Chapter VI

SUPPOSED LACK OF PROOF OF REVELATION, AND ITS WANT OF UNIVERSALITY.

It has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation, that its evidences are not adequate, and that it is not universally known and believed.

But the argument amounts to just this, that God would not bestow on us any favor, except in such a mode and degree as we thought best, and did exactly the same for everybody else.

Such a notion, all analogy contradicts.

I. _Men act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence._

=1.= It is often absolutely _impossible_ to say which of two
modes of acting will give most pleasure or profit.

=2.= If it were possible, we cannot know what changes temper,
satiety, ill health, &c. might produce, so as to destroy our
pleasure.

=3.= We cannot foresee what accidents may cut it all off.

=4.= Strong objections and difficulties may attach to the course
of action we adopt, which yet all would admit ought not to deter
us.

=5.= We may, after all, be deceived by appearances, or by our
passions, &c.

=6.= Men think it reasonable to engage in pursuit of advantage,
even when the probabilities of success are against them.

II. _As to the light of Christianity not being universal._

=1.= Temporal good is enjoyed in very different degrees even
among creatures of the same species.

=2.= Yet it is certain that God governs.

=3.= We may prudently or imprudently use our good things.

=4.= The Jewish religion was not universal.

=5.= If it be _intended_ that Christianity should be a small
light, shining in a great and wide-spread darkness, it would be
perfectly uniform with other parts of God’s providence.

=6.= If some have Christianity so corrupted, and interpolated, as
to cause thoughtful persons to doubt it, as is the case in some
countries; and if, where it is the purest, some learn much less
from it than they might, there are manifest parallels in God’s
natural dispensations.

=7.= No more is expected of any one, than is equitable under his
circumstances.

=8.= Every one is bound to get rid of his ignorance, as far as he
can, and to instruct his neighbor.

=9.= If revelation _were_ universal, in extent and degree,
different understandings, educations, tempers, length of lives,
and outward advantages, would soon make the knowledge of it as
different as it is at present.

III. _Practical reflections._

_First._ That the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably
to convince all, may be part of our probation.

=1.= It gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our
understanding. Just as is the case in common affairs.

=2.= Intellectual inattention to so serious a matter, is as
immoral, as disobedience after conviction of the truth.

_Secondly._ If the evidence is really doubtful, it puts us on
probation.

=1.= If a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done
him the greatest favor, or whether his whole temporal interest
depended on him, he ought not to regard that person as he would
if there were _no_ reason to think so.

=2.= So if there is only reason to apprehend that Christianity
_may_ be true, we are as much bound to _examine_, &c. as we
would be bound to _obey_, if we _knew_ it was true.

=3.= Considering the infinite importance of religion, there is
not much difference as to what ought to be the mode of life of
those who are convinced and those who doubt its truth. Their
hopes and fears are the same in kind, though not in degree; and
so their obligations are much the same.

=4.= Doubts presuppose _some_ evidence, belief _more_, and
certainty _more still_. Each state should influence our
conduct, and does so, in common things.

=5.= It shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is
glaring; and a corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless
overpowering.

_Thirdly._ Difficulties as to believing religion, are no more a
ground of complaint, than difficulties in practising it.

=1.= They constitute a wholesome discipline.

1.) In allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself.

2.) In requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some
uncertainties.

=2.= In the case of some minds, speculative difficulties as
to the evidence of religion is the _principal_ trial. A full
conviction of its truth would _constrain_ some to obedience.

_Fourthly._ The difficulties may be _in the objector_ rather than
in the religion.

=1.= Not sufficiently in earnest to be informed.

=2.= Secretly _wishes_ religion not to be true.

=3.= Looks at objections rather than replies.

=4.= Treats the subject ludicrously.

_Fifthly._ The proof of Christianity is level to common men.

=1.= They are capable of being convinced of the existence of
God, and of their moral accountability.

=2.= And they can understand the evidence of miracles, and the
fulfilment of prophecy.

=3.= If they are capable of seeing the difficulty, they are
capable of understanding the proof.

=4.= If they pick up objections from hearsay, and will not or
cannot examine them thoroughly, they must remain ignorant, just
as they do as to the sciences.

_Objec._ Our directions should be too plain to _admit_ of
doubt; like those of an earthly master.

_Ans._ The earthly master only wants his work done, and is
careless as to the state of the heart; but as the whole of
morality consists in the state of the heart, the cases are
not parallel.

_Finally._ The credibility of our being in a state of probation
is just as great as the credibility of there being any religion.
Our probation may be whether we choose to inform ourselves as to
our duty, and then whether we choose to do it.

Such is exactly the case as to temporal matters. To discern what
is best often requires difficult consideration, and yet leaves
doubts: and not reflecting carefully, or not acting even when
there may be doubt, is often fatal.