st and 84th Reserve Infantry Regts., 18th Division, and two machine guns were captured. The great difficulty experienced was to know where troops were situated. The weather was bad, and the effort of attacking was in itself a gigantic 87 one, but that effort had been made, and seemed to hang on the brink of success, and if the artillery could have helped a little more would have been entirely satisfactory. The artillery, however, were greatly handicapped. Maps could not tell them where the new enemy trenches were, and aeroplanes were unable to take photographs. As to being helped by roads, though these were clearly marked on the map, they had been almost completely blown away by shell fire on the ground and were by no means easy to distinguish. It was a vile country.

The latter days of the Somme battle were even worse for the R.A.M.C. Wounded men had to be carried to Ginchy and frequently from there to Montauban. The medical branch of the division never experienced a harder time than that on the Somme.

On the night of the 9th October the 56th Division was relieved by the 4th Division. The battles of the Somme were practically over. Sir Douglas Haig wanted to push on in the direction of Le Transloy:

“On our eastern flank ... it was important to gain ground.
Here the enemy still possessed a strong system of trenches
covering the villages of Transloy and Beaulencourt and the
town of Bapaume; but although he was digging with feverish
haste, he had not been able to create any very formidable
defences behind this line. In this direction, in fact, we
had at last reached a stage at which a successful attack
might reasonably be expected to yield much greater results
than anything we had yet attained. The resistance of the
troops opposed to us had seriously weakened in the course of
our recent operations, and there was no reason to suppose
that the effort required would not be within our powers.

This last completed system of defence, before Le Transloy, 88
was flanked to the south by the enemy’s position at
Sailly-Saillisel and screened to the west by the spur lying
between Le Transloy and Les Bœufs. A necessary preliminary,
therefore, to an assault upon it was to secure the spur and
the Sailly-Saillisel heights. Possession of the high ground
at this latter village would at once give us far better
command over the ground to the north and the north-west,
secure the flank of our operations towards Transloy, and
deprive the enemy of observation over the Allied
communications in the Combles valley. In view of the enemy’s
efforts to construct new systems of defence behind the Le
Transloy line, it was desirable to lose no time in dealing
with the situation.

Unfortunately, at this juncture very unfavourable weather
set in, and continued with scarcely a break during the
remainder of October and the early part of November. Poor
visibility seriously interfered with the work of our
artillery, and constant rain turned the mass of hastily-dug
trenches for which we were fighting into channels of deep
mud. The country roads, broken by countless shell craters,
that cross the deep stretch of ground we had lately won,
rapidly became almost impassable, making the supply of food,
stores, and ammunition a serious problem. These conditions
multiplied the difficulties of attack to such an extent that
it was found impossible to exploit the situation with the
rapidity necessary to enable us to reap the full benefits of
the advantages we had gained.”

Two attacks were, indeed, made to assist the French in their operations against the important village of Sailly-Saillisel, which fell to them on the 18th of the month, but by that time the weather had become so bad, and the delay had been so long, that the decisive moment had passed. [The short and successful battle of the Ancre was 89 fought on the 13-18th November, bringing the total number of 1916 Somme battles up to twelve.]

* * * * *

Lieut.-Col. A. D. Bayliffe, who commanded the 168th Brigade through this great battle, wrote at the time an interesting paper which he heads: “Lessons to be deducted from the Operations on the Somme.” Written with the incidents and conditions fresh on his mind, and for future guidance, it is not a criticism of the actions fought, but from his recommendations we may gather something of the difficulties which had to be faced and overcome. We give only some striking extracts:

“The results of the operations carried out by this brigade
bear out more than ever the necessity for an assault being
made direct at the objective. Failures, or partial failures,
are attributable to present-day troops being asked to
perform a complicated manœuvre such as a wheel or change of
direction during an assault.

The objectives allotted should be as far as possible
definite, and should be chosen on the ground so that
well-defined landmarks may be included. With the heavy
casualties which occur among the officers, and considering
the partially-trained state of N.C.O.s and men, it is seldom
any use leaving the site of the objective to the judgment of
the assaulting troops.

In order to comply with this suggestion, it is essential
that a proper scheme of assembly trenches should be thought
out, and proper time given for their construction even in
the rapid advances which have been taking place.

In this connection it should be remembered that troops
engaged in holding the line cannot be expected to do much 90
digging work. Also that, without further training,
reinforcement officers are incapable of finding their way
over unknown ground, even with good maps, and that they
cannot tape out trenches and extend working parties. It is
therefore necessary to use pioneers very largely for the
digging of assembly trenches if this essential work is to be
well done.

Attacks delivered on too broad a front with too little
weight fail even against what appears to be inferior hostile
defences. The reason is that assaulting troops edge away
from the source of hostile fire, and when the lines of men
are too thin, they move forward through the gaps in the
hostile defences without dealing with them.

It appears that assaults, to be successful, should never be
delivered with less than four waves even against near
objectives. One hostile machine gun may completely break up
the first wave or two; if there are two or more waves in
rear they may successfully carry on the assault.

It is desirable to have Battalion Headquarters as far
forward as possible, right up in the front assembly trenches
if possible, before an attack. But it is no good placing
them there unless there is some suitable shelter (however
small), and unless time is available to lay communication
lines forward. Brigade Headquarters should also be right
forward, provided there is some accommodation. This
facilitates personal reconnaissance and liaison.

If the efficiency of a brigade is to be maintained as a
fighting unit through a period of several weeks of active
operations, a far larger proportion of officers and men
should be left back than is customary. The average
reinforcement officer is quite useless when his first
appearance on service is in the middle of a modern battle. I
would suggest that a battalion should go into action with
from 12 to 16 officers only, and that 4 to 8 more should be
kept about the line of Brigade Headquarters, and the remainder 91
to be at the transport lines. N.C.O.s should be dealt with
in the same proportion.

It is well borne out through these operations that, if the
artillery barrage is good and the infantry advance close to
it, they will probably reach their objective without heavy
loss. Usually the standing barrage was put up behind the
objective, and it is thought that the standing barrage
should be on the objective until the creeping barrage
coincides with it and then both move together to their next
standing line.

On one occasion (7th October) the three battalions of
infantry on this brigade front had to advance at different
times; the consequence was that the last to move had to face
a very heavy barrage in addition to machine-gun fire. It is
thought that the infantry should always move at zero, even
if they are not in line with each other, and that the
barrage line should be made to conform with the line of the
assaulting infantry.

As usual there was a complete lack of touch throughout the
operations with the heavy artillery. It is thought that the
artillery group system should be extended so as to include
some heavy artillery.

It is suggested that a large supply of signboards, painted
white or luminous, should be prepared for active operations,
and also a supply of trench bridges ... reliefs were often
much complicated and delayed by the lack of good tracks.

The value of the Stokes mortars in the more open fighting we
have been having is very doubtful. The results achieved have
never been commensurate with the great labour involved in
getting the guns and ammunition forward. The trench mortar,
from an administrative point of view, is more trouble than
any other unit when frequent moves and reliefs occur, as it
is not self-contained, and much work and trouble is involved
at very busy moments in devising how its stores are to be
moved.

The Tanks allotted to co-operate with this brigade were not 92
found to be of any use at all. It is thought that Tanks
require select crews of great determination, and officers in
charge who have more experience and knowledge of the methods
of infantry and artillery in war. If the speed of the Tanks
could be increased, it would add very greatly to their
value.”

The difficulties indicated in this paper were those which faced the actual fighting men. We have already mentioned the zigzag line, and the reader will readily appreciate how the attempt to form a front, moving in a given direction after the men had left the trenches, frequently led to confusion and loss of direction. Col. Bayliffe’s statement that men will edge away from the source of fire does not necessarily contravert our assertion that they are drawn towards the sound of fire, which must be read in conjunction with the admitted uncertainty of the exact position of an objective. During an attack no officer or N.C.O. can control more than half a dozen men, and the more usual number is two. On this basis the proportion of officers and N.C.O.s is totally inadequate, and it follows that success depends largely on the men themselves. The assaulting troops will fall naturally under two heads: leaders and followers. The leaders are the men of greater initiative, and in moments of uncertainty, when doubt of their direction seizes them, when no trench is visible, they turn towards the sound of the enemy--the place where the firing comes from. It is one of the factors to be dealt with in keeping direction. A line which has become thin through casualties will, no doubt, swerve from a strongly-held post.

And what a lot is covered by the paragraph on digging! The physical 93 effort required to go through a battle like the Somme was colossal. Relief meant only relief from the actual front line, not relief from open trenches, from wet, from mud, from cold, or even from severe casualties; it was merely a case of moving a short way back to other trenches. After days of this sort of life an assault was a most exhausting experience and, if successful, was not finished with the written message, “We are on our objective.” Exhausted men were called upon to dig new trenches at once, under fierce fire, and the trenches dug, they waited for the counter-attack which, on the Somme, inevitably followed. Perhaps the counter-attack succeeded and the men were driven back to their original line--and still there was no rest.

Imagine the condition of mind of the surviving officers and men of a company when they were reinforced by troops straight from home, with no experience of modern or indeed any other form of fighting. The reinforcements came almost as an added anxiety to the old men. And how could the new arrivals be expected to appreciate the advantage of following close on our own barrage, in itself a doubt-provoking thing? There was nothing easy for the regimental officer or for his men; they fought the enemy, the earth, and the sky.

We give the gallant colonel’s remarks on Tanks as an interesting light on the early proceedings of the new engines of war. We are well aware that they will provoke a smile from some readers, but they are none the less justifiable. Tanks accomplished very little on this part of the battle front. To the infantry they seemed only to attract the attention of the enemy with the appalling noise they made and the very definite target they afforded, and then they broke down! Col. 94 Bayliffe’s opinion, which does not absolutely condemn the use of Tanks, was shared by two Brigadier-Generals of the 16th Division, and most of the infantry in less exalted positions. That they afterwards accomplished the object of their inventors is beside the point.

Heaven forbid that we should appear to offer excuses for the 56th Division--none are needed. But we find it impossible to give a true picture of the conditions under which men fought, and by placing a few of the difficulties before the reader, hope to enable him to appreciate the truly great fighting qualities of these London men. Success conjures up to the mind a picture of swift movement, and such successes were gained during the war--but not on the Somme. The enemy was strong and determined, and fought to the last. Gen. Falkenhayn, who was the instigator of the Verdun offensive, seems to rather pooh-pooh the battle of the Somme, and give the impression that it had little effect on the Central Powers; but as he was dismissed at the end of August, one might deduce that other people did not share his views. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, on the other hand, wag their heads gravely over the whole business. The Germans were being badly battered, and were fighting most desperately to arrest disaster. And so, in recording the exploits of the 56th Division, we have to repeat somewhat monotonously the account of attacks being continually delivered on the same trench or point.

The trouble in a battle of this sort is to reconcile the two points of view: that of the Higher Command and that of the infantry. For the infantry there was no break in the fighting--if they did not assault 95 “over the top,” they were bombing the enemy out of a trench or being bombed out themselves. And it is not too easy to decide what particular trenches were held at any one moment. The position in Loop Trench, for instance, was continually changing. Combles Trench, the sunken road, and the southern end of Bouleaux Wood were points of continual struggle. The enemy exerted his full pressure on the 56th Division. But for the Higher Command this month of fighting divides itself into five attacks!

The plan on this part of the front was to surround Combles by joining the French on the far side. The junction of two armies of different nationalities might always be considered a point of weakness, and the movement itself was one of which the enemy could take advantage. Lord Cavan explains the position very clearly with a small rough sketch:

“The plan to take Combles was like this:

Therefore during the advance the protection of my flank from
a possible counter-stroke down the arrow was most important. 96
This protection from Leuze Wood to Morval was splendidly and
gloriously afforded. Further, in the actual attack on Morval
and Les Bœufs this protecting flank had to be advanced to
keep pace with the attack. The key of this was the capture
of a trench about X-X. This was captured and held, and the
complete success of the battle was assured. I had every
confidence in Hull and his men, tired though they were, and
this confidence was more than justified.”

This grim, determined, and desperate struggle reveals qualities in the London troops which, though they existed, would not in a more spectacular success have been so clearly demonstrated. It requires good men to attack again and again until their object is gained, and when these attacks are launched against such splendidly trained soldiers as the Germans, one can only marvel that the thing was ever done, and applaud the steadfast courage, the endurance of body and spirit, which enabled the men to do it.

True, the battles of the Somme ended with both sides being stuck in the mud--an inglorious ending to so much heroism--and the final, and perhaps fatal, stroke was snatched from our grasp by the weather; but those who came through the battle may now consider dispassionately what it was they had accomplished.

The Central Powers (we must always remember that we fought more than the strength of Germany) had decided, as we know, to bleed France white on the field of Verdun. They were also pressing Italy hard and had gained important successes. The Entente Powers replied first with Brussiloff’s attack, and secondly with the Franco-British offensive on the Somme. Falkenhayn declares that the most dangerous moment of 97 the Russian offensive had been passed before the first shot of the battle of the Somme had been fired. He also maintains that the Austrian loss of the right bank of the Isonzo had no connection with the Somme; that the Germans would not in any case have sent troops to help their ally in Italy. As for Verdun, he deals with it in a somewhat unsatisfactory paragraph:

“The only tangible gain, then, of this battle to the enemy
remains in its effect on the situation on the Western Front.
As a matter of course, an expenditure of strength such as
the enemy favoured demanded the use of corresponding forces
for the defence. The operations in the Meuse area were not
yet, however, immediately affected. On the 11th July we were
still able, by a strong thrust, to advance our line on the
east bank.... After this it was the tension of the whole
situation, and especially the necessity to husband our
_matériel_ and ammunition, which necessitated the
abandonment of any big German offensive operations on the
Meuse. The headquarters of the Crown Prince’s Army Group
were instructed to carry on the offensive calmly and
according to plan, so as to give the enemy no good reason
for concluding that he could hope for its cessation. This,
too, was quite successful, for the French were unable to
bring up reinforcements from the Meuse to the Somme front
until September, when, following on the change of Chief of
the General Staff, the ‘Verdun-offensive’ had been
completely abandoned.”

The last sentence is, of course, the bitter pill for Falkenhayn. It is perhaps only natural that he would seek to justify his policy, and persist that he was right and would have succeeded had he been left alone. Hindenburg’s memoirs give one a somewhat different impression: 98

“Very soon after I took over my new post I found myself
compelled by the general situation to ask His Majesty the
Emperor to order the offensive at Verdun to be broken off.
The battles there exhausted our forces like an open wound.
Moreover, it was obvious in any case that the enterprise had
become hopeless, and that for us to persevere with it would
cost us greater losses than those we were able to inflict on
the enemy. The battlefield was a regular hell, and was
regarded as such by the troops.”

And of the Somme he says:

“The extent of the demands which were being made on the army
in the West was brought before my eyes quite vividly for the
first time during this visit to France. I will not hesitate
to admit that it was only now that I fully realised all that
the Western Armies had done hitherto.... I could now
understand how everyone, officers and men alike, longed to
get away from such an atmosphere.... Many of our best and
finest fighting men had to pour out their heart’s blood in
destroyed trenches....

It was only when the arrival of the wet season began to make
the ground impossible that things became quieter in the
battle area of the Somme. The million of shell-holes filled
with water became mere cemeteries.... Over everyone hovered
the fearful spectre of this battlefield, which for
desolation and horror seemed to be even worse than that of
Verdun.”

General Ludendorff carries the impression still further[3]:

“On the Somme the enemy’s powerful artillery, assisted by 99
excellent aeroplane observation and fed with enormous
supplies of ammunition, had kept down our fire and destroyed
our artillery. The defence of our infantry had become so
flabby that the massed attacks of the enemy always
succeeded. Not only did our _moral_ suffer, but in
addition to fearful wastage in killed and wounded, we lost a
large number of prisoners and much material....

The 25th saw the beginning of the heaviest of the many heavy
engagements that made up the battle of the Somme. Great were
our losses. The enemy took Rancourt, Morval, Gueudecourt,
and the hotly-contested Combles. On the 26th the Thiepval
salient fell....

The fighting had made the most extraordinary demands both on
commanders and troops.... Divisions and other formations had
to be thrown in on the Somme front in quicker succession,
and had to stay in the line longer. The time for
recuperation and training on quiet sectors became shorter
and shorter. The troops were getting exhausted. Everything
was cut as fine as possible. The strain on our nerves in
Pless was terrible....”

We may conclude, then, that the Somme, as the chief counter-stroke of the Entente Powers, defeated the Central Powers; France was not bled white; and although the Russians were driven back, and Roumania, who had entered the war, was speedily defeated by the Central Powers, Italy was relieved and delivered a successful counter-attack on the Austrians. The situation, as a result of the Somme, although the individual British soldier may not have thought it vastly improved, was more than ever serious for the Central Powers, and one could not at that stage hope for more.

The total number of prisoners taken by the British Armies on the 100 Somme, from 1st July to 18th November, was over 38,000. Also 29 heavy guns, 96 field guns, 136 trench mortars, and 514 machine guns.

[3] _My War Memories, 1914-1918_, Ludendorff.