Chapter VI: Of Necessity as Influencing Conduct

Fatalists have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course hold the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature.

The question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what Christianity teaches.

To argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity, is puzzling; and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore be excused.

I. _Necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of the world._

=1.= It does not exclude design and deliberation.

1.) This is matter of actual experience and consciousness.

--Necessity does not account for the _existence_ of any
thing, but is only a _circumstance_ relating to its origin.
Instance the case of a house: the fatalist admits that it had
a builder, and the only question would be, was he obliged to
build it as he did?

2.) It is the same as to the construction of the world. To say
it exists by necessity must mean it had a maker, who _acted_ by
necessity: for necessity is only an abstract notion, and can
_do_ nothing.

3.) We say God exists by necessity, because we intuitively
discern that there must be an infinite Being, prior to all
causes; but we cannot say that _every thing_ so exists.
The fact that many changes in nature are produced by man’s
contrivance is a proof of this.

4.) Thus though the fatalist does not choose to mean by
necessity _an agent acting necessarily_, he is obliged to mean
this.

5.) And it also follows that a thing’s being done by necessity
does not exclude _design_.

=2.= It does not exclude a belief that we are in a state of
religion.

1.) Suppose a fatalist to educate a child on his own
principles,--viz.: that he cannot do otherwise than he does;
and is not subject to praise or blame.

(It might be asked, _would_ he, if possessed of common sense,
so educate his child?)

--The child would be delighted with his freedom; but would
soon prove a pest, and go to destruction.

--He would meet with checks and rebuffs, which would teach
him that he _was_ accountable.

--He would, in the end, be convinced either that his doctrine
was wrong, or that he had reasoned inconclusively upon it,
and misapplied it.

2.) To apply fatalism to practice, in any other way, would be
found equally fallacious: _e.g._ that he need not take care of
his life.

3.) No such absurdity follows the doctrine of freedom.

--Reasoning on this ground is justified by all experience.

--The constitution of things is _as if_ we were free.

4.) If the doctrine of necessity be true, and yet, when we
_apply it_ to life, always misleads us; how, then, can we be
sure it would not mislead us with respect to future interests?

5.) It follows that if there are proofs of religion on the
supposition of freedom, they are just as conclusive on the
supposition of necessity.

=3.= It does not refute the notion that God has a will and a
character.

1.) It does not hinder _us_ from having a will and a character;
from being cruel, or benevolent, or just, &c.

2.) If necessity be plead as the excuse for crime, it equally
excuses the _punishment_ of crime; for if it destroys the sin
of the one, it destroys the sin of the other.

3.) The very assumption of injustice in punishing crime, shows
that we cannot rid ourselves of the notion of justice and
injustice.

_Objec._ If necessity be _reconcilable_ with the character of
God, as portrayed in Christianity, does it not destroy _the
proof_ that he has that character; and so destroy the proofs of
religion?

_Ans._ No. Happiness and misery are not our fate, but the
results of our conduct. God’s government is that of a father
and a magistrate; and his natural rule of government must be
veracity and justice. We shall proceed to show that,

II. _Necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion._

=1.= It is a plain fact that God rewards and punishes.

1.) He has given us a moral faculty, by which we discern
between actions, and approve or disapprove, &c.

2.) This implies a _rule_, a peculiar _kind_ of rule; _i.e._
one from which we cannot depart without being self-condemned.

3.) The dictates of our moral faculty are God’s laws, with
sanctions. It not only raises a sense of _duty_, but a sense of
_security_ in obeying, and danger in disobeying; and this is an
explicit sanction.

4.) God’s government must conform to the nature he has given
us; and we must infer that in the upshot happiness will follow
virtue, and misery vice.

5.) Hence religious worship is a duty, if only as a means of
keeping up the sense of this government.

6.) No objection from necessity can lie against this course of
proof.

--The conclusion is wholly and directly from facts; not
from what might appear to us to be _fit_, but from what his
actions tell us _he wills_.

=2.= Natural religion has external evidence which necessity, if
true, does not affect.

1.) Suppose a person convinced of the truths of natural
religion, but ignorant of history, and of the present state of
mankind, he would inquire:

--How this religion came?

--How far the belief of it extended?

--If he found that some one had totally propounded it, as a
deduction of reason, then, though its evidences from reason
would not be impaired, its history would furnish no further
proof.

2.) But such an one would find, on the contrary,

--That essentially it had been professed in all countries.

--And can be traced up through all ages.

--And was not _reasoned out_, but revealed.

3.) These things are of great weight.

--Showing natural religion to be conformed to the common
sense of mankind.

--And either that it was revealed, or forces itself upon the
mind.

--The rude state of the early ages leads to the belief of its
being revealed, and such is the opinion of the learned.

=3.= Early pretences to revelation indicate some original real
one from which they were copied.

--The history of revelation is as old as history itself.

--Such a fact is a proof of religion, against which there is
no presumption.

--And indicates a revelation prior to the examination
of the book said to contain it; and independent of all
considerations of its being corrupted, or darkened by fables.

=4.= It is thus apparent that the _external_ evidence of religion
is considerable; and is not affected by the doctrine of necessity.

REMARKS.

1. The danger of taking custom, &c. for our moral rule.

1.) We are all liable to prejudice.

2.) Reason may be impaired, perverted, or disregarded.

3.) The matter in hand is of infinite moment.

2. The foregoing observations amount to practical proof.

_Objec._ Probabilities which cannot be confuted, may
be overbalanced by greater probabilities: much more by
demonstration. Now, as the doctrine of necessity must be true,
it cannot be that God governs us as if we were free when he
knows we are not.

_Ans._ This brings the matter to a point, and the answer is
not to be evaded,--viz.: that the whole constitution and
course of things shows this reasoning to be false, be the
fallacy where it may.

The doctrine of freedom shows where,--viz.: in supposing
ourselves necessary agents when in fact we are free.

Admitting the doctrine of necessity, the fallacy evidently
lies in denying that necessary agents are accountable; for
that they _are_ rewarded and punished is undeniable.

CONCLUSION.--It follows that necessity, if true, neither proves that God will not make his creatures happy or miserable according to their conduct, nor destroys the proofs that he will do so. That is, necessity, practically, is false.