Chapter III: Part 3

At about 10 o'clock on the night of the 22d, the three Corps commanders of the Army of the Tennessee (one of them in command of the Army) met in the rear of the Fifteenth Corps, on the line of the Decatur road, under an oak tree, and there discussed the results of the day. Blair's men were at the time in the trenches; in some places the enemy held one side and they the other. The men of the Fifteenth Corps were still in their own line, but tired and hungry, and those of the Sixteenth were, after their hard day's fight, busy throwing up intrenchments on the field they had held and won. It was thought that the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio, which had not been engaged that day, should send a force to relieve Blair, and Dodge, being the junior Corps commander, was dispatched by General Logan, at the requests of Generals Logan and Blair, to see General Sherman. My impression is that I met him in a tent; I have heard it said that he had his headquarters in a house. When I met him he seemed rather surprised to see me, but greeted me cordially, and spoke of the loss of McPherson. I stated to him my errand. He turned upon me and said, "Dodge, you whipped them today, didn't you?" I said, "Yes, sir." Then he said: "Can't you do it again tomorrow?" and I said, "Yes, sir"; bade him good-night, and went back to my command, determined never to go upon another such errand. As he explained it afterward, he wanted it said that the little Army of the Tennessee had fought the great battle that day, needing no help, no aid, and that it could be said that all alone it had whipped the whole of Hood's Army. Therefore, he let us hold our position and our line, knowing that Hood would not dare attack us after the "thrashing" he had already received. When we consider that in this, the greatest battle of the campaign, the little Army of the Tennessee met the entire rebel Army, secretly thrust to its rear, on its flank, and upon its advance center, with its idolized commander killed in the first shock of battle, and at nightfall found the enemy's dead and wounded on its front, we see that no disaster--no temporary rebuff--could discourage this Army. Every man was at his post; every man doing a hero's duty. They proved they might be wiped out but never made to run. They were invincible.

Companions, regarding so great a battle, against such odds, with such loss, the question has often been asked me--and I know it has come to the mind of all of us--why it was that this battle was never put forth ahead of many others inferior to it, but better known to the world and causing much greater comment?

The answer comes to all of us. It is apparent to us today, as it was that night. We had lost our best friend,--that superb soldier, our commander, General McPherson; his death counted so much more to us than victory that we spoke of our battle, our great success, with our loss uppermost in our minds.

This monument was erected by the Society of the Army of the Tennessee on the spot where Major-General James B. McPherson was killed, July 22, 1864.]

LETTER TO GENERAL RAUM

CORRECTING SOME STATEMENTS
IN
GENERAL GREEN B. RAUM'S
DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA
PUBLISHED
IN THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE, WASHINGTON, D. C.
SEPTEMBER 25, 1902

_My Dear General_:

Referring to my conversation with you in Washington, I will endeavor to aid you in getting at the actual facts connected with the Battle of Atlanta, as it has never yet been properly written up.

I delivered an address on September 25th, 1889, to the Army of the Tennessee on that battle, copy of which I am sending to you, and from which I think you can get a good deal of information.

I first want to call your attention to the fact that the battle commenced about fifteen minutes after 12 o'clock, and that the Sixteenth Army Corps fought a long time before the Seventeenth Corps was attacked. You can verify this statement by reading General Strong's account of the battle, which is given in our Army of the Tennessee records, volume 11 to 13, page 242.

It was just 12 o'clock exactly when I reached Fuller's headquarters. Having gone to the front to select my position, Fuller asked me to stop and take luncheon, and I got down from my horse and went into his tent. I had sat down at the table when I heard skirmish firing in the rear. Fuller said it was a lot of the boys out there killing hogs. The stillness had been oppressive as we went clear to the left and front of Blair's line to select my new position. We inquired from the pickets and found that nobody had seen anything of the enemy. It made an impression on us all; so the moment I heard this firing I jumped up, as if by instinct, and told Fuller to get into line, and sent a staff officer towards Sweeney; but before he hardly got out of the tent Sweeney was in line and fighting, so you can see how sudden the attack was.

In volume 11 to 13 of the Army of the Tennessee records, page 243, Strong, in his address on the Battle of Atlanta, has this to say fixing the time of the commencement of the battle, speaking of the time when an officer was sent with an order to me from McPherson:

The officer had hardly disappeared from sight, when a shot was heard
to the left and rear of us, then another, followed quickly by a
rattling volley of small arms, and at almost the same instant a shell
came crashing through the tree-tops near us, followed by a rapid and
incessant firing from Dodge's Corps. At the first shots every officer
sprang to his feet and called for his horse. The time, I should think,
was ten or fifteen minutes past 12 o'clock.

Then after speaking of the fighting of this Division, comes this, on page 243:

After the _two_ attempts to break the Sixteenth Corps had failed,
General McPherson sent me to General Blair to ascertain the condition
of affairs along his line, and instructed me to say to General Giles
A. Smith to hold his position; that he would order up troops to occupy
the gap between the Seventeenth and Sixteenth Corps; and also saying
as I left him that he would remain with his orderly where he then was
(a commanding position on Dodge's right) until I returned. I rode
rapidly through the woods towards the Seventeenth Corps and found
General Blair with General Giles A. Smith near the extreme left of the
Fourth Division (Hall's Brigade).

This conclusively shows that Blair was not attacked until after two attacks had been made upon me, although Hall's report gives the attack upon Blair as at 12 o'clock, that time being before the Sixteenth Corps was attacked. Fuller gives the time of attack upon him as 12:30. By reading all of page 243 you will get a full and clear idea of time and everything. The time was also taken by my staff and record made of it, and that agrees with Strong. This only shows how far apart officers can get as to time in a great battle, and on many things, unless correct data is made of record on the spot.

On page 484, of volume 14 to 16 of Society of the Army of the Tennessee records, General Leggett says:

Both divisions of the Sixteenth Army Corps immediately became hotly
engaged.... Just at this time I espied General McPherson upon the high
ground in the immediate rear of General Fuller's command, and sent
Captain John B. Raymond of my staff to inquire of General McPherson
the expediency of having General Giles A. Smith and myself change our
line so as to face south, and at the same time I sent Captain George
W. Porter to ascertain whether or not the left of General Smith and
the right of General Fuller were sufficiently near together to
antagonize any force seeking entrance there.... The enemy in front of
the Sixteenth Corps rallied in the woods (this is after the first
attack) and renewed their attack with increased vigor and
bitterness.... The conflict continued for some time, with no
appearance on either side of any disposition to yield the ground, when
the enemy gave way, and fell back in confusion, followed by the
Sixteenth Corps.... The second assault (upon the Sixteenth Corps) was
simultaneous with the attack upon General Giles A. Smith's Division,
which was the left of the Seventeenth Corps.

You will note from my address that the moment I was attacked I sent an aide, and afterwards a signal officer named Sheffly (I think), who was detailed with me that day, or happened to be with me. These officers had gone to General Giles A. Smith, who commanded Blair's left, Fourth Division, Seventeenth Corps, to get him to refuse his left and join my right. I think the first officer I sent was Captain Jonas of my staff, who returned immediately to me, and General Giles A. Smith sent me word that he would refuse. That was a long time before Cleburn's Division got between us; but, as my paper and your article show, McPherson had sent word to Giles A. Smith without knowing the condition in his front, to hold his position, stating that he would send reinforcements to fill the gap between Fuller and himself. Of course, had McPherson been there earlier and seen what I saw, he would have had Smith's left join my right immediately, which would have put Cleburn in front of us instead of between us. That is one of the things that occur in battle that the person on the ground knows better than the one distant. It was on the third attack on my line that the enemy struck Blair, as Strong did not go to Blair until after the repulse of the second attack. Cleburn's force got right in behind Blair's left and picked up that portion of his line that was refused, and swept back his force so that Blair's left, even before Waglin of the Fifteenth Corps got there, was pretty nearly an extension of but a quarter of a mile away from Fuller's right, and after I got through fighting I had to withdraw my entire right quite a distance to connect with Waglin and Blair, as Cleburn's force had pressed clear beyond me and before he was halted was way in the rear of my right.

After the second attack, Cleburn, as he pressed through the gap between Fuller and Smith, forced Fuller to change front and use part of his force to protect his flank, and the Sixty-fourth Illinois in this movement captured the skirmish-line that killed McPherson, taking from them his field-glass, orders, and other papers that they had taken from McPherson's body; and later in the day I sent these to General Sherman. See report Sixty-fourth Illinois, volume 38, part 3, War Records, page 494. Fuller's maps, page 480, volume 38, part 3, War Records, show where Fuller fought, and where we had to intrench.

Where I stood in my line I could see the entire Confederate force, and all of my own, something that very seldom occurs, and, of course, the scene, as Blair states, was a magnificent one. I saw Fuller do a most gallant act. I sent an aide to him with instructions to charge, but before he got there Walker's division broke the center of Fuller's Brigade, his own regiment, the Twenty-seventh Ohio, falling back. I saw Fuller get down off his horse, grab the colors of the Twenty-seventh, rush to the front with them in his hands, and call upon his regiment to come to the colors; and they rallied and saved his front. It was but a moment later that I saw Walker, who commanded the division that was attacking Fuller, fall from his horse, and the division broke and went into the woods. The action of Fuller was very gallant, and has been painted, and I have a copy of the painting in my room.

Blair in his report has this to say of the fighting, which shows that he watched us a long time before he was attacked; and if you will read his report carefully, you will see that it bears out my statements in full:

I started to go back to my command and witnessed the fearful assault
made on the Sixteenth Army Corps, and its prompt and gallant repulse
by that command. It was a most fortunate circumstance for the whole
army that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the position I have
attempted to describe at the moment of attack, and although it does
not belong to me to report upon the bearing and conduct of the
officers and men of that Corps, still I cannot withhold my expression
of admiration for the manner in which this command met and repulsed
the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy. The attack upon our
flank was made by the whole of Hardee's Corps.

I speak in my address of Mercer's Brigade fighting on three parts of the field. Mercer, after helping to retake the Decatur-road line, camped right in the rear of the Fifteenth Corps, and did not come back to me. When Logan, Blair and myself met that evening, Blair asked Logan for some help to go up to relieve troops at Bald Hill. Logan, seeing Mercer's Brigade there, ordered me to send it up. They went up there and crawled in and relieved the men on Bald Hill. This was very late in the night, and even then fresh men coming in drove out or captured what men there were still lying on the enemy's side of the intrenchments. Mercer never made a report of this battle. You will see by my paper that he was virtually out of the service, awaiting transportation home; but he went in with his regiment the same as though they were still in the service. He was a German, and I do not suppose he knew the importance of reporting; and as it was only a short time later that I had to leave that army, I therefore did not follow it up, and I find no report of Mercer or of the Ninth Illinois; but I think the regimental reports of the Eighty-first Ohio give all these facts. See War Records, volume 38, part 3, page 463, and report Second Brigade, Second Division Sixteenth Army Corps, volume 38, part 3, page 450.

In my address I did not go much into detail, but I have all the data of this battle compiled, and intend some day to put it in shape; but I give you enough so you can, after examining the reports of Blair and the others, make your article historically correct. Most of it is correct and well-stated, but I know you want to get the dates and movements at the left on such an occasion so full that they will stand criticism, as the Battle of Atlanta was the great battle of that campaign.

Your article and many others that I have seen assumes that it was a part of Hardee's Corps that struck Blair's front--that is, his front that was towards Atlanta; but that is not so. Cleburn's Division was the left Division of Hardee's Corps. There were three other Divisions. Maney's (Cheatham's old Division), Bate's, and Walker's. Walker was the next to Cleburn and attacked Fuller. Bate and Maney struck Sweeney. Cleburn's Division was in front of Blair after Cleburn had driven back his left and he had refused it from Leggett's Hill towards my right. What saved Blair was that Cheatham, who commanded Hood's old Corps, whose orders were to attack Blair's front at the same time Hardee struck his rear, in accordance with the plans of both Hood and Hardee, did not attack because Hardee struck me, which was a surprise to them as well as to me, and when Cheatham got ready to attack Blair's front, hitting Leggett's Division, and on down the Fifteenth Corps, two Divisions, Bate's and Walker's, had been whipped, and were virtually out of the fight, because after the third attack upon me, and my breaking up of one of their columns so badly, they did not come again in any force. They went back to the road on the ridge, just south of and parallel to my line. I forget the name of the road, but it was the one that led off to Decatur, and there they intrenched, and when I pushed forward my skirmishers I found them in force. Between 3 and 4 o'clock Maney's Division left my front and went around to help Cleburn.

There have also been many statements that in the first attack two Divisions of Hardee's Corps struck the Sixteenth Corps and two the Seventeenth, Blair's. This is not correct. Three Divisions struck my Corps, and one Division, Cleburn's, struck Blair's Corps, and caught his left and rear; but after the third attack on my front Maney's Division was sent around to join Cleburn, and joined in the fiercest attack of the day, about 4 p. m., upon Leggett's and Smith's Divisions after their line had been refused and formed almost at right angles at Leggett's Hill, and reaching out towards me, with Waglin's Brigade on their left. From all accounts this attack was a fearful one, Maney's men reaching and holding the outside of the intrenchments that were occupied by Blair's men. This line faced almost due south, and both forces fought there off and on until about 7 p. m., some of the enemy remaining in the outside intrenchments until Mercer's Brigade of the Sixteenth Corps went in at near midnight to support that line.

Again, many records have it that Blair was forced back early in the battle. This is a mistake, as his Fourth Division, commanded by General Giles A. Smith, which was on the extreme left, held most of his original intrenched line until between 3 and 4 o'clock, when the attack of Cheatham from the Atlanta side forced them to take a new position to keep them from being crushed by Cleburn in the rear and Cheatham's attack from the Atlanta front.

There is another thing that does not seem to be fully understood, and that is that when Blair got his left refused so as to face Maney and Cleburn in his front they were unable to gain any headway on him in their attacks. In fact, they suffered great loss, and they only damaged Blair when they got in behind his left. Blair had three Regiments there refused at right angles to his front, and it was a portion of two of these Regiments that Cleburn picked up. Blair lost nearly all his prisoners from Giles A. Smith's Division, when Cleburn swept down through the gap and got right in behind them before they knew anybody was on them. In fact, Blair's men had to turn around and fight towards their rear, and, as I have stated, Cleburn got past Fuller's right and commenced shooting into his flank. Just after Walker was killed there was a lull, and Fuller turned two regiments right into Cleburn's main line, and, as Captain Allen of the Signal Corps, says, and my records show, captured that skirmish-line that killed McPherson, and brought it in.

To show McPherson's feeling about Blair's left flank, I sent Fuller's command to that flank the night before on a request from McPherson, who felt anxious about Blair's position, that flank being in the air; but Blair camped Fuller near where he opened the battle in the rear of the Seventeenth Corps instead of connecting his left with it. They camped about a quarter of a mile to his rear and a little back from his extreme left. Blair, no doubt, thought that would protect him, as well as put them in line, but he took one of my batteries (Murray's) and put it in his front line. Now this battery was on the way from Blair to report to me, coming down just as McPherson was going up the road, and the same skirmish-line that killed McPherson killed the horses of that battery and captured a portion of the men, and McPherson really almost fell upon the limber of one of the guns. This was Murray's United States Battery of four pieces. I do not know as I have seen this mentioned in any of the reports, unless it is in mine; but these are the facts of the matter. That is the way a battery of my Corps was reported lost or captured by the enemy. It was passing from Blair to myself, and not captured in line of battle or fighting, as a great many have stated and supposed to be the case.

In your article you speak of Logan taking a part of the Sixteenth Corps and leading it, as though it was right on my front, and then speak of him as leading a portion of the Fifteenth Corps that had been broken through on the Decatur road back into position. The facts are that it was about 4 o'clock in the afternoon when Logan came to me and asked me to send any force I had free to help retake the line that General John C. Brown's Division had broken through the Fifteenth Corps. I sent Mercer's Brigade of the Second Division, and with it sent Captain Jonas of my staff. (See his statement copied in my address.) Logan followed with the command, and it double-quicked the whole distance without stopping. As soon as it got there it found Lightburn's Division drifted back, but holding their line behind the trees, and the enemy in possession of DeGresse's Battery; and as Mercer's Brigade went in on the front, Williamson's Brigade of Wood's Division, which Sherman had directed to make a flank charge, was moving, and they both reached the works together. The men of Mercer's Brigade got hold of DeGresse's guns (see report of Eighty-first Illinois) and turned them on the enemy. There has always been a contest between these two Brigades as to which got there first, but that does not matter, for they got in together and retook the line. General J. C. Brown, who commanded the Confederate Division, was with me afterwards for many years on the Texas and Pacific Railway, and has given me a full account of his attack, and the fury with which he was forced out by this movement from the flank by Wood and the direct assault by Mercer. Mercer in going in had his horse killed under him.

Fighting along the Fifteenth Corps came late, and was all pretty much after the fighting on my front was over, because when General Logan came to me for aid I was intrenching the new line made by the refusal of Blair's left, and took Mercer's Brigade right out of my front to go with him. The fact is I did not happen to have a single man in reserve. Every man I had on the field was in line from the commencement of the fighting. Sweeney's Division stood right up in the road it was marching on, and the two batteries were in the center of his division; the position was a very strong one. If I had had plenty of time to select a position I could not have found a stronger one. It was the first time I ever saw such execution done by artillery. They used canister against those columns with terrible effect.

To show you how small a thing will sometimes change the prospects in a battle, one of Hardee's Divisions coming towards me got entangled in something--at that time I could not tell what, but on going to the ground afterwards I found that it was a mill-pond--that exposed the flank of Maney's Division that was next to Walker's. Seeing this, I rode down to Mercer and told him to take his Brigade and charge right into it, which he did. It was quite a time before I could tell what the result was, but I soon saw prisoners coming back and knew then that Mercer had them. He had that Division at a great disadvantage, and captured a great many prisoners out of it and several battle-flags. See report Second Brigade, Second Division Sixteenth Army Corps, volume 38, part 3, page 450, Army Records. That charge, no doubt, saved my line, because I had a very thin line, and with the most of Hardee's Corps coming at me in double column, as it was, I have no doubt that if it had reached me it would have given me trouble; but they never got to me on any of their attacks. We were fortunate enough to break them before they could reach the line, though on Fuller's front they were right up to it when Walker fell.

There was a great dispute between Hood and Hardee about this movement to the rear, Hood claiming that Hardee should have reached there early in the morning, while Hardee claimed he did not receive the order in time to get there before he did--a very fortunate fact for us, for if he had reached the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and Cheatham and Stewart had attacked in the front, it would have been rough times for the old Army of the Tennessee; but no doubt they would have come out of it with honor in some way.

I think there is no doubt about the time McPherson was killed--it was just about two hours after the battle had opened. Of course there are all kinds of time given, but the fact of the stopping of the watch of the signal officer, Sheffly, when he fell against the tree at two minutes past two, is almost conclusive evidence. See his statement, volume 11-13, page 242, records Society Army of the Tennessee. You can judge of that yourself, because even before McPherson got up to my right, where he stood, as Strong says, watching me, I had been fighting some time, for he had to ride from near Sherman's headquarters up there, a distance of two to three miles. If you will read carefully the address I am sending you, and the report Blair made--also the address of Strong--I think you will come to the same conclusions I give you. An article on the death of General McPherson, by W. W. Allen, of San Diego, California, Signal Officer of the Army of the Tennessee, appeared in an issue of the National Tribune some time this year, but of what date I do not know. It goes to prove the time and the hour McPherson was killed, and the capture of the skirmish-line that killed him. Of course a great many of the official reports are misleading as to time, and it is only by these circumstances that we can judge definitely. I notice it was 12:20 o'clock, according to Allen, when they first heard the rattle of musketry and artillery.

When you have read Allen's article please return it to me. I will be very glad to give you any further information you may need if it is possible for me to do so.

Truly and cordially yours,

GENERAL GREEN B. RAUM. GRENVILLE M. DODGE.

_Chicago, Ill._

In the Indian Campaign of 1865.]

THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS 1864 AND 1865

WRITTEN IN 1874
BY MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE
AND READ TO THE
COLORADO COMMANDERY OF THE LOYAL LEGION
OF THE UNITED STATES, AT DENVER

APRIL 21, 1907.

In December, 1864, I was assigned to the command of the Department of the Missouri. In January, 1865, I received a dispatch from General Grant asking if a campaign on the plains could be made in the winter. I answered, "Yes, if the proper preparation was made to clothe and bivouac the troops." A few days after I received a dispatch from General Grant ordering me to Fort Leavenworth. In the meantime the Department of Kansas was merged into the Department of the Missouri, placing under my command Missouri, the Indian Territory, Kansas, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and all the country south of the Yellowstone River, and embracing all the overland mail-routes and telegraph-lines to the Pacific.

On reaching Port Leavenworth I found that General Curtis, the former commander of that department, had reported against any campaign during the winter; that the Indians had possession of the entire country crossed by the stage-lines, having destroyed the telegraph-lines; and that the people living in Colorado, Utah, California, Western Nebraska and Western Kansas were without mails, and in a state of panic; that the troops distributed along the routes of travel were inside their stockades, the Indians having in nearly every fight defeated them. This success had brought into hostility with the United States nearly every tribe of Indians from Texas on the south to the Yellowstone on the north. It was a formidable combination, and the friendly Indians were daily leaving the reservations to join their hostile brethren. Two thousand Indians had destroyed over one hundred miles of telegraph, and were in possession of the country between the Arkansas and the North Platte Rivers.

The opinion at Fort Leavenworth before I arrived was that it was impossible to make a successful campaign against these Indians during the winter and successfully open these lines of communication. There were two Regiments of Cavalry in Kansas, mostly idle. There was no communication with any of the posts except by messenger. A dispatch from Colorado showed a panic there, and the people demanded that troops of the Department be stationed there to protect the citizens, instead of their organizing and fighting the Indians, and that martial law had been declared.

I saw, after spending a day at Fort Leavenworth, that it was necessary to change the depressed feeling and temper existing among the troops and the citizens throughout the department. I sent for Bela M. Hughes, agent of the overland stages, and Edward Craighten, general manager and superintendent of the overland telegraph, and consulted fully with them. I selected from my old guides some of the most trusted men, and some of the trusted Indians that I had known, and sent by them to each district commander who could be reached, these two short dispatches:

1. What measures are you taking to keep open the route and protect it?
What Indians are engaged in the struggle? Where are their villages? Do
their families travel with them? Have you spies in their camps? What
action have you taken to repair telegraph-lines? Give me all
particulars.

2. Place every mounted man in your command on the South Platte Route.
Repair telegraphs; attack any body of Indians you meet, large or
small. Stay with them and pound them until they move north of the
Platte or south of the Arkansas. I am coming with two Regiments of
cavalry to the Platte line and will open and protect it, and whip all
the Indians in the way.

I also found that the plains were covered with Indian traders who had permits, under the guise of which they were stealing from the Indians, both friendly and hostile, and were selling them arms and ammunition. I immediately revoked all these permits, and ordered the arrest of all traders who had in their possession Indian or Government stock. I also immediately wired to Major Frank North, who was the interpreter of the Pawnee Indians, and also to the Chief of the Omaha Indians, both of whom had been with me on the plains, and instructed them to select their most trusted men and send them on the plains to ascertain for me the purpose of the hostile Indians, and whether they would head towards the settlements, or if their movements indicated they would attack only the lines of communication and the trains crossing the plains. At the same time we stopped all trains on the plains and ordered them to the nearest military post, instructing the officers to arm and organize them in companies, and place a United States officer over them, and have them move with the army trains.

Having perfected the preliminary organization for moving upon the stage- and telegraph-lines, we saw it was necessary to concentrate on one line. At this time the stage- and telegraph-lines on the north ran from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Kearney, and from Omaha to Fort Kearney, where they were consolidated, running up the Platte Valley to the mouth of the Lodge Pole, the stage-station at that point being known as Julesburg. The lines here separated again, the main telegraph-line running to old Fort Laramie, thence up the Sweetwater through South Pass and thence to Utah. The stage-line ran up the South Platte to Denver, then by the Cache La Poudre to Laramie Plains, over them to Fort Halleck and Bridger, and on to Utah. I concluded to concentrate all our efforts to open the line from Fort Leavenworth and Omaha to Kearney, thence to Denver and on to Utah, known as the South Platte Route.

The overland route from Fort Leavenworth and Omaha crossing the continent had a stage-station about every twelve miles. The troops along the lines were posted at the forts and stockades about every hundred miles, with a few soldiers distributed at each stage-station. Then scattered along the road were ranches, and relay- and feeding-stations for the regular commercial and supply-trains that were continually on the road. The great mining-camps, and all the inhabitants of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and Idaho, were dependent upon these trains for their supplies. In winter these trains were generally mule-trains of twenty wagons each, and during the summer were generally ox-trains of fifty to a hundred wagons each. They were in the habit of straggling along through the country, taking care of themselves. Their stock had to be herded at night, and it was a great temptation to the Indians to steal, and a great deal of this had been done, but no actual fighting or attacking of trains or troops occurred until the winter of 1864-65. The stopping of these trains, mail, and supplies, and the destruction of the telegraph wires, caused great consternation in that country and on the Pacific Coast, and the demands upon the Government to open and maintain these lines were persistent.

At Fort Leavenworth there appeared to have been no systematic effort to reopen these lines. It seemed that the troops were taking care of the posts and resisting attacks. They did not seem to appreciate the Indian character; that the only way to strengthen and protect the lines of communication was to go for the Indians. What troops had been sent against the Indians were small and weak parties, and had evidently gone out with the intention of locating the Indians and avoiding them.

Along the south emigrant line from Kansas City, following the Arkansas River to New Mexico, was the line of supplies for all of New Mexico and Southern Colorado. The Indians here were in possession. The travel and traffic along it were not to be compared with that along the northern lines. Then again the citizens of Kansas and Nebraska had settled along these routes as far west as the 100th Meridian, obtaining their living from this great traffic, and the Indians in their raids had picked them up, a family at a time, until they had a great many prisoners, mostly women and children, the men being generally massacred when captured.

I found the Eleventh Kansas Cavalry at Fort Riley, and the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, and immediately placed them _en route_ for Fort Kearney. All the posts were, unfortunately, short of subsistence, forage, and ammunition. The three-months' Regiments enlisted in Colorado for the Indian service had been discharged, their time having expired, and there had been no troops sent to take their places. My only resource was to utilize the Colorado Militia until I could send troops 600 miles to take their places.

I immediately started for Fort Kearney, taking with me a few soldiers in the stage and one of my staff. It was the opinion of all the officers at Fort Leavenworth that it would be impossible for me to make the trip, but I knew it required personal presence among the troops to bring about quick results. The troops that I had ordered to march from Fort Riley refused to march in the winter. I answered to place under arrest all officers of the companies and Regiments that refused to obey the order, and have them report to Fort Leavenworth, intending to replace them with veteran officers of the department whom I knew would move, no matter what the hardship. The next morning I received a report from Fort Kiley that the troops would move. The Regiment that marched from Fort Riley to Fort Kearney lost thirteen men from freezing, as the weather was very severe, and while they were properly clothed, they did not know how to protect themselves from the weather.

On my arrival at Fort Kearney I immediately notified Mr. Hughes, agent of the stage-lines, that I was prepared to protect his stages, and called upon him to replace his stock immediately, ready to start out his stages. I also notified Mr. Craighten, superintendent of the telegraph-lines, to replace his operators, for I would have his lines open in a few days. Both of these orders were made known to the public. I also notified the "press" at Omaha and Fort Leavenworth that all trains which were tied up on the plains would be moved to their destinations during that month. We found it necessary to inspire energy and confidence in these three great interests, as not one of them even thought we would succeed, and, in fact, the "press" comments on our orders showed that they had no faith in them. I found on the line of the Platte the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, and at Fort Laramie and on the Sweetwater the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry.

When we arrived in sight of Fort Kearney the troops were prepared to fight us, thinking it was a band of Indians. We discovered that the troops were depressed from the success of the Indians and the murder and mutilation of their comrades, and that they hardly stuck their heads out of the stockade. Having had experience with Indians, I called the troops together and instructed them how to handle and to fight Indians, telling them that an aggressive war would be made against the Indians, and no matter how large the Indian bands were, or how small the troop, that hereafter they must stand and fight; that if they did the Indians would run. If they did not, the Indians would catch and scalp them, and even if they had to retreat, they must do so with their faces to the enemy.

The Indians, after the Chivington fight on Big Sandy, had concentrated upon the South Platte and on the Sweetwater. The reports showed that they held possession from Julesburg to Valley Junction and to Mud Springs, and held the telegraph-line west of Fort Laramie. They had with them 2,000 head of captured stock and had captured all the stage-stations and many trains, devastated the ranches, butchered many men, women, and children, and destroyed 100 miles of telegraph.

To show more plainly than I can describe the condition of the country, I give the reports of the three commanding officers along the South Platte Route, in answer to the dispatches which I sent by messenger to all commanders the day I arrived at Fort Leavenworth. These answers met me at Fort Kearney.

General Robert Mitchell, who commanded the territory from Omaha to Lodge Pole, replied as follows:

The telegraph from Lodge Pole Creek, twenty-five miles west to
Julesburg, on Laramie Route, is destroyed for fifteen miles. Poles cut
down and destroyed on the Denver line beyond Julesburg for the first
fifty miles. The telegraph is destroyed about ten miles north. We are
compelled to haul poles from 130 to 140 miles. Every means in my power
is used to have the lines fixed. All the available troops I have at my
disposal are in the vicinity of Julesburg, except some small garrisons
at posts required to be kept up on the Denver route. My district only
extends to Julesburg. I have sent some troops, however, up that route
fifty miles since the outbreaks and find everything destroyed. We have
no communication with Denver, and have not had since the last
outbreak. Neither can I communicate with Fort Laramie in consequence
of the lines being down. I have been traversing the country constantly
on and adjacent to the mail- and telegraph-lines during the past four
months, sending guards on the stages, and, when deemed necessary,
mounted guards and patrols on all dangerous portions of the road
through my district.

This plan succeeded until an overpowering force attacked Julesburg and
drove the troops inside of their works and burned the stage- and
telegraph-station, destroying a large amount of stores for both
companies. The overland stage cannot run through until they can
provide for supplies for stock from Julesburg to the Junction, where
overland stage leaves Denver route, everything belonging to the stage
company, citizens and government being entirely destroyed. The Indian
villages are unknown to us. From the best information I have I believe
them to be on the Powder River. I know certainly there is a large
village there. There have been no squaws in the country, to my
knowledge, since last fall. The tribes engaged are the Cheyennes,
Arapahoes, Kiowas, Brule, Ogallala Sioux, a portion of the Blackfeet,
and a large portion of what is known as the Missouri River Sioux, the
same Indians General Sully made the campaign against last summer. From
3,000 to 5,000 additional troops will be needed to punish the Indians.
One column will never be able to overtake them, unless they are
willing to give battle. I think three columns of men, 1,000 strong
each, with ample garrison on the overland-mail and telegraph lines,
well mounted and supplied, can clear out the country of all hostile
Indians, if done before grass comes. After that time, in my judgment,
it will take twice that number of men.

In addition to the troubles west, I would not be surprised any day to
hear of an outbreak in the northern part of my district. I am informed
by Indian scouts that there is a large encampment of Indians on the
Running Water that are ready to engage in the war against the whites.
Among them are some of the Yanktonais Sioux.

Colonel R. R. Livingston reported as follows:

In reply to your inquiries I would respectfully state that in the
early part of January last, indications of large parties of Indians
moving westward on Republican were reported by the scouts sent to gain
information of their movements. On January 7th they had crossed South
Fork of Platte River, twenty-three miles west of this post, camped
with their families, forming a camp of 400 lodges, containing eight
warriors each, many lodges being thirty robes in size. They commenced
the work of destruction along the road west as far as Junction
Station, 100 miles from here. Their forces in this fight were not less
than 2,000, well armed with breech-loading carbines and rifles. A
desperate attempt on their part to burn the overland-stage station
near this post was made at this time, but was frustrated by the
gallantry of Captain N. J. O'Brien, Company F, Seventh Iowa Cavalry.
Every ranch and stage-station from Junction Station to this post is
burned, and the charred remains of every inmate who failed to escape
tells of the brutality they were subjected to. I telegraphed Hon. Sam
H. Elbert, acting Governor of Colorado, early in January of the state
of things. The troops of Colorado have been withdrawn from Valley,
fifty miles west of here, I surmise, to concentrate around Denver. The
telegraph-lines to Salt Lake and the Denver branch lines are destroyed
for a distance of nearly ten miles on the northern route, and in
different points throughout 100 miles along the Denver route.

I have but 360 troops, but so long as human endurance holds out we
will work night and day to get the communication perfect with the
west.

The Indians engaged in this war are the Cheyennes, Ogallalas, and
Brule Sioux. They have gone northward towards Horse Creek and Fort
Laramie. Their trail leads in that direction, but they are slow in
marching, feeling audacious and indifferent to any effort from the
small body of troops in this district. I saw their signals today,
probably those of small war parties, on the North Platte. You will
hear of continued murders and robberies as long as the road is so
poorly protected by troops. No spies can be used now, owing to
numerous small war parties being met everywhere in this country. I
predict that if more troops are not sent into this district
immediately, this road will be stripped of every ranch and white man
on it. Should these Indians swing around by Niobrara River and take
the Omaha road below Kearney, where settlements are numerous, infinite
mischief will result to the settlers. What we need are troops,
supplies for them, and a vigorous campaign against these hostile
Indians. They must be put on the defensive instead of us. No
difficulty can arise in finding them. Over 2,000 cattle accompany
them.

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT COLORADO.
DENVER, COLORADO TERRITORY, Feb. 2, 1865.

The Indians are bold in the extreme. They have burned every ranch
between Julesburg and Valley Station, and nearly all the property at
latter place; driven off all stock, both public and private. These
Indians are led by white men, and have complete control of all the
country outside my district, so that I am hemmed in.

The weather has been very severe here for nearly three weeks; the
thermometer 30 degrees below zero, with quite a fall of snow on the
ground. I have tried every means in my power to raise volunteers for
three months' State service, but as yet have not succeeded, owing to
the factional spirit existing in the community.

The Legislature took the matter in hand at my suggestion,
appropriating so much money. Territorial bonds, to give the men a
bounty and purchase horses to mount them on, as I have none; but the
members cannot agree on the spoil likely in their estimation to accrue
from such a proceeding, so the bill has not yet passed. I addressed
the Speaker of the House yesterday, informing him that unless
something was done within forty-eight hours I would be compelled, much
against my will, to proclaim martial law and stop all business,
forcing every man to enter the ranks and open the line of
communication. I have now a city organization of about 100 men
organized into companies, so that in case of an attack here I would
have something tangible to lay hold of and make a fight. I have had a
great deal of trouble in this matter, as there is no concert of
action, every man suspecting his fellow of some chicanery.

Fort Lyon is being rapidly fortified, so that 200 men can defend it
against 2,000 Indians. Militia companies are being organized all over
the settled parts of the country (under penalty of being pressed into
service) to defend the frontier settlements southward, and could I but
get a Regiment here now I could keep things in a running trim until
the arrival of a sufficient force to make a campaign. The Indians are
now determined to make it a war of extermination, and nothing short of
5,000 men can make it extermination for them.

Major Wynkoop informed me from Fort Lyon that many warriors were on
the headwaters of the Smoky Hill and intended attacking all the
settlements as well as Denver. Provisions, owing to the
transportation-line being cut off, are at an exorbitant price, as well
as labor and forage.

Cannot troops be sent out here immediately, or authority to raise
companies, which could be easily done, for one year?

The Santa Fe line has threatened to stop running on account of the
Indians. Should such be the case, then all is cut off.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS MOONLIGHT,

_Colonel Eleventh Kansas Cavalry, Commanding_.

Colonel Chivington, from Fort Rankin, reported:

Lieutenant-Colonel Collins, with 200 men of the Eleventh Ohio, and
Company D, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, fought Indians from the 4th to the
9th inst., at Mud Springs. The Indians at one time charged our forces
in the face of artillery and were nearly successful. Two thousand
warriors were engaged in the fight. It is supposed forty Indians were
killed. Beaure's and Craighten's herds were driven off. The Indians
crossed at Bush Creek, going north. The telegraph poles were gone and
wires so inextricably tangled as to be useless. Seven hundred lodges
crossed Pole Creek, six miles below Pole Creek crossing.

These Indians were not driven off and the telegraph-lines retaken without severe fighting and loss of many soldiers. Within two weeks the troops drove these Indians north, where a detachment of troops from Fort Laramie attacked them and drove them across the Platte. Finally the Indians saw that a different warfare was being made against them, and they fled to their villages on the Powder River and in the Black Hills country.

There was such energy and such spirit displayed by the troops, that after two weeks' work they had the telegraph-lines replaced between Omaha and Denver, a distance of 600 miles, and this without any additional force to aid them. The progress made in putting up the wires is shown by this report:

My troop is at Moore's ranch; passed there at 2 o'clock. We ran twelve
miles of wire and set eight miles of poles, had two severe fights, and
marched fifty-five miles in fifty-two hours. Operators furnished
valuable service.

E. B. MURPHY,

_Captain Seventh Iowa Cavalry_.

The thermometers all this time were from 5 to 10 degrees below zero. On February 13th telegraphic communication was resumed through to California, and Mr. Craighten notified the Government of the fact.

An inquiry made of Craighten by General Grant, as to where I was located (Craighten being a personal friend of mine who was most skeptical at the start of my accomplishing anything with the material I had, was overjoyed at our success), was answered, "Nobody knows where he is, but everybody knows where he has been."

From the 5th to the 13th of February every mounted man on that line was in the saddle, either assisting the operators or chasing real or imaginary Indians. The moment a scout came in, instructions were given to the officers to send them out and not allow any mounted troops in the stockade until the lines were opened and the Indians driven at least 100 miles away from the line of telegraph, and the only dashes the Indians made after we got fairly at them was to cut off a part of an unguarded train, and at unguarded ranches, and at those stage-stations where only a few soldiers were located; but in every attack the soldiers stood their ground and fought, and when driven they only backed far enough to get a secure place. The troops knew better than to go back to the fortified posts, as they had instructions to keep to the hills, but in nearly every case they were successful, and the daring that some of the troops showed in these fights was remarkable.

Great atrocities were committed by the Indians, scalping the men alive and abusing the women. This caused the troops to stand and fight, preferring to die rather than to fall into their hands. Wherever a fight was successfully made, no matter whether commissioned or non-commissioned officers commanded, I telegraphed him in person thanking him, and to the commanding officer of his Regiment, requesting that he be given the first promotion, and wrote to the Governor of his State.

As soon as this stage-line was opened we concentrated about 500 mounted men, intending to catch the Indians before they left the North Platte; but the Indians fled as soon as they heard of this, and did not stop until they reached Powder River, too far north for us to follow until arrangements were made for supplies for troops and stock, as everything had to be teamed from Fort Leavenworth.

The storms during March were very severe. Snow lay two feet on the level and was crusted so hard that for weeks it was almost impossible to force animals through it. As soon as we heard from my scouts of the departure of the Indians and found they had no intention of molesting the citizens of Nebraska, and had placed themselves on Powder River too far north to return until the return of the grass in May, I distributed the troops along the stage- and telegraph-lines to Salt Lake, and returned to open the South Route to New Mexico.