Chapter VI: Part 6

On February 16th General Van Dorn's command commenced crossing the Tennessee to join General Bragg's Army. I sent my cavalry to attack him. I wired General Rosecrans that we had attacked Van Dorn's rear guard and took some fifty prisoners from him. He had with him General Roddey, commander of some fifteen hundred men, of which we captured about two hundred. These prisoners said they were ordered to join General Bragg's Army. General Rosecrans, in answer to my dispatch, sent me this message:

MURFREESBOROUGH, February 16, 1863.

_Brigadier-General Dodge, Corinth, Miss._:

Hurlbut's request and my own coincide. Hope you will be able to cut
off some of Van Dorn's command. Will give you all our news in your
direction. Accept my thanks for your promptness and energy.

W. S. ROSECRANS,

_Major-General_.

Soon after this General Rosecrans conceived the idea of sending Colonel A. D. Streight with two thousand mounted cavalry and infantry from Nashville by boat to Eastport, Miss., to go from there east to Georgia, destroying the railroads and supplies Bragg's army was depending on, and then move south and west, finally landing in Corinth, Miss. General Rosecrans proposed that I should send two brigades to Iuka in support of this movement, which General Grant acceded to, and said in making this movement for me to go on and carry out the plan I had suggested in destroying the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and the supplies gathered along it. I sent this dispatch, giving my plan of the movement:

HDQRS. DIST. OF CORINTH, DEPRT. OF THE TENNESSEE,

CORINTH, April 4, 1863.

_Henry Binmore, Assistant Adjutant-General_:

CAPTAIN:--In accordance with Major-General Hurlbut's dispatch, I
submit the plan of operations east of here. General Rosecrans proposes
to land a force at Florence, attack and take that place, while, with a
heavy body of cavalry, he penetrates Alabama north of Tennessee River,
and gets into Johnson's rear. At the same time I am to strike and take
Tuscumbia, and, if practicable, push my cavalry to Decatur, destroy
the saltpeter works, and the Tuscumbia and Decatur Railroad, which
they have just finished, and take all the horses and mules in that
country, to prevent them from raising any large crops. To do this, I
propose to move simultaneously with General Rosecrans, throw all my
cavalry suddenly across Bear Creek, capture the ferries, and hold them
until my infantry and artillery arrive, and then immediately force my
cavalry as far toward Tuscumbia as possible, and secure the crossings
of Little Bear, on which creek the enemy will concentrate. To
accomplish this I shall move light, taking nothing but ammunition and
provisions, and march twenty miles per day, with infantry and
artillery. I shall take such a force as to render certain the success
of the expedition, and propose to take command in person. The movement
is to be made next week, or as soon as General Rosecrans notifies me
he is ready. I trust this will meet the view of the General
commanding.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. M. DODGE,

_Brigadier-General Commanding_.

To ascertain what enemy I would have to meet, I sent my chief of staff, Captain George E. Spencer, a very competent officer who was a genius in getting inside of the enemy's lines, with a communication to General P. D. Roddey, who had returned to Tuscumbia, and was in command of the rebel forces south of the Tennessee River. I told Captain Spencer that the communication was an important one and he must not deliver it to any one except General Roddey; that he must impress upon the officer on the enemy's picket-line that he must take him to General Roddey and in that way he would be able to determine very closely what forces I would have to meet. Captain Spencer went prepared to do this. He met the picket officer; they became very chummy, and the officer took Captain Spencer right through all of the enemy's forces between Bear River and Tuscumbia, and he delivered the message to General Roddey, who was in great anger at his officer; but they made the best of it. After the war, Captain Spencer and General Roddey were great friends and I believe partners in some business. The result of Captain Spencer's trip I set forth in the following dispatch to General Oglesby:

CORINTH. _April_ 17, 1863.

_Major-General Oglesby, Jackson_:

My A. A. G., Captain George E. Spencer, has just returned from
Tuscumbia; succeeded in getting through all the enemy's camps and
obtaining valuable information. The forces are posted as follows:
Colonel Dibrell, 900 men, at Tuscumbia Landing; Colonel Josiah
Patterson, 1,000, at Florence; Colonel M. W. Hannon, 1,800, at
Tuscumbia; Colonel Roddey's old regiment, 800, at Tuscumbia Landing;
Baxter Smith, 350, ten miles this side; Colonel Hampton, 300 at same
place; W. R. Julian, 300, at Grey's, six miles this side; and Smith,
100, at Big Bear. The above all cavalry. Between Courtland and
Tuscumbia, one brigade of infantry, under Colonel Wood, as follows:
Colonel A. H. Helvenston, 300; Colonel J. B. Bibb, 500; Colonel W. B.
Wood, Sixteenth Alabama, 400. The last brigade, and one brigade of
cavalry, under General Roddey, arrived at Tuscumbia last week. This
more than doubles their force. They have also five pieces of artillery
at Florence and six pieces at Tuscumbia.

G. M. DODGE,

_Brigadier-General_.

Upon notification of General Rosecrans of the movement of Colonel Streight, I moved out to carry out the combined plan, engaging the enemy at Little Bear and Tuscumbia, and defeated them as my report shows. Colonel Streight was greatly delayed in starting from Nashville, and was only partially mounted, his intention being to complete the mount of his force as he traveled through the enemy's country--a fatal mistake. His delay in reaching me and my movement caused Bragg to send General Forrest to join General Roddey; and so by the time General Streight reached Eastport, April 21st, the force before me had been doubled and the best cavalry officer in the rebel force had arrived to take command in my front.

Colonel Streight lost part of his horses and mules while unloading at Eastport, and, although I made an effort to mount him, stripping my own transportation and scouring the country in my vicinity, still he left us after I captured Tuscumbia the second time, on May 26th, with two hundred of his men dismounted and one-half of the rest on mules, illy prepared for such a trip. I told Colonel Streight that I would hold the enemy in my front as long as possible, but the moment Colonel Forrest got word of his movement he would go after him and follow him to death. His only salvation was to get three or four days' start by long marches before Forrest learned of his movement. Colonel Streight was an officer peculiarly fitted for such a raid. He was active, clearheaded, determined, and of excellent judgment, and his many fights with Forrest showed him full of resources; but his two-days' halt at Moulton, the heavy rains, and the condition of his stock, were fatal to him.

On the morning of May 27th I felt carefully of the enemy and found them in my front, and commenced immediately to force them back, trying to make them believe, if they discovered Colonel Streight, that it was only a side movement into the loyal part of Alabama, where we had many friends and where we enlisted a Regiment of loyal Alabamians, which was afterwards known as the First Alabama Cavalry, commanded by Colonel George E. Spencer, whose Regiment became noted for its valuable service throughout the war. General Sherman selected it as his headquarters escort in his march to the sea.

Generals Forrest and Roddey, on May 28th, made a determined stand to halt my advance on Town Creek. The high water delayed my crossing, but on the morning of the 29th, after my force had crossed and driven the enemy from the heights beyond, I discovered that I had only General Roddey and his force in my front and I forced my cavalry out towards Decatur until the enemy disappeared from the front. The evening of the 28th I notified Colonel Streight that Forrest was still with me, and I was greatly alarmed to find that Colonel Streight was still directly south of me, when I hoped he would be well on the road. When General Bragg found that I was continuing my advance up the Tennessee, destroying his stores, he despatched General Van Dorn with his cavalry command to cross the Tennessee at Florence and get in my rear, but as soon as the enemy disappeared in my front, I turned immediately and marched rapidly back to Bear River, so that, if General Van Dorn succeeded in crossing the Tennessee River, I would have him in my front. My troops destroyed all the supplies in the whole Valley of the Tennessee, burnt the railroad stations, and destroyed the railroad so that it was never rebuilt until after the war. There followed me back to Corinth almost the entire negro population of that valley. They came in every conceivable conveyance from their masters' private carriage to a wheelbarrow, and they had hitched to the conveyances sometimes a cow and horse and sometimes a fine team of horses, or a cow and an ox. Hundreds were on foot, with their household goods packed on a mule, a horse, or a cow. They made a picturesque column, much longer than my command. At night their camps spread over a large territory, the camp-fires surrounded by the most motley and poorly-dressed crowd I ever saw, and it was a problem to me what I could do with them or what would become of them if the enemy's forces should happen to get into my rear. However, we all arrived safely at Corinth, where I established the great contraband camp and guarded it by two companies of Negro soldiers that I uniformed, armed, and equipped without any authority, and which came near giving me trouble. Many of the Negro men afterwards joined the First Alabama Colored Infantry and other Negro Regiments that I raised and mustered into the service.

In my advance up the Valley of the Tennessee, after I had passed Beaver Creek the enemy got into my rear, committing depredations and picking up stragglers, and all kinds of reports went back to Corinth of our fighting, capture, and other calamities too numerous to mention. These reports were all repeated to General Grant, who said, after being surfeited with them, "Well, if Dodge has accomplished what he started out to do, we can afford to lose him." General Grant said afterwards in discussing this movement that he knew they could not capture or destroy the kind of troops I had with me without my being heard from; that they might defeat me, but they could not capture me; and the boys used to use this saying in rounding up what value I was to the service. As my own report and that of Colonel Streight gives more and better detail of the movements of both, and the results, I submit them here:

I moved from Corinth with the Second Division, Sixteenth Army Corps,
Wednesday, April 15. Camped at Burnsville. The next day moved to
Cook's, two and a half miles west of Great Bear Creek, and made my
preparations to cross, the rebels holding the opposite side.

Friday morning, April 17, I made a feint at Jackson and Bailings
Fords, and, under the cover of my artillery, threw the most of my
force across at Steminine's Ford.

The cavalry, under Colonel Cornyn, and mounted infantry, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, made the crossing and pushed forward. My
instructions were for them to go forward three and a half miles, and
await my coming. Colonel Cornyn, meeting the enemy about a mile out,
commenced fighting them, they falling back rapidly. Hearing of Colonel
Roddey commanding a force of the enemy on my left flank, I sent
orders forward for the command to halt; but before the messenger got
to him Colonel Roddey had got between the cavalry and infantry. The
Third Brigade was in advance, commanded by Colonel Bane, who,
ascertaining this fact, pushed forward and fell upon their rear, but
not until Colonel Roddey had taken two pieces of artillery, twenty-two
men, and one company of mounted infantry, who were guarding it, which,
through neglect, had been allowed to fall three miles in the rear of
the advance.

Colonel Cornyn, hearing firing in the rear, immediately fell back, and
with the First Alabama Cavalry charged the rebels and retook the
artillery and caissons, with the exception of one gun, which the enemy
succeeded in getting off with.

The charge of the Alabamians with muskets only, and those not loaded,
is creditable, especially as they are all new recruits and poorly
drilled. In this charge, Captain Cameron, the commanding officer of
the Alabama Cavalry, a deserving and much-lamented officer, was
killed.

Colonel Bane, on his arrival, disposed of his troops admirably.
Colonel Cornyn advanced with his cavalry as a feint, and the rebels
advanced to meet him. He fell back to the rear of the infantry, which
was posted under cover and out of sight on both flanks of the cavalry.
On the appearance of the enemy, the infantry opened a heavy and
destructive fire, which caused the rebels to fall back in confusion,
utterly routed. This day's work brought us thirteen miles in advance
of the main force.

Colonel Streight not arriving, I fell back with the advance to Great
Bear Creek, where the rest of the command was posted, to await his
coming.

Sunday afternoon, Colonel Streight commenced landing his force at
Eastport, but came poorly prepared for his contemplated movement. He
had two thousand infantry and about one thousand mules. At least four
hundred of them were unserviceable, and in unloading them, through the
carelessness of one of his officers, two hundred strayed away. He was
under the impression that he would find plenty of stock in the valley
to mount the rest and replace those broken down. During Monday and
Tuesday we scoured the country, and found all we could.

Tuesday night Colonel Fuller's Brigade, from Corinth, joined me.

Wednesday morning I advanced with all the force, and came up with the
enemy at Rock Cut, five miles west of Tuscumbia; planted my batteries,
and drove them out of it, taking the line of Little Bear Creek that
night. The enemy's position was a very strong one, and there was but
one way to flank it. The enemy fell back as soon as I brought the
infantry to bear upon them.

Thursday we moved, crossing at three places, throwing my cavalry by
the Frankfort and Tuscumbia road, into the enemy's rear; but during
the night, anticipating this movement, the enemy fell back. We reached
Tuscumbia about noon, and after slight skirmishing took possession of
the city. I immediately dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, with
two squadrons of mounted infantry, two squadrons of the Fifteenth
Illinois Cavalry, and a section of Welker's battery, to take Florence.
They refused to surrender, when Colonel Phillips immediately opened on
the town. A few shell brought them to terms, and we occupied the
place. At the same time I ordered Colonel Cornyn forward toward
Courtland, to feel the enemy. He came up with their rear some two
miles beyond Leighton. The command consisted on our part of the Tenth
Missouri and Seventh Kansas Cavalry, about eight hundred in all, and
drove the enemy eight miles. The rebel force was thirty-five hundred,
besides one battery. The fighting of the cavalry against such odds is
beyond all praise.

The next morning the cavalry fell back to Tuscumbia, to await the
advance of the main column.

Finding it impossible to obtain stock to mount Colonel Streight's
command, I took horses and mules from my teams and mounted infantry,
and furnished him some six hundred head, mounting all but two hundred
of his men. I also turned over all my hard bread, some ten thousand
rations, and he left me at midnight on the 26th instant, with the
intention of going through Russellville, Moulton, and Blountsville, to
Gadsden, then divide, one force to strike Rome and the other Etowah
Bridge.

I moved forward Monday morning, and drove the enemy across Town Greek
that night, and ascertained that they were in force, under Forrest, on
the opposite bank. That night I communicated with Colonel Streight, at
Mount Hope, and ascertained that he was all right.

Tuesday morning the creek rose ten feet, and the current was so swift
that neither horse nor man could cross. I immediately made disposition
to cross at three points, to cover the railroad bridge and throw
across foot-bridges.

The resistance of the enemy was very strong, and their sharpshooters
very annoying. The artillery duel was very fine, parts of Welker's,
Tannrath's, Richardson's, and Robinson's batteries taking part in it.
The practice on both sides was excellent. The Parrott guns drove the
enemy away from their pieces, disabling and keeping them away for two
hours, but the fact of my being unable to cross infantry prevented our
securing them.

About noon I crossed the railroad bridge with the Eighty-first Ohio
and Ninth Illinois Infantry, and soon after crossed the rest of my
force, except the artillery, on foot-bridges, and drove the enemy
within three miles of Courtland, when they, hearing of the force at
Moulton, fled to Decatur. I followed up, and then returned to camp at
Town Creek that night, being unable to cross any of my artillery.

Colonel Streight reached Moulton Tuesday night, and commenced crossing
the mountains Wednesday, having got nearly two days' start of them.
They supposed he was making for Decatur, and only discovered Wednesday
that he was crossing the mountains toward Georgia.

Having accomplished fully the object of the expedition, and driving
the enemy, which was 5,500 strong, to Decatur, and having been on half
rations for a week, I fell back to Tuscumbia, in order to communicate
with transports, to obtain rations and ammunition. On arriving there I
received information that the gunboats had gone down the river, taking
the transports with them, a part of Van Dorn's force having made their
appearance on the north side of the Tennessee River and shelled South
Florence that day at 4 p. m. They also planted a battery at Savannah
and Duck River; but my precaution in destroying all means of crossing
the river on my advance, prevented him getting in my rear, and the
gunboats, to save the transports, left the day before, having a short
engagement at Savannah and Duck River. Van Dorn's force then moved
toward Decatur. That was the last we heard of them.

On my return I burned all provisions, produce, and forage, all mills
and tan-yards, and destroyed everything that would in any way aid the
enemy. I took stock of all kinds that I could find, and rendered the
valley so destitute that it cannot be occupied by the Confederates,
except provisions and forage are transported to them. I also destroyed
telegraph and railroad between Tuscumbia and Decatur, and all the
ferries between Savannah and Courtland.

I have no doubt but that Colonel Streight would have succeeded had he
been properly equipped and joined me at the time agreed upon. The
great delay in an enemy's country necessary to fit him out gave them
time to throw a large force in our front. Although Colonel Streight
had two days' start, they can harass him, and perhaps check his
movements long enough for them to secure all their important bridges.
If he could have started from Bear Creek the day I arrived there, then
my movements would have been so quick and strong that the enemy could
not have got their forces together.

The animals furnished him were very poor at the start. Four hundred of
them were used up before leaving me, and those furnished him by me
were about all the serviceable stock he had, though I hear he got two
hundred good mules the day he left me, in Moulton Valley.

On my return, I sent Colonel Cornyn, with the Tenth Missouri, Seventh
Kansas, Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry, and Ninth Illinois Mounted
Infantry, to attack the force congregated at Tupelo and Okolona. He
came up with the enemy on Wednesday, and immediately attacked them,
they being some three thousand strong, under Major-General S. J.
Gholson and Brigadier-General Ruggles. Brigadier-General Chalmers,
with thirty-five hundred men, was at Pontotoc, but failed to come to
Gholson's aid, though ordered to.

Colonel Cornyn fought so determinedly and so fast that he soon routed
the force in his front, driving them in all directions, killing and
wounding a large number and taking one hundred prisoners, including
some seven officers; also a large number of arms and one hundred and
fifty horses, saddles, etc.

The enemy fled toward Okolona and Pontotoc, and Colonel Cornyn
returned to Corinth.

The expedition so far can be summed up as having accomplished the
object for which it started, the infantry having marched two hundred
and fifty miles and the cavalry some four hundred, and fought six
successful engagements, driving the enemy, three thousand strong, from
Bear Creek to Decatur, taking the towns of Tuscumbia and Florence,
with a loss not to exceed one hundred, including three officers.
Destroyed a million and a half bushels of corn, besides large
quantities of oats, rye, and fodder, and five hundred thousand pounds
of bacon. Captured one hundred and fifty prisoners, one thousand head
of horses and mules, and an equal number of cattle, hogs, and sheep;
also one hundred bales of cotton, besides keeping the whole command in
meat for three weeks. Destroyed the railroad from Tuscumbia to
Decatur; also some sixty flat-boats and ferries in the Tennessee
River, thereby preventing Van Dorn, in his move, from crossing to my
rear; also destroyed five tan-yards and six flouring-mills.

It has rendered desolate one of the best granaries of the South,
preventing them from raising another crop this year, and taking away
from them some fifteen hundred negroes.

We found large quantities of shelled corn, all ready for shipment,
also bacon, and gave it to the flames.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. M. DODGE,

_Brigadier-General U. S. A._

The following is Colonel A. D. Streight's report:

General Dodge informed me that there was no doubt but Forrest had
crossed the Tennessee River, and was in the vicinity of Town Creek;
hence, he agreed to advance as far as Courtland, on the Decatur road,
and, if possible, drive the enemy in that direction, but if they (the
enemy) turned toward Moulton, our cavalry, under General Dodge, was to
be sent in pursuit.

With this understanding, I marched from Tuscumbia at 11 p. m. on the
night of the 26th instant in the direction of Moulton, via
Russellville. It was raining very hard, and the mud and darkness of
the night made our progress very slow. One hundred and fifty of my men
had neither horses nor mules, and fully as many more had such as were
unable to carry more than the saddles; hence fully three hundred of
the men were on foot.

It was expected when I left General Dodge that the greater part of my
command would be able to reach Moulton, some forty miles distant, by
the next night, but, owing to the heavy rains and consequent bad
condition of the roads, it was impossible; consequently I dispatched a
messenger to General Dodge, stating that I would halt at Mount Hope
and wait for the portion of my command who were on foot to come up.

We continued to scour the country for horses and mules, but so many of
those drawn at Nashville were continually failing, that, although we
were successful in collecting a large number, still, many of the men
were without anything to ride.

On the night of the 27th, at Mount Hope, I received word from General
Dodge, stating that he had driven the enemy, and that I should push
on. My command had not all come up yet, nor did they until about 10
a. m. the next day, when we proceeded to Moulton, where we arrived
about dark. Up to this time we had been skirmishing occasionally with
small squads of the enemy, but I could hear of no force of consequence
in the country. All of the command but about fifty men were now
mounted.

We started from Moulton, in the direction of Blountsville, via Day's
Gap, about midnight on April 28. The two previous days it had been
raining most of the time, and the roads were terrible, though on the
evening of the 28th it bid fair for dry weather, which gave us strong
hopes of better times.

We marched the next day (the 29th) to Day's Gap, about thirty-five
miles, and bivouacked for the night. Every man now was mounted, and
although many of the animals were very poor, nevertheless we had
strong hopes that we could easily supply all future demands. We
destroyed during the day a large number of wagons belonging to the
enemy, laden with provisions, arms, tents, etc., which had been sent
to the mountains to avoid us, but, luckily, they fell into our hands.
We were now in the midst of devoted Union people. Many of Captain
Smith's men (Alabamians) were recruited near this place, and many were
the happy greetings between them and their friends and relations. I
could learn nothing of the enemy in the country, with the exception of
small squads of scouting-parties, who were hunting conscripts. We
moved out the next morning before daylight. I will here remark that my
men had been worked very hard in scouring so much of the country, and,
unaccustomed as they were to riding, made it still worse;
consequently, they were illy prepared for the trying ordeal through
which they were to pass. I had not proceeded more than two miles, at
the head of the column, before I was informed that the rear guard had
been attacked, and just at that moment I heard the boom of artillery
in the rear of the column. I had previously learned that the gap
through which we were passing was easily flanked by gaps through the
mountains, both above and below; consequently, I sent orders to the
rear to hold the enemy in check until we could prepare for action. The
head of the column was at the time on the top of the mountain. The
column was moving through the gap; consequently the enemy was easily
held in check.

I soon learned that the enemy had moved through the gaps on my right
and left, and were endeavoring to form a junction in my advance;
consequently I moved ahead rapidly until we passed the intersecting
roads on either flank with the one we occupied. The country was open
sand ridges, very thinly wooded, and afforded fine defensive
positions. As soon as we passed the point above designated (about
three miles from the top of the mountains), we dismounted and formed a
line of battle on a ridge circling to the rear. Our right rested on a
precipitous ravine and the left was protected by a marshy run that was
easily held against the enemy. The mules were sent into a ravine to
the rear of our right, where they were protected from the enemy's
bullets. I also deployed a line of skirmishers, resting on our right
and left flanks encircling our rear, in order to prevent a surprise
from any detached force of the enemy that might approach us from that
direction and to prevent any straggling of either stray animals or
cowardly men.

In the meantime I had instructed Captain Smith, who had command of our
rear guard (now changed to our front), to hold his position until the
enemy pressed him closely, when he should retreat rapidly, and, if
possible, draw them onto our lines, which were concealed by the men
lying down immediately back of the top of the ridge. The lines were
left sufficiently open to permit Captain Smith's command to pass
through near the center. I had two twelve-pounder mountain howitzers,
which were stationed near the road (the center). They were also
concealed. We had hardly completed our arrangements when the enemy
charged Captain Smith in large force, following him closely, and no
sooner had he passed our lines than our whole line rose up and
delivered a volley at short range. We continued to pour a rapid fire
into their ranks, which soon caused them to give way in confusion; but
their reinforcements soon came up, when they dismounted, formed, and
made a determined and vigorous attack. Our skirmishers were soon
driven in, and about the same time the enemy opened upon us with a
battery of artillery.

The enemy soon attempted to carry our lines, but were handsomely
repulsed. During their advance they had run their artillery to within
three hundred yards of our lines, and as soon as they began to waver I
prepared for a charge. I ordered Colonel Hathaway, Seventy-third
Indiana, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sheets, Fifty-first Indiana, on the
left, to make a charge, in order to draw the attention of the battery,
and immediately threw the Third Ohio, Colonel Lawson, and the
Eightieth Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Rodgers, forward rapidly,
hoping to capture the battery. The enemy, after a short but stubborn
resistance, fled in confusion, leaving two pieces of artillery, two
caissons, and about forty prisoners, representing seven different
regiments, a larger number of wounded, and about thirty dead on the
field. Among the former was Captain William H. Forrest, a brother of
General Forrest. Our loss was about thirty killed and wounded, among
the latter Lieutenant-Colonel Sheets, Fifty-first Indiana (mortally),
a brave and gallant officer and one that we were illy prepared to
lose, and Lieutenant Pavey, Eightieth Illinois (on my staff),
severely.

It was now about 11 o'clock, fighting having continued since about 6
o'clock in the morning. I had learned, in the meantime, that the enemy
were in heavy force, fully three times our number, with twelve pieces
of artillery, under General Forrest in person; consequently I was
fearful that they were making an effort to get around us and attack in
the rear of our position; hence I decided to resume the march.
Everything was soon in readiness, and we moved out, leaving a strong
guard (dismounted) in the rear, to check any immediate advance the
enemy might make previous to the column getting in motion. We were not
too soon in our movements, for the column had hardly passed a
cross-road some six miles from our first battle-ground when the enemy
were discovered advancing on our left. Sharp skirmishing commenced at
Crooked Creek, which is about ten miles south of Day's Gap, and
finally the enemy pressed our rear so hard that I was compelled to
prepare for battle. I selected a strong position about a mile south of
the crossing of the creek, on a ridge called Hog Mountain. The whole
force soon became engaged (about one hour before dark). The enemy
strove first to carry our right; then charged the left; but with the
help of the two pieces of artillery captured in the morning and the
two mountain howitzers, all of which were handled with good effect by
Major Vananda, of the Third Ohio, we were able to repulse them.

Fighting continued until about 10 p. m. when the enemy were driven
from our front, leaving a large number of killed and wounded on the
field. I determined at once to resume our march, and as soon as
possible we moved out. The ammunition which we had captured with the
two guns was exhausted, and being very short of horses, I ordered the
guns spiked and the carriages destroyed. I had ordered the
Seventy-third Indiana (Colonel Hathaway) to act as rear guard, and I
remained in the rear in person, for the purpose of being at hand in
case the enemy should attempt to press us as we were moving out. We
had but fairly got under way when I received information of the
enemy's advance.

The moon shone very brightly, and the country was an open woodland,
with an occasional spot of thick undergrowth. In one of these thickets
I placed the Seventy-third Indiana, lying down, and not more than
twenty paces from the road, which was in plain view. The enemy
approached. The head of his column passed without discovering our
position. At this moment the whole regiment opened a most destructive
fire, causing a complete stampede of the enemy. I will here remark
that the country from Day's Gap to Blountsville (about forty miles) is
mostly uninhabited; consequently there is nothing in the country for
man or beast. I had hopes that by pushing ahead we could reach a place
where we could feed before the enemy would come up with us, and, by
holding him back where there was no feed, compel him to lay over a day
at least to recuperate. I had learned that they had been on a forced
march from Town Creek, Ala., a day and two nights previous to their
attacking us. We were not again disturbed until we had marched several
miles, when they attacked our rear guard vigorously. I again succeeded
in ambuscading them, which caused them to give up the pursuit for the
night. We continued our march, and reached Blountsville about 10
o'clock in the morning. Many of our mules had given out, leaving their
riders on foot, but there was very little straggling behind the rear
guard.

At Blountsville we found sufficient corn to feed our tired and hungry
animals. Ammunition and rations were hastily distributed to the men,
and the remaining ammunition was put on pack-mules and the wagons
burned, as it was now understood that it would be impossible to take
them over the roads before us. After resting about two hours, we
resumed our march in the direction of Gadsden.

The column had not got fairly under motion before our pickets were
driven in, and a sharp skirmish ensued between Forrest's advance and
our rear guard, under Captain Smith, in the town of Blountsville. The
enemy followed closely for several miles, continually skirmishing with
the rear guard, but were badly handled by small parties of our men
stopping in the thick bushes by the side of the road and firing at
them at short range, and when we reached the East Branch of the Black
Warrior River the ford was very deep and the enemy pressed so closely
that I was compelled to halt and offer him battle before we could
cross. After some maneuvering, I advanced a heavy line of skirmishers,
who drove the enemy out of sight of my main line, when I ordered the
troops, except the skirmishers, to cross the river as rapidly as
possible. After all had crossed except the skirmishers, they were
rapidly withdrawn, under cover of our artillery, and a heavy line of
skirmishers thrown out on the opposite bank for that purpose. It was
about 5 p. m. when the last of the command crossed the East Branch of
the Black Warrior. We proceeded in the direction of Gadsden without
further interruption, with the exception of small parties who were
continually harassing the rear of the column, until about 9 o'clock
the next morning, May 2, when the rear guard was fiercely attacked at
the crossing of Black Creek, near Gadsden. After a sharp fight the
enemy was repulsed.

I had learned in the meantime, through my scouts, that a large column
of the enemy was moving on our left, parallel with our route,
evidently with the intention of getting in our front, which made it
necessary for us to march all night, though the command was in no
condition to do so, and, to add still more to my embarrassment, a
portion of our ammunition had become damaged in crossing Will's Creek,
which, at the time, was very deep fording. I only halted at Gadsden
sufficiently long to destroy a quantity of arms and commissary stores
found there, and proceeded on. Many of our animals and men were
entirely worn out and unable to keep up with the column; consequently
they fell behind the rear guard and were captured.

It now became evident to me that our only hope was in crossing the
river at Rome and destroying the bridge, which would delay Forrest a
day or two and give us time to collect horses and mules, and allow
the command a little time to sleep, without which it was impossible to
proceed.

The enemy followed closely, and kept up a continuous skirmish with the
rear of the column until about 4 p. m., at which time we reached
Blount's plantation, about fifteen miles from Gadsden, where we could
procure forage for our animals. Here I decided to halt, as it was
impossible to continue the march through the night without feeding and
resting, although to do so was to bring on a general engagement.
Accordingly, the command was dismounted, and a detail made to feed the
horses and mules, while the balance of the command formed in line of
battle on a ridge southwest of the plantation.

Meanwhile the rear guard, in holding the enemy in check, had become
severely engaged and was driven in. The enemy at once attacked our
main line, and tried hard to carry the center, but were gallantly met
and repulsed by the Fifty-first and Seventy-third Indiana, assisted by
Major Vananda, with two mountain howitzers. They then made a
determined effort to turn our right, but were met by the gallant
Eightieth Illinois, assisted by two companies of the Third Ohio.

The enemy, with the exception of a few skirmishers, then fell back to
a ridge some half a mile distant, and commenced massing his force, as
if preparing for a more determined attack. It was becoming dark, and I
decided to withdraw unobserved, if possible, and conceal my command in
a thicket some half a mile to our rear, there to lie in ambush and
await his advance. In the meantime I had ordered Captain Milton
Russell (Fifty-first Indiana) to take two hundred of the best-mounted
men, selected from the whole command, and proceed to Rome, and hold
the bridge until the main command could come up.

The engagement at Blount's plantation revealed the fact that nearly
all of our remaining ammunition was worthless, on account of having
been wet. Much of that carried by the men had become useless by the
paper wearing out and the powder sifting away. It was in this
engagement that the gallant Colonel Hathaway (Seventy-third Indiana)
fell, mortally wounded, and in a few moments expired. Our country has
seldom been called upon to mourn the loss of so brave and valuable an
officer. His loss to me was irreparable. His men had almost worshiped
him, and when he fell it cast a deep gloom of despondency over his
regiment which was hard to overcome.

We remained in ambush but a short time when the enemy, who by some
means had learned of our whereabouts, commenced a flank movement,
which we discovered in time to check. I then decided to withdraw as
silently as possible, and push on in the direction of Rome, but as a
large number of the men were dismounted, their animals having given
out, and the remainder of the stock was so jaded, tender-footed, and
worn down, our progress was necessarily slow; yet, as everything
depended on our reaching Rome before the enemy could throw a
sufficient force there to prevent our crossing the bridge, every
possible effort was made to urge the command forward. We proceeded
without interruption until we reached the vicinity of Centre, when one
of my scouts informed me that a force of the enemy was posted in
ambush but a short distance in our front. I immediately threw forward
a line of skirmishers, with orders to proceed until they were fired
upon, when they should open a brisk fire on the enemy, and hold their
position until the command had time to pass.

The plan worked admirably, for, while my skirmishers were amusing the
enemy, the main column made a detour to the right, and struck the main
road some three miles to the rear of the enemy. As soon as our main
force had passed, the skirmishers withdrew and fell in the rear of the
column. I was then hopeful that we could reach Rome before the enemy
could overtake us. My principal guide had thus far proved reliable,
and I had made particular inquiries of him as to the character of the
road and the country the evening before, and he assured me that there
were no difficult streams to cross and that the road was good; hence
we approached the Chattanooga River at the ferry without any
information as to the real condition of things. Captain Russell had
managed to ferry the last of his command across about one hour
previous to my arrival, but the enemy had seized and run off the boat
before we reached there.

I then ascertained that there was a bridge some seven or eight miles
up the river, near Gaylesville, and procured new guides and pushed on
as rapidly as possible in order to reach the bridge before the enemy
should take possession of it. We had to pass over an old coal-chopping
for several miles, where the timber had been cut and hauled off for
charcoal, leaving innumerable wagon-roads running in every direction,
and the command was so worn out and exhausted that many were asleep,
and in spite of every exertion I could make, with the aid of such of
my officers as were able for duty, the command became separated and
scattered into several squads, traveling in different directions, and
it was not until near daylight that the last of the command had
crossed the river. The bridge was burned, and we proceeded on and
passed Cedar Bluff just after daylight. It now became evident that the
horses and mules could not reach Rome without halting to rest and
feed. Large numbers of the mules were continually giving out. In fact,
I do not think that at that time we had a score of the mules drawn at
Nashville left, and nearly all of those taken in the country were
barefooted, and many of them had such sore backs and tender feet that
it was impossible to ride them; but, in order to get as near as
possible to the force I had sent ahead, we struggled on until about 9
a. m. when we halted and fed our animals. The men, being unaccustomed
to riding, had become so exhausted from fatigue and loss of sleep that
it was almost impossible to keep them awake long enough to feed. We
had halted but a short time, when I was informed that a heavy force of
the enemy was moving on our left, on a route parallel with the one we
were marching on, and was then nearer Rome than we were. About the
same time I received this information our pickets were driven in. The
command was immediately ordered into line, and every effort made to
rally the men for action, but nature was exhausted, and a large
portion of my best troops actually went to sleep while lying in line
of battle under a severe skirmish-fire. After some maneuvering,
Forrest sent in a flag of truce, demanding the surrender of my forces.
Most of my regimental commanders had already expressed the opinion
that, unless we could reach Rome and cross the river before the enemy
came up with us again, we should be compelled to surrender.
Consequently, I called a council of war. I had learned, however, in
the meantime that Captain Russell had been unable to take the bridge
at Rome. Our condition was fully canvassed. As I have remarked before,
our ammunition was worthless, our horses and mules in a desperate
condition, the men were overcome with fatigue and loss of sleep, and
we were confronted by fully three times our number, in the heart of
the enemy's country, and, although personally opposed to surrender,
and so expressed myself at the time, yet I yielded to the unanimous
voice of my regimental commanders, and at once entered into
negotiations with Forrest to obtain the best possible terms I could
for my command, and at about noon, May 3, we surrendered as prisoners
of war.

We were taken to Richmond, Va. The men were soon sent through the
lines and exchanged. My officers and myself were confined in Libby
Prison, where we remained until the night of February 9 last, when
four of my officers and myself, together with several other prisoners,
succeeded in making our escape, and reached Washington in safety about
March 1. The balance of my officers, or nearly all of them, are still
confined as prisoners or have died of disease the result of long
confinement, insufficient food, and cruel treatment at the hands of
the enemy.

I am unable to report the exact number of casualties in the command,
but from the best information I have been able to obtain there were
fifteen officers and about one hundred and thirty enlisted men killed
and wounded. It was a matter of astonishment to all that so much
fighting should occur with so few casualties on our side; but we acted
purely on the defensive, and took advantage of the nature of the
country as best we could. From actual personal observation where we
had driven the enemy from the field, and from what my surgeons, left
with our wounded, learned in relation to the loss of the enemy, I am
convinced that we killed more of his men than we lost in both killed
and wounded.

Previous to the surrender, we had captured and paroled about two
hundred prisoners, and had lost about the same number in consequence
of the animals giving out, and the men, unable to keep up, broke down
from exhaustion, and were necessarily picked up by the enemy; but in
no case was the enemy able to capture a single man in any skirmish or
battle within my knowledge.

I deem it proper to mention the barbarous treatment my wounded
received at the hands of the enemy. Owing to the nature of the service
we were performing, we were compelled to leave our wounded behind. I
provided for them as best I could by leaving them blankets and such
rations as we had, and two of my surgeons remained behind to attend
them; but no sooner did the enemy get possession of our hospitals than
they robbed both officers and men of their blankets, coats, hats,
boots, shoes, rations, and money. The medical stores and instruments
were taken from the surgeons, and my wounded left in a semi-naked and
starving condition, in some instances many miles from any inhabitants,
to perish.

Many thanks to the Union ladies of that country, for they saved many a
brave soldier from a horrible death.

In reviewing the history of this ill-fated expedition, I am convinced
that had we been furnished at Nashville with 800 good horses, instead
of poor, young mules, we would have been successful, in spite of all
other drawbacks; or if General Dodge had succeeded in detaining
Forrest one day longer, we would have been successful even with our
poor outfit.

A. D. STREIGHT,

_Colonel Fifty-first Indiana Veteran Volunteer Infantry_.

On my return, I dispatched Colonel Cornyn with his Brigade to the attack of the force of the enemy that I had located near Tupelo, Miss. He tells the story of his battle better than I can, in his official report, which follows:

We arrived at Tupelo on Tuesday, May 5, and here we fought the
best-contested fight of the whole expedition. Just before entering the
town of Tupelo, and to the east of the railroad, it is necessary to
cross a dense and almost impassable swamp, on the western edge of
which runs Old Town Creek. We had almost reached the western edge, and
were approaching, as well as the nature of the swamp would permit, the
bridge over this creek, when the enemy, entirely unseen by us, opened
upon us with musketry. I immediately threw out to my right and left
several squadrons of the Tenth Missouri, who succeeded in dislodging
the enemy, and securing an easy passage of the bridge for the balance
of the command. Still keeping my skirmishers out to my right and left,
and an advance guard in front, I moved down a lane to the left and
south of the town and massed my command in an open field, about six
hundred yards from the southern border of Tupelo. Here word was
brought me from one of my skirmishing squadrons that the enemy were
drawn up in line on their front, to the number of six hundred. I
ordered two squadrons of the Seventh Kansas, that were armed with
Colt's revolving rifles, to dismount and attack them on foot,
supporting them with two squadrons of the Tenth Missouri (mounted),
under Lieutenant-Colonel Bowen, with orders to charge with the saber
as soon as the enemy's line should break. This order, I am proud to
say, was well obeyed and gallantly executed by both the mounted and
dismounted soldiers, for the enemy retired, and for a few minutes all
was silent along the lines. In about half an hour from the first
attack, sharp firing was heard on my front, and the enemy was
advancing toward us with yells. I immediately moved my whole force to
the rear and west of the village, and, placing my mountain howitzers
upon the brow of a hill, I sent forward all the cavalry except one
squadron of the Fifteenth Illinois, which I ordered to dismount and
support the battery. Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, commanding the Ninth
Illinois Mounted Infantry, having been detailed for that purpose early
in the morning, acted as the rear guard and guard for the train, and,
knowing that the rear was in such good hands, I felt no anxiety on
that account; and this important trust was well sustained. As soon as
my front had become fully engaged with the enemy, who fought with
considerable determination, I ordered the battery to shell the woods
from which the enemy was emerging. This fire was effective, and from
that moment the battle became general. At one time two regiments of
mounted infantry, commanded by the rebel General Ruggles, forced their
way between my fighting column and my reserve, but were suddenly
induced to retire much more rapidly than they came. My left at one
time fell back toward the battery, which then poured charge after
charge of canister into the rebel ranks, with considerable effect,
forcing them to retreat, rapidly followed by the cavalry. The enemy
had scarcely begun to waver when his whole force fled in dismay,
throwing away their arms, coats, and hats. We took from the enemy
eighty-one prisoners, including three commissioned officers. On the
field, the scene of the battle, immense quantities of arms, coats, and
blankets were found and destroyed by us. I had no means of
ascertaining the enemy's loss in killed and wounded, but from the
evidence of the battle-field it must have been heavy.

FLORENCE M. CORNYN,

_Colonel Tenth Missouri Cavalry, Commanding Cavalry Brigade_.

Colonel Cornyn was a very efficient cavalry officer and always accomplished whatever he was sent to do. He was an aggressive fighter, always attacking, no matter what the force before him, and had won a deserved standing as a Brigade commander. When he was killed, by his Lieutenant-Colonel, Bowen, during the latter's trial before a court-martial on charges preferred by Colonel Cornyn, there was a bitter personal dispute and enmity between them which came to this sad ending.

Left to Right--Front Row, Major-General W. T. Sherman, Major-General U. S. Grant, Major-General James B. McPherson, Major-General O. O. Howard. Rear row, Major-General John A. Logan, Major-General G. M. Dodge, Major-General Frank P. Blair. Extreme right, Brigadier-General John A. Fuller, leading Division of the Sixteenth Army Corps. Copy of painting by James E. Taylor for Major-General W. T. Sherman.]

THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE

ADDRESS TO THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE
DELIVERED AT THE NATIONAL ENCAMPMENT, G. A. R.
WASHINGTON, D. C., OCTOBER, 1902
BY MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE

_Comrades of the Army of the Tennessee_:

On the 28th of August, 1861, General U. S. Grant was assigned to duty in command of the District of Southeast Missouri, with headquarters at Cairo, Ill., and here commenced the organization and growth of the Army of the Tennessee. It remained under his personal command, or as a unit of his great Army, from the beginning until the end of the war, except for two short intervals, one after the great Battle of Donelson, and the other after the greater Battle of Shiloh, both of which he won, and gave the first great light and hope to our country; and it is hard now, after reading all the records, to understand the reasons for his being relieved. It appears to have been done through a misunderstanding, and with no intention of doing injustice to General Grant.

Following General Grant as commander came General Sherman, a member of the Army almost as long as General Grant. General Sherman was in direct command, or the Army served under him as a unit of his greater Army, from the time he assumed command until the end of the war.