Chapter I: Formation and the Attack on the Gommecourt Salient (1)

After the declaration of war, when the first news of the Expeditionary Force began to trickle across the Channel, the people of England were told that troops were marching to the lilting tune with the Cockney refrain:

Good-bye, Piccadilly,
Farewell, Leicester Square,
It’s a long, long way to Tipperary,
But my heart’s right there.

Within a few months territorial battalions were marching in France and singing the same absurd song. But the London, the Cockney spirit, impudent, noisy, but good-tempered and friendly, always wide awake, observant, and ready for a scrap, above all never down-hearted, led the way from the very beginning of the war. It is with the light-hearted crowd of Piccadilly and Leicester Square that we are concerned, for the whole of London some time or other passes through those thoroughfares.

* * * * *

There is something peculiarly fascinating in following the fortunes of London troops, particularly Territorial troops.

For some reason there has been a tendency of late years to look down 2 on the men of London, to dismiss them as weaklings, as men of poor physique, with maybe smart tongues and clothes, but without the necessary stamina for hardy soldiers. It would be difficult to say on what ground such an opinion was based. At least it has no historical foundation. The Trained Bands of London have a very definite place in the history of England.

Although it is not the oldest corps, the Artillery Company of London, formed to train men in the use of the long bow, cross bow, and hand gun, dates back to the time of Henry VIII. Westminster and the County of Middlesex were ever to the fore in raising Volunteers as distinct from the Militia, though the distinction was not always too clear. St. George’s, Hanover Square--Pimlico--Inns of Court--Bloomsbury--St. James’s are names to be found in every record of effort to meet a national danger. Enfield, Tottenham, Stoke Newington, Chelsea, Kensington, Chiswick, Battersea, Clapham, Clerkenwell, Deptford, Hungerford, Islington, Lambeth, and Wandsworth have all raised companies for the defence of England in former times of stress.

There is no need to labour the point. Every student of the history of the British Army knows what the Service owes to London. The Londoner has always proved himself a valiant soldier, and has not withheld from enlistment.

What England owes to the Territorial is above computation. As the descendant of the old Volunteer he was enrolled to serve in England alone. But when war with the Central Powers was declared he did not hesitate--his response was immediate and unanimous. Territorials 3 landed in France in 1914, and continued to arrive in that country in a steady stream as they could be spared from Great Britain.

When the 56th Division was assembled in France during the first days of February 1916, it was not, therefore, a new unit, looking about with wondering eyes at new scenes, and standing, as it were, on the tiptoes of expectation as it paused on the outskirts of the great adventure. The twelve battalions of infantry were veterans.[1]

On the 5th February Major-Gen. C. P. A. Hull, to whom command of the new division was given, arrived at Hallencourt, between Abbeville and Amiens, where his staff was to meet.

Lieut.-Col. J. E. S. Brind G.S.O.1.
Major A. E. G. Bayley G.S.O.2.
Capt. T. W. Bullock G.S.O.3.
Bt. Lieut.-Col. H. W. Grubb A.A. and Q.M.G.
Capt. W. M. Sutton D.A.A.G.
Major F. J. Lemon D.A.Q.M.G.
Lieut. H. C. B. Way A.D.C.

The presence of these officers, however, did not constitute a division. Brigade commanders and their staffs arrived--Brig.-Gen. F. H. Burnell-Nugent, 167th Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. G. Loch, 168th Brigade, Brig.-Gen. E. S. Coke, 169th Brigade--and we find a wail of despair going up from the 169th Brigade: “No rations, fuel, or stationery yet available”--“No divisional organisation exists” (this on the 8th), and a wealth of meaning in this note written on the 18th: “The Brigade Interpreter (who should have been available at first) 4 arrived at last. Rain whole day.” Could anything be more tragic?

Our sympathies are entirely with the staff on these occasions, for though the situation cannot be described as chaotic, it is bewildering. Troops were arriving from all directions and at all times of the day; the machinery was not in running order, and its creaking wheels, which occasionally stopped, necessitated the most careful watching and a great deal of work. When an organisation is being made, no one can say “that is not my job,” for it seems as though all jobs are his for the time being. The Interpreter would have been most useful if only to arrange the billeting--and what is a staff officer without stationery?

The Brigades were as follows:

The 167th Infantry Brigade; commanded by Brig.-Gen. F. H. Burnell-Nugent, with Capt. G. Blewitt as his Brigade Major and Capt. O. H. Tidbury as Staff Captain. The battalions of this brigade were the 1/1st London Regt., the 1/3rd London Regt., the 1/8th Middlesex Regt., and the 1/7th Middlesex Regt.

The 168th Infantry Brigade; commanded by Brig.-Gen. G. G. Loch, with Capt. P. Neame, V.C., as his Brigade Major, and Major L. L. Wheatley as Staff Captain. The battalions of this brigade were the 1/4th London Regt., the 1/12th London Regt. (Rangers), the 1/13th London Regt. (Kensingtons), and the 1/14th London Regt. (London Scottish).

The 169th Infantry Brigade; commanded by Brig.-Gen. E. S. Coke, with Capt. L. A. Newnham as his Brigade Major, and Capt. E. R. Broadbent as Staff Captain. The battalions were the 1/2nd London Regt. (Royal Fusiliers), the 1/5th London Regt. (London Rifle Brigade), the 1/9th 5 London Regt. (Queen Victoria’s Rifles), and the 1/16th London Regt. (Queen’s Westminster Rifles).

It is not easy to keep the brigade groupings in mind at this stage--arrangements were recast and designations were changed. The 1/1st (London) Bde. R.F.A., the 2/1st (London) Field Coy. R.E., the 2/1st (London) Field Ambulance were posted to the 167th Brigade. The 1/2nd London Bde. R.F.A., the 2/2nd London Field Coy. R.E., and the 2/2nd London Field Ambulance were posted to the 168th Brigade. The 1/3rd London Bde. R.F.A. and the 2/3rd London Field Ambulance to the 169th Brigade. But we find that subsequent changes result in--

the 1/1st London Bde. R.F.A. becoming 280th Bde. R.F.A;
the 1/2nd London Bde. R.F.A. becoming 281st Bde. R.F.A.;
the 1/3rd London Bde. R.F.A. becoming 282nd Bde. R.F.A.;

and a newly-formed 18-pounder brigade, the 283rd Bde. R.F.A. Also the two field companies of the Royal Engineers become known as the 512th and 513th Field Companies, and were joined by the 416th Edinburgh Field Coy., which was posted to the 169th Infantry Brigade.

And the Royal Army Service Corps, which appears at first as numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 Companies, become the 213th, with the 214th, 215th, and 216th posted to the three infantry brigades in numerical order.

The Stokes trench mortar batteries were numbered 167th, 168th, and 169th; the medium trench mortar batteries as X, Y, and Z. They were posted in numerical or alphabetical order to the infantry brigades. 6 There was also a heavy trench mortar battery designated V Battery, which was formed in May 1916.

The pioneer battalion was the 1/5th Battalion Cheshire Regt. The veterinary unit was the 1/1st London Mobile Veterinary Section.

These were the bits of machinery forming the 56th Division.

The first divisional conference was held on the 11th February, when most of the officers attending had their first introduction to Gen. Hull. He was a tall, good-looking man with an abrupt manner, but of singular charm. It did not take him long to win the complete confidence of his division.

In the midst of the work of getting the machine properly fitted together, there were the usual rumours and warning orders which came to nothing. The first information Gen. Hull received was that the VI Corps, of which his division formed a part, would relieve the XVII French Corps and would move to the area Domart-en-Ponthieu. The move took place on the 27th February, in the midst of a heavy fall of snow, which made the roads very heavy for transport. And a further move was made on the 12th March to the Doullens area, between that town and St. Pol.

Whenever units were behind the line they trained. It did not matter how long the individual soldier had been in France and Belgium, he was never excused as a “fully trained soldier.” Even instructors were sent from time to time to receive fresh instruction at Divisional, Corps, or Army schools. And so, during the period of assembly, the units of the 56th Division trained. Some were attached for ten days or a 7 fortnight to the 14th Division for work in a “forward position” round about Dainville--infantry, artillery, engineers, and field ambulance took their turn at this work; others carried on the routine of exercise on the training-grounds in the neighbourhood of their billets. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, visited the divisional area and the school at Givenchy on the 30th March.

In studying the adventures of a division, whether it is holding the line or whether it is in a reserve area, one must always visualise a great deal more than the twelve battalions of infantry which make or repel the final charge in any engagement. A division occupies and works over a large area, and depends, of course, on a base of supplies. When a person is told of the front taken up by a division, he will look at the map and measure off the width of the front line. “There,” he says, “is the division”! But the division covers quite a big area in depth as well. Not only do the billets of troops not actually employed in the front line go back a long way in successive stages, but the wagons and lorries of the Royal Army Service Corps work back many miles. The narrowest measurement of a divisional area is usually the front line.

Perhaps the following list, showing the dispositions of the division in billets during March, will give those with no experience some idea of what is meant by the word “division”:

Divisional Headquarters Le Cauroy
Divisional Artillery Headquarters Le Cauroy
Divisional R.E. Headquarters Le Cauroy
5th Cheshire Regt. Grand Rullecourt
B Squadron King Edward’s Horse Grand Rullecourt
Divisional Cyclists’ Coy. Grand Rullecourt
1/4th London Howitzer Bde. Wamlin and Rozière 8
Divisional Ammunition Column Etrée-Wamin
Headquarters Divisional Train Bruilly
No. 1 Coy. Divisional Train Wamin
56th Sanitary Section Le Cauroy
Mobile Veterinary Section Bruilly
Salvage Company Le Cauroy
R.E. Ordnance Dump Le Cauroy
Divisional Canteen and Shops Le Cauroy
Divisional Schools Givenchy-le-Noble

167TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

Brigade Headquarters Rebreuve
167/1st and X56th Trench Mortar Batteries Rebreuve
1/1st London Regt. Ivergny
1/3rd London Regt. Cannettemont
1/7th Middlesex Regt. Beaudricourt
1/8th Middlesex Regt. Rebreuviette
1/1st London Bde. R.F.A. Rebreuve
2/1st London Field Coy. R.E. Honval
No. 2 Coy. Train Rebreuviette
2/1st London Field Ambulance Ivergny

168TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

Brigade Headquarters Manin
168/1st Trench Mortar Battery Magnicourt
Y56th Trench Mortar Battery Berlencourt
1/4th London Regt. Beaufort
1/12th London Regt. Ambrines
1/13th London Regt. Lignereuil
1/14th London Regt. Villers-sire-Simon
1/2nd London Bde. R.F.A. Berlencourt
2/2nd London Field Coy. R.E. Sars-les-Bois
No. 3 Coy. Train Denier
5th Entrenching Battalion Blavincourt
2/2nd London Field Ambulance Liencourt

169TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

Brigade Headquarters Houvin-Houvigneul
169/1st and Z56th Trench Mortar Batteries Houvin-Houvigneul
1/2nd London Regt. Séricourt
1/5th London Regt. Magnicourt
1/9th London Regt. Houvigneul
1/16th London Regt. Moncheaux 9
1/3rd London Bde. R.F.A. Bouret-sur-Canche
No. 4 Coy. Train Houvin-Houvigneul
2/3rd London Field Ambulance Houvin-Houvigneul
Divisional Supply Column Liencourt
Divisional Ammunition Sub-Park Avesnes-le-Comte

All these units contribute to an advance. Some designation, such as “shops,” may strike the ear as strange, an unlikely unit to help much in an advance; but a man cannot march without boots, a gun can neither shoot nor advance with a broken spring, a motor lorry will not bring up a single tin of “bully beef” if its axle breaks, and all these things are put right by men who are labelled “shops.” Even the Divisional Canteen plays its part, and has on occasions pushed well forward to refresh wearied troops.

We say these units contribute to an advance! They contribute to every action, to every move--they are the division.

As a further measure, which will give the importance of the unit rather than the size of it, the maximum British effort was 99 infantry, 6 cavalry, and 4 yeomanry divisions (the latter were more often infantry than cavalry).

The work of perfecting the organisation went on through the months of February, March, and April. The problem of how to create from nothing had sometimes to be faced as the Army usually faces such conundrums--by cutting a bit from something else which did exist. Capt. Newnham notes in the 169th Brigade diary under date 17th April: “Brigade Machine Gun Coy. formed. Capt. J. R. Pyper, 4th London, to command, and Capt. J. B. Baber, Queen’s Westminsters, second in command. Company formed from existing personnel in battalions, each battalion finding a section, and some from Headquarters. No M.G.C. 10 gunners available, as per War Office letter. Already weak battalions lose good men and reinforcements will have to come from them as well.”

The health of the division was good except for an outbreak of measles in the 169th Brigade.

On the 3rd May the 167th Brigade moved to Souastre, under the VII Corps, and the rest of the division followed on the 6th May, Divisional Headquarters being established at Hénu.

On the 9th May the C.R.A., Brig.-Gen. R. J. C. Elkington, took over artillery positions from the C.R.A. 14th Division on the Hébuterne front.

* * * * *

Three months had elapsed since the division had commenced to assemble at Hallencourt. Troops were well rested and trained, and were now to be launched in the big operations of 1916. It would be as well at this point to note the general situation, as from now on the 56th Division took a prominent part in the severe fighting which commenced on 1st July.

We will give the German point of view as expressed by Gen. von Falkenhayn and published in his war book[2]:

“France has been weakened almost to the limits of endurance,
both in a military and economic sense--the latter by the
permanent loss of the coalfields in the north-east of the
country. The Russian armies have not been completely
overthrown, but their offensive powers have been so
shattered that she can never revive in anything like her 11
old strength. The armies of Serbia can be considered as
destroyed. Italy has no doubt realised that she cannot
reckon on the realisation of her brigand’s ambitions within
measurable time, and would therefore probably be only too
glad to be able to liquidate her adventure in any way that
would save her face.

If no deductions can be drawn from these facts, the reasons
are to be sought in many circumstances ... the chief among
them cannot be passed over, for it is the enormous hold
which England still has on her allies.”

He then goes on to discuss what can be done to break the will of England. He says that the history of the English wars against the Netherlands, Spain, France, and Napoleon is being repeated. That England is “obviously staking everything on a war of exhaustion.” He puts the winter of 1917 as the latest date when a food crisis and “the social and political crisis that always follow them, among the members of our alliance,” will occur, and asks, or rather states, that England must be shown that her venture has no prospects. But “in this case, of course, as in most others involving higher strategic decisions, it is very much easier to say what has to be done than to find out how it can and must be done.”

How can one inflict a decisive defeat on England on land? Invasion is impossible--the German Navy is convinced of that.

“As far as our own Continent of Europe is concerned, we are
sure of our troops, and are working with known factors. For
that reason we must rule out enterprises in the East, where
England can only be struck at indirectly. Victories at 12
Salonica, the Suez Canal, or in Mesopotamia can only help us
in so far as they intensify the doubts about England’s
invulnerability which have already been aroused among the
Mediterranean peoples and in the Mohammedan world. Defeats
in the East could do us palpable harm among our allies. We
can in no case expect to do anything of decisive effect on
the course of the war, as the protagonists of an Alexander
march to India or Egypt, or an overwhelming blow at
Salonica, are always hoping. Our allies have not the
necessary means at their disposal. We are not in a position
to supply them, owing to the bad communications, and
England, which has known how to swallow the humiliations of
Antwerp and Gallipoli, will survive defeats in those distant
theatres also.

When we turn from them to the European theatre, where
England can be struck on land, we cannot close our eyes to
the fact that we are faced with an extraordinarily difficult
problem.”

It would seem that England was giving poor von Falkenhayn a lot of trouble. After looking vainly in the East for a vulnerable point in her armour, he is forced to turn his eyes to the West. And in the West he does not like the look of the British Army. He cannot collect more than twenty-five or twenty-six divisions to attack with, and they are not nearly enough!

“Attempts at a mass break-through, even with an extreme
accumulation of men and material, cannot be regarded as
holding out prospects of success against a well-armed enemy
whose _moral_ is sound and who is not seriously inferior in
numbers. The defender has usually succeeded in closing the
gaps. The salients thus made, enormously exposed to the
effects of flanking fire, threaten to become a mere 13
slaughterhouse. The technical difficulties of directing and
supplying the masses bottled up in them are so great as to
seem practically insurmountable.”

He sweeps aside the idea of attacking the English Army with a final complaint that, even if he drove it completely from the Continent, “England may be trusted not to give up even then,” and France would not have been very seriously damaged, so that a second operation would have to be taken against her. It would be impossible to get sufficient men.

England’s allies are called her “tools,” and the only thing to do is to smash up the “tools.” But no weapon is to be discarded, and so unrestricted submarine warfare must be undertaken against this arch-enemy.

“If the definite promises of the Naval Authorities that the
unrestricted submarine war must force England to yield in
the course of the year 1916 are realised, we must face the
fact that the United States may take up a hostile attitude.
She cannot intervene decisively in the war in time to enable
her to make England fight on when that country sees the
spectre of hunger and many another famine rise up before her
island. There is only one shadow on this encouraging picture
of the future. We have to assume that the Naval Authorities
are not making a mistake.”

As for the “tools,” Italy is ruled out as a possible one to be broken as she is not of much account in Falkenhayn’s opinion, and he thinks there will soon be internal troubles. Russia is also ruled out because he does not see any gain in the capture of Petrograd or Moscow, and 14 there are also “internal troubles.” There is France left.

“As I have already insisted, the strain on France has almost
reached the breaking-point--though it is certainly borne
with the most remarkable devotion. If we succeed in opening
the eyes of her people to the fact that in a military sense
they have nothing more to hope for, that breaking-point
would be reached and England’s best sword knocked out of her
hand.... Within our reach behind the French sector of the
Western Front there are objectives for the retention of
which the French Staff would be compelled to throw in every
man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed
to death.... The objectives of which I am speaking now are
Belfort and Verdun.”

Altogether this document, which was prepared for the Kaiser and must have been read by that potentate with mixed feelings, was not the work of an optimist. It reads more like despair, as though Falkenhayn was saying, “I can still fight, I can still hurt, but I am bound to go down in the end”! One cannot see any very shrewd reasoning in it, for he not only underrated the valour of the French (as the Germans always did), but he was placed in very serious difficulties by the successful attack of Brussiloff on the Austrians in June, so that he also undervalued the strength of Russia. For this misfortune, however, the Germans blame the Austrians, condemning them for their offensive against the Italians in May, which was undertaken against German advice and made the Brussiloff adventure possible. But this document shows the policy and plans of Germany for the year 1916--the great German effort on Verdun, which was to bleed France to death, dominates all other events. The attack was launched on the 21st February and 15 coincides with the formation of the 56th Division, and the subsequent movements of the division were connected with the wide-spreading influence of the Verdun battle.

In his dispatch dated the 29th May, Sir Douglas Haig sums up the early situation very briefly. Since the 19th December, 1915,

“the only offensive effort made by the enemy on a great
scale was directed against our French Allies near Verdun.
The fighting in that area has been prolonged and severe. The
results have been worthy of the highest traditions of the
French Army and of great service to the cause of the Allies.
The efforts made by the enemy have cost him heavy losses
both in men and in prestige, and he has made these
sacrifices without gaining any advantage to counterbalance
them.

During the struggle my troops have been in readiness to
co-operate as they might be needed, but the only assistance
asked for by our Allies was of an indirect nature--viz., the
relief of the French troops on a portion of their defensive
front. This relief I was glad to be able to afford.”

On the other hand, plans for a Franco-British offensive had been fully discussed by Sir Douglas Haig and Marshal Joffre and complete agreement arrived at. Vast preparations were in progress. Sir Douglas Haig desired to postpone the attack as long as possible, because both the British Army and the supply of ammunition were growing steadily, and time would enable the newer troops to complete their training. But though the original plans had no connection with Verdun, they were bound to influence and be influenced by the great German attack.

It may be said that the Entente Powers were not looking for a speedy 16 termination of the war, but were bent on inflicting heavy blows on Germany and her allies, while Germany was seeking, by a concentration on France at Verdun, to gain a decision in the West. Falkenhayn’s advice was being followed, although the unrestricted submarine warfare was postponed for the time being.

The plan for the British offensive was that the main attack should be delivered by the Fourth Army, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, on a front stretching from Maricourt, on the right, to Serre, on the left; while farther north the Third Army, under Sir E. H. H. Allenby, would make an attack on both sides of the Gommecourt salient.

For an offensive on this scale enormous preparations were necessary. There was no end to the amount of stores to be accumulated, from ammunition to horseshoes. In the forward trench system many miles of trenches had to be dug--assault trenches, assembly trenches, communication trenches, trenches for telephone wires--dugouts had to be constructed for sheltering troops, for dressing-stations, for storing food, water, and engineering material, not forgetting ammunition. We are bound to admit, however, that in those days, although much work was done on dugouts, the infantry saw precious little of them. Mining they saw, indeed, but dugouts were rare.

Then there were dumps to be made at convenient points, and many miles of railway line, both standard and narrow gauge, to bring the stores within reach of the fighting troops. Roads had to be constructed, and in some places causeways had to be built over marshy valleys. Wells were sunk, over a hundred pumping stations were installed, and a 17 hundred and twenty miles of water-mains laid.

The whole country behind this vast front was teeming with men and horses, with wagons and motor lorries. At night it was as though an army of gigantic ants were at work, stretched out in long lines, building and excavating, marching in solemn silent processions with grim, determined purpose in the slowness of their gait, and bowed down under loads of material. They passed and repassed in never-ending streams; the roads were congested with motor and wagon traffic; paths across the open country could be traced by the shadowy silhouettes of men in single file. And the horizon flickered with the flash of guns as with summer lightning, while shells passed overhead with a long-drawn, ghostly wail, or fell with a sharp swish and a crash. The line, that maze of foul mud-filled ditches constructed in a belt of shell-pounded and festering earth, was indicated at night by floating starlights rising irregularly as sparks, bursting into brilliancy, and remaining for a moment, suspended in the blackness of the sky like arc lamps, then dying once more to so many sparks before they fell to the ground.

Sometimes the nights would be quiet--that is to say, quiet except for occasional crashes at intervals of several minutes--although the constant flickering on the horizon would never cease; at others they would be “lively,” one might almost say there would be a sensation of hustle, so swift would be the wailing passage and so continuous the crash of bursting shells. This might last all through the night as an organised “shoot,” or would come suddenly, without warning, a swift artillery attack on roads, working parties, or billets--what was 18 afterwards known as “harassing fire” though it was in a more intense form--and shifting from one point to another, from front line to roads, from roads to billets, from billets to some spot where troops were suspected to be working. Or there would be a raid with an angry concentration of artillery from both sides.

And night after night the preparation for the “Big Push” went on.

* * * * *

The 56th Division, now trained and “shaken together,” arrived in the Hébuterne sector, on the right of the Gommecourt salient and towards the left of the front under preparation for the British effort. The 167th Brigade took over the front-line system held by the 145th Brigade, 48th Division, on the 4th May. The 168th Brigade marched from their billets in the Doullens area on the 6th, and the 169th Brigade followed on the 7th May. Divisional Headquarters were established at Hénu.

First blood was drawn for the division by the 167th Brigade on the 18th May. A German patrol attempted to bomb a sap held by the 3rd London Regt., and was beaten off with the loss of one officer and one N.C.O. killed. These proved to be of the 169th Infantry Regt., 52nd Division, one of the divisions of the XIV German Corps and a normal identification.

The system of holding the line was one of “grouping.” On the 22nd May Brig.-Gen. Coke, 169th Brigade, was in command of the line, which was held by two battalions of the 169th Brigade and two battalions of the 168th Brigade. In support was Brig.-Gen. Nugent, with his headquarters at Souastre, having under his command his own four battalions and one 19 of the 169th Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Loch, 168th Brigade, with his headquarters at Grenas, had two of his own battalions and one of the 169th Brigade.

Plans were now in preparation for a very remarkable achievement.

We have seen that the scheme for the big British offensive included an attack on the Gommecourt salient. This was to be undertaken by the Third Army, and the task fell to the VII Corps (Gen. Snow), holding the front in question. For the moment we will confine ourselves to the point that the 56th Division was to be one of the attacking divisions.

When Gen. Hull was informed of what he was expected to do, he was at once confronted with an obvious difficulty--the front line of his sector was some seven hundred yards away from the enemy! It was not impossible to shorten this distance, but, with one exception, the several ways of doing it must result in heavy casualties; the enemy would be bound to see what was afoot, and would try by every means in his power to prevent and to hinder its execution, and render it as costly as he could. It would also be a lengthy business unless it was boldly tackled. Gen. Hull decided on the boldest of all courses.

He traced out a new line which was, on an average, four hundred yards in advance of the old one. This meant working, in some spots, within two hundred and fifty yards of the enemy. _And he decided to dig it in one night!_ It meant that at least three thousand yards of trench must be constructed in a few hours, a task of appalling magnitude; and it must be remembered that every effort was always made to limit the number of men in any working party required for No Man’s 20 Land. When he announced his intentions there was something like consternation at Corps Headquarters.

The task was allotted to Brig.-Gen. Nugent and the 167th Brigade. He had at his disposal, over and above the five battalions of his “group,” one company of the 5th Cheshire Regt. with a half of the 2/2nd London Field Coy. R.E.

So that the men might know the lie of the land, the 167th Brigade was sent on ahead of the rest of the division and straight into the line, which it held for a fortnight. The Engineers, the company officers of battalions concerned, and the brigade staff made most careful reconnaissance, patrolling every night, noting landmarks, getting acquainted with that silent, eerie tract separating the two lines of combatants. Conversations throughout the day were punctuated with references to “the strong point,” “the lonely tree,” the “May bush,” “the Z hedge,” “the head of Sap 4,” as landmarks became familiar. Sometimes German patrols were met, sometimes imagined.

It was decided to divide the whole front into four sections--A, B, C, and D. The only difficulty was the junction between B and C, but this was eventually marked by a heap of white stones--a small heap.

Four days before the date fixed for the operation, the brigade was relieved, and during the following days the whole of the arrangements were rehearsed--with the exception of the actual digging--first by day and then by night.

Meanwhile the artillery were warned that nothing was to be done by them to rouse the enemy while the work was being carried out, but that 21 all batteries must be manned and ready for instant action. All known machine-gun emplacements were carefully registered, and arrangements were made with the Brigadier-General commanding the Corps heavy artillery to register on all German batteries whose zone of fire included the area of the work. Two of the Divisional 4·5 howitzers were to assist in the counter-battery work.

Although the trench was dug in one night, the whole operation required three nights to complete. On the first night, the 25-26th May, covering parties crept out and took up positions in advance of the selected line. Then engineers followed, quiet and certain in all that they did, and marked out the line with string and pegs. On the left they got to work speedily: the pegs were about nine inches long and made from small round stakes from which the bark had not been removed; the string was ordinary jute twine which had been prepared with loops at the proper intervals to mark the angle of bays and traverses. They were undisturbed, and C and D sections were marked out.

But in A and B sections the night was one of excursions and alarms. First of all there was great difficulty in getting the covering party through our own wire, which suggests an unfortunate oversight; and then German patrols were encountered. The latter occurrence was a contingency which had always been reckoned with. A game of hide and seek ensued, but meanwhile time passed. There was no question of clearing No Man’s Land when other parties were working on the left, and so the marking had to be abandoned. It did not, however, cause any serious inconvenience.

The next night each battalion marched from billets fully armed for 22 digging. Ten per cent. carried picks, and the remainder carried shovels which had been carefully sharpened. Each man had three sandbags, one being wrapped round the shovel or pick to prevent noise, and between them they also carried a quantity of white tape.

In the line ten exits had been made by cutting through our wire and constructing steps out of the trench--trench ladders had also been provided by the engineers in case the steps should be impassable through rain. White boards were hung on the wire to mark these gaps for the withdrawal.

The communication trenches to be used by the working battalions were left quite clear by the troops holding the line, and, at the appointed time, the head of each battalion was at the selected entrance and advanced in the following order: covering parties, taping parties, working parties.

The covering parties, consisting of sixty officers and men in six groups, had orders to use rifle fire as sparingly as possible, but to make full use of the bayonet if enemy patrols were encountered.

When the covering parties had been given time to get out, the two other groups of parties followed at short intervals. And half an hour after the digging parties had left the trench, wiring and carrying parties, about a hundred men to each battalion, went out. There were three thousand men in No Man’s Land!

The boldness of Gen. Hull’s enterprise was amply justified. By 2.30 a.m. the trench had been made and was held by posts, found from the covering parties, reinforced with Lewis guns; they had rations, water, and shovels to improve their positions, and were in telephonic 23 communication with the old trench, and all the working parties had filed away as silently as they had come.

During the ensuing day the Royal Flying Corps successfully prevented any enemy aeroplanes from approaching our lines, but our airmen photographed the new line themselves, and at noon Gen. Hull was able to see from a photograph what work had been done.

On the night of 27-28th the same number of men were out working again, improving the front-line trench and wire, digging support lines and two other communication trenches. The new work had been pegged out the previous night by the engineers.

The 56th Division had then started its career with the astounding feat of having in the space of forty-eight hours constructed and wired a new system of trenches, comprising 2,900 yards of fire trench and 1,500 yards of communication trenches, in No Man’s Land and within 250 yards of the enemy. Casualties were 8 killed and 55 wounded. A little luck had waited on audacity, but the success of the whole operation was undoubtedly due to the intelligence and keenness of the men. They had nothing much to help them. Gen. Hull had, indeed, ordered two or three wagons, loaded with empty shell-cases and biscuit tins, to drive up and down the roads in rear of his lines, and the artillery fired an occasional round from a howitzer as a means of distracting the attention of the enemy, but it only required one foolish man to lose his head and disaster would have descended on the whole brigade.

It is interesting to note the dress. The covering parties were in full fighting kit and carried one day’s ration; the taping, digging, and 24 wiring men had no equipment, but carried a rifle, loaded with ten rounds, and one bandolier; the wire-carrying party had no arms or equipment.

The first stage was over. There was, however, still an enormous lot of work to be done--the trenches had to be improved, deepened, revetted, emplacements had to be made for machine guns and trench mortars, stores for ammunition of all sorts had to be constructed, cables had to be buried--it is but a repetition of what was going on everywhere on that front.

* * * * *

Gen. Hull and his G.S.O.1, Lieut.-Col. J. E. S. Brind, an artilleryman, were considering the problem of attack. The main features of it are noted by Gen. Hull as follows:

(_a_) The village of Hébuterne, which affords concealment
from view to within a short distance of our present line and
good observation of the German positions between Gommecourt
and the spur north of the sunken road (K17a and b) on the
right of the divisional front.

(_b_) The valleys west of Hébuterne, which afford good
artillery positions and cover from view, except from the
trees in Gommecourt Park.

(_c_) The spur running eastward from Hébuterne just north of
the Hébuterne-Puisieux Road, which defilades the area, north
of the spur, from the German trenches, south of the spur.

(_d_) Gommecourt Park and village, which, to a certain
extent, dominate the ground to the south.

(_e_) The spur running from E29c (north-east of Gommecourt)
through K5a and b to the Rossignol Wood along the southern
portion of which spur runs the German fourth line.

This spur commands the eastern edge of Gommecourt, dominates 25
the German trench system south-east and south of
Gommecourt, and affords concealment, both for battery
positions in the valley to the east and for a covered means
of approach for a counter-attack against the captors of
Gommecourt.

(_f_) The valley south-east of Nameless Farm, in which runs
the Puisieux-Gommecourt Road, a line of approach covered
from view from our present line.

It was once asked after a severe action for the capture of some rising ground, “What is the use of turning Fritz off a hill? There is always another hill behind it.” Which was true enough. But it is as well to remember that the high ground to the left as far as Blairville, held at this date by the Germans, was in 1918 in our hands, and it enabled Sir Douglas Haig to turn the whole of the old Somme position.

Of the German line Gen. Hull says:

“The German position south-east of Gommecourt Park and
village consists of three lines of trenches, of which the
first is heavily wired, the second lightly wired, the third
does not appear to be wired at all unless there is sunken
wire on the road. All three lines are visible from our
present position except the second and third lines behind
the strong point K11c and d. The northern flank of this
system of trenches rests on the southern edge of Gommecourt
Park, the trenches along which are organised to fire south.
The southern flank of the system rests on the strong point
K11c.

In rear of this system is another consisting of two lines of
trenches running from the south-east corner of Gommecourt
along the ridge in 5Ka, b, and c, to Rossignol Wood. The
front trench of this system is heavily wired and visible.”

In a most interesting paper on the proposed attack Gen. Hull says: 26

“The object of the VII Corps attack will be to establish
itself on the line 16 Poplars-Nameless Farm-Little Z-Tree at
E23a12.

The 46th Division will attack from the north and the
question was discussed:

(_a_) Should we endeavour to secure a footing on the
ridge E29c-K5a in the initial assault, or

(_b_) Should the 56th Division first secure the German
third line from the south-east corner of Gommecourt
Wood and then, under Corps direction, launch a second
attack to secure the ridge?

Whichever solution the Corps Commander considers it wisest
to adopt, there is one point which I wish to urge: that no
advance through the village or park of Gommecourt should be
attempted until the ridge E29c-K5a is secured.

The clearing of the village and wood is bound to be a costly
enterprise if the enemy makes any attempt to fight it out.
It is to be hoped that the heavy bombardment will very
seriously affect the _moral_ of the garrison of the
village and park, and I consider that the knowledge that
they were cut off from escape and from reinforcements might
have so great an effect on the German troops as to make them
surrender and so save us valuable troops for further
operations.

I was, and still am, in favour of the first solution, i.e.
to secure the Quadrilateral in the first assault. The
reasons which have been urged against this course are:

(_a_) That at Loos no success was achieved after a
certain limited distance had been carried.

(_b_) That in the event of either the 46th or the 56th
Divisions failing to achieve their objective, the
detachment of the other would be in an extremely
isolated position.

I have carefully considered both these arguments, and do not 27
think there is any reason to alter my opinion.

At Loos the 47th Division was the only division to which a
definite objective was given. Its rôle was to form a
defensive flank on the right of the IV Corps. Its left flank
advanced nearly 2,500 yards behind the German front line
without serious loss or difficulty. In the present case I am
proposing an advance, at one point on each divisional front,
of only 800 yards, in the case of the 56th Division, and
less in the case of the 46th Division. In the present case,
too, we have the additional advantage of much heavier
artillery, more ammunition, and a salient to attack.

As regards the second argument, that in the event of one or
other attack failing the detachment of the other division
would be isolated:

In the event of my reaching my objective in K5a, and the
46th Division failing to reach E29c, I should consider it my
duty to put in troops (if necessary from my reserve brigade)
to help the 46th Division.

Troops at K5a would be within 500 yards of the unit at the
south-eastern edge of Gommecourt, and in direct
communication by visual signalling with my present trench
system, so that they can hardly be considered isolated, and
the risk, if any, is, I consider, worth running in order to
isolate completely the enemy troops in Gommecourt Park and
village.

I do not like the idea of delay and a second attack to
capture the Quadrilateral in K5a. The second attack would
have to be launched from our front line trenches, as I do
not consider it would be feasible to organise and launch an
attack from the newly-captured trenches. Any delay would
enable the enemy to put his barrage in front of our
front-line system, as if there is a weak point in our
organisation, it is in the number of counter-batteries
available to deal with the enemy guns. If we delay we lose
the advantage surprise would give us.”

While these problems were being discussed, Sir Douglas Haig had 28 decided to hurry on his preparations. We have seen that his desire was to delay as much as possible and perfect his machine, also that every day meant to him added strength. But meanwhile the Entente Powers were being pressed in another direction. The Austrians had attacked the Italians with great initial success. By the end of May the situation on that front was so serious that the Russian offensive was opened in the early days of June in order to relieve the pressure.

The Germans accuse the Austrians of having drained their front in Galicia of artillery for their Italian offensive, and also of holding the line with troops of poor quality. However that may be, Gen. Brussiloff’s army, “after a relatively short artillery preparation ... got up from their trenches and simply marched forward.” Falkenhayn has a delightful observation on the whole business: “A ‘reconnaissance’ like Brussiloff’s was only possible, of course, if the General had decisive reason for holding a low opinion of his enemy’s power of resistance. And on this point he made no miscalculation.”

The immediate effect of the Russian success was the transfer of three divisions from the Western Front, and later more followed; but the Germans were still very strong in numbers, and there was no slacking off of their efforts on Verdun. They were able to help the Austrians to check the Russian advance and eventually to repulse it, but, on the other hand, the Italian counter-attack met with success and drove the Austrians back.

Sir Douglas Haig says that

“The heroic defence of our French Allies had already gained 29
many weeks of inestimable value and had caused the enemy
very heavy losses; but the strain continued to increase. In
view, therefore, of the situation in the various theatres of
war, it was eventually agreed between Gen. Joffre and myself
that the combined French and British offensive should not be
postponed beyond the end of June. The object of that
offensive was threefold:

(1) To relieve the pressure on Verdun.

(2) To assist our Allies in the other theatres of war
by stopping any further transfer of German troops from
the Western Front.

(3) To wear down the strength of the forces opposed to us.”

We begin to see now the dominating influence of Verdun. In any case the offensive could not have been postponed much longer, and if it was an alteration of plan forced by the enemy, it was not to be compared with the abandonment by the Germans of their offensive--which Falkenhayn says he had prepared against the British with the object of forestalling the Entente blow on the Western Front--due to the uncomfortable situation of the Austrians.

Probably, however, the date did influence the approaching action of the 56th Division. The new front line was still a long way from the enemy. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles succeeded in advancing a small sector of the line by a hundred yards and, had there been time, the whole division would have crept closer before jumping on the enemy.

The weather, too, was very bad.

In due course Gen. Hull issued his preliminary instructions, from which it will be seen that the decision to attempt the capture of the Quadrilateral in one operation had been taken:

“The attack of the 56th Division will be carried out by the 30
168th and 169th Brigades, whose tasks will be as follows:

(_a_) The objective of the 168th Brigade will be to
capture the German line from Fair Trench, about K11d13,
along Farm, Fame and Elbe, Felon, to a point in Fell
fifty yards north-west of the trench junction at K5c52,
and to establish itself in three strong points:
(1) About Farmyard, Farmer, Farm.
(2) About Elbe, between Et and Felon.
(3) About cross-trenches of Fell and Felon with Epte.

168th Brigade will be responsible for the construction of a
fire trench facing south-east to connect the right flank of
the captured line to our present line in W47.

(_b_) The task of the 169th Brigade will be carried out
in three phases. The object of the 169th Brigade in the
first phase will be to capture the line of German
trenches from the left of the 168th Brigade along Fall,
Fellow, the Cemetery, Eck, the Maze, Eel, and Fir, and
to establish strong points:

(1) From Feud through Ems to the Cemetery inclusive.
(2) About the Maze.
(3) About the south-east corner of Gommecourt Park.

The second phase of the 169th Brigade attack will take place
immediately after the first phase.

The objective of the second phase is the Quadrilateral of
the trenches in the south-east portion of K5a. The artillery
lifts will be timed on the assumption that the infantry will
reach Ems (between Etch and Fillet) twenty-five minutes
after zero; and Exe (between Etch and Fillet) twenty-seven
minutes after zero time.

The third phase will take place directly after the
Quadrilateral is captured, and will consist of the securing 31
of the cross-trenches at K5a78 (where Indus crosses Fill and
Fillet) and joining hands with the 46th Division along Fill.
Fillet will be consolidated facing east.

The following will be carried on the man:
200 rounds S.A.A.;
Waterproof sheet;
Haversack;
Iron ration and current day’s ration;
Two to three sand-bags;
Two tube helmets;
Proportion of wire-cutters, bill-hooks, tools.”

The instructions for the 167th Brigade are practically embodied in the following paragraphs:

“One company 167th Brigade will be placed at the disposal of
the Brigadier-General commanding 169th Brigade, to hold
sectors Y49 and Y50.

Seven officers and 200 men of the 167th Brigade will be
detailed for the control of smoke, and will be under the
orders of the Divisional Gas Officer. Approximately 1,200
men will be required for work under the C.R.E. on
communication trenches across No Man’s Land and for carrying
parties.”

Practice attacks, based on these instructions, were carried out by the brigades in reserve.

We have written of the constructive preparations which were going on all along the line of proposed attack. These preparations were continued until the last moment. But meanwhile another element was introduced--that of destructive preparation. It is scarcely necessary to point out that neither form of preparation could be concealed from the enemy. The Germans knew as well as we did where we would attack.

The Gommecourt sector to be attacked was held by the German 169th and 32 170th Regiments, with about 1-1/2 battalions on the front line, 1 battalion in support, 2 battalions in reserve in Bucquoy, and 2 companies at Ablainzeville. Their artillery consisted of 5 batteries of heavy artillery and 12 batteries of field artillery. These batteries were divided into three groups at Quesnoy Farm, on the left of the British position, Biez Wood and Puisieux. There was a further group of guns near Adinfer Wood which could assist in the defence.

The 56th Divisional Artillery, together with the heavy VII Corps guns, had now to prepare for the infantry assault by smashing up not only the wire and trench system, but billets and gun positions behind the German lines as well. As regards villages, most attention was given to Bucquoy, Essart, Ablainzeville, and Achiet-le-Grand.

Three groups of artillery were formed--a northern group, under Lieut.-Col. Southam, a southern group, under Lieut.-Col. Macdowell, and a wire-cutting group under Lieut.-Col. Prechtel. The northern and southern groups were under the orders of the Corps, and consisted of:

NORTHERN GROUP

3 batteries of 18-pounders (until zero day, then 4 batteries).
1 battery 4·5 howitzers.
Affiliated at zero to the 169th Brigade.

SOUTHERN GROUP

4 batteries of 18-pounders.
1 battery 4·5 howitzers.
Affiliated at zero to the 168th Brigade.

WIRE-CUTTING GROUP 33

5 batteries of 18-pounders until zero and then 4 batteries.
1 battery 4·5 howitzers.
Two of the guns of the 4·5 battery will be at the call of the
counter-battery group.

In the preliminary instructions it will be noticed that a party of officers and men were detailed to act under the Divisional Gas Officer. Their special duty was to cover the approach of the infantry by the discharge of a smoke cloud. It was hoped to introduce some element of surprise by occasional discharges of smoke during the preparatory bombardment, and so the Corps ordered that the bombardment should be carried out for a period of five days, and the attack would take place on the sixth. These days would be known as U, V, W, X, Y, and Z days.

“Smoke discharges lasting for a period of ten minutes will
take place on the days and at the hours mentioned below.
They will coincide with the intense artillery bombardment of
the enemy trenches. These bombardments will commence thirty
minutes before the smoke, and will reach their maximum
intensity during the ten minutes that it is being discharged:

U day, no discharge.
V day, no discharge.
W day from 10.15 a.m. to 10.25 a.m.
X day from 5.45 a.m. to 5.55 a.m.
Y day from 7.15 a.m. to 7.25 a.m.

On Z day the smoke cloud will commence five minutes before
zero. On the 46th and 56th Divisional fronts its duration
will be as arranged by divisions. On the 37th Divisional 34
front it will continue for one hour.”

U day was the 24th June, but the whole of the great attack was postponed for two days, so that, instead of having five days of the preliminary bombardment, there were seven.