Chapter V: Part 5

Cole had not advanced very far towards Port Connor when, on September 6th, Colonel Walker and his command joined him. Then he had plenty of men to meet all the Indians in the country, if his force was properly handled. When this fighting commenced he was not over thirty miles from where Connor fought his battle, and Captain Palmer states that they heard a cannon, but could not tell which direction the noise came from. Connor, hearing nothing from Cole, sent out Major North with a couple of Indian scouts and with Bridger as guide. They got over into the Powder River country and discovered Cole's trail. During Cole's retreat up the Powder there came a fearful snow-storm. The animals having marched so far without grain, were already very much exhausted, and the storm lasting three days, they became so weak that they were not fit to use, and they were therefore shot, just as they stood at the picket-line, to prevent them from falling into the Indians' hands. This destruction of the animals and the burning of all their equipment was about the first thing that Major North struck, and of course he experienced a great anxiety, fearing that Cole had met with great disaster, and immediately reported to General Connor, who at once sent Sergeant C. L. Thomas with two Pawnees with dispatches to Colonel Cole to march on up Powder River to Fort Connor, where he would find supplies. Cole's troops seem to have started out not fully prepared for such a trip, especially in the line of shoes and leggings, although they were carefully instructed by me to be sure to take a surplus, as I knew the country. Cole's excuse is that while he made ample requisition, the Quartermaster never shipped them, and so when he reached Omaha he had to buy such as he could find. Colonel Cole's troops seem to have kept up their organization and their fighting qualities, for whenever they met the Indians they always whipped them; but they were on the retreat, which gave every advantage to the Indians. When Cole's troops reached Port Connor they were in a deplorable condition--ragged, barefooted, and almost without rations and ammunition.

The Indians surrounding Fort Connor at this time had become so numerous that the commanding officer thought it prudent to intrench the post, which shows good judgment; but Colonel Cole complains in his report that the troops were made to help do this intrenching. Speaking of this he says:

While camped here (Fort Connor) an occurrence took place, strange but
most true, which as an integral part of the closing history of the
command must have full relation. Some thirty-six hours after reaching
this post, a fatigued detail of 400 men was ordered from the Second
Missouri Light Artillery to work on the earthworks being thrown up
around the place. If the spirit that prompted the detail expected to
force its principles through insubordination or rebellion, it was
disappointed. What a sight was here! Four hundred ragged, bare-footed
men, emaciated with fatigue, who had met and worsted the enemy on
three several occasions, marched up in the face of a garrison of 2,000
or more.

I don't know where he got the 2,000 troops, as all the troops when he reached Fort Connor were two companies of Michigan cavalry, General Connor then not having reached that post; and when he did, all told there were not 2,000 troops there. Cole's loss was very light,--nine killed,--while he claims to have killed from 200 to 500 of the Indians.

It was very evident to me that there was no very severe fighting here; it was simply a skirmish on a retreat.

Lieutenant-Colonel Walker's column, which started from Fort Laramie on August 2d, moved up the west base of the Black Hills, and struck Cole's column on August 20th on what was known as Piney Creek. After striking Cole's trail he followed it a short distance, and then left it and struck Powder River, much farther south than Cole had, and on reaching the river he fell right into the same band of Indians that were gathered along the Powder River to harass Cole. He, too, was short of provisions, although he was equipped to travel very rapidly, having all his supplies on pack-mules. As soon as he got in touch with Cole he joined him and followed him to Fort Connor. General Connor's idea was to make up a rapid-moving column of about 1,000 men, using the pack-mules of Walker, and then combine his and Cole's troops to move on a line farther to the west and follow these Indians to the British Possessions if necessary. He had the ammunition, equipment and everything at Fort Connor to fit out these columns with. As near as they could estimate there were about 6,000 Indians all told.

Prominent land-mark near where Colonels Cole and Walker fought the Indians in September, 1865, on Powder River.]

The wagon-road train that started from Sioux City under Colonel Sawyer's engineering party, with two companies of the Fifth United States Volunteer Infantry under the command of Captain George N. Williford, that were to open a wagon-road from Sioux City up the Niobrara River by a short route to the north end of the Black Hills, intended to cross to Powder River and then to the south end of the Big Horn Mountains, making a direct emigrant route into Montana. As soon as I heard of the instructions given this expedition I got word to Colonel Sawyer that it was impossible for him to travel on that route; that he must keep to the south end of the Black Hills and follow up the North Platte until he struck what was known as the Bozeman trail, that was laid out in 1864 by some emigrants going into Montana. This was the trail that Connor had taken on his route to Tongue River. It was feasible all the way from the Platte to Montana. Colonel Sawyer paid no attention to this information, but kept on his original route until he got into the brakes of the Powder River, not very far from where Cole struck them. When within twenty miles of the River, he ascertained by his own guide that it was impossible to advance any farther in that direction; consequently, he had to retrace his steps. On the second day they were attacked by a large band of Indians; evidently the Cheyennes and Sioux that afterwards attacked Colonels Cole and Walker. These Indians kept them corralled nearly four days and nights, fighting through the day and withdrawing at night, only to begin their hostilities at dawn; but finding that their efforts only resulted in many being killed, they abandoned the siege and left, going south, striking Cole's trail on August 22d, which they followed, and on the 23d Colonel Sawyer marched into Port Connor. While Captain Williford does not say that he took charge of this train, that is a fact. He took charge of it and kept it until he got to Fort Connor. He was a splendid officer and it was through his good judgment and his ability as a soldier that he saved the whole outfit. The Bent Boys, who were at the head of the Cheyennes, would communicate with Sawyer and get him to send out persons for the purpose of trading with them, and whoever was sent inside their lines was held prisoner, the idea being to wear Sawyer's force out by this means. But they struck the wrong man in Captain Williford, who, comprehending the situation, attacked the Indians. I knew Williford in the Civil War, and he was a very efficient officer. At Fort Connor I relieved Williford, his men being mostly barefooted, and put Colonel Kidd of the Michigan Cavalry, in command, with a suitable escort, and instructed him to follow the Connor trail until they struck Tongue River, and then to swing towards the Yellowstone and strike the trail up that river to Bozeman. This train, when they got nearly opposite to where General Connor fought, was again attacked by the Indians; but Colonel Kidd managed to get news to General Connor and he sent two or three companies of his command to the rescue. They were absent while he fought his battle on Tongue River. They drove off the Indians, and relieved the train, which reached Montana in safety.

Early in September I reached Fort Connor--before General Cole and Colonel Walker had concentrated there--and gave instructions under the direction of the authorities at Washington, forwarded to me by General Pope, to withdraw all the troops to Fort Laramie, and stop all their operations against the Indians, and endeavor to bring them in for a consultation, and, if possible, to make an agreement as to the cessation of all hostilities. This was a fatal mistake. When I received this dispatch from General Pope, on August 31st, I sent the following message to him:

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES.

FORT LARAMIE, DAKOTA TERRITORY, August 31, 1865.

_Major-General John Pope, St. Louis, Mo._:

I consider the Indian matters here of so much importance, and knowing
no one can judge of them so well as when he is on the ground, that I
desire to make a proposition to the Government. If the Government will
allow me to keep General Connor in the field with not to exceed 2,000
men of his present force, leaving the forces you have designated to
garrison posts on the plains. I will settle these Indian difficulties
before spring satisfactorily to the Government, and bring about a
peace that will be lasting. I may do it in a month or two; or it may
be longer. The additional expense to the Government will be the pay of
that number of troops for the time detained. All the stores, forage,
etc., to support them are here and _en route_. As soon as we settle
with them we can send these troops in and take 2,000 more from our
posts in addition and muster them out. General Connor left Powder
River with sixty days' supplies, and I am satisfied if we will allow
him he will settle the matter before he returns. Should he come back
by our orders without settling the matter, the entire Indian tribes
will be down on our lines, and we will have our hands full, and more
too. The forces for Utah I will soon have on the road, and when Connor
gets back he can go right there.

G. M. DODGE,

_Major-General_.

General Connor, after getting news of the position of Cole's and Walker's forces, moved back with his forces to Fort Connor, with a view of taking command of Cole's and Walker's forces and organizing them into two columns--one a light column with pack-mules, and the other with the trains,--and then to follow and attack the Indians that had been fighting Cole and Walker. When he arrived at Fort Connor he found my dispatches, which, of course, changed his whole policy. He knew then where all the Indians were located. They had all been forced away from the traveled lines to protect their villages, and it was only a question of time--weeks or months--before we would have conquered a peace that the Indians would have recognized.

The dispatches which I sent from Fort Laramie brought an answer from General Grant to the effect that the authorities at Washington were determined to stop all campaigns against the Indians. They had been made to believe by the Interior Department that all they had to do was to withdraw the troops and the Indians would come in and make peace. On my return from Fort Connor, when I reached the North Platte I sent this dispatch:

HORSESHOE, September 15, 1865.

_Major-General John Pope, St. Louis_:

Arrived here today on my return from Powder River. That post is well
located, right in heart of Indian country, and is an important post.
The Indians' trails all cross at or near it, and it will have good
effect hereafter in holding in check Indians. Have not heard from
General Connor since August 24. We cannot reach him now. They have
done a good deal of work on Powder River; got up stockade and
commenced Quartermaster buildings; well under way. Great lack of
Quartermaster's stores up there, the Powder River stores not having
reached Laramie yet. From Laramie to Powder River, then to Virginia
City, is an excellent wagon-road; good grass, water, and wood all the
way, and the most direct road that can be got. The travel over it in
another season will be immense; it saves at least 450 miles in
distance. After the Indians attacked Colonel Sawyer's wagon-road party
and failed in their attempt, they held a parley. Colonel Bent's sons,
George and Charles Bent, appeared on part of Indians, and Colonel
Sawyer gave them a wagon-load of goods to let him go undisturbed,
Captain Williford, commanding escort, not agreeing to it. The Indians
accepted proposition and agreed to it, but after receiving the goods
they attacked party; killed three men. Bent said that there was one
condition on which the Cheyennes would treat; viz., the hanging by
Government of Colonel Chivington. He also said that the Indians
considered that they were strong enough to fight the Government;
preferred to do it; that they knew the Government would withdraw
troops in fall; then they would have it all their own way again.
Expressed great fear about Connor, and said they were concentrating
everything to meet him, which is true. Since he left no Indians have
troubled the mail- or telegraph-lines, but are all moving north,
stragglers and all. At Fort Connor they kill a few of them as they
pass every few days. There is one band of Arapahoes in Medicine Bow
Mountains, who are committing depredations around Denver, on Cache La
Poudre and Big Thompson Creeks. They belong to the band that was at
Cow Creek treaty. I shall be in Laramie tomorrow; see General Wheaton;
thence to Denver. Bent also said that some of tribes had agreed to
make peace on Missouri River, but they were doing this to keep us
from sending a force that way. These Bent boys were educated in St.
Louis. One has been with Price in the rebel Army; was captured. His
father got him released and took him to his ranch on the Arkansas
River, when he joined the Cheyennes, of which he is a half-breed. He
was dressed in one of our staff officer's uniforms.

G. M. DODGE,

_Major-General_.

On General Connor's arrival at Fort Connor he wired me the results of the campaign and protested strenuously against the order stopping it, saying he was then in condition and position to close it, conquer the Indians, and force a lasting peace. On receipt of his report I sent this dispatch:

CENTRAL CITY, COLO., September 27, 1865.

_Major-General John Pope, St. Louis, Mo._:

On August 28th, General Connor surprised Medicine Man's band of
Indians on Tongue River; killed fifty; captured village, all winter
provisions, and 600 horses--all the stock they had. On the 1st of
September the right column, under Colonel Cole, had a fight with the
Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes, on Powder River, and whipped them. On
the evening of the 3d of September attacked them again, driving them
down Powder River ten miles. Next morning at daylight attacked again,
fight lasting until 10 a. m., when Indians were defeated with loss of
200 killed. They fled in every direction, losing large number of
horses, camp equipage, provisions, etc. On 8th instant, Colonel
Walker, commanding center column, who was in advance of Colonel Cole,
met Indians in large force. Colonel Cole came up and after a short but
spirited engagement they totally routed Indians, driving them in every
direction with great loss, several of principal chiefs being killed in
this fight. On the night of the 9th of September a severe snow-storm
raged, in which 400 of Colonel Cole's horses perished. I was in that
storm on Powder River. It was very severe, and I lost several animals.
Our total loss in all the engagements not more than fifty killed and
wounded, including one officer. Colonel Cole or Colonel Walker had not
communicated with General Connor and were on Powder River, but by this
time they have communicated, as they had ascertained where General
Connor's column was.

G. M. DODGE,

_Major-General_.

General Connor, in compliance with his orders, moved south from Fort Connor to distribute at the different posts where they had been assigned, the forces not ordered to be mustered out. As soon as he started south to Fort Laramie the Indians followed him and swarmed immediately on the overland routes, both the North and South Platte, reaching even as far as the Arkansas, and committed great depredations. The troops along those lines had been mustered out, and the regular-army force that was to take their places had not arrived. It was a harvest for the Indians. In my absence General Pope had assigned to the different districts regular-army officers for permanent command. They were to take the places of the volunteers. Under my instructions I immediately sent word to the Indians to come to Fort Laramie for the purpose of a consultation. To accomplish this I sent out the best-posted guides (using chiefs, sub-chiefs, half-breeds of friendly Indians) that I knew on the plains, to each of the hostile tribes asking them to come into Fort Laramie. I instructed the messengers to tell them that if any of their people had gone to the Missouri River for peaceable purposes to let them go, but to bring in all that were left, providing they felt disposed to settle without delay. I sent them word that if they did not come in and settle they would find that our summer campaign was only a taste of what they would get this winter, for we would give them no rest. I posted the district commanders thoroughly, telling them what we wanted was to settle with the Indians before they discovered the smallness of our forces on the plains. I told them they might say, also, that all of the Indians south of the Arkansas had made peace, and gave instructions that they be told about the battle with the Arapahoes and Cheyennes on Powder and Tongue Rivers. I sent the district commanders word to show Big Ribs, one of my messengers, the forces at their posts, and to impress upon him our power. The effect of this appeal to the different tribes was that early in the spring of 1866 we got together at Fort Laramie the principal chiefs and the head men of the North Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and the different tribes of the Sioux, when a council was held.

I had instructed General Frank Wheaton, who commanded at Fort Laramie, that we would agree to almost anything to bring a permanent peace except to allow the Indians to come down to the North Platte and occupy the country through which the new military road was laid out to Bozeman, Mont. Our troops, in passing up the east base of the Black Hills, had discovered gold. There were Colorado and California Regiments in the commands, and I knew, and so did General Connor, that many were preparing, as soon as a treaty was made, to go back into that country and prospect it, and I gave that reason to the Indians for holding them north of the Belle Fourche Fork of the Cheyenne River; but that country was their best hunting-ground. They were perfectly willing to give up all the country south of the Platte River, and not to interfere with the building of the Union Pacific road or with any of the overland routes up the North or South Platte; but they would not consent to give up the Black Hills north of the North Platte. Finally we made an agreement with them that they should occupy the country north of the North Platte River until such time as the Government should see proper to send a commission out to negotiate a permanent peace with them. I gave instructions to tell them that if the white men went into their territory and we did not keep them out, they were at liberty to do so. I knew that would deter any white man going in there, and as long as they kept the peace, we would. Red Cloud, who had then come to the head of the Ogalalla band of the Sioux Indians, took a prominent part in this conference, and was backed by such chiefs as Spotted Tail, Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses, Big Ribs, and the Bent boys on behalf of the Cheyennes. He declared that they would never give up their country north of the Platte. "You may take my country," said Red Cloud, "but I will mark every mile of that Bozeman trail from the North Platte to Yellowstone with the bodies of your soldiers;" and this he pretty nearly accomplished. This agreement, made at Fort Laramie, accomplished nothing. During the years 1866, 1867 and 1868 the Indians swarmed across the lines agreed upon and occupied the country, especially along the Union Pacific, which was then being constructed through that country. The Government had to send in additional troops, and all the military posts over the country had to be re-occupied the same as they had been before. The Government endeavored to again reach these Indians through a peace commission in 1868. General W. T. Sherman was at the head of it, and it was composed of General Harney and others. They visited me at Fort Sanders, Wyo., before they went to make a treaty with the Indians, and wished to know my reasons for the position I took in the consultation of 1866. I then told General Sherman that my soldiers had found gold in all the streams heading in the Black Hills north of the North Platte, and that as soon as he allowed those Indians to come to the North Platte under a treaty of peace, he would not be across the Missouri River on his return before that country would be covered by prospectors from California and Colorado. General Sherman answered that their instructions were to make such a peace and they were sent there to do it, and, sure enough, they did; and as soon as the treaty was made the miners poured into the country. One of the first mines that was discovered was the Homestake or Homestead. Sitting Bull, who had taken part in this treaty and whose country was the Black Hills, sent in protest after protest, demanding that the Government live up to the terms of the treaty and drive the miners out, but no attention was paid to them. The miners and settlers poured into the Black Hills country and drove the Indians out, and Sitting Bull said in a conference he had with some of the Army officers in the 70's that if the Government did not protect their territory as provided in the treaty, they would themselves; and they started to do it. The massacres of that year came from his band, the troubles finally ending with the sacrifice of the Custer Regiment in 1876. While this was a horrible event, the Indians, under the treaty, were fully justified in it. During this same time Red Cloud occupied the Bozeman trail. He killed emigrants, besides murdering Captain Fetterman and his company at Fort Phil Kearney, and other troops located at the posts that we established along there in 1866, such as Forts Reno, McKinney, Phil Kearney, and C. F. Smith. It was not until after the Custer massacre that these Indians were brought to time and put on reservations; since then peace has prevailed.

The Government had the same difficulty on the Arkansas River route that we had on the Platte routes in the summer of 1866, 1867, and 1868. The Indians that had made the agreement with Colonel Leavenworth were all committing depredations until finally the Government sent General Sheridan there with instructions to punish them. They tried to play the same game with Sheridan that they had played with us, but he would have none of it. There was no one in Washington who would force him to listen to the appeals of the peace commission. His troops, under Colonels Custer, Evans, and others, fought three battles south of the Arkansas, noticeably wiping out some bands, and making them give up their prisoners, stop their murders, and go on reservations in the Indians' territory. From that time on they have been peaceable.

We were much better prepared, in the fall of 1865, both on the Arkansas and on the Yellowstone, to conquer these Indians. We had got up to their villages and had plenty of troops, plenty of provisions, and plenty of clothing, and could carry on the campaign through the winter, if necessary; and so, if we had allowed General Ford or General Sanborn to have gone forward with the columns and punish those southern Indians, they would have made a permanent peace. But the fact is the Indians did not give up until they were thoroughly thrashed and made to recognize the power and authority of the Government.

The policy of the United States in dealing with the Indian problem is beyond the comprehension of any sensible man. They were treated the same as foreign nations; and while they made treaties they never carried out their part of them, breaking them whenever the trend of civilization westward interfered with them in any way. The Government attempted to deal with and govern the Indians with civil agents and at the same time tried to enforce peace through the military authorities. This caused friction; and deception and cheating in the supplying of them through their contractors and civil agents brought untold complaints. If the Government had treated the Indians as a ward that they were bound to protect, as the English did, they would have had very little trouble in handling them. The military force would have held all conferences with them; fed them when they needed it; located them in an early day on unoccupied good hunting-grounds; and finally, as civilization moved into their territories and as their tribes wasted away, would have given them reservations where the Government from the money they received from the lands the Indians claimed, could have kept and fed them without any great burden or cost. In all the days of Indian warfare and treaties, there never was such a farce, or failure to comprehend the frontier situation, as in the years 1865 and 1866, and the failure of the Government to take advantage of the comprehensive plans instituted by the military authorities, as well as of the great expenditures made, and to punish the Indians as they deserved, brought, in after years, greater expenditures and more disturbances than ever.

Early in the campaign, after General Pope had made known his views to the Government, he requested me to write fully mine to the Secretary of the Interior, who had charge of Indian affairs, and who was from my state, and I sent him this letter:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI.

ST. LOUIS, MO., June 22, 1865.

_Hon. James Harlan, Secretary of the Interior, Washington, D. C._:

MY DEAR SIR: Copies of Senator Doolittle's and Commissioner Dole's
letters to you of dates May 31 and June 12 have been furnished me. My
acquaintance with you leads me to believe that you are endeavoring to
get at the real facts of our Indian difficulties and the best methods
for putting an end to them. So far as Senator Doolittle's letter
refers to "some general getting up of an Indian war on his own hook"
and for his own purposes, I shall indulge no reply. You know me, and
if it was intended in any way to apply to me I leave you to judge of
how much credence should be attached to it. My sincere desire is to
terminate these Indian troubles, and I have no hesitation in saying
that if I am allowed to carry out the policy now being pursued toward
them I will have peace with them before another emigration crosses the
plains. When I assumed command of the former Department of Kansas I
found all the important Indian tribes on the plains in open hostility
against us. Whether it was the fault of the white man or the Indian,
the fact was patent. They were holding the entire overland route from
Julesburg to Junction Station, had destroyed the telegraph-lines,
captured trains, burned ranches, and murdered men, women, and children
indiscriminately. I soon stopped these proceedings, opened our broken
lines of communication; repaired, so far as possible, the injury done;
pushed troops out there, and then tried to effect a settlement with
the Indians. On the southern route I found a similar state of affairs
existing. The Indians were on the warpath, and I at once started
expeditions against them, learning of which Colonel Leavenworth,
Indian Agent, informed me that he could make peace with them; that we
were at fault, etc. I stopped my expeditions on the southern route to
give him an opportunity to accomplish this object. He started for
their camps; they robbed him, stole his mules, and he hardly escaped
with his scalp; and on his return stated that it was useless to
attempt to make peace with them. I then, in accordance with the orders
of the Secretary of War, started for the Indians again, and had just
got my forces under way when the committee, of which Senator Doolittle
is a member, reached Fort Larned, and after an interview with Colonel
Leavenworth, gave orders for the expeditionary movements to stop. The
grounds for this action the Senator gives in his letter. I was then
aware that the Indians were moving north to attack that line, and was
moving two columns in concert with General Ford to intercept and
punish them; and I at that time telegraphed that the tribes spoken of
by Senator Doolittle were on their way north to attack our trains.
They had then driven out all traders, made a treaty with the southern
Indians and Texans, and sent me word that they wanted no peace.

Within ten days from the time Senator Doolittle and his party left
Fort Larned, and before I had time to countermand their orders and get
my troops disposed, the Indians attacked the posts and trains all
along the line, running off stock, capturing trains, etc., murdering
men, and showing conclusively that they were determined on war at all
hazards. Our overtures to them, as well as those of the agents sent
out by General Carleton, were treated with disdain. From Fort Laramie
I sent word to the Sioux, Cheyennes, etc., that if they wanted peace
to come in and stop their hostilities. A few of each tribe responded
by coming in; the rest refused, and indicated their purposes and
feelings by attacking the posts west of Fort Laramie, and on Laramie
Plains, murdering, stealing, etc. I undertook to remove the friendly
Indians from Fort Laramie to Fort Kearney, in order to get them away
from the troubles. When about sixty miles south of Fort Laramie they
attacked their guard, killed a captain and four privates, turned upon
five of their chiefs who were disposed to be friendly, killed them,
and then escaped, leaving their camps, etc., in our hands; so that now
we have every Indian tribe capable of mischief from the British
Possessions on the north to the Red River on the south, at war with
us, while the whites are backing them up. These facts, it appears to
me, are a sufficient answer to the letters of Senator Doolittle and
Commissioner Dole. That these Indians have been greatly wronged I have
no doubt, and I am certain that the agents who have been connected
with them are as much to blame as any one else. So far as the
Chivington fight was concerned, it occurred before I assumed command.
I condemned it, and I have issued orders that no such acts will be
tolerated or allowed; that the Indians on the warpath must be fought
wherever and whenever found, but no outrages or barbarities must be
committed. I am convinced that the only way to effectually settle
these troubles is for us to move our columns directly into their
country, punish them when we find them, show them our power, and at
the same time give them to know that: we are ready to make peace with
them--not, however, by paying them for murdering our people and
plundering our trains and posts, but by informing them that if they
will refrain from further hostilities they shall not be molested; that
neither agents nor citizens shall be allowed to go among them to
swindle them; that we will protect them in their rights; that we will
enforce compliance with our part of the treaty, and will require them
to do the same on their part. Let them ask for peace. We should keep
citizens out of their country. The class of men sent among them as
agents go there for no good purpose. They take positions for the sole
purpose of making money out of the Indians by swindling them, and so
long as they can do this they shield them in their crimes.

Colonel Leavenworth, who stands up so boldly for the southern Indians,
was dismissed from the United States service. He "blows hot and cold"
with singular grace. To my officers he talks war to the knife; to
Senator Doolittle and others he talks peace. Indeed, he is all things
to all men. When officers of the army deal with these Indians, if they
mistreat them, we have a certain remedy for their cases. They can be
dismissed and disgraced, while Indian agents can only be displaced by
others perhaps no better. Now I am confident we can settle these
Indian difficulties in the manner I have indicated. The Indians say to
me that they will treat with an officer of the army (a brave), in all
of whom they seem to have confidence, while they despise and suspect
civilian agents and citizens, by whom they say they have been deceived
and swindled so much that they put no trust in their words. I have
given orders to the commanders of each of my columns that when they
have met and whipped these Indians, or even before, if they have an
opportunity, to arrange, if possible, an informal treaty with them for
a cessation of hostilities, and whatever they agree to do, to live to
strictly, allowing no one, either citizen or soldier, to break it. I
shall myself go out on the plains in a few weeks and try to get an
interview with the chiefs and if possible effect an amicable
settlement of affairs; but I am utterly opposed to making any treaty
that pays them for the outrages they have committed, or that hires
them to keep the peace. Such treaties last just as long as they think
them for their benefit, and no longer. As soon as the sugar, coffee,
powder, lead, etc., that we give them, is gone, they make war to get
us to give them more. We must first punish them until we make them
fear us and respect our power, and then we must ourselves live
strictly up to the treaties made. No one desires more than I do to
effect a permanent peace with these Indians, and such is the desire of
every officer under me, all of whom agree in the method suggested for
bringing it about.

Very many of these officers on the plains have been there for years,
and are well acquainted with these Indians and their character, and my
own opinions in this matter are founded not alone from my experience
and observations since I have commanded here, but also with
intercourse with them on the plains during a number of years prior to
the war, in which time I met and had dealings with nearly every tribe
east of the Rocky Mountains. Until hostilities cease I trust that you
will keep all agents, citizens and traders away from them. When peace
is made with them, if civilian agents and citizens are sent among
them, send those who you know to be of undoubted integrity. I know you
desire to do so, and from the appointments you have already made I
believe you will be successful. My plan, however, would be to keep
these Indians under the care of officers of the army, stationed in
their country; that what is given them be given by these officers, and
that all citizens, agents and traders should, while among them, be
subject to their (the officers') supervision and police regulations.
In this way I have no doubt these Indians can be kept in their own
country, their outrages stopped, and our overland routes kept safe.
Now, not a train or coach of any kind can cross the plains in safety
without being guarded, and I have over 3,000 miles of route to protect
and guard. The statement that the Sand Creek affair was the first
Indian aggression is a mistake. For months prior to that affair the
Indians had been attacking our trains, posts, and ranches; had robbed
the emigrants and murdered any party they considered too weak to
defend themselves.

The theory that we cannot punish these Indians effectually, and that
we must make or accept any kind of a peace in order to hold our
overland routes, is not sustained by the facts, is singularly
erroneous, and I cannot agree to it by any means. I have now seven
different columns of troops penetrating their country in all
directions, while at the same time I am holding the overland routes.
This display of force alone will alarm and terrify them; will show
them that we are in earnest, have the power, and intend at all hazards
to make them behave themselves. After we have taught them this they
will sue for peace; then if the government sees fit to indemnify them
for any wrongs inflicted upon them, they will not charge it to our
fears or inability to cope with them. The cost of carrying on this war
with them is, to be sure, considerable; but the question arises, Had
we not better bear this cost now while the preparations are made and
the force on hand ready to be thrown in such strength into their
country as to make quick, effective, and final work of it, than to
suffer a continuance of their outrages for a long time and finally
have to do the work at greater expense of blood and treasure? I have
written you this frankly and truly, knowing that you want to get at
the facts and do that which is for the best, and I am convinced that
when you fully understand these matters you will agree with me. I
shall be glad at any and all times to furnish you any information in
my possession that you may desire, and I assure you I shall bend all
my energies to the accomplishment of the great object in view and so
much desired--a lasting and just peace with these Indians.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

G. M. DODGE,

_Major-General Commanding_.

Since writing this report of the Indian campaign of 1865 and 1866, I have seen Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells's diary of the reconstruction period, from which the following extracts are taken:

Tuesday, August 8, 1865.

Stanton submitted a number of not material questions, yet possessed of
some little interest. Before the meeting closed the subject of army
movements on the plains came up, and Stanton said there were three
columns of twenty-two thousand troops moving into the Indian country,
with a view to an Indian campaign. Inquiry as to the origin and
authority of such a movement elicited nothing from the War Secretary.
He said he knew nothing on the subject. He had been told there was
such a movement, and Meigs had informed him it was true. Grant had
been written to for information, but Grant was away and he knew not
when he should have a reply. The expenses of this movement could not,
he said, be less than $50,000,000. But he knew nothing about it.

Friday, August 11, 1865.

The question of the Indian war on the plains was again brought
forward. No one, it appears, has any knowledge on the question. The
Secretary of War is in absolute ignorance. Says he has telegraphed to
General Grant, and General Grant says he has not ordered it. McCulloch
wanted to know the probable expense--the numbers engaged, etc. Stanton
thought McCulloch had better state how many should be engaged--said
General Pope had command. Harlan said he considered Pope an improper
man--was extravagant and wasteful. Thought twenty-two hundred instead
of twenty-two thousand men was a better and sufficient number.

This whole thing is a discredit to the War Department.

Tuesday, August 15, 1865.

Stanton says there is to be a large reduction of the force which is
moving against the Indians. That by the 1st of October the force will
be about 6,000. That large supplies have gone on, but they can be
divided or deflected to New Mexico and other points, so that they will
not be lost.

Friday, August 18, 1865.

Senator Doolittle and Mr. Ford, who have been on a mission to the
plains, visiting New Mexico, Colorado, etc., had an interview with the
President and Cabinet of an hour and a half. Their statement in
relation to the Indians and Indian affairs exhibits the folly and
wickedness of the expedition which has been gotten up by somebody
without authority or the knowledge of the Government.

Their strong protestations against an Indian war, and their statement
of the means which they had taken to prevent it, came in very
opportunely. Stanton said General Grant had already written to
restrict operations; he had also sent to General Meigs. I have no
doubt a check has been put on a very extraordinary and unaccountable
proceeding, but I doubt if an active stop is yet put to war expenses.

It is no wonder that with such ignorance in the Cabinet as to the condition of the country, that the administration at Washington was so incompetent in the Civil War. No person can read Secretary Wells's diary of the daily doings at Washington of the Cabinet during President Lincoln's administration and see how little appreciation and support he got from his Cabinet. Dissensions among themselves and hardly ever agreeing on any important question, brings to view the great responsibility of the President and the fact that in all the important matters he was dependent upon his own judgment. The Cabinet knew nothing of the Indian depredations that for three months held all the lines of travel, mail, and telegraph crossing the plains to California, with every State and Territory west of the Missouri River appealing for protection, until President Lincoln wrote to General Grant to try and have something done to protect that country. General Grant instructed me to make the campaign in the winter of 1864-65, which was so successful that in forty days all the overland routes were opened, and the stage, telegraph, and mails replaced, as shown in my reports, though at the beginning of the campaign every tribe of Indians from the British Possessions to the Indian Territory was at war, with captures and murders of settlers along all the overland routes, in all the frontier States, every-day occurrences; with women and children captured and outrages committed that cannot be mentioned. And yet this Cabinet had no knowledge of the conditions, and concluded from the report of the Doolittle Peace Commission that the Indian expedition was a complete failure, notwithstanding that this commission failed to make ponce with a single tribe of Indians and failed to stop the depredations of any band of Indians; and, upon its report, declaring that the Indian expeditions were a folly and wickedness gotten up by some one without the authority or knowledge of the Government.

There never were 22,000 troops on the plains, nor one-half of that number. The War Department may have sent that number out, but, as I have shown, they were all mustered out before they reached their work; and the cost of the campaign with a year's supplies at the posts for all the troops on the plains or engaged in the campaign was not more than $10,000,000, a very small amount compared with the trouble and cost of fighting these Indians for ten years thereafter. Secretary Harlan says that 2,200 troops were sufficient. When I took command, in January, 1865, there were not to exceed 5,000 troops guarding trains, stages, and telegraph-lines, and protecting all the routes of travel across the plains, and they had utterly failed. All travel had been stopped and no expeditions against the Indians had been made. The Indians had held the overland routes for three months in spite of these troops. It shows how little knowledge Secretary Harlan had of the condition of Indian affairs in his department. From the statements of Secretary Wells it is evident where the order came from to stop all operations on the plains and withdraw all troops by October 15th. When Secretary Stanton states that by October 1st the troops on the plains would be reduced to 6,000, it shows how little knowledge he had of affairs in his department, for at that time there were not 6,000 troops on the plains or in my command.

It is well that no one knew the condition of affairs; that no one was aware of the ignorance of the group of statesmen at Washington who were supposed to be responsible for our nation and its preservation. They did not seem to know where to ascertain the facts. It would seem that Secretary Stanton purposely wished to place a reflection on General Grant, for he must have known that he was responsible for the Army and for all of its movements. It seems that General Grant was away at the time the dispatches of General Pope and myself were sent showing the necessity of continuing the campaign and punishing these savages. When he returned he tried to stop this Cabinet panic, but his dispatches in answer to those from Pope and myself show that he could not do it, and the fatal mistake was made of stopping the campaign just as it was accomplishing and successfully ending a year's work. It seems to have all come about through the misrepresentation of the Doolittle Peace Commission and the lack of proper information on the part of the Cabinet.

In the years 1863, 1864 and 1865 the Indians deliberately made war, believing that the Civil War had so crippled us that we could not effectively contend with them; but just as we had spent millions of dollars, sent thousands of troops into their country, and commenced fighting and capturing them, we were forced to lay down our arms almost in sight of the line of battle and beg for peace, and the Indians believed they had defeated us and that we could not conquer them, and for from three to ten years afterward we had to spend great sums, make winter campaigns, and suffer great losses of life and property, before we obtained the lasting peace which was in sight in 1865 and 1866 if we had been allowed to carry out our campaigns and plans to a legitimate end.

Upon the close of my campaigns on the plains the Legislature of the State of Iowa passed and sent me these commendations of my services:

_Resolved_, By the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of
Iowa, That the thanks of the people of this State are due and are
hereby extended to Major-General Grenville M. Dodge, for his able and
efficient management of Indian affairs on the plains, in protecting
the Great Overland Routes, and our western borders from the
depredations and incursions of hostile Indians, as also for his
distinguished services as a commander in the field, and his able
administration of the Department of the Missouri.

During this campaigning on the plains I had as my escort Company A, Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry. They belonged to one of the Regiments that was sent from the East to take part in the Indian campaigns, and did not ask to be mustered out until after the campaign. I was greatly indebted to this company for the close attention they gave to me and the intelligence they showed during the whole trip. They had served faithfully in the Civil War, and their veteran experience there was a great benefit in the work they had to do on the plains, often in taking messages and performing other duties where only two or three of them could be detailed at a time. It has always been a great pleasure to me to have had an invitation, ever since they organized their society, to attend their reunions, but, unfortunately, I have been so far away that I could not go; and to the surviving members I with great pleasure extend my thanks for their good services to me.

Model of fortified town on the table. Left to right--Lieutenant J. W. Barnes, A. D. C.; Captain O. J. Dodds, D. Q. M.; Captain C. C. Carpenter, Com. of Sub.; Captain J. K. King, A. Q. M.; Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Barnhill, D. P. M.; Major N. B. Howard, Judge Advocate; Lieutenant J. H. Hogan, Ordnance Officer; Major W. R. Marsh, Medical Director; Captain B. P. Chenoweth, A. A. I. G.; Captain Henry Horn, Chief of Grand Guards.]

CAMPAIGN UP THE TENNESSEE RIVER VALLEY

GENERAL DODGE
IN THE REAR OF GENERAL BRAGG'S ARMY
AND
COLONEL STREIGHT'S RAID
SPRING OF 1863

When General Grant planned the second campaign against Vicksburg he notified me, then in command of the District of Corinth, with about eight thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, that he intended to take my command with him; but a few days before starting he sent one of his staff officers to me stating that he had concluded to leave me with my command and some additional troops to hold that flank while he moved on Vicksburg. This dispatch was a great disappointment to myself and my command. When the officer returned to General Grant he no doubt told him of our disappointment, as General Grant wrote me a letter stating that my command was of much more importance than a command directly under him, and said he had fears that General Bragg, who was then facing General Rosecrans in Middle Tennessee, might detach a portion of his force, cross the Tennessee River, and endeavor to make a lodgment on the Mississippi River at some point and break up his communications with the North, with a view of forcing him to abandon the campaign. He said he had left me to take care of that flank, as he knew I would stay there. I read between the lines and learned what was expected of me.

General Grant, in discussing this order of his afterwards, said that he had learned from my services under him that I was peculiarly fitted for such a command, where I had to rely on my own judgment, and that I acted promptly without waiting for orders, and that it came, he thought, from my experience before the war, when I was always in charge of engineering parties in the field and often in a hostile Indian country where I had to act promptly in any emergency. There was, at that time, quite a large force in my front and between me and General Bragg, commanded by General Earl Van Dorn, General N. B. Forrest, and General P. D. Roddey. This force was collecting supplies and storing them along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Bear River to Decatur, Ala. The Tennessee Valley in this territory was twenty miles wide, and full of all kinds of supplies. I wrote to General Grant about this storage of supplies for General Bragg's Army, and suggested that I move up the Tennessee Valley with my force to destroy these stores and whatever there was in the valley that Bragg's Army could utilize; but General Grant made no response then to my suggestion. In February I discovered a movement of the force in my front towards General Rosecrans's Army and notified him in the following dispatch:

CORINTH, MISS., February 10, 1863.

_Major-General Rosecrans_:

One of my scouts left Van Dorn Sunday night. He then had two regiments
and one battery across the Tombigbee, at Cotton-Gin Port; was crossing
slowly, and all his forces had not got to him. His men and officers
said he was going to Bragg. His stock is not in good condition. He
appears to be going the Pikevill and Russellville road. Streams are
high, and roads bad. We captured mail from Bragg's Army yesterday. All
the officers' and privates' letters express a belief that Bragg is
fixing to fall back; some say to Huntsville, some to Bridgeport. You
can judge how reliable such suspicions are. I have endeavored to get a
gunboat up to Florence, and if one could go there it could destroy all
the forces, and check Van Dorn materially. I will co-operate with it
in any way to benefit the service.

G. M. DODGE,

_Brigadier-General_.