Chapter XLI: Conclusion (2)

[7] [These three ways of being “like,” are very distinct from each other. The first is equivalent to a logical induction. The second produces belief, because the same evidence made us believe in a similar case. The third is just an analogy, in the popular sense of the term.]

[8] The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability.

[9] [This is good common sense, and men always act thus if prudent. But it is not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation. “He that _believeth_ not shall be damned:” Mark xvi. 16. “He that _believeth_ hath everlasting life:” John iii. 36. “With the heart man _believeth_ unto righteousness:” Rom. x. 10. Belief is part of the sinner’s _duty_ in submitting himself to God; and not merely a question of prudence.]

[10] See Part II. chap. vi.

[11] Philocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant.

[12] [Some of these speculations, carried to the full measure of absurdity and impiety, may be found in Bayle’s great “Historical and Critical Dictionary.” See as instances, the articles ORIGEN, MANICHÆUS, PAULICIANS.]

[13] Ch. i.

[14] Ch. ii.

[15] Ch. iii.

[16] Ch. iv.

[17] Ch. v.

[18] Ch. vi.

[19] Ch. vii.

[20] Part II. Ch. i.

[21] Ch. ii.

[22] Ch. iii.

[23] Ch. iv.

[24] Ch. v.

[25] Ch. vi. vii.

[26] Ch. viii.

[27] [This chapter Dr. Chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in the book: not because lacking in just analogies, but because infected with the obscure metaphysics of that age. His reasoning, however, only serves to show that B. has perhaps made too much of the argument from the indivisibility of consciousness; and by no means that he does not fairly use it.

We certainly cannot object that the subject of identity is not made plain. Who has explained identity, or motion, or cohesion, or crystallization, or any thing? Locke goes squarely at the subject of personal identity, (see Essay, ch. 27,) but has rendered us small aid. His definition is, “Existence itself, which determines a being of any sort, to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the same kind.” I had rather define it “the uninterrupted continuance of being.” What ceases to exist, cannot again exist: for then it would exist after it had ceased to exist, and would have existed before it existed. Locke makes _consciousness_ to constitute identity, and argues that a man and a person are not the same; and that hence if I kill a man, but was not conscious of what I did, or have utterly forgotten, I am not the same person. Watts shows up this notion of Locke very ludicrously.

Butler, in his “Dissertation,” urges that consciousness _presupposes_ identity, as knowledge presupposes truth. On Locke’s theory, no person would have existed any earlier than the period to which his memory extends. We cannot suppose the soul made up of many consciousnesses, nor could memory, if material, spread itself over successive years of life.]

[28] I say _kind_ of presumption or probability; for I do not mean to affirm that there is the same _degree_ of conviction, that our living powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will.

[29] _Destruction of living powers_, is a manner of expression unavoidably ambiguous; and may signify either _the destruction of a living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all_; or _the destruction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its present state of perception and of action_. It is here used in the former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet _present_ is added. The loss of a man’s eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being endued with living powers, ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them.

[30] [The next paragraph indicates that Butler does not, as Chalmers thinks, consider this argument as “handing us over to an absolute demonstration.” It just places all arguments for and against the soul’s future life, in that balanced condition, which leaves us to learn the fact from revelation, free from presumptions _against_ its truth. This view of the case entirely relieves the objection as to the future life of brutes; and shows how entirely we must rely on revelation, as to the future, both of man and beast.]

[31] [Dodwell had published a book, in which he argues that human souls are not _naturally_ immortal, but become so, by the power of the Holy Ghost, in regeneration. Dr. Clarke replied. The controversy was continued by Collins. Dr. C. wrote four tracts on the subject.

These “presumptions” form the base of materialism, and hence the denial of a future state. Surely, thoughts and feelings, if material, have extension. But can any one conceive of love a foot long, or anger an inch thick? How superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels have even pagans been! Cicero makes Cato say, “The soul is a simple, uncompounded substance, without parts or mixture: it cannot be divided, and so cannot perish.” And in another place, “I never could believe that the soul lost its senses by escaping from senseless matter; or that such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers;” and again, “I am persuaded that I shall only begin truly to live, when I cease to live in this world,” Xenophon reports Cyrus as saying, in his last moments, “O my sons! do not imagine that when death has taken me from you, I shall cease to exist.”]

[32] See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it.

[33] [As every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years, an average life would take us through many such changes. If the mind changes with the body, it would be unjust for an old man to be made to suffer for the sins of his youth. To escape this, the materialist is driven to affirm that _the whole_ is not altered, though every particle be changed.

This argument from the constant flux is irresistible. It proves our identity, and that matter and mind are not the same. Does it not also destroy all presumption that the Ego cannot exist without this particular body?]

[34] See Dissertation I.

[35] [The mind affects the body, as much as the body does the mind. Love, anger, &c. quicken the circulation; fear checks it; terror may stop it altogether. Mania is as often produced by moral, as by physical causes, and hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure. The brain of a maniac, seldom shows, on dissection, any derangement. But this does not prove that there was no _functional_ derangement.]

[36] [“S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts with his instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also. S. Does he use his eyes also, in making shoes? A. Yes. S. But are we agreed that he who uses, and what he uses, are different? A. Yes. S. The shoemaker, then, and harper, are different from the hands and eyes they use? A. It appears so. S. Does a man then _use_ his whole body? A. Certainly. S. But he who uses, and that which he uses are different. A. Yes. S. A man then is something different from his own body.” PLAT. ALCIBI. PRIM. p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed.

“It may easily be perceived that the _mind_ both sees and hears, and not those parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind.” “Neither are we bodies; nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy body.” “Whatever is done by thy mind, is done by thee.” CICERO, Tusc. Disput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 52.

“The mind of each man is the man; not that figure which may be pointed out with the finger.” CIC., de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.]

[37] [Butler’s argument, if advanced for _proof_ would prove too much, not only as to brutes but as to man; for it would prove pre-existence. And this is really the tenet, (_i.e._ transmigration,) of those who arrive at the doctrine of immortality only by philosophy. Philosophy cannot establish the doctrine of a future state, nor can it afford any presumptions _against_ either a future or a pre-existent state.

Nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine of the soul; any more than there would be by insisting that by it we learned the doctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does teach that He who can _create_, under infinite diversity of forms, can _sustain_ existence, in any mode he pleases.

The reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to the immortality of brutes, will find it spread out in POLIGNAC’S Anti-Lucretius, and still more in BAYLE’S Dictionary, under the articles PEREIRA, and RORARIUS. The topic is also discussed in DES CARTES on the Passions: BAXTER on The Nature of the Soul: HUME’S Essays, Essay 9: SEARCH’S Light of Nature: CHEYNE’S Philosophical Principles: WAGSTAFF on the Immortality of Brutes: EDWARDS’ Critical and Philosophical Exercitations: WATT’S Essays, Essay 9: COLLIBER’S Enquiry: LOCKE on the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix.: DITTON on the Resurrection: WILLIS De Anima Brutæ.]

[38] [It is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks, as that an eye sees, or a finger feels. The eye no more sees, than the telescope or spectacles. If the _nerve_ be paralyzed, there is no vision, though the eye be perfect. A few words spoken or read, may at once deprive of sight, or knock a person down.

The mind sometimes survives the body. Swift, utterly helpless from palsy, retained his faculties. In some, the body survives the mind. MORGAGNI, HALLER, BONNET, and others, have proved that there is no part of the brain, not even the pineal gland, which has not been found destroyed by disease, where there had been no hallucination of mind, nor any suspicion of such disease, during life.]

[39] Pp. 84, 85.

[40] [We are told by sceptics that “mind is the result of a curious and complicated organization.” A mere jumble of words! But were the mind material, there is no evidence that death would destroy it: for we do not see that death has any power over matter. The body remains the very same as it does in a swoon, till _chemical_ changes begin.]

[41] There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here considered: Whether death be the destruction of living agents; if not, Whether it be the destruction of their _present_ powers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sensation; and if not, Whether it be the suspension, or discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers. Now, if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible, less for the next, and less still for the first.

[42] This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, νομίζειν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι· τὸν δὲ θάνατον, γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον, καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα τοῖς φιλοσοφήσασι· Lib. xv. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. [“For they think that the present life is like that of those who are just ready to be born; and that death is a birth into the real life, and a happy one to those who have practised philosophy.”] To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may allude in these words, ὡς νῦν περιμένεις, πότε ἔμβρυον ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς τῆς γυναικός σου ἐξέλθῃ, οὕτως ἐκδέχεσθαι, τὴν ὥραν ὲν ᾗ τὸ ψυχάριόν σου τοῦ ἐλύτρου τούτου ἐκπεσεῖται. Lib. ix. c. 3. [As this last passage may, by some, be thought indelicate, it is left untranslated.]

[43] [The _increase_ of a force in any direction, cannot of itself _change_ that direction. An arrow shot from a bow, towards an object, does not aim at some other object, by being shot with more force.]

[44] [Our nature will _always_ be ours, or we should cease to be ourselves, and become something else. And this nature is _social_. Every one feels, at least sometimes, that he is not complete in himself for the production of happiness; and so looks round for that which may fit his wants, and supply what he cannot produce from within. Hence amusements, of a thousand kinds, are resorted to, and still more, society. Society is a want of the mind; as food is of the body. Society, such as perfectly suits our real nature, and calls out, in a right manner, its every attribute, would secure our perfect happiness. But Such society must include God.]

[45] See Part II. chap. ii. and Part II. chap. iv.

[46] [Objections and difficulties belong to all subjects, in _some_ of their bearings. Ingenious and uncandid men may start others, which care and candor may remove. It is therefore no proof of weakness in a doctrine, that it is attacked with objections, both real and merely plausible. Error has been spread by two opposite means:--a dogmatic insisting on doubtful points, and an unteachable cavilling at certain truth.]

[47] Part I. chap. vii.

[48] [Our relation to God is “even necessary,” because we are his creatures: so that the relation must endure so long as we endure. But our relations to other creatures are contingent, and may be changed or abrogated.]

[49] Pp. 93, 94.

[50] [“The terms nature, and power of nature, and course of nature, are but empty words, and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or frequently. The raising of a human body out of the earth we call a miracle, the generation of one in the ordinary way we call natural, for no other reason than because one is usual the other unusual. Did men usually rise out of the earth like corn we should call that natural.” Dr. CLARKE, Controv. with Leibnitz.]

[51] [That man consists of parts, is evident; and the use of each part, and of the whole man, is open to investigation. In examining any part we learn what it _is_, and what it is _to do_: _e.g._ the eye, the hand, the heart. So of mental faculties; memory is to preserve ideas, shame to deter us from things shameful, compassion to induce us to relieve distress. In observing our whole make, we may see an ultimate design,--viz.: not particular animal gratifications, but intellectual and moral improvement, and happiness by that means. If this be our end, it is our duty. To disregard it, must bring punishment; for shame, anguish, remorse, are by the laws of mind, the sequences of sin.

See LAW’S Notes on King’s Origin of Evil.]

[52] [It is almost amazing that philosophy, because it discovers the laws of matter, should be placed in antagonism with the Bible which reveals a superintending Providence. The Bible itself teaches this very result of philosophy,--viz.: that the world is governed by _general laws_. See Prov. viii. 29: Job. xxxviii. 12, 24, 31, 33: Ps. cxix. 90, 91: Jer. xxxi. 35, and xxxiii. 25.]

[53] See Part II. chap. vi.

[54] Part II. chap. vi.

[55] The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine, as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe, that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description, as the Scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great distinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the end of this world; that each shall _then_ receive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should, finally and upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and ill with the wicked: but it could not be determined upon any principles of reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; but _the mystery of God_, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail, _shall then be finished_; and he will _take to him his great power and will reign_, by rendering to every one according to his works.

[56] [Our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument analogical. Butler here seizes the very points, which are most plausible and most insisted on, as showing the harshness and unreasonableness of Christianity; and overthrows them at a stroke by simply directing attention to the same things, in the universally observed course of nature.]

[57] Chap. i.

[58] See chaps. iv. and vi.

[59] [This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of positive argument. If in this world, we have _proofs_ that God is a moral governor, then in order to evince that we shall be under moral government _hereafter_, we have only to supply an intermediate consideration,--viz.: that God, as such, must be unchangeable. The argument, as just remarked, assumes a substantive form, because admitted facts, as to this world, exhibiting the very _principles_ on which God’s government goes at present, compel us not only to _suppose_ that the principles of God will remain, but to _believe_ so.]

[60] Chap. ii.

[61] The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And therefore the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider them in the second part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi., as urged against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against the religion of nature; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that chapter.

[62] Dissertation II.

[63] Chap. vi.

[64] See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II.

[65] [At the foundation of moral improvement, lies the conviction that what is right, is our happiness, no less than our duty. This again is based upon a conviction that God governs justly; and has all power over us for good or evil. As creation is full of the evidences of _design_, so is Providence. And as the human mind shows, in its structure, the most exquisite marks of design, so the government of mind shows a final object for all our faculties. Among the attributes of mind we observe, conspicuous, a disposition to seek ends, lay plans, and sacrifice present indulgence to future and greater good: and a facility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another, so as to secure success in our plans. This, with conscience to approve or disapprove our modes, constitutes an evident _adaptedness_ to a moral government on the part of God; and would be worse than superfluous, if there be no such government. Every rule of action, deduced by reason from the light of nature, may fairly be regarded as God’s law; and the inconveniences resulting from wrong actions, are God’s retributions. These retributions, felt or observed, are divine teachings, saying, emphatically, if you act thus you shall receive thus. We do actually so judge, in relation to physics. Every rule of motion, distance, gravitation, heat, electricity, &c. &c., is received as God’s law; and we would deem it insane to act in opposition.]

[66] [Consult CAPP on the Gov. of God: TWISSE Vindiciæ Prov. Dei: WITTICHII Excre. Theol.: DWIGHT’S Theol.: MARTINIUS de Gubernatione Mundi: LIEFCHILD on Providence: MORTON on do.: SHERLOCK on do.: RUTHERFORD on do.: and the Sermons of Thos. Leland, Porteus, Topping, Hunt, Davies, Horseley, South, Wisheart, Seed, Collings, and Doddridge.]

[67] Chap. ii.

[68] [In the structure of man, physical and mental, we find no contrivances for disease or pain, so that in general those who conform to the laws of their being, enjoy happiness; and suffering is chiefly the result of our own conduct. But, as without revelation we could only learn the evil of vice, by its effects, and would often learn it too late to retrieve our affairs, or our souls’ peace, God has in mercy given forth his teachings, by which, _beforehand_, we may know the effects of actions.]

[69] See Dissertation II.

[70] [It was contended by MANDEVILLE in his “_Fable of the Bees_,” that private vices, as luxury for instance, are often conducive to the well-being of society. This idea is fully refuted by WARBURTON, Divine Legation of Moses, b. 1: BERKELEY, Minute Philosopher, Dial. 2: and by BROWN, Characteristics, Ess. 2.]

[71] [A strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the “delivering up” of our Savior to be crucified. As to the mere act of delivering up, we find it referred, =1.= To God the Father, John iii. 16: Acts ii. 23: Rom. viii. 32. =2.= To Christ himself, Eph. v. 2, and v. 25, &c. In this last passage it is literally _delivered himself_. =3.= To the Jewish rulers, Luke xx. 20: Mark xii. 12. =4.= To Pontius Pilate, Matt. xxvii. 26: Mark xv. 15: John xix. 6. =5.= To Judas, Matt. xxvi. 15: Zec. xi. 12.

As to the _mere act_, Judas and Pilate did just what God the Father, and our Lord Jesus did. But how infinitely unlike the _qualities_ of the act!]

[72] [“When one supposes he is about to die, there comes over him a fear and anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before. For the stories which are told about _Hades_, that such, as have practised wrong, must there suffer punishment, although made light of for a while, these torment the soul lest they should be true. But he who is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant and good hope, which will support old age.” PLATO, Respub. i. s. 5.]

[73] See Dissertation II.

[74] [Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must be derived from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our moral sense, which constrains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable distinction, and moral worth as our highest excellence. Hence we ascribe perfect virtue to God. It does not follow from such reasoning, that we form a Deity after our own conceptions, for it is but the argument _a fortiori_, “He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” Ps. xciv. 9. We do not conceive of a Deity who sees just as we do; but that _he sees_, for he makes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have them, from him.

This point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily acknowledge God’s physical attributes, because the argument is addressed to their _understanding_, but deny his moral ones, because their _hearts_ are hardened through the deceitfulness of sin.]

[75] [It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue, are no less conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally advantageous. In view of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a proper and commanded view to our instinctive desire for happiness. In face of its disadvantages, we cultivate virtue for its own sake.]

[76] [The common remark, “virtue brings its own reward,” is true only with qualifications. The apostles, as to _this_ life, were the most miserable of men: (1 Cor. xv. 9.) Virtue does not _always_ bring earthly rewards. The grand support of the good is drawn from considerations of that future state which the infidel denies. Observe, 1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct man, as that his principal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very good persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their future safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of future happiness were the _only_ reward of virtue? 3. This reward, at best, is private; but for the encouragement of virtue, it must have _obvious_ triumphs.

On the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience, so that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and what is worse, owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who kills a good man, wholly _deprives_ him of his only reward, if this life alone gives it. And the villain who kills himself, escapes his only punishment.

Virtuous persons, in the strong language of ROBERT HALL,[A] would be “the _only_ persons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the only persons who (by a fatal and irreparable mistake), expecting an imaginary happiness in an imaginary world, lose their only opportunity of enjoying those present pleasures, of which others avail themselves; dooming themselves to grasp at shadows, while they neglect the substance, and harassed with a perpetual struggle against their natural propensities and passions, and all in vain!”

[A] Sermon on the Vanity of Man.]

[77] [Because, so soon as any community, or collection of persons, conclude a man to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any restraint of conscience, he is at once shorn of his influence, and will soon be stripped of all power of mischief. On the other hand, we see the might of virtue unarmed with power, in Luther, in Roger Williams, in Wm. Penn, and innumerable other instances.]

[78] Isa. lx. 21.

[79] P. 109.

[80] P. 110, &c.

[81] P. 111, &c.

[82] P. 118, &c.

[83] See this proof drawn out briefly, ch. vi.

[84] [This chapter is one of many attempts to account for the mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world; and demands close examination both of its theory and its arguments. The student may consult, as he has opportunity, MUSÆI Disput.: HOLTZSFUSII Disp. de Lapsu Prim. Hominum: SELDEN de Laps. Angelorum: STAPFERI Inst.: WITSII Econom. Fœd.: BATE’S Harmony of the Divine Attrib.: CALCOTT on the Fall: SHUCKFORD on the Creation of Man: MANTON’S Sermons: SOUTH’S do.: TOPLADY’S do.: PEARSON on the Creed: LE CLERC’S Diss.: HENLY’S Dissert.: KENNICOTT on the Tree of Life: and FABRICIUS de Primo Peccato Angelorum Lapsorum.]

[85] [The _evils_ of life, are not to be regarded as entering, necessarily, into God’s plan of probation; and they are not here so presented. The Scriptures show that _all_ suffering is either punitive, or castigatory. Man at first was to be tried by temptations, not by sufferings.]

[86] Chap. ii.

[87] See Sermons preached at the _Rolle_, 1726, 2d ed. p. 205, &c. Pref. p. 25, &c. Serm. p. 21, &c.

[88] [“If we persist in our objection, notwithstanding these analogies, then should we conclude, either that we are under the regimen of an unrighteous Deity, or that there is no Deity at all.”--Dr. CHALMERS.]

[89] [Shall _we_ be of such? Shall we forget or disregard the great fact that when death has transferred us to other conditions, we, our proper selves, will remain? No longer, indeed, united with flesh and blood, surrounded with houses, lands, business, or enjoyments, such as the present, _but still ourselves_. Still with wants to be supplied, desires to be gratified, and capacities to be employed and developed!]

[90] Part II. chap. v.

[91] [This is one of those passages, remarked on in our introduction, as a statement not properly explained or guarded. We cannot suppose the author, to have overlooked the great fact of man’s fall and corruption. That the argument properly considered, stands good, is the verdict of such a man as CHALMERS. After speaking of human helplessness in matters of religion, he says, “There is nothing in this [helplessness] to break the analogies on which to found the negative vindication that forms the great and undoubted achievement of this volume. The analogy lies here:--that if a man wills to obtain prosperity in this life, he may, if observant of the rules which experience and wisdom prescribe, in general, make it good. And if he wills to attain blessedness in the next life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, most certainly make it good; in conformity with the declaration, ‘he that seeketh findeth.’”]

[92] [It comes to this:--good things, in this life, are not forced upon us; for we may refuse them, or turn any of them into evils. Nor are they offered for our mere acceptance: but only as the _results_ of self-control and pains-taking. So is it, as to heaven.]

[93] [They _are_ an answer, but a cavil remains,--viz.: “the difference between temporal and eternal things, is so vast that the cases are not analogous.” Fairly considered, the cases are analogous, differing only in _degree_, and not at all in principle. What would be wrong on a great scale, is wrong on a small one.

Perhaps the analogy may be pressed further. As the happiness and life of some animals, may be sacrificed for the benefit of man, why may not the happiness and life of some men, be sacrificed for the good of innumerable beings of a higher order, who witness the affairs of this earth? It would but be securing “the greatest good of the greatest number.” No analogies could _teach_ this, for analogies of course teach nothing. But if the Scriptures contained this doctrine, immensely more repugnant than that which our author is here defending, would analogy offer repellant presumptions?]

[94] [That is, the son of Sirac, who says, “All things are double, one against another; and He hath made nothing imperfect: one thing established the good of another:” Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24.]

[95] [Consult MILLMAN’S Hist. of Christ, vol. i.: PRIESTLEY’S Institutes of Nat. and Rev. Rel., vol. i. ch. i.: and WHATELY’S Pol. Econ., sec. 5.]

[96] [We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor; (which is often the chief effect) in improving or impairing his own powers. A razor used to cut wood or stone, is not only put to an improper use, but spoiled for the use which is proper. But this is a faint illustration. The razor may be sharpened again; but how shall we restore a blunted sensibility, an enfeebled judgment, or a vitiated appetite? Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on ourselves than on our victims; and the evil may spread disaster over our whole future. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose that an occasional indulgence in impropriety may be compatible with general welfare, and improvement. Instead of balancing the pros and cons of a particular act, in the scale of utility or pleasure, they should mark well its effects on themselves. See the description of how an upright being may fall; in a subsequent part of this chapter.]

[97] [“It might seem, at first sight, that if our state hereafter presented no temptations to falsehood, injustice, &c., our habit of indulging these vices here would be no disqualification for such a state; and our forming the contrary habits no qualification. But _habits_ of veracity, justice, &c. are not merely securities against temptations to the contrary, but needful for conserving the _principles_ of love of truth, justice, &c. As our happiness depends upon _the ratio_ between our circumstances and our dispositions, our happiness, in a state where things are ordered so as to give no scope for the practice of falsehood, injustice, &c., _must depend on our having formed a love for their opposites_. Besides, the circumstances of the future life may be such as only to remove temptations from characters formed by such moral discipline as we undergo in this life, and not all things that could be temptations to any one.”--PROF. FITZGERALD.]

[98] It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by a _sense of interest_ is meant a speculative conviction or belief, that such and such indulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction; it is contrary to present experience to say, that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging themselves. And if by a _sense of interest_ is meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our happiness; this is not only coincident with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily see it overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any thing, even indolence: especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness and self-love; and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle.--See p. 131.

[99] [Discipline is mainly promoted by a careful regard to acts of small individual moment. The subjecting of trivial acts to moral considerations, is the sure, and the only mode of self-culture. These acts are embryo habits, and we may often see clearly the moral character of a habit, when the single act seems indifferent. Thus viewed, the importance of single acts will seldom seem small. A single cigar, one glass of wine for convivial purposes, one story told with exaggerations, may change the complexion of our character, and of our whole destiny!

It is doing or refusing to do, from a law-abiding regard to consequences, that constitutes self-discipline. Papists wholly err in teaching the repression of bodily desires as in itself virtuous. Indulgence may be either an obstacle or an aid to moral progress, according to our reason for indulgence. When we can repress an appetite or passion whenever indulgence would be wrong, its mastery over us is broken; and when the passions and appetites act rightly, from force of virtuous habit, without direct volition, discipline is complete. Ascetic acts are only useful as _means_, and so long as they are _ascetic_ (askesis) are proofs of imperfect obedience. Discipline is good only _as_ discipline; and when complete, changes from a struggle between principle and inclination, to a spontaneous habit, and permanent mental peace.]

[100] [Chalmers objects to this hypothetical fall of man, that it wants harmony with the Scripture account. But I do not see the force of the objection. Butler _of course_ does not copy the Scripture account, for he would then depart from the aim and nature of his book. The Bible says man fell _suddenly_, no less in his state than in his character. Butler says that we could not reason out _how much_ disorder and damage would ensue from the first sin: and in saying this, avoids any incongruity with the Mosaic account, which tells us how much. What B. says of the formation of habit, by repeated transgressions, certainly cannot be gainsayed.

Adam “died,” the very day he ate the forbidden fruit. The sinner “lives” the very day he believes on the only-begotten Son of God. Increase of guilt, or growth in grace are predicable in both instances. In both also there is an instant transition into a new relationship with God.]

[101] [A forced or reluctant obedience is wholly incompatible with earthly happiness; but may, in the highest degree promote our _future_ happiness. It will not _long_ mar our happiness, even here; because being based on principle, and established by habit, it will, in process of time, be superseded by prompt and pleasurable submission. Thus a person _habitually_ virtuous, is hardly conscious of self-denial; a fact noticed by Aristotle. “He who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights, is virtuous in this very abstinence; but he who is troubled by it is undisciplined.” Ethic. Nic. ii. 3.]

[102] P. 145.

[103] [The student should learn to distinguish between the _kinds_ of necessity. There is--1. “Logical necessity,” which requires the admission of a consequent to a premise 2. “Moral necessity,” which requires means in order to ends. “Physical necessity,” which is the compulsory connection of sequences to antecedents, in the material world. 4. “Metaphysical necessity,” which belongs to God only, as existing eternally and immutably. All these exist and operate, and by them we govern ourselves.

But there are various other kinds of necessity, erroneous and pernicious, which may be grouped under two heads:--1. “Atheistic,” sometimes called the Democritic, which ascribes all things to the mechanical laws of matter. 2. “Theistic,” which admits the existence of God, but denies to him moral character, and makes him the arbitrary and only agent in the universe, and creatures not responsible. See COLLINGS on Providence, PRICE’S Dissertations, RUTHERFORD on Providence, CHARNOCK’S Sermons, and WHATELY’S Logic.]

[104] P. 157.

[105] P. 158.

[106] [HUME says, “though man, in truth, is a necessary agent, having all his actions determined by fixed and immutable laws, yet, this being concealed from him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent.”

Which is the same as to say that God intended to conceal from men an important fact, involving the whole subject of right and wrong, but Mr. Hume found him out!]

[107] By _will_ and _character_ is meant that which, in speaking of men, we should express, not only by these words, but also by the words _temper_, _taste_, _dispositions_, _practical principles_: _that whole frame of mind, from whence we act in one manner rather than another_.

[108] Chap. ii.

[109] P. 157, &c.

[110] Chap. ii.

[111] Dissert. II.

[112] Serm. 2, at the _Rolls_.

[113] Dissert. II.

[114] However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God is determined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to say, that _it is fit and reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness_, then _fitness of action, or the right and reason of the case_, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end, to be the ground of the preference; as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it, to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative to perception, than abstract truth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and lightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded.

[115] P. 118.

[116] P. 110, &c.

[117] Chap. ii.

[118] Dissertation II.

[119] Pp. 68, 71.

[120] Serm. 8th, at the _Rolls_.

[121] [Consult, in favor of the doctrine of necessity, atheistical writers generally; such as Fichte, Hegel, D’Holback, Comte, Crousse, Martineau, Leroux, and Holyoake--also, BELSHAM’S Essays, COLLINS on Liberty, CROMBIE on Phil. Necessity, HOBBES’ Liberty and Necessity, and Leviathan, PRIESTLEY on Liberty, HARTLEY on Man, and EDWARDS on the Will.

Against the doctrine, see BEATTIE’S Works, Part 2; Replies to Hobbes by BRAMHALL and LAWSON; Replies to Priestley by PALMER and BRYANT; GROVE on Liberty; CLARKE’S Sermons at the Boyle Lectures; GIBB’S Contemplations; KING’S Origin of Evil; REID on the Mind; WATTS on Liberty; HARRIS’ Boyle Lectures; JACKSON’S Defence; BUTTERWORTH on Moral Government.]

[122] [MAIMONIDES makes use of the following similitude. “Suppose one of good understanding, whose mother had died soon after he was born to be brought up on an island, where he saw no human being but his father nor the female of any beast. This person when grown up inquires how men are produced. He is told that they are bred in the womb of one of the same species and that while in the womb we are very small and there move and are nourished. The young man inquires whether when thus in the womb we did not eat, and drink, and breathe, as we do now, and is answered, No. Then he denies it, and offers demonstration that it could not be so. For says he, if either of us cease to breathe our life is gone; and how could we have lived close shut up in a womb for months? So if we cease to eat and drink, we die, and how could the child live so for months? and thus he satisfies himself that it is _impossible_ man should come into existence in such a manner.”]

[123] [Let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great historical painting, before which hangs a thick curtain. The attendant raises the curtain a few inches. Can the spectator, from the unmeaning strip of foreground, derive any conception of the figures yet concealed? Much less is he able to criticize their proportions, or beauty, or perspective, or even the design of the artist? The small fragment of a tree, or flower, or animal, or building, may seem quite unmeaning and even ugly, though the whole would present beauty, fitness, or grandeur. Now the portion of God’s dominions within our survey, is as utterly insignificant, compared to the universe, and its interminable duration, as, an atom compared to a planet or a man’s age to eternity.

The concluding observations of this chapter, abundantly remove every difficulty as to such ignorance being as valid against the _proofs_ of religion, as it is against _objections_ to it.]

[124] [No truly philosophical mind can be arrogant; because the wider the range of thought, the greater are the discoveries of our ignorance. The young student may well hesitate to decide points, on which the profoundest thinkers take opposite sides, and when conscious of inability intrust himself to the guidance of those whose lives are best.]

[125] Pp. 177, 178.

[126] P. 173, &c.

[127] P. 175.

[128] Pp. 72, 73.

[129] P. 68, and Part II. chap. vi.

[130] Serm. at the _Rolls_, p. 312, 2d ed.

[131] P. 172, &c.

[132] See Part II. ch. ii.

[133] P. 173.

[134] [The remainder of this chapter is a recapitulation of the whole argument from the beginning; and should be carefully conned.]

[135] Part II. ch. vi.

[136] P. 108.

[137] [There is a slight indication in this chapter that Butler falls into the old plan of settling the necessity of Christianity, before determining its truth. Paley discards this order of arrangement, in his very first sentence; and with good reason. The necessity of revelation is an abstraction; the proofs of it are patent facts. To hold in abeyance the credentials presented by Christianity, till we first satisfy ourselves that God could or would make any such announcements, is unphilosophical and irreverent. This chapter discusses the _importance_ rather than the necessity of revelation; and so is a fitting commencement of the discussion. Every truth disclosed in revelation, over and above the truths which natural religion furnishes, proves the _necessity_ of revelation, if we would know any thing of _such_ truths. And it is such truths which constitute the very peculiarities of revelation, and teach the _way of salvation_, for the sinful and helpless.]

[138] [No one can read the writings of the great sages of antiquity without a full and sad conviction that in relation to the character of God, the sinfulness of man, the future state, and the rules of living, those prime points on which we need knowledge, they were almost profoundly ignorant. See on this point, LELAND’S Adv. and Necess.: CHALMERS’ Nat. Theol.: MCCOSH’S Div. Gov.: PASCAL’S Thoughts: WARBURTON’S Div. Legation.]

[139] Invenis multos----propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid mihi præcepturus est Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid mihi necessarius est Christus; nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio contaminor? Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. _Aug. in Psal._ xxxi. [You find many who refuse to become Christians, because they feel sufficient of themselves to lead a good life. “We ought to live well.” says one. “What will Christ teach me? To live well? I do live well, what need then have I of Christ? I commit no murder, no theft, no robbery. I covet no man’s goods, and am polluted by no adultery. Let some one find in me any thing to censure, and he who can do so, may make me a Christian.”]

[140] [The true mode of distinguishing a temporary, local, or individual command from such as are of universal and perpetual obligation, is well laid down by WAYLAND, _Mor. Sci._ ch. ix. sec. 2.]

[141] [Natural religion shows us the danger of sin; but not the infinite danger of eternal retribution, and the hopelessness of restoration after death. And as to the efficacy of repentance, it rather opposes that doctrine than teaches it. At least it does not teach that repentance may be accepted, so as not only to cancel guilt, but restore to the favor of God.]

[142] [“Christianity was left with Christians, to be transmitted, in like manner as the religion of nature had been left, with mankind in general. There was however this difference that by an institution of external religion with a standing ministry for instruction and discipline, it pleased God to unite Christiana into _visible churches_, and all along to preserve them over a great part of the world, and thus perpetuate a general publication of the Gospel.” BUTLER’S sermon before the Soc. for Prop. the Gospel. He goes on to show, in that discourse, that these churches, however corrupt any may become, are repositories for the written oracles of God, and so carry the antidote to their heresies.]

[143] Rev. xxii. 11.

[144] [“It is no real objection to this, though it may seem so at first sight, to say that since Christianity is a _remedial_ system, designed to obviate those very evils which have been produced by the neglect and abuse of the light of nature, it ought not to be _liable_ to the same perversions. Because--1. Christianity is not designed primarily to remedy the defects of _nature_, but of an unnatural state of ruin into which men were brought by _the Fall_. And 2. It is remedial of the defects of nature in a _great degree_, by its giving additional advantages. 3. It might be impossible that it should be remedial in a greater degree than it is, without destroying man’s free agency; which would be to destroy its own end, the practice of virtue.”--FITZGERALD’S Notes.]

[145] [CHALMERS (Nat. Theol., b. v. ch. iv.) makes this very plain. He shows the _ethics_ of natural religion to be one thing and its _objects_ another. Natural religion discloses no Redeemer or Sanctifier; but it teaches how we should regard such a person, if there be one. It teaches love and conformity to such a being by the _relation_ in which we of course stand to him. How we are to _express_ that love and obedience it cannot teach.]

[146] See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian Sacraments, &c., [by WATERLAND,] and COLLIBER of Revealed Religion, as there quoted.

[147] [If Christianity were but “a republication of natural religion,” or as Tindall says, “as old as creation,” why do deists oppose it? It does indeed republish natural religion, but it adds stupendous truths beside. If it gave us no new light, no new motives, it would be but a tremendous curse, making us all the more responsible, and none the more instructed or secure.]

[148] P. 94.

[149] Ch. v.

[150] John iii. 5.

[151] This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts considered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have somewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them, considered in this view. Moral and positive precepts are in some respects alike, in other respects different. So far as they are alike, we discern the reasons of both; so far as they are different, we discern the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See p. 189, &c.

[152] [Without offering the least objection to what is here said of the comparative value of moral and positive institutions, it should not be overlooked that sometimes, obedience to a positive rite is more indicative of an obedient spirit, than obedience to a moral rule. The latter is urged by its intrinsic propriety, over and above the command, and appeals to several of our finer impulses. The former rests singly on our reverence for the will of God. There are many who would repel a temptation to steal, or to lie, who yet are insensible to the duty of baptism or the Lord’s supper.]

[153] Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7.

[154] Hosea vi. 6.

[155] See Matt. xii. 7.

[156] See ch. iii.

[157] [Dr. ANGUS judiciously remarks on this sentence, “This sentiment, as understood by Butler, is just, but very liable to abuse. Clearly, the Bible must be so interpreted as to agree with _all_ known truth, whether of natural religion or natural science. At the same time, to correct the theology of the Bible by the theology of nature, as finite and guilty men understand it, may involve the rejection of Bible theology entirely; and of the very light and teaching it was intended to supply. The converse of Butler’s statement is equally true, and even more important. If in natural theology there be found any facts, the seeming lesson of which is contrary to revealed religion, such seeming lesson is not the real one.” Practically, it will be found that seeming meanings of Scripture, really erroneous, are corrected by other parts of Scripture itself. I understand Butler as only affirming that we must interpret Scripture according to immutable principles, and _known truth_. The infidel rejects it for not conforming to his _assumed hypothesis_.]

[158] P. 203.

[159] Chaps. iii., iv., v., vi.

[160] Chap. vii.

[161] P. 172.

[162] [Papists urge that the actual conversion of the bread and wine in the Eucharist is an invisible miracle. But an invisible miracle is such because wrought under circumstances which _exclude_ examination: while transubstantiation _invites_ and _facilitates_ examination. It is wrought publicly, and constantly, and yet cannot be discovered to be a miracle. Indeed it supposes the working of a second miracle, to make the first invisible.]

[163] [Paley shows conclusively that a denial of miracles leads not only to a denial of revelation, but a denial of the existence of God, all of whose extraordinary acts are necessarily miraculous.]

[164] [WHATELY, in his _Logic_, b. iii., has shown the folly of the Deistical attempts to explain our Savior’s miracles as mere natural events. Having labored to show this of some _one_ of the miracles, they then do so as to _another_, and thence infer that _all_ were accidental conjunctures of natural circumstances. He says, they might as well argue “that because it is not improbable one may throw sixes once in a hundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that one may throw sixes a hundred times running.”

FITZGERALD says, “the improbability of a whole series of strange natural events, taking place unaccountably, one after another, amounts to a far greater improbability than is involved in the admission of miracles.”]

[165] [That man, at first, must have had supernatural _instructions_, or in other words some revelations, is shown by Archbishop WHATELY in his “Origin of Civilization.” Rev. SAMUEL STANHOPE SMITH expresses his conviction, both from reason and history, that man in his savage state could not even have preserved life without instruction from his Creator.]

[166] [The maintenance by the Jews, of a system of pure Theism, through so many and so rude ages, without being superior, or even equal to their neighbors, in science and civilization, can only be accounted for on the presumption of a revelation.]

[167] P. 166, &c.

[168] [MILLS (Logic, chap. 24, § 5,) points out what he deems a mistake of “some of the writers against Hume on Miracles,” in confounding the improbability of an event, before its occurrence, with the improbability afterwards; that is, considering them equal in degree. He fully proves that the great Laplace fell into this error, and the student should consult the passage.