Chapter IV: Part 4

Baron Sonnino had to take into account not only the unsteadiness of the ground on which the Government stood, owing to these parliamentary regroupings, but the general effects that would ensue from the country's financial position. When, in spite of the victory and the approach of peace, the exchange price of the lira dropped 2 to 3 points towards the end of November, this may have had, contrary to what was thought by many, no connection with a revolutionary movement. The fact that in Triest the authorities had been obliged to isolate Italian ex-prisoners on their return from Russia, since they were imbued with revolutionary principles, at any rate were uttering loud revolutionary cries, may have been the mere temporary infection caught from their environment. But that of which there was no doubt was the entire truth of Caroti's statement when that deputy declared at Milan that while Italy had been triumphant in the military sphere, she had been economically overthrown. Bankruptcy had not been announced, though it existed. Sonnino may therefore have been impelled not only by imperialism, by his inability to adjust himself to the new international situation, but by the hope that through his policy the new internal situation might be tided over. If the thoughts of his fellow-countrymen could be directed elsewhere than to bankruptcy and possible revolution, it might be that in the meantime adroit measures and good luck would brush away these disagreeable phenomena. And he would then be rightly looked upon as one who had deserved well of his country. So he set about the task with such a thoroughness that he turned not alone the thoughts of men, but their heads. Professor Italo Giglioli addressed a letter to _The New Europe_ in which he said that he was claiming now not the territories given by the Treaty of London, but considerably more. He wanted all Dalmatia, down to Kotor. In foreign hands, he said, Dalmatia would be an eternal danger, and besides: "What in Dalmatia is not Italian is barbaric!" It was a melancholy spectacle to see a man of Giglioli's reputation saying that Dubrovnik, the refuge of Slav culture in the age of darkness and the place in which Slav literature so gloriously arose, was, forsooth, throughout its history always Italian in culture and in literature. "Among thinking people in Italy," proclaims the Professor, "there are indeed but few who will abandon to the Balkan processes a region and a people which have always been possessed by Italian culture and which constitute the necessary wall of Italy and Western Europe against the inroads of the half-barbaric East." He protests that it is ridiculous of _The New Europe_ to assert that the secret Treaty of London is supported by a tiny, discredited band of Italians; and indeed that Review has regretfully to acknowledge that many of his countrymen have been swept off their feet and carried onward in the gale of popular enthusiasm. Giglioli ends by asking that his name be removed from the list of _The New Europe's_ collaborators. In vain does the _The New Europe_ say that the Professor's programme must involve a war between Italians and Yugoslavs. "We must be prepared for a new war," said the _Secolo_ on January 12. "The Italians who absolutely demand the conquest of Dalmatia must have the courage to demand that the demobilization of our Army should be suspended, and to say so very clearly." And the _Corriere della Sera_ warned Orlando of the consequences if he took no steps to silence the mad voices. "No one knows better," it wrote, "than the Minister of the Interior, who is also Premier, that on the other coast Italy claims that part of Dalmatia which was assigned to her by the Treaty of London, but not more.... If the Government definitely claims and demands the whole of Dalmatia, then the agitation is justified; but if the Government does not demand it, then we repeat that to favour and not to curb the movement is the worst kind of Defeatism, for it creates among Italians a state of mind tending to transform the sense of a great victory into the sense of a great defeat ... quite apart from the intransigeance which this provokes in the Yugoslav camp." It was in vain. And when Bissolati, having resigned from office on the issue of Italo-Yugoslav relations, attempted to explain his attitude at the Scala in Milan on January 11, his meeting was wrecked, for though the body of the hall and the galleries were relatively quiet, if not very sympathetic--it was a ticket meeting--the large number of subscription boxes, which could not be closed to their ordinary tenants, had been packed by Bissolati's adversaries, who succeeded in preventing him from speaking. After a long delay he managed to read the opening passage, but when he came to the first "renunciation"--the Brenner for the Teutons--disturbance set in finally and he left the theatre. Afterwards the rioters adjourned to the _Corriere_ and _Secolo_ offices, where they broke the windows. And thus the first full statement of the war aims of any Italian statesman could not be uttered. It was spread abroad by the Press. Bissolati claimed to speak in the name of a multitude which had hitherto been silent.... The masses, he said, demanded, that their rulers should devote all their strength to "the divine blessing of freeing mankind from the slavery of war." ... "To those," he said, "who speak of the Society of Nations as an 'ideology' or 'Utopia' which has no hold over our people, we would reply: Have you been in the trenches among the soldiers waiting for the attack?" [Signor Bissolati had the unique record, among Allied or enemy statesmen, of having volunteered for active service, though past the fighting age, and of having served in the trenches for many months before entering the Orlando Cabinet.]

A FOUNTAIN IN THE SAND

The speech was an admirable expression of that new spirit which the Allies had been fighting for. "Each of the anti-German nations," he said, "must guard itself against any unconsciously German element in its soul, if only in order to have the right to combat any trace in others of the imperialism which had poisoned the outlook of the German people." With regard to the Adriatic: "Yugoslavia exists, and no one can undo this. But to the credit of Italy be it said, the attainment of unity and independence for the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was and must be alike the reason and the certain issue of our War.... Italy felt that if Serbia had been swallowed up by that monstrous Empire--itself a vassal of the German Empire--her own economic expansion and political independence would have received a mortal blow. And so she was on Serbia's side, first in neutrality, then in intervention.... Those who only see, in the formation of the Yugoslav State, a sympathetic or antipathetic episode of the War, or a subsidiary effect of it, have failed to detect its inner meaning." As for the Treaty of London which was concluded against the enemy, it was not to be regarded as intangible against a friendly people. By special grants of autonomy, as at Zadar, or by arrangements between the two States, he would see the language and culture of all the trans-Adriatic sons of Italy assured. He warned his countrymen lest, in order to meet the peril of a German-Slav alliance against them, they should have to subordinate themselves to France and England, and be their proteges instead of their real Allies--a situation not unlike that of the Triple Alliance when Germany protected them against the ever-imminent attack of Austria.... "But perhaps the Yugoslavs will not be grateful or show an equal spirit of conciliation? Certainly they will then have no vital interests to push against Italy, and in the long run sentiments follow interests." There was, in fact, throughout the speech only one questionable passage, that in which he said that "if Italy renounced the annexation of Dalmatia she might obtain from Yugoslavia or from the Peace Conference the joy of pressing to her heart the most Italian city of Rieka, which the Treaty of London renounced." This may have been a sop to Cerberus. But Bissolati's appeals to justice and to wisdom fell upon the same stony ground as his demonstration that Dalmatia's strategic value is very slight from a defensive point of view to those who possess Pola, Valona and the outer islands. There is a school of reasonable Italians, such as Giuseppe Prezzolini, who for strategic reasons asked for the isle of Vis. Mazzini himself, after 1866, found it necessary, for the same reasons, that Vis should be Italian, since it is the key of the Adriatic. Some of us thought that it might have been feasible to follow the precedent of Port Mahon, which Great Britain occupied without exercising sovereignty over the rest of the island of Minorca. The magnificent harbour of Vis, perfectly protected against the bora, would have satisfied all the demands of the Italian navy. Vis is to-day practically as much Slav as Minorca was Spanish, and if the Slavs had been left in possession of the remainder of that island it would have proved the reverse of a danger to the Italians, since with a moderate amount of good sense the same relations would have existed as was the case upon Minorca.... The solution which was ultimately found in the Treaty of Rapallo was to allocate to the Italians in complete sovereignty not the island of Vis, but the smaller neighbouring island of Lastovo.

While the vast majority of Italians would not listen to Bissolati they delighted in Gabriele d'Annunzio. The great poet Carducci[21] had his heart full when he thought about the ragged, starving Croat soldiers, pitiable victims of the Habsburgs, exploited by them all their lives and fighting for them in a foreign land--and they fought bravely; but as they were often clad in miserable garments, they were called by those who wanted to revile them "Croat dirt." And that is what they are to Gabriele d'Annunzio. When the controversies of to-day have long been buried and when d'Annunzio's works are read, his lovers will be stabbed by his _Lettera ai Dalmati_. And if the mob had to be told precisely what the Allies are, it did not need a lord of language to dilate upon "the thirty-two teeth of Wilson's undecipherable smile," to say that the French "drunk with victory, again fly all their plumes in the wind, tune up all their fanfares, quicken their pace in order to pass the most resolute and speedy--and we step aside to let them pass." No laurel will be added to his fame for having spoken of "the people of the five meals" [the English] which, "its bloody work hardly ended, reopens its jaws to devour as much as it can." All Italy resounded with the catchword that the Croats had been Austria's most faithful servants, although some Italians, such as Admiral Millo, as we shall see, when writing confidentially, did not say anything so foolish. Very frequently, however, as the Croats noticed, those who had been the most uncompromising wielders of Austria's despotism were taken on by Italy, the new despot. For example, at Split when the mayor and other Yugoslav leaders were arrested at the beginning of the War, one Francis Mandirazza was appointed as Government Commissary, after having filled the political post of district captain (Bezirkshauptmann) which was only given to those who were in the entire confidence of the Government. As soon as the Italians had possession of [vS]ibenik they took him into their service.

THOSE WHO HELD BACK FROM THE PACT OF ROME

_The New Europe_, whose directors had taken a chief part in bringing the Italians and the Yugoslavs together, which congress had resulted in the Pact of Rome, of April 1918, pointed out that in those dark days of the high-water mark of the great German offensive, this Pact--which provided the framework of an agreement, on the principle of "live and let live"--was publicly approved of by the Italian Premier and his colleagues, but was rejected now when the danger was past and Austria was broken up. Those who brought about the Pact reminded Italy that she was bound to it by honour and that the South Slav statesmen never had withdrawn from the position which it placed them in with reference to Italy.... Everyone must sympathize with the disappointment of those gentlemen who--Messrs. Franklin-Bouillon, Wickham Steed and Seton-Watson were associated in this endeavour--had striven for a noble end, had achieved something in spite of many obstacles, and now saw that one party simply would not use the bridge which they had built for it. This party had, however, shown such reticence both while the bridge was being made and afterwards that one could scarcely be astonished at their attitude. The Congress at Rome was in no sense official, but a voluntary meeting of private persons, who were got together with a certain amount of trouble. So unofficial, in fact, was the Congress that those Serbs who worked with the representatives of the Yugoslav Committee belonged to the Opposition; the Serbian Government, then in Corfu, not giving their adhesion to the Congress, which was perhaps a very clever move on the part of Pa[vs]i['c]. Whether it be true or not that Signor Amendolla, the General Secretary--he is the political director of the _Corriere della Sera_--was asked by the Yugoslav Committee not to admit any Serbian deputies except those of the Opposition, it appears that no other Serbs took a part in the proceedings. The Italian Government adopted an ambiguous attitude, for while Orlando publicly endorsed the resolutions, as did several other Ministers, notably Bissolati, the Premier gave no confirmation to those who interpreted his attitude as implying the tacit abandonment of Italy's extreme territorial claims. Sonnino was so reserved that he took no share at all in the Congress and refused to receive the Yugoslavs. He made no secret of his determination to exact the London Treaty. Nothing was signed by the Italian Government; and if Orlando's honour was involved it certainly does not seem possible to say the same of Sonnino. It may be that Pa[vs]i['c] foresaw what would happen and was therefore unwilling to be implicated. He is an astute statesman of the old school--"too old," says _The New Europe_, which regards him as an Oriental sultan. But respecting the Pact of Rome they were rather at issue with the Italians. What the Italians gained was that the various clauses of the Pact were used as the basis for propaganda in the Austrian ranks on the Piave. And when once the Austrian peril had vanished the old rancour reappeared, particularly when, by the terms of the military armistice with Austria, Italy obtained the right to occupy a zone corresponding with what she was given by the London Treaty. Whereas in that instrument the frontiers were exactly indicated, there was in the Pact of Rome no more than a general agreement that the principles of nationality and self-determination should be applied, with due regard to other "vital interests." Bissolati's group was in favour of something more definite, but to this Orlando was not well disposed; and Trumbi['c], the President of the Yugoslav Committee, did not avail himself of the, perhaps rather useless, offer of some Serbs who were not participating in the Congress, but suggested that while he worked with the Government they would keep in touch with the Bissolati group; even as Bismarck who would work openly with a Government, and through his agents with the Opposition.

GATHERING WINDS

As the Serbian Society of Great Britain observed in a letter of welcome which they addressed to Baron Sonnino on the occasion of a visit to London, they were convinced "after a close study and experience of the Southern Slav question in all its aspects and some knowledge of the Adriatic problem as a whole, that there is no necessary or inevitable conflict between the aspiration of the Southern Slav people towards complete unity and the postulates of Italian national security and of the completion of Italian unity; but that, on the contrary, there exist strong grounds for Italo-Southern Slav co-operation and friendship." The Italian Government, however, had now got almost their whole country behind them, and in the months after the War so many Italians had become warlike that they were enchanted with the picture drawn by Gabriele d'Annunzio: "And what peace will in the end be imposed on us, poor little ones of Christ? A Gallic peace? A British peace? A star-spangled peace? Then, no! Enough! Victorious Italy--the most victorious of all the nations--victorious over herself and over the enemy--will have on the Alps and over her sea the _Pax Romana_, the sole peace that is fitting. If necessary we will meet the new plot in the fashion of the Arditi [units of volunteers employed on specially dangerous enterprises], a grenade in each hand and a knife between our teeth." It is true that the other poor little ones of Christ, the Franciscans, who are greatly beloved by the people of Dalmatia, from whom they are sprung, have hitherto preached a different _Pax Romana_. The Dalmatian clergy, who are patriotic, have been rather a stumbling-block in the way of the Italians. A very small percentage of them--about six in a thousand--have been anti-national and opportunist. At one place a priest whom his bishop had some years ago had occasion to expel, returned with the Italian army in November 1918 and informed the bishop that he had a letter from the Pope which reinstated him, but he refused to show this letter. He was anxious to preach on the following Sunday; the bishop declined to allow him. Then came unto the bishop the chief of the Italian soldiery and he said unto him: "Either thou shalt permit this man to preach or I will cause thine office to be taken from thee." Unfortunately the bishop yielded, and the sermon, as one would imagine, was devoted to the greater glory of the Italians. Sometimes the Italians, since their occupation, have made a more humorous if not more successful use of the Church. On Palm Sunday, after the service a number of peasants, in their best clothes, were walking through a village holding the usual palm leaves in their hands. They were photographed, and a popular Italian newspaper printed this as a full-page coloured illustration. It was entitled: "Dalmatian Peasants on their way to pay Homage to Admiral Millo."

This policy of a grenade in each hand and a knife between the teeth makes a powerful appeal to the munition firms. And others who feed the flame of Italo-Slav hatred are, as Gaetano Salvemini, the anti-chauvinist, pointed out in the _Unita_ of Florence, those professional gladiators who would lose their job, those agents of the Italo-German-Levantine capitalism of the Triest Chamber of Commerce who want to be rid of the competition of Rieka and think that this can only be obtained by annexation, and also those Italian Nationalists who believe that the only path to national greatness is by acquiring territory everywhere. No light has come to them from the East; the same arguments which are now put forward by such societies as the "Pro Dalmatia" could be heard in Italy before she possessed herself of Tripoli. One heard the same talk of strategic necessities; one heard that nearly all the population was waiting with open arms for the Italians; one heard that from a business point of view nothing could be better; one heard that the Italians without Tripoli would be choked out of the Mediterranean. And what have been the fruits of the conquest of Tripoli? No economic advantages have been procured, as Prezzolini wrote, no sociological, no strategic, no diplomatic benefits. A great deal of money was thrown away, a vast amount of energy was wasted, and thousands of troops have to be stationed permanently in the wilderness. That expedition to Tripoli, which was one of the gravest errors of Italian politics, was preceded by clouds of forged documents, of absurdities, of partial extracts out of consular reports, of lying correspondence which succeeded in misleading the Italians.

WHY THE ITALIANS CLAIMED DALMATIA

"The Italian Government," said the _Morning Post_,[22] "is well qualified to judge of the interests of its own people." Here the _Morning Post_ is not speaking of the Italian Government which dealt with Tripoli, but that which has been dealing with Dalmatia. The reasons which have been advanced for an Italian or a partly Italian Dalmatia are geographical, botanical, historical, ethnical, military, naval and economic. As for the geographical reasons: even in the schools of Italy they teach that the Italian natural frontier is determined by the point of division of the waters of the Alps and that this frontier falls at Porto Re, a few miles to the south of Rieka--everything to the south of that belonging to the Balkan Peninsula. We may note the gallant patriotism of an Italian cartographer mentioned by Prezzolini; this worthy has inscribed a map of Dalmatia down to the Narenta with the pleasing words: "The new natural boundaries of Italy." As for the argument that the flora of Dalmatia resembles that of Italy, this can equally well be employed by those who would annex Italy to Dalmatia. Historically, we have seen that Venice, which held for many years the seacoast and the islands, did not alter the Slav character of the country. It is not now the question as to whether Venice deserved or did not deserve well of Dalmatia, but "the truth is," says M. Emile Haumant,[23] the learned and impartial French historian, "the truth is that when Marmont's Frenchmen arrived they found the Slav language everywhere, the Italian by its side on the islands and the coast, Italian customs and culture in the towns, and also the lively and sometimes affectionate remembrance of Venice; but nowhere did a Dalmatian tell them that he was an Italian. On the contrary, they all affirmed that they were brothers of the Slav beyond, in whose misfortunes they shared and whose successes they celebrated." The Italians themselves, in achieving their unity, were very right to set aside the undoubted historical claims of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, those of the House of Este and those of the Vatican, seeing that they were in opposition to the principle of nationality and the right of a people to determine its own political status. With regard to the ethnical reasons, we are flogging another dead horse, as the statistics--even those taken during the Italian occupation--prove to the meanest intellect; and now the pro-Italians, despairing to make anyone believe that the 97.5 per cent. of the people of Dalmatia are truly Italians who by some kink in their nature persist in calling themselves Slavs, have invented a brand new nationality, the Dalmatian, after the classic style of the late Professor Jagi['c] who at Vienna, under the pressure of the Austrian Government, began talking of the Bosnian language in order not to say that it is Serbo-Croat. He was drowned in laughter. With respect to the military reasons, the Dalmatian littoral cannot be defended by a State which is not in possession of the hinterland. In time of peace a very strong army would be needed; Italy would, in fact, have to double her army for the defence of a frontier 700 kilometres long. And in the event of war it would be necessary either to abandon Dalmatia or to form two armies of operation, one on the frontiers of Julian Venetia, the other in Dalmatia, and without any liaison between them. From the military point of view it is incomparably more to the interest of Italy that she should live on friendly terms with the people of the eastern shore of the Adriatic than that she should maintain there an army out of all proportion to her military and economic resources--an army which in time of war would be worse than useless, since, as M. Gauvain observes, the submarines, which would find their nesting-places in the islands, would destroy the lines of communication. An Italian naval argument is, that if she had to fight on the eastern side of the Adriatic her sailors in the morning would have the sun in their eyes; but the Yugoslavs would be similarly handicapped in the case of an evening battle. With regard to the economic reasons, the longitudinal lines will continue to guarantee to the Germans and Magyars the commercial monopoly of the East, and Italy will perceive that she has paid very dearly for a blocked-up window. The sole method by which Italy can from the Adriatic cause her commerce to penetrate to the Balkans is by concluding with a friendly Yugoslavia the requisite commercial treaties, which will grow more valuable with the construction of the lateral railways, running inland from the coast, which Austrians and Magyars so constantly impeded.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE TREATY OF LONDON

If, then, it is difficult to see where the Italian interests will be profited by the possession of Dalmatia, there remains the argument that, irrespective of the consequences, she must have a good deal of it since it was allotted to her by the Treaty of London,[24] although the engagements entered into by Italy, France and Great Britain when they signed the Treaty with Germany caused the earlier instrument to be subject to revision where its terms had been disregarded. Signor Orlando, in an interview granted in April 1918 to the _Journal des Debats_, eagerly insisted that the Treaty had been concluded against the Austrian enemy, not against the Yugoslav nation; and if this be more than a mere phrase it is clear that with the disappearance of Austria-Hungary the Treaty automatically fell to the ground. By this Treaty of April 1915, France and Great Britain are bound--if necessary, by force of arms--to assist Italy in appropriating what, I believe, will be acknowledged to be some one else's country, at all events a country the vast proportion of whose inhabitants have determined that on no account will they come under the Italians. Would it not have been advisable if those who signed this document had made a few not very recondite researches into eastern Adriatic questions? They must have felt some qualms at the cries of indignation and amazement which arose when the provisions of the Treaty were disclosed, for it did not remain a secret very long. They had imagined, on the whole, that as Dalmatia had been under alien rulers, Venetian, Austrian and so forth, for so many years it really would not matter to them very much if they were governed from Vienna or from Rome. Perhaps a statesman here and there had heard that the Dalmatian Diet had petitioned many times since 1870 that they should be reunited to their brothers of Croatia and Slavonia in the Triune Kingdom. But all the calculations seem to have been made upon the basis that Austria-Hungary would survive, as a fairly formidable Power at any rate. The union of the Southern Slavs was too remote, and the Italians would be kindly masters. When the howl of indignation rose, the statesmen seem to have conceived the hope that the Italians would be generous and wise. The chief blame for the Treaty does not rest, however, on the Frenchmen and the Englishmen, but on the Russians; it was naturally felt that they should be more cognizant of Slav affairs, and if they were content to sign the Treaty, France and England might well follow their example. When Dr. Zari['c], the Bishop of Split, saw the former Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonov, in Paris in the spring of 1919, this gentleman was in a state of such dejection that the Bishop, out of pity, did not try to probe the matter. "Sometimes," said Sazonov, "sometimes the circumstances are too much opposed to you and you have to act against your inclinations."[25] The French and British statesmen gave the Bishop the impression that they were ashamed of the Treaty. He read to them in turn a memorandum in which he suggested that the whole Dalmatian question should be left to the arbitration of President Wilson, who was well informed, through experts, of the local conditions. And was it, in any case, just that an Italian, both claimant and judge, should sit on the Council of Four, to which no Yugoslav was admitted? To President Wilson the Bishop said, "You have come to fight for the just cause."

The President made no reply.

The Bishop, a native of the island of Hvar, a great linguist, was a man who made you think that a very distinguished mind had entered the body of the late Cardinal Vaughan. To him the most noticeable features of the President were the clear brow, the mystic eyes and the mouth which showed that he stood firmly on the ground.

"You have come to work and fight for the peace," said the Bishop.

"Yes, indeed, to fight," said Dr. Wilson. "And I will act with all my energy. You," he said, "you must help me."

"I will help you," said the Bishop, "with my prayers."

The Yugoslav Delegation in Paris had, on the authority of the Belgrade Cabinet, suggested that the question should be arbitrated.

"The Italians have declined the arbitration," said Dr. Zari['c], "just as in the War Germany and Austria declined yours."

The President nodded.

"They have committed many disorders in our fair land," said the Bishop.

"I know, I know," said the President.

But, it will be asked, why did not Dr. Wilson insist on a just settlement of the Adriatic question, taking into his own hands that which Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau were so chary of touching? These two statesmen, with the London Treaty hanging over them, wanted Wilson's assent for matters in which British and French interests were more directly concerned, while they required Sonnino's co-operation in the Treaty with Germany. It would have suited them very well if Wilson had taken such energetic steps with Italy that they themselves could, suitably protesting to Sonnino, be swept along by the presidential righteousness. But Dr. Wilson was disappointing those who had--in the first place because of the lofty language of his Notes--awaited a really great man. He was seen to be out of his depth; strenuously he sought to rescue his Fourteen Points and to steer the Covenant of the League through the rocks and shallows of European diplomacy. Sonnino, playing for time, involved the good Wilson in a maze of confused negotiations, while nearly every organ of Italian official and unofficial opinion was defaming the President. On April 15 Dr. Wilson in a memorandum suggested the famous "Wilson Line" in Istria, which thrust the Italian frontier westwards, so that Rieka should be safeguarded from the threat of an Italian occupation of Monte Maggiore. Italy was to give up northern Dalmatia and all the islands, save Lussin and Vis; in return she was to be protected by measures limiting the naval and military powers of Yugoslavia. When Wilson appealed over the head of the Italian Government to the people, their passions had been excited to such a degree that much more harm was done than good. It is said that he had promised Messrs. Lloyd George and Clemenceau that he would not publish his letter for three hours, but that--pride of authorship triumphing over prudence--it was circulated to the Press two hours before this time was up, and a compromise which had been worked out by Mr. Lloyd George had perforce to be abandoned. This was one of the occasions when the President's impulsiveness burst out through his cold exterior, when his strength of purpose, his grim determination to fight for justice were undermined by his egotism.

ITALIAN HOPES IN MONTENEGRO

For months the Italians had been consoling themselves with the thought that such a hybrid affair as Yugoslavia would never really come into existence. Some visionaries might attempt to join the Serbs and Croats and Slovenes, yet these must be as rare as Blake, who testified that "when others see but the dawn coming over the hill, I see the sons of God shouting for joy." One only had to listen, one could hear already how they were growling, how they were quarrelling, how they were killing each other. In Montenegro, for example, and Albania the Italians were greatly interested--not always as spectators. If you tell a hungry Montenegrin peasant in the winter that there is a chance of his obtaining flour and--well, that he may have to fight for it, but he will get good booty at Cetinje, he will go there. In January 1919 there was a battle. "The Montenegrin people rose in rebellion against the Serbians to recover their independence," said an Italian writer, one Dr. Attilio Tamaro in a weekly paper called _Modern Italy_, which was published in London. "This intensely popular revolt, animated by the heroically patriotic spirit of the Montenegrins, was relentlessly suffocated in blood. In the little city of Cetinje alone, where there are but a few thousand inhabitants, over 400 were killed and wounded. The Serbians and the French together accomplished this sanguinary repression. We repeat, it is painful to see the French lend their men, their blood and their glorious arms to the carrying out of the low intrigues of Balkan politics." The money and the arms that were found on the dead and captured rebels were Italian. If the schemes of the Italians had not been upset by the timely arrival of the Yugoslav forces, with the few Frenchmen, they would have occupied Cetinje and restored the traitor king. As it was, they occupied Antivari, from which place they smuggled arms and munitions into the country. They conspired with the adherents of the old regime, a very small body of men who were enormously alarmed at the loss of their privileged position. The chief of them was Jovan Plamenac, a former Minister whom the people at Podgorica had refused to hear, a few weeks previously, when he attempted to address them. He was hated on account of the most ruthless fashion in which, as Minister, he had executed certain of his master's critics at Kola[vs]in. There was a time, during the first Balkan War, when he advocated union with Serbia and on April 6, 1916, he wrote in the _Bosnische Post_ of Sarajevo that Nikita, owing to his flight, "may be regarded as no longer existing." But his unpopularity remained and, with vengeance burning in his heart, he went from Podgorica to the Italians. They concocted a nice plan--he was to raise an army of his countrymen and the Italians would bring their garrison from Scutari. On January 1 Plamenac and his partisans tried to seize Virpazar, on the Lake of Scutari--the Commandant of the Italian troops at Scutari, one Molinaro, had asked the chief of the Allied troops, three days before this attempt, whether he might dispatch two companies to that place for the purpose of suppressing the disorders which had not yet come to pass. Another rising was engineered at Cetinje, where twenty or thirty of the poor peasants who had let themselves be talked over by Plamenac were killed; the rest of the misguided fellows were sent home, only their leaders being detained. Plamenac himself escaped to Albania.[26] On the side of the Montenegrin Provisional Government no regular troops were available, as the Yugoslav soldiers who had lately arrived were engaged in policing other parts of the country. Volunteers were needed and a body of young men, mostly students, enrolled themselves. They were so busy that they omitted to inform Mr. Ronald M'Neill, M.P., that they really were Montenegrin students. That indignant gentleman insists that they were Serbs, armed with French and British rifles, against which, he tells us (in the _Nineteenth Century_, January 1921) the insurgents could not do much. Eleven of these volunteers were killed and they were buried underneath the tree where Nikita used to administer his brand of justice. All kinds of incriminating documents were found upon the dead and captured rebels, as also a significant letter from the Italian Minister accredited to Nikita, which was addressed to the chancellor of the Italian Legation at Cetinje. An inter-Allied Commission, over which General Franchet d'Esperey presided, issued their report on February 8 at Podgorica. "All the troops," it said, "in Montenegro are Yugoslavs and not Serbs; there are not more than 500 of them." It further stated that the rebellion had been provoked by certain agents of the ex-King, assisted by some Italian agents. As for the ridiculous Italian charge which I quoted, accusing the French of a share in the low intrigues of Balkan politics, this participation consisted in their General at Kotor demanding of Darkovi['c], the leader of the Montenegrin deputies, that his followers and the rebels should not come to blows. The reply, which annoyed the General, was to the effect that if the rebels made an attack, then Darkovi['c] with his scratch forces would defend himself--and the battle lasted for two or three days. A junior French officer, who had been in command of a small detachment at Cetinje, told me that the noise of firing had awakened him every night and he had not the least idea what it was all about. But the French had a pretty accurate idea of the nationality of the "brigands" who on December 29 fired on the SS. _Skroda_ and _Satyre_ near the village of Samouritch when it was carrying a cargo of flour up the Bojana for the Montenegrins. These vessels were sailing under the French flag and the "brigands," about fifty in number, were armed with machine guns. An International Commission established these facts, as also that the Italian ship _Vedeta_ passed up the river just before the outrage and the _Mafalda_ just after it, and neither of them was molested. In consequence of what occurred and as practically all the supplies for Montenegro had at that time to be sent by the Bojana, General Dufour, in the absence of French troops, authorized the Serbs on February 12 to occupy the commanding position of Tarabosh.

WHAT HAD LATELY BEEN THE FATE OF THE AUSTRIANS THERE

These Yugoslav troops had been detached from the left wing of the Salonica forces and had come overland in order to deal with the situation in Montenegro. The Austrians had been in a woeful plight; it was regarded as a punishment to serve in Montenegro and Albania, not only because of the lack of amenities and the unruly spirit of the people, but also for the reason that the officers who came there--many managed to avoid it--were too often causes of dissatisfaction. More complaints had gone up from this front than from any other. The supplies allotted by the High Command in Austria were ample, as the Rieka depots testified, but a great deal did not reach its proper destination. Some officers took down their wives or other ladies, loading up the army motor-cars with luxuries of food and grand pianos, while the men were forced to tramp enormous distances; if anyone fell out, the natives in Albania would emerge from where they had been hiding and would deprive the wretched man of his equipment and his clothing, and perhaps his life. The sanitary section of that Austrian army was not good; it happened frequently that victims of malaria and wounded men were told to walk--if they arrived, so much the better. These poor fellows did not know that if they ultimately got back to Vienna they might be the objects of Imperial solicitude--the least to be dreaded was the Archduke Salvator, who was wont to come to a hospital, with his wife, and to bestow on every man a coloured picture-postcard of their Imperial and Royal persons, with a sentence printed underneath respecting their paternal and maternal love; it was officially reported in Vienna, of another hospital, that those who lay there had been spending "happy hours" in "the circle of the exalted Family"--this referred to the Archduchess Maria Immaculata, whose compositions for the piano are said to be beyond all criticism; she herself did not play them, but would sit there while they were inflicted by a courtier on the helpless men. Not very enviable was the lot of those Magyar officers who were taken to that hospital in Buda-Pest over which the Archduchess Augusta, a strikingly ugly woman, presided. It was a regulation that no wounds were allowed to be dressed until the Archduchess, arrayed in uniform and armed with a revolver, made her appearance of an evening. The officers were told that it was etiquette for them to broach a pleasant conversation with their benefactress. But the most dangerous Habsburg was the Archduchess Blanka, who was interested in medicine; she had thought out for herself a remedy which human ailments never would withstand, but which was more especially effective in cases of tuberculosis, of malaria and of kidney diseases. At the hospital in the Kirchstetterngasse she had a ward entirely devoted to kidneys. Her treatment consisted in hot bandages of corn-flowers; the patients were packed in these bandages and that was all that was done to them. With regard to the diet, there were no particular regulations. Some of the men were sent from there to another and less original hospital, but it was often too late.

AND OF THE NATIVES

The Montenegrins who had been for so long--some of them for three years--leading a congenial life among their rocks, descending now and then to kill an Austrian and to gather booty, were most active when the ill-starred Imperial army was retiring. Six hundred Austrians, for instance, took the road from Kola[vs]in with the intention of marching to Lieva Rieka, a distance of 45 kilometres. Thirty-five of them arrived there. Thus the population avenged such incidents as the hanging by the Austrian authorities of the brother of the ex-Minister General Ve[vs]ovi['c],[27] the General having taken to the hills and his brother being executed by way of reprisal. The Austrians had now to pay the penalty of ruthlessness; on September 1, 1917, Count Clam Martini['c], the Military Governor, issued Order No. 3110 which stated that: "In consequence of the recent inquiry having revealed the fact that telegraph and telephone wires have been cut by civilians, we make the following order:

"1. Persons caught red-handed in acts of sabotage will be
summarily shot, their houses will be razed to the ground and
their property confiscated by the Military Administration
Authorities.

"2. If the author of the outrage cannot be found, the
procedure will be as follows:--

"(_a_) The commune where the act of sabotage has taken place
will be condemned to a heavy fine. If the sum demanded is not
paid within forty-eight hours, the cattle will be seized.

"(_b_) Hostages will be taken who, if the cases of sabotage
are repeated, will be executed in their commune."

Life under the Austrians had become unendurable. Typhoid fever, marsh fever, typhus and dysentery assumed such proportions that in the towns and villages one saw--apart from such notices as Order No. 3110--no other bills posted up on the walls but those containing advice as to the correct way of nursing the sick. While poor wretches were dying of hunger in the hospitals and on the high road for want of bread, the authorities published a recipe for the making of wheat-butter, which was a recent discovery of German science, reputed to be very nourishing for debilitated organisms. But the price of a kilo (2 lb.) of wheat was 12 crowns (about 10s.). When the epidemic of typhus, which broke out in Cetinje and in the Njegu[vs] clan, reached alarming proportions and spread to other districts, the medical authorities advertised that household effects and linen should be washed with water and potatoes. A kilo of potatoes, in the autumn of 1917, cost a price equivalent to 6s., a quart of oil cost L2, 10s., a quart of milk 5s., a kilo of coffee L2, 18s. 4d., a yard of cloth L4, 4s. to L6, 6s., a pair of boots L8, 7s. An average of 200 persons--mainly women and children--were dying every day of starvation.

The Austrian army in retreat was incapable of action. It occupied a line east of Podgorica: Bioce-Tuzi-Lake of Scutari, with very few guns. The troops were scanty, they were weakened by malaria, etc.; but the Italians pursued them with great caution. The chief enemies were Albanians and Montenegrins. The wily Austrians gave rifles to the Albanians in order that they should attack the Montenegrins, but they were often used against their former owners. Then the contingents of the Salonica army came across the mountains, and when the Austrians went north, as best they could, the Yugoslavs of the Imperial and Royal army--Bosniaks were well represented--pinned on their tunics the national colours and were greeted by the inhabitants. Arriving at Cetinje they heard the incredible news that a Yugoslav State had been founded, that the Austrian navy had been handed over to the Yugoslavs, that French and Italians were already at Kotor. During the journey to that port the commanders were depressed, but the rank and file rejoiced at the idea of going home. Discipline was at an end. Thousands of rockets were fired into the air. It was the end of the Habsburg monarchy.

NOW NIKITA IS DEPOSED

The next thing for the Montenegrins to do was to depose Nikita. By a futile proclamation that personage had tried in October to resist the union of the Yugoslavs; he had made a last desperate attempt to save his crown. "I am ready to do," he said, "what my people desires." He plaintively protested that all his life had been dedicated to their service and now he wanted to go back to ascertain precisely what they wished. "Montenegro," he had said, "belongs to a nation of heroes, who fought with honour for the highest ideals." But when on November 24 the Great National Skup[vs]tina met, and when on the 26th it unanimously deposed him--the old gentleman was wise enough to follow the advice of some French statesmen and remain where he was. "Here am I amongst you, dressed in our beautiful national costume," he said at Neuilly to his supporters, on one of the occasions when he denied that he had been a traitor or anything so dreadful. But being a prudent old gentleman he refrained from uttering these words at Podgorica, where the Skup[vs]tina had met; a better plan was to communicate with the Press Association, in the hope that many editors would print his words. If it was a final anti-climax for a mediaeval prince--ah well, what is life but one long anti-climax? He would protest against the constitution of the Skup[vs]tina. He had by no means given his approval to the new election laws; and if, contrary to his own practice, the gendarmes were having nothing to do with the urns, that was merely in order to curry favour with the Western Powers. The deputies were chosen by the people indirectly--that is to say, every ten men elected a representative, and these in their turn elected the deputies. This was not done by ballot, for Montenegro, like Hungary, had never known the ballot. An absurd outcry was raised by Nikita's band of adventurers and their unhappy dupes in this country; they called the world to witness this most palpable iniquity on the part of the Serbs, whose armed forces had rushed across the mountains, and the moment they arrived in Montenegro had so overawed the population that this pro-Serb, pro-Yugoslav Skup[vs]tina was duly chosen. Go to! Of course it was a sad disappointment to Nikita that a Yugoslav instead of an Italian army should occupy Montenegro. He had telegraphed at the beginning of the War to Belgrade that: "Serbia may rely on the brotherly and unconditional support of Montenegro, in this moment on which depends the fate of the Serbian nation, as well as on any other occasion"; and since he knew, without any telegram, that Serbia would in her turn support Montenegro--but not the tiny pro-Nikita faction--he was reduced to the appalling straits of a plot to force himself upon his own people by means of a foreign army. Now the composition of the aforementioned Yugoslav forces should be noted--after more than six years of heroic fighting against the Turks, the Bulgars, the Austro-Germans, the Albanian blizzards, and again the Bulgars and the Austro-Germans there did not survive a very large number of the splendid veterans of Marshal Mi[vs]i['c], and in Macedonia the ranks were filled by Yugoslav volunteers from the United States. Many of these Yugoslavs (over half of them Dalmatians and Bosnians) were included, in the army which entered Montenegro. The whole force at the time of the National Skup[vs]tina consisted of about 200 men, ten of whom were Serbs from the old kingdom--and if anyone maintains that 200 men could impose their will upon a population of 350,000 which has arms enough and is skilful in the use of arms, he makes it clear that he knows little of the Montenegrins.

THE ASSEMBLY WHICH DEPOSED HIM