Chapter XII: Part 12

At last, on April 25, the elections were held. There were two parties, that of the C.N.I., swollen with arditi and fascisti, who would have nothing to do with the Treaty of Rapallo--their programme consisted in annexation to Italy--and the other party, whose object was to carry out the provisions of the Treaty. Professor Zanella was its chief. There did not seem to be much hope that it would be successful, although it contained what was left of the Autonomists, who in 1919 were the largest party--desiring that the town should be neither Yugoslav nor Italian--and these Autonomists were now reinforced by the Yugoslavs. But so numerous had been the expulsions that many of the survivors feared that it would be futile to vote, and on the other hand the Annexionist party was quite confident that it would win. During the afternoon of the election day, however, they perceived that the impossible was happening, and that Zanella was marching to victory. Thereupon the enraged fascisti had recourse to violence. "Zanella's victory was intolerable to these patriots," said _La Nazione_,[65] "because they remembered the two years of tenacity and of splendid Italian spirit and of suffering which the town had lived through." Most of the electors remembered the suffering. The fascisti seized a number of urns and made a bonfire of them; there was presented the spectacle of Signor Gigante, d'Annunzio's obedient mayor, bursting with armed companions into that room of the Palace of Justice where the votes were being scrutinized. "I yield to violence," said the presiding official; and twenty minutes afterwards the contents of the urns were burning merrily. But these measures did not help the cause of the fascisti, no more than did their screams that they had been betrayed. And if Zanella had to fly from Rieka because, as the Nationalist paper put it, he could not stand up against the vehement indignation of so many of the citizens, yet he and his party have triumphed. "Fiume or Death," used to be the device dear to d'Annunzio. He placarded the long-suffering walls with it, and it was on the lapels of the coats of his adherents. "Fiume must belong to Italy or be blown up," cried the poet. But, strange to say, a majority of the inhabitants prefer that their town should continue to exist, and this it can only do if, in accordance with the Treaty of Rapallo, it becomes a neutral State on friendly terms with both its neighbours, Italy and Yugoslavia. The Italian Government desires, of course, to execute its Treaty obligations,[66] and if it finds too painful the task of moderating the ardours of its own super-patriots, it will no doubt be glad to have this done by an International force. That method, which was only prevented by d'Annunzio's arrival in 1919, offers the speediest and most efficacious solution of Rieka's troubles.

THE STRICKEN TOWN

If anyone imagined that they would be ended with the installation of Zanella he was wrong. At the municipal elections 90 per cent. voted for the Autonomist party, the Yugoslavs having had the good sense to join them. But the Italian Nationalists were not going to yield to moderation, and immediately after the elections Zanella was obliged to flee for his life, so that he was not installed in office until October 5. He struggled manfully to clear away the chaos and to make such economic arrangements as would eventually convert Rieka into a prosperous port. This the fascisti of Triest and Venice could by no means tolerate, and on January 31 an unsuccessful attempt was made by them on his life as he was leaving the Constituent Assembly. On February 16 the Anai (Assoziazione Nazionale fra gli Arditi d'Italia) sent out a very urgent message from their headquarters in the Via Macchiavelli in Triest. They informed the subsections that not only was Zanella preparing to deliver Rieka to the Croats, but that the army of the "globe-trotter" Wrangel was waiting in Su[vs]ak to seize the wretched town. Therefore Gabriele d'Annunzio had commanded that every loyal servant of the cause was to be mobilized. And after a few rhetorical sentences it continued, "I will give the marching orders by telegram as follows: 'Send the documents. Farina.' If only a small number of people are needed I will telegraph, 'Send ... Quintal. Farina.'" The men were to assemble at the Italian Labour Bureau, 9 Via Pozza Bianca in Triest. They were to be clad in mufti, to be armed so far as it was possible and to have with them three days' provender.... The subsections are asked to telegraph the approximate number of those on whom they can rely. And this memorandum should be acknowledged. It is signed, "With brotherly greetings. Farina Salvatore." About ten days later--between February 26 and 28--there was a meeting at the Hotel Imperial in Vienna, under the presidency of Vilim Stipeti['c], formerly a major of the Austrian General Staff. Some dissident Croats--among them Dr. Emanuel Gagliardi, Captains Cankl and Petri[vc]evi['c], Gjuro Kli[vs]uri['c], Josip Boldin and Major-General I[vs]tvanovi['c]--two dissident Montenegrins, Jovo Plamenac and Marko Petrovi['c], together with two Italian officers, adherents of d'Annunzio, Colonel Finzi of Triest and Major Ventura of Rome, ... assembled for the purpose of stirring up trouble for the Yugoslavs in the spring. They referred with pleasure to the presence of sundry Bulgarian komitadjis in Albania, Finzi declared that the Italian Government would satisfy the Croats and give them Rieka as soon as Croatia had achieved her independence and a less visionary promise was made of disturbances in Rieka. On March 1 the two Italian officers left for Triest and on March 3 Rieka was confronted with another _coup d'etat_. The fascisti of Triest and of Gulia Venetia descended on the town in two special trains of the Italian State Railway. They had not the slightest confidence in Zanella, who was an honest man, working on the basis of the Treaty of Rapallo, whereby Italy and Yugoslavia recognized the Free State of Rieka. In their eyes it was a monstrous thing that Italy should be expected to observe this instrument. So let the town be freed, let Zanella be expelled. And as he only had at his disposal a force of about three hundred local gendarmes, with rifles but without munition, it was not particularly difficult for the fascisti heroes to accomplish their task. Zanella had to fly once more.

"If Italy were to offend against the freedom and independence of the State of Rieka she would deprive herself," said Signor Schanzer, the Italian Foreign Secretary "she would deprive herself of the name of a Great Power and in the Society of Nations she would retain no authority." Thus did the successor of the relentless but unavailing della Torretta try, with eloquent and noble words, to wipe the blot from Italy's scutcheon. She could scarcely have the nations coming to the Congress of Genoa, there to debate with regard to the economic re-establishment of Europe, while her own conduct was so very much under suspicion. It would have been rather curious, so the _Zagreber Tagblatt_[67] pointed out, for a robber to invite you to his house with a view to taking steps against robbery. Something drastic had to be done, so that Europe would not look askance at the Italian Government. Zanella, it was true, had been thrown out--but why should not the world be told that this had been effected by the people of the town? A very excellent idea! And so a certain Lieut. Cabruna of the _gendarmerie_ made a plan to get together the Constituent Assembly and then--well, there are always methods by which resolutions can be passed. Perhaps it would not even be necessary for a single rifle to be fired at the deputies from the Distinguished Strangers' Gallery. But most of the deputies succeeded in escaping from the town, although frantic efforts were made to prevent them. Out of the threescore only thirteen poor devils were held fast and came to the futile meeting. The others, with Zanella, assembled on Yugoslav territory at a place called Saint Anna.

And Signor Schanzer went on talking. Officers and men of the Italian army and navy, said he, had shown perfect discipline. Signor Schanzer may not be an expert on discipline, but as a humorist he wins applause. One's ordinary notions of discipline do not include the seizure of a warship by a handful of bandits, the cannons of the vessel being afterwards directed against the Government palace of a neutral State. The fascisti, with the help of Italian troops and accompanied by several Italian deputies, eject the legal Government of Rieka. One of these deputies, Giuratti, is chosen by his friends to be President of the Free State--Giuratti of the fascisti, Giuratti who most barbarically had ill-treated the Istrian Slavs, but--for we will be just--this was when he believed they were barbarians, savages, quite common, brutal men; well, he had learned, he wrote,[68] that this was not the case, they had adopted Western culture, they had raised the revolutionary flag against the dynasty of Karageorgevi['c] and if Yugoslavia's dismemberment should ever come to pass, "then, as I confidently hope," said he, "the Croats with their righteous national aspirations will unite with their great neighbour Italy. We salute the Croat Revolution with sincerest sympathy..." and so on and so on. That was the kind of calm, impartial personage to have as Governor of the distracted Free State, where in one point anyhow most of the population think the same, and that is that their union with Italy would be an absolute disaster. Behold this Giuratti posing his candidature, Giuratti whose patriotism and idealism are, says the Italian Government, fully appreciated by them; nevertheless it has advised him to refuse the suggested honour. That he should be punished did not occur to them; but what would they have said if a Yugoslav--surely with more right than an Italian and certainly with a larger following of townsfolk--had been selected as President? "The proceedings of the Italian Government," said Schanzer, "are clear, speedy and determined." But did anything unpleasant happen to Commandant Castelli, an officer sent to make order, when he quite openly placed himself on the side of the fascisti? Would degradation be the lot of any officer or soldier who "mutinied" and joined the fascisti?... Apparently it was due to the unhappy political condition of Europe that the whole civilized world did not launch an indignant protest against the baseness and cynicism of the Italians. But how utterly they failed to persuade others that the wishes of Rieka were as they represented them! Rieka desires to remain independent and this desire the Italians will have to respect. And the later they make up their mind to keep their promises, so much the worse for them. The Yugoslavs can wait, for theirs is the future. A cartoonist in the Belgrade _Vreme_ depicted a rough old Serbian warrior holding on his open hand a very neat little Italian soldier. "Now listen to me," he was saying, "and I will tell you a story. Once upon a time there was a country called Austria...."

There was a characteristic little affair at Saint Anna on March 23. A few minutes after Zanella had left the Lubi['c] Inn a suspicious-looking person appeared. He began observing the customers and their surroundings, when the Police-Commissary Per[vs]i['c] came up to him and asked for his passport. "Take yourself off!" shouted the intruder, as he pulled a bomb out of his trouser pocket. Per[vs]i['c] grappled with him and soon overpowered him. And outside the house four other fascisti, Armano Viola, Carpinelli, Bellia and Murolo, were captured. They claimed to be journalists, and it is quite true that Viola is on the staff of the notorious _Vedetta Italiana_; but when he comes into a foreign country as a special correspondent and is teaching others how to go about that business--for until then they had been otherwise engaged, Murolo being charged with numerous thefts and attempted murders, while Bellia and Carpinelli were accused of breaking into the Abbazia Casino--if Viola was teaching them how to be journalists he would on this occasion have been better advised if he had restricted them to the conventional tools of the profession instead of bombs, revolvers and daggers. Little use did they get out of them, for a trio of these armed individuals were seized and disarmed by one Yugoslav gendarme, who was himself very meagrely equipped. With tears in their eyes they begged for mercy. "Pieta, Pieta!" they exclaimed. So long as their own lives were spared they were very willing to forgo the 60,000 lire which had been put on Zanella's head.

Unfortunately it seems obvious that this exploit, if not ordered by the Italian Government was, at any rate, permitted by them. How otherwise could the automobile containing these men have got past the sentries at the Su[vs]ak bridge and two other Italian sentry posts? Moreover, these men were in possession of documents which proved that official Italian circles at Rieka were privy to their undertaking, and that they proposed to investigate the Yugoslav military positions on the frontier.... These five fascisti brigands--who were also lieutenants of the Italian army--would therefore have to be tried not only for attempted murder but for attempted espionage. They were put into a train and transported to the prison at Zagreb. "If once we begin to march," so the Italian soldiers at Rieka had over and over again been telling the Croats, "then we shall not halt before we come to Zagreb, your capital." Those five will perhaps some day explain to their comrades how quickly Zagreb can be reached.... As yet those whom they left behind them had not lost their bombast: a manifesto was issued by them which declared that five true patriots had sallied forth to Saint Anna, for the purpose of parleying with the Constituent Assembly, and that in a barbarous fashion they had been arrested, maltreated and possibly killed. Let the people avenge the shedding of such noble blood. Everything, everything must be done in order to liberate the captured brethren. And so, towards eleven at night, about sixty fascisti and legionaries came together. Armed to the teeth, they designed to cross over into Yugoslav territory, but when they noticed that the sentry posts had been strengthened they went home to bed.

A number of American and European journalists rushed out to Belgrade, under the impression that the Yugoslav-Italian War could now no longer be avoided. But they did not realize how great a self-control the Yugoslavs possess. It may be, as a commentator put it in the _Nation_,[69] that Italy "is practically at war with Yugoslavia," for she is obsessed by the "Pan-Slav menace"; but if they insist on the arbitrament of arms they will have to wait until the Yugoslavs have time to deal with them.... The Free State of Rieka owes its existence to a Treaty between Italy and Yugoslavia; both of them should therefore guarantee its freedom. Italian and Yugoslav _gendarmerie_ and troops should resist together the incursions of fascisti; and if the two races cannot work in harmony, then let the administration of the town be entrusted to neutral troops; and as High Commissioner one would suggest Mr. Blakeney, the British Consul at Belgrade. If this imperturbable and most kindly man were to fail in the attempt at repeating in Rieka what has been accomplished in Danzig, then, indeed, one might despair; but he would brilliantly and placidly succeed. All the other qualifications are his; an intimate knowledge of every Near Eastern language--and, of course, Italian; a perfect acquaintance with the mentality of all those peoples; common sense of an uncommon order, and the whole-hearted confidence of those with whom he comes into contact. Great Britain and France compelled the Yugoslavs, at enormous sacrifices, to sign the Treaty of Rapallo; they are, therefore, morally obliged to see that it is executed. For too many months the Italians were saying that they would carry out their part of it and leave the third zone in Dalmatia if the Yugoslavs would agree to a few more concessions, commercial and territorial, that were not in the Treaty. During the Genoa Conference in the spring of 1922 the Italian authorities confessed to the Yugoslav delegates that their hands were bound by the fascisti. These elements would certainly object to the execution of that part of the Treaty of Rapallo which refers to the port of Baro[vs]. Accurately speaking, the arrangements with regard to Baro[vs] are embodied in a letter from Count Sforza, the then Foreign Secretary, and are added to the Treaty as an appendix. Both were signed on the same day, and apparently this plan of an appendix was adopted on account of the fascisti. Yet if Count Sforza had not signed that letter it is safe to say that the Yugoslavs would not have signed the main body of a Treaty which to them was the reverse of favourable. And at Genoa the Italians started haggling about a strip of land near Baro[vs], in the hope that some success would stay the zeal of the fascisti. Furthermore they pleaded that Zadar could not live if Yugoslavia did not, in addition to supplying it with water, give it railway communication with the interior. The Yugoslavs were thus invited to construct at great expense a railway to a foreign town which their own [vS]ibenik and other Adriatic towns did not possess. This, naturally, they refused to undertake, as also to agree to the Italian suggestion that a free zone of some twenty kilometres should be instituted at the back of Zadar. One might safely say that the Italian agents in this region would not have confined themselves to salutary measures for the welfare of the town. It is stated in the Treaty of Rapallo that in case of disagreement either party could invoke an arbitrator, and the Yugoslavs, who happen now to be the weaker party, have been contemplating application to the League of Nations. Well, in Genoa it was proposed by Italy that Yugoslavia should renounce the clause which deals with an eventual arbitration. If you make a large number of demands--never mind that they should be in opposition to a Treaty you have signed--then you may gain a few of them--and Italy was hoping that the Free State would repay the costs which she incurred there on account of her unruly son d'Annunzio, and, likewise, that the good Italianists who at the end of the Great War committed wholesale thefts from the State warehouses should not be made to pay for it. With all their guile and strength the Italians were endeavouring to avoid the execution of her Treaty of Rapallo. "Italy is the one Power in Europe," says Mr. Harold Goad[70] who thrusts himself upon our notice, "Italy is the one Power in Europe that is most obviously and most consistently working for peace and conciliation in every field."

HOPES IN THE LITTLE ENTENTE

The complicated troubles, avoidable and unavoidable, that have been raging in Central Europe after the War are being met to some extent by the Little Entente, an association in the first place between Yugoslavia and the kindred Czecho-Slovakia, and afterwards between them and Roumania. The world was assured that this union had for its object the establishment of peace, security and normal economic activities in Central and Eastern Europe; no acquisitive purposes were in the background, and since these three States now recognized that if they try to swallow more of the late Austro-Hungarian monarchy they will suffer from chronic indigestion, we need not be suspicious of their altruism. It is perfectly true that the first impulse which moved the creators of the Little Entente was not constructive but defensive; their great Allies did not appear, in the opinion of the three Succession States, to be taking the necessary precautions against the elements of reaction. Otherwise they, especially France (which was naturally more determined that Austria should not join herself to Germany), would not have favoured the idea of a Danubian Federation, in which Austria and Hungary would play leading parts. The Great Powers would also, if they had been less exclusively concerned with their own interests, have handled with more resolution the attempts of Charles of Habsburg to place himself at the head of the present reactionary regime at Buda-Pest; and if it had not been for certain energetic measures taken by the members of the Little Entente it may well be doubted whether the Government of Admiral Horthy, which does not conceal the fact that it is royalist--the king being temporarily absent--would have required Charles to leave the country. The Little Entente pointed out to their great Allies what these had apparently overlooked, namely, that the return of the Habsburgs was not opposed by the Succession States out of pure malice but for the reason that it would inevitably strengthen the magnates and the high ecclesiastics in their desire to bring about the restoration of Hungary's old frontiers. As the frontiers are now drawn there dwell--and this could not be prevented--a number of Magyars in each of the three neighbouring States (the fewest being in Yugoslavia), just as the present Hungary includes a Czech-Slovak, Roumanian and Yugoslav population.[71] But the Great Powers agree that if this frontier is to be changed at all, every precaution should be taken against having it changed by force. It is no exaggeration to say that there can be no real peace in Central Europe until normal intercourse with Russia is re-established, but let it in the meantime be the task of the Little Entente to guard the temporary peace from being shattered.

Apart from this defensive object the countries of the Little Entente have the positive aim of a resumption of normal economic conditions and the institution of a new order of things in accordance with the new political construction of Central and Eastern Europe. It is obvious that these three States have numerous interests in common which make their co-operation very natural, if not indeed indispensable.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 46: April 16, 1920.]

[Footnote 47: January 22, 1920.]

[Footnote 48: According to the Rome correspondent of the _Petit
Journal_.]

[Footnote 49: But the wind was considerably tempered for him:
vessels laden with his precise requirements sailed over from
Italy and said they had been captured by d'Annunzio's arditi.
General Badoglio, in command of the royal troops outside the
town, ascertained in November 1919 that Rieka's coal-supply was
nearly exhausted and 7000 tons per month were required for the
public services alone. He accordingly informed a syndicate of
coal merchants in Triest that he would be personally
responsible for the first consignment of coal to d'Annunzio. A
month earlier, when the town was supposed to be blockaded, it
was announced that a limited supply of food-stuffs would,
nevertheless, be introduced, through the Red Cross, for very
young children. This amounted, as a matter of fact, to 21
truckloads a week. It is significant that there was no rise in
the prices charged in the public restaurants of Rieka, and that
persons living outside the line of Armistice found it cheaper
to do their shopping in the besieged city.]

[Footnote 50: February 20, 1920.]

[Footnote 51: September 1921.]

[Footnote 52: However, in the Yugoslav Parliament, although
some of the deputies have spent their lives in far-off,
primitive places--by no means all of those who represent the
Albanians can read and write--one does not hear such deplorable
language as that which, according to the _Grazer Volksblatt_ of
January 19, 1922, disgraced the Austrian Assembly. A certain
Dr. Waneck, of the Pan-German party, wished to criticize the
Minister of Finance, Professor Dr. Guertler of the Christian
Socialists. He remarked that one could not expect this Minister
to be sober at four o'clock in the afternoon, and went on to
say that no less than five banks, whose names he would give,
had received early information from the Minister, which enabled
them to speculate successfully. He repeated this accusation
several times and with great violence, but when he was invited
to reveal the names of these banks--"No, sir!" he cried. "I
will not do so, because I don't want to."]

[Footnote 53: Cf. "The Tri-Une Kingdom," by Pavle Popovi['c]
and Jovan M. Jovanovi['c], in the _Quarterly Review_, October
1921.]

[Footnote 54: He was kept for some time in confinement at
Mitrovica, in Syrmia, and in November 1920 he was liberated in
consequence of the great amnesty.]

[Footnote 55: Cf. _Spectator_, July 17, 1920.]

[Footnote 56: Cf. _Edinburgh Review_, July 1920.]

[Footnote 57: A few months after this, in the course of a
little controversy in the _Saturday Review_ (which arose from
an unsigned and, I hoped, rather reasonable article of mine on
the Adriatic Settlement) I quoted from memory this passage of
Mrs. Re-Bartlett's and said that the Italian captain was giving
chocolates to the children at Kievo. Thereupon Mr. Harold W. E.
Goad of the British-Italian League wrote a highly indignant
letter to the editor, and in the course of it he denounced me
for having egregiously invented the chocolates "for the sole
purpose of throwing her testimony into ridicule.... What do
you, Sir, think of such methods as that?" And he concluded by
declaring that I wallowed in a "truly Balkan slough of
distortion and calumny." Well, on referring to Mrs.
Re-Bartlett's article I find that there is no mention of
chocolates, and I apologize; presumably the children were
crowding round their adored _Capitano_ in order to thank him
for the bridges and waterworks which were being built in
Dalmatia.]

[Footnote 58: During the Italian occupation, said Professor
Salvemini, teachers, doctors and priests were deported or
expelled from the country, while the Italian Government had to
dissolve 30 municipal councils out of 33, so that at the head
of the communes were Italian officials and not properly elected
mayors. Moreover, all liberties were suppressed. No Slav
newspapers, no Slav societies were permitted, and 32 out of 57
magistrates were dismissed--these methods being due not to
cruelty or folly, said the Professor, but to the necessity of
keeping order by forcible means in a country which was wholly
hostile.]

[Footnote 59: November 13, 1920.]

[Footnote 60: November 15, 1920.]

[Footnote 61: This, of course, did not meet with the approval
of Signor d'Annunzio. He made numerous pronouncements with
regard to his inflexible desires, saying that, if necessary, he
would offer up his bleeding corpse. And his resistance to the
Italian Government did not confine itself to rhetoric. During
his usurpation of Rieka this man had done his country grievous
harm. It was not only that he held her up to the smiles of the
malicious who said that she could not keep order in her own
house, but he was guiding the people back to barbarism. When
sailors of the royal navy deserted to his standard, he knelt
before them in the streets of Rieka at a time when from Russia
Lenin was inciting the Italian Communists to revolution and to
the conquest of the State. He refused to deal with Giolitti,
even as he had rejected the advances of Nitti. But the aged
Giolitti grasped the problem with more firmness, which was what
one might expect from the statesman who, after his return to
power, had leaned neither on the industrial magnates of Milan
nor on their Bol[vs]evik antagonists. Giolitti was resolved to
put an end to the nuisance of d'Annunzio; in no constitutional
State is there room for a Prime Minister and such a
swashbuckler. The Nationalists of Italy were furious when they
perceived that the Premier was in earnest and that force would
be employed against their idol. And it had to come to that, for
the utterly misguided man continued to resist--hoping doubtless
for wholesale desertions in the army and navy--with the
deplorable result that a good many Italians were slain by
Italians. Orders were issued by the Government that all
possible care should be taken of d'Annunzio's person; and
eventually when Rieka was taken by the royalist troops the poet
broke his oath that he would surely die; he announced that
Italy was not worth dying for and it was said that he had
sailed away on an aeroplane. He had accomplished none of his
desires; the town had not become Italian, though he had bathed
it in Italian blood. His overweening personal ambitions had
been shipwrecked on the rock of ridicule, for as he made his
inglorious exit he shouted at the world that he was "still
alive and inexorable." But yet he may have unconsciously
achieved something, for his seizure of what he loved to call
the "holocaust city" provided the extreme Nationalists with a
private stage where--in uniforms of their own design, in cloaks
and feathers and flowing black ties and with eccentric
arrangements of the hair--they could strut and caper and fling
bombastic insults at the authorities in Rome, until the
Government found it opportune to take them in hand. The
greatest Italian poet and one of the greatest imaginative
writers in Europe will now be able to devote himself--if his
rather morbid Muse has suffered no injury--to his predestined
task. Those--the comparatively few that read--whose
acquaintance with this writer's work usually caused them to
regret his methods, could not help admiring his personal
activities, his genius for leadership and his vital fire during
the War. But, once this was over, he relapsed; and expressing
himself very clearly in action, so that he became known to the
many instead of the few, he lived what he previously wrote, and
now it is generally recognized that Gabriel of the
Annunciation, as he calls himself, who produced a row of
obscene and histrionic novels, is a mountebank, a self-deceiver
and a most affected bore. When he came to Rieka he thought fit
to appeal to the England of Milton. And, like him, Milton lived
as he wrote. Milton, Dante and Sophocles--to mention no others
of the supreme writers--were as serious and responsible in
their public actions as in the pursuit of their art.]

[Footnote 62: Whatever be the limitations of the _Dom_ as a
newspaper--it is almost exclusively occupied with the person
and programme of Mr. Radi['c]--yet that brings with it the
virtue, most exceptional in Yugoslavia, of refusing to engage
in polemics. This would otherwise take up a good deal of its
space, as Radi['c] has become such a bogey-man that nothing is
too ridiculous for his opponents to believe. A Czech newspaper
not long ago informed the world that this monstrous personage
had told an interviewer that not only had Serbian soldiers in
Macedonia been murdering 200 children but that they had roasted
and consumed them. Furthermore Radi['c] had said that the
British Minister to Yugoslavia had called upon him and had
asked his advice with some persistence, not even wishing to
leave Radi['c] time to reflect, as to whether the Prince-Regent
should rule in Russia, while an English Prince should be
invited to occupy the Yugoslav throne. The first of these
remarks proved conclusively, said a number of Belgrade papers,
that Radi['c] was a knave and by the second he had demonstrated
that he was an imbecile. And my friend Mr. Leiper of the
_Morning Post_ speculated as to whether he was more likely to
end his days in a lunatic asylum or a prison. But Radi['c] was
caring about none of these things; his birthday happened at
about this time and some 30,000 of his adherents came to do him
honour at his birthplace, over 500 of them on decorated horses
having met him at Sisak station the previous evening. When I
asked him what he had to say about the two afore-mentioned
remarks he gave me an amusing account of how the interviewer
had appreciated the various samples of wine which he (Radi['c])
had just brought down from his vineyard. The conversation
lasted for about four hours, and in the course of it Radi['c]
mentioned that a certain Moslem deputy from Novi Bazar,
irritated by the fact that Mr. Dra[vs]kovi['c], Minister of the
Interior, found no pleasure in his continued presence on a
commission of inquiry in the region of Kossovo, had been
throwing out very dark hints about a child which he accused the
Serbs of killing in the stormy days of 1878, and then relating
to the Tsar that this dastardly deed had been committed by the
Turks. This was the basis of that part of the interview. As for
the other absurdity, it was mentioned that some courtiers had
told the Prince-Regent that he alone could establish an orderly
Government in Russia, whereupon Radi['c] observed that England
and France were not likely to allow one person to reign both
there and in Yugoslavia. And when I asked why he had not
published this explanation in his paper, he said that he
couldn't very well charge a guest with having liked his wine
too much.]

[Footnote 63: Cf. _The Quarterly Review_ (October 1921), in
which Messrs. Pavle Popovi['c] and Jovan M. Jovanovi['c]
published a very able survey of Yugoslav conditions.]

[Footnote 64: Cf. _Nineteenth Century and After_, January
1921.]

[Footnote 65: April 26, 1921.]

[Footnote 66: Unhappily it became apparent that the Italians
were not disposed to have the Treaty put in force]

[Footnote 67: March 23, 1922.]

[Footnote 68: Cf. an article in a fascisti newspaper, quoted by
the _Zagreber Tagblatt_ of May 14, 1922.]

[Footnote 69: Cf. "The Rise of the Little Entente," by Dorothy
Thompson. April 1, 1922.]

[Footnote 70: _Fortnightly Review_, May 1922.]

[Footnote 71: The magnates of Hungary and their friends do not
grow weary of lamenting the sad fate of the Magyar minorities.
Whatever may be happening in Transylvania, they have a very
poor case against the Serbs. In the Voivodina there are,
according to Hungarian statistics, about 382,000 Magyars out of
1.4 million inhabitants. These Magyars have their primary and
secondary schools, their newspapers and so forth, whereas in
the spring of 1922 the schools in various Serbian villages near
Budapest were forcibly closed, the lady teachers being told
that if they stayed they would have to undergo the physical
examination which is applied to prostitutes.]

VIII

YUGOSLAVIA'S FRONTIERS

INTRODUCTION--(_a_) THE ALBANIAN FRONTIER: 1. THE ACTORS--2. THE AUDIENCE RUSH THE STAGE--3. SERBS, ALBANIANS AND THE MISCHIEF-MAKERS--4. THE STATE OF ALBANIAN CULTURE--5. A METHOD WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN TRIED IN ALBANIA--6. THE ATTRACTION OF YUGOSLAVIA--7. RELIGIOUS AND OTHER MATTERS IN THE BORDER REGION--8. A DIGRESSION ON TWO RIVAL ALBANIAN AUTHORITIES--9. WHAT FACES THE YUGOSLAVS--10. DR. TRUMBI['C]'S PROPOSAL--11. THE POSITION IN 1921: THE TIRANA GOVERNMENT AND THE MIRDITI--12. SERBIA'S GOOD INFLUENCE--13. EUROPEAN MEASURES AGAINST THE YUGOSLAVS AND THEIR FRIENDS--14. THE REGION FROM WHICH THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE RETIRED--15. THE PROSPECT--(_b_) THE GREEK FRONTIER--(_c_) THE BULGARIAN FRONTIER--(_d_) THE ROUMANIAN FRONTIER: 1. THE STATE OF THE ROUMANIANS IN EASTERN SERBIA--2. THE BANAT--(_e_) THE HUNGARIAN FRONTIER--(_f_) THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIER--(_g_) THE ITALIAN FRONTIER.

INTRODUCTION

Nobody could have expected in the autumn of 1918 that the frontiers of the new State would be rapidly delimitated. Ethnological, economic, historic and strategical arguments--to mention no others--would be brought forward by either side, and the Supreme Council, which had to deliver judgment on these knotty problems, would be often more preoccupied with their own interests and their relation to each other. It would also happen that a member of the Supreme Council would be simultaneously judge and pleader. The mills of justice would therefore grind very slowly, for they would be conscious that the fruit of their efforts, evolved with much foreign material clogging the machinery and with parts of the machinery jerked out of their line of track, would be received with acute criticism. When more than two years had elapsed from the time of the Armistice a considerable part of Yugoslavia's frontiers remained undecided. We will travel along the frontier lines, starting with that between Yugoslavs and Albanians.

(a) THE ALBANIAN FRONTIER

1. THE ACTORS

Those who in old Turkish days lived in that wild border country which is dealt with on these pages would have been surprised to hear that they would be the objects of a great deal of discussion in the west of Europe. But in those days there was no Yugoslavia and no Albania and no League of Nations, and very few were the writers who took up this question. It is, undoubtedly, a question of importance, though some of these writers, remembering that the fate of the world was dependent on the fraction of an inch of Cleopatra's nose, seem almost to have imagined that it was proportionately more dependent on those several hundred kilometres of disputed frontier. It would not so much matter that they have introduced a good deal of passion into their arguments if they had not also exerted some influence on influential men--and this compels one to pay them what would otherwise be excessive attention.

Let us consider the frontier which the Ambassadors' Conference in November 1921 assigned to Yugoslavia and the Albanians. We have already mentioned some of the previous points of contact between those Balkan neighbours who for centuries have been acquiring knowledge of each other and who, therefore, as Berati Bey, the Albanian delegate in Paris, very wisely said, should have been left to manage their own frontier question. A number of Western Europeans will exclaim that this could not be accomplished without the shedding of blood; but it is rather more than probable that the interference of Western Europe--partly philanthropic and partly otherwise--will be responsible for greater loss of life. If it could not be permitted that two of the less powerful peoples should attempt to settle their own affairs, then, at any rate, the most competent of alien judges should have sat on the tribunal. A frontier in that part of Europe should primarily take the peculiarities of the people into account, and I believe that if Sir Charles Eliot and Baron Nopsca with their unrivalled knowledge of the Albanians had been consulted it is probable they would, for some years to come, have thought desirable the frontier which is preferred by General Franchet d'Esperey, by a majority of the local Albanians, and by those who hope for peace in the Balkans.

2. THE AUDIENCE RUSH THE STAGE

A battle which took place near Tuzi, not far from Podgorica, in December 1919, may assist the study of the difficult Albanian question. At the first attack about 150 Montenegrins, mostly young recruits, were killed or wounded; but in the counter-attack the Albanian losses were much greater, 167 of them being made prisoners. On all of these were found Italian rifles, ammunition, money and army rations. On the other hand, a few Montenegrins, with three officers, were also captured and were stripped and handed over, naked, to the Italians. But these declined to have them, saying that the conflict had been no concern of theirs, and the unfortunate men--with the exception of one who escaped--remained among the Albanians. The fact that Tuzi would be of no value to the Italians neither weakens nor strengthens the supposition that they were privy to the Albanian attack; but it may very well be that the natives had taken their Italian equipment by force of arms. It would, anyhow, seem that the Italians have little understanding of this people: during the War, when General Franchet d'Esperey was straightening his line, he paid some hundreds of Albanians to maintain his western flank, and they were very satisfactory. (It troubled them very little whether they were holding it against the Austrians or against other Albanians.) When Italy took over that part of the line she employed a whole Division, which--to the amusement, it is said, of Franchet d'Esperey--provided the local population with a great deal of booty, and in particular with mules. There was constant trouble in those regions of Albania which were occupied by the Italians,[72] and in June 1920 things had come to such a pass that the Italian garrisons, after being thrown out of the villages of Bestrovo and Selitza, were actually retiring with all the stores they could rescue to Valona. Their retreat, said Reuter, in a euphemistic message from Rome, was "attended by some loss." As Valona was their last stronghold in Albanian territory, it seemed that very few, if any, of the tribes were in favour of an Italian protectorate. And since it was calculated that during the first six months of 1920 the Italian Government was paying from 400 to 500 million lire a month for corn, and the year's deficit might be enough to lead the State to the very verge of bankruptcy, one was asking whether from an economic, apart from any other, point of view, it would not be advisable for the Italians to cut their losses in central Albania. And this they very wisely determined to do. Would that their subsequent policy in northern Albania had been as well-inspired.

It would also seem as if the affair of Tuzi shows that the Albanians have no wish for a Yugoslav protectorate, and there are a good many Serbs, such as Professor Cviji['c], who view with uneasiness any extension of their sway over the Albanians. Many of the tribes are prepared, after very small provocation or none, to take up arms against anybody; and those who, in the north and north-east of the country, are in favour of a Yugoslav protectorate would undoubtedly have opposed to them a number of the natives, less because they are fired with the prospect of "Albania for the Albanians" than on account of their patriarchal views. We must, however, at the same time, acknowledge that those Albanians who are impelled by patriotic ideals, and who would like to see their countrymen within the 1913 frontiers, resolutely turn away from the various attractions which the Slavs undoubtedly exercise over many of them and combine in a brotherly fashion, under the guidance of a disinterested State, to work for an independent Albania--those idealists have every right to be heard. Their solution is, in fact, the one that would, as we have elsewhere said, be best for everyone concerned. The late Professor Burrows, who believed in the possibility of such an arrangement, thought that it would take generations for this people "to pass from blood feud and tribal jealousy to the good order of a unified State, unless they have tutorage in the art of self-government." There seem to be grave difficulties, both external and internal, in the way of setting up such a tutorage over the whole of the 1913 Albania; and if a majority of the northern and north-eastern tribes prefer to turn to Yugoslavia, rather than to join the frustrated patriots and the wilder brethren in turning away from it, they should not be sweepingly condemned as traitors to the national cause. The frame of mind which looks with deep suspicion on a road that links a tribe to its neighbour is not very promising for those who dream of an Albanian nation; it is a prevalent and fundamental frame of mind. "The Prince of Wied," we are told by his countryman, Dr. Max Mueller, "succeeded in conquering the hearts of those Albanians who supported him and of gaining the highest respect of those who were his political opponents." No doubt they were flattered when they noticed that he had so far become an Albanian as to surround his residence at Durazzo with barbed-wire entanglements.

Among the solutions of the Albanian problem was that which Dr. Mueller very seriously, not to say ponderously, put forward in 1916.[73] This gentleman, with a first-hand knowledge of the country, which he gained during the War, did not minimize the task which would face the Prince of Wied on his return. Of that wooden potentate one may say that his work in Albania did not collapse for the reason that it was never started; a few miles from Durazzo, his capital, from which, I believe, he made only that one excursion whose end was undignified, a few miles away he excited the derision of his "subjects," and a few miles farther off they had not heard of him. Dr. Mueller, after reproving us sternly for smiling at the national decoration, in several classes, with which his Highness on landing at the rickety pier was graciously pleased to gladden the meritorious natives, admits that at his second coming he will have to take various other steps. Austrians and Germans should be brought to colonize the country, and not peasants, forsooth, like those who have laboriously made good in the Banat, but merchants, manufacturers, engineers, doctors, officials and large landowners--not by any means without close inquiry, so as to admit only such as are in possession of a blameless repute and a certain amount of cash. Dr. Mueller was resolved that, so far as lay with him, none but the very best Teutons should embark upon this splendid mission. He desired that, after landing, they should first of all remain at the harbour, there to undergo a course of tuition in the customs and peculiarities of the tribe among which they proposed to settle. His compatriots would be so tactful--apparently not criticizing any of the customs--that the hearts of the Albanians would incline towards them and by their beautiful example they would make these primitive, wild hearts beat not so much for local interests but very fervently for the Albanian fatherland. One cannot help a feeling of regret that circumstances have prevented us from seeing Dr. Mueller's scheme put into action.

3. SERBS, ALBANIANS AND THE MISCHIEF-MAKERS

In 1913, after the Balkan War, the flags of the Powers were hoisted at Scutari, and a frontier dividing the Albanians from the Yugoslavs (Montenegrins and Serbs) was indicated by Austria and traced at the London Conference. This boundary was still awaiting its final demarcation by commissioners on the spot when the European War broke out. Then in the second year of the War disturbances were organized by the Austrians in Albania--their friend the miscreant ruler of Montenegro caused money to be sent for this purpose to the Austro-Hungarian Consul at Scutari--and in April and May of that year the Serbs were authorized by their Allies to protect themselves by occupying certain portions of the country. Various battles took place between those Albanians who were partisans of Austria and those who were disinclined to attack the Serbs in the rear. The Serbian Government opposed the Austrian propaganda by dispatching to that region the Montenegrin Pouni[vs]a Ra[vc]i['c], of whom we have much to say. He was accompanied by Smajo Ferovi['c], a Moslem sergeant of komitadjis. They explained to the Albanians that the Serbs had been offered a separate peace with numerous concessions, but that Mr. Pa[vs]i['c] had refused to treat. When the two Albanian parties discussed the situation by shooting at each other, the Austro-Hungarian officers made tracks for Kotor, and that particular intrigue came to an end.

When the War was over, the Serbs, sweeping up from Macedonia, were requested by General Franchet d'Esperey to undertake a task which the Italians refused, and push the demoralized Austrian troops out of Albania. Some weeks after this had been accomplished, the Italians, mindful of the Treaty of London, demanded that a large part of Albania should be given up to their administration. The Serbs agreed and withdrew; they even took away their representative from Scutari, where the Allies had again installed themselves. The Treaty of London bestowed upon the Serbs a sphere of influence in northern Albania, but--save for a few misguided politicians--they were logical enough to reject the whole of the pernicious Treaty, both the clauses which robbed them in Dalmatia and those which in Albania gave them stolen goods. Over and over again did the Yugoslav delegates declare in Paris that it was their wish to see established an independent Albania with the frontiers of 1913. These, the first frontiers which the Albanians had ever possessed, were laid down by Austria with the express purpose of thwarting the Serbs and facilitating Albanian raids. It is true that several towns with large Albanian majorities were made over to the Serbs--very much, as it turned out, to their subsequent advantage--yet, being separated from their hinterland, this was a doubtful gift. Nevertheless, if a free and united Albania could be constituted the Serbs were ready to accept this frontier, and even Monsieur Justin Godart, the strenuous French Albanophile of whom we speak elsewhere, cannot deny that this attitude of the Yugoslavs redounds very much to their honour. But before relative tranquillity reigns among the Albanians it is, as General Franchet d'Esperey perceived in 1918, an untenable line. He, therefore, drew a temporary frontier which permitted the Serbs to advance for some miles into Albania, so that on the river Drin or on the mountain summits they might ward off attacks. These, by the way, had their origin far more in the border population's empty stomachs than in their animus against the Slavs. And nobody with knowledge of this people could regard the 1918 frontier as unnecessary. The Albanians were themselves so much inclined to acquiesce that one must ask why, in the months which followed, there was a considerable amount of border fighting. What was it that caused the Albanians in the region of Scutari to make their violent onslaughts of December 1919 and January 1920, the renewed offensive of July 1920 at the same places--after which the Albanian Government forwarded to that of Belgrade an assurance of goodwill--and the organized thrust of August 13 against Dibra, which was preceded on August 10 by a manifesto to the chancelleries of Europe falsely accusing the Serbs of having begun these operations, and which was followed by the Tirana Government promising to try to find the guilty persons? The 19th of the same month saw the Albanians delivering a further attack in the neighbourhood of Scutari, and then the Yugoslav Government decided that their army must occupy such defensive positions as would put a stop to these everlasting incidents. But a voice was whispering to the Albanians that they must not allow themselves to be so easily coerced. "You have thrown us out of all the land behind Valona," said the voice, "and out of Valona itself. You must, therefore, be the greatest warriors in the world, and we will be charmed to provide you with rifles and machine guns and munitions and uniforms and cash. We will gladly publish to the world that your Delegation at Rome has sent us an official Note demanding that the Yugoslav troops should retire to the 1913 line, pure and simple. Of course we, like the other Allies, agreed that they should occupy the more advanced positions which General Franchet d'Esperey assigned to them--and to show you how truly sorry we are for having done so, we propose to send you all the help you need. In dealing with us you will find that you have to do with honourable men, whereas the Yugoslavs--what are they but Yugoslavs?"

Anyone who travelled about this time along the road from Scutari down to the port of San Giovanni di Medua would inevitably meet with processions of ancient cabs, ox-wagons and what not, laden with all kinds of military equipment. Some of these supplies had come direct from Italy, while others had been seized from the Italians near Valona. The detachment of Italian soldiers at San Giovanni, and the much larger detachment at Scutari, may have looked with mixed feelings at some of these commodities, but on the other hand they may have thought, with General Bencivenga,[74] that it was good business--"_un buon affare_"--in exchange for Valona to obtain a solid and secure friendship with the Albanians. Roads, as he pointed out, lead from Albania to the heart of Serbia, and for that reason a true brotherhood of arms between Italians and Albanians was, in case of hostilities, enormously to be desired. And so the Italians stationed at Scutari, under Captain Pericone of the Navy, may have felt that it was well that all those cannon captured from their countrymen were in such a good condition. They would now be turned by the Albanians against the hateful Yugoslavs. ["Italy is the one Power in Europe," says her advocate, Mr. H. E. Goad, in the _Fortnightly Review_ (May 1922), "that is most obviously and most consistently working for peace and conciliation in every field."] ... A further supply of military material is said to have reached the Albanians from Gabriele d'Annunzio in the S.S. _Knin_. To the Irish, the Egyptians and the Turks the poet-filibuster had merely sent greetings. Some one may have told him that even the most lyrical greeting would not be valued by the Albanians half as much as a shipload of munitions.