Chapter XI: The Reed Era 264 (6)

Uniform wearing of the “slop chest” variety was, however, always regarded as the badge of the pressed man and jail bird. The “prime seaman” who joined decently clad was allowed to wear his own clothes, and these were decided by fashion. There were dudes in the Navy in those days, and contemporary art records a good deal of variety. In our own day, when exactitude is at a premium, it has erred badly enough to depict bluejackets with moustachios.[65] In the old days it was probably even more careless still. Consequently everything as to the costume of men in the Nelson era required to be accepted with caution. It is, however, clear from the more reliable literary and descriptive sources that the dandy sailor existed very freely. The “prime seaman” loved to hall-mark himself by his costume.

On board ship in dirty weather he wore anything and his best when coming up for punishment.[66] In a general way fashion always worked from the officers’ uniform, with fancy additions. A natty blue jacket was the essential feature, with as many brass buttons as the owner could afford. A red or yellow waistcoat seems to have been _a la mode_. Trousers, preferably of white duck, but sometimes of blue, were also “the fancy.” Sometimes these were striped. In all cases they were ample, free, and flowing, as they are at the present day. Convenience of tucking up on wet decks is the usual explanation; but there is good reason to believe that idle fashion of the Nelson days had just as much or more to do with the modern bluejacket’s trousers.

The quaint little top hat of the midshipman was generally worn by the Lower Deck dandy. A pig tail was also a _sine qua non_ during the period of the Second Great War.

The origin of the pigtail is wrapped in some mystery. It has been variously ascribed to copying the French Navy[67] and to imitating the Marines, who wore wonderfully greased pigtails at this period.

To complete the rig the seamen used to decorate themselves with coloured ribbons let into their clothes. They lived a hard life, and much has been written upon the subject. But the evidence generally tends to prove that the “prime seaman” as a rule had a far better time than those who (failing to recognise that conditions have altered to-day) appear to realise.[68] The lack of liberty, entailed by the presence of so many men who would assuredly desert on half a chance, was so general and so long-standing that it is doubtful whether it was felt to any really great extent. Customs cover most things.

To our modern ideas the punishments afloat were horribly brutal; but here again it is necessary to remember the difference in era. Floggings and kindred punishments were plentiful enough ashore; and there is a good deal of evidence to indicate that they were taken as “all in the day’s work afloat.” The victim was usually “doped” by his messmates, who saved up part of their rum tots for the purpose, and the horrors of the cat have undoubtedly been somewhat exaggerated. It was undeniably brutal and cruel; but, to select a homely simile, so were dental methods a few years ago. Our fathers submitted to things in this direction which none of us would, or, for that matter, could stand nowadays. The bulk of contemporary evidence is that the (to our eyes) brutal punishments of the Navy of a hundred odd years ago were never regarded as serious grievances by those who stood to undergo them.

The actual grievances revolved entirely around the administration of undeserved punishments. A certain number of captains misused their powers and prerogatives, but only a small percentage did so. At no time does the average captain appear to have been a brutal bully. This is, however, to be qualified by the midshipmen, of whom a certain number deliberately bullied men into doing things for which they got brutally punished afterwards. But outside this the conditions were by no means so horrible as generally depicted. The real sufferers were the pressed landsmen, who certainly learned to be seamen in a very hard school.

It is necessary, however, even here to remember the times and the conditions. This view is borne out by the Great Mutiny. The mutineers, even at the Nore, never demanded the abolition of the cat. When trouble was connected with it in any way, it was over its unreasonable use, as, for instance, in the insensate flogging of the last two men off the rigging, which led to the Mutiny in the _Hermione_. This--which entailed punishing the smartest men since these had furthest to go--goaded the “prime seamen” to desperation and sympathy with the landsmen element afloat, which was ever in a semi-mutinous condition. It is impossible to hold that Captain Pigot of the _Hermione_ did not deserve his fate. But Pigots were comparatively rare, and captains like Nelson by no means scarce. Nelson had no hesitation in flogging men, but he flogged justly, and no troubles ever occurred in any ship commanded by him. For that matter it was characteristic of the time that a captain might be a Tartar, and yet be quite popular with his crew so long as he was just. The “prime seamen” who formed the nucleus of the ship’s company realised the necessity of severe measures and strict discipline in order to tame the human ullage which made up the rest of the crew.

In this connection it is interesting to note that towards the end of the period there began to creep in the commencement of a later classification of ratings not liable to corporal punishment.

Had life afloat in the days of the Great War been quite as terrible as it is often depicted as having been, the volunteer element of trained seamen could hardly have existed, nor could the glamour of the sea have brought so many raw volunteers as it did. When a ship was commissioned, the first step was advertising for men. The advertisements were specious and alluring enough; but the captain’s character generally had most influence on the response; and all the essential seamen element, unless they had spent all their money, were pretty wary as to who they shipped with.

To be sure it did not take the seaman long to lose his money. On a ship paying off he received a considerable accumulated sum, and every kind of shark and harpy was on the lookout to relieve him of it. He got gloriously drunk and so remained while the money lasted, and in this condition the press-gang often got him.

The press-gang was a legalised form of naval conscription. In theory any seafaring man who could be laid hands on might be taken; in practice all was fish that came to the press-gang’s net.

The press-gang, armed with cudgels and cutlasses, used to operate at night, generally in the naval towns,[69] but at times also further afield. It laid hands upon all and sundry, hitting them over the head if they resisted.

A cargo secured, the men were taken on board and kept between decks under an armed guard pending examination by the captain and surgeon. Certain people, such as apprentices or some merchant seamen, were exempt and had to be liberated. Badly diseased men were also let loose again. Verminous and dirty folk were scrubbed with a brutality which created subsequent cleanly habits. Their clothes were either fumigated or else thrown away altogether, and fresh clothing supplied from the “slop chest” at so much off their pay.

If within a fortnight the pressed man cared to call himself a volunteer he received a bounty; but, whether he volunteered[70] or not, once aboard the ship there he remained till death or the paying off of the ship years later. It was this confinement to the ship which led to so much agitation, and was made one of the principal grievances of the mutineers at Spithead.

On the side of the authorities it has to be remembered that had any man been allowed ashore he would certainly never have been seen again, at any rate, so long as he had any money. In most fleets also, an attempt at a substitute was made by allowing ship to ship visiting. Such visits invariably resulted in drunken bouts and subsequent floggings. Nelson went further--he instituted theatricals on shipboard. It is generally clear that--very crudely, of course--the authorities were not blind to the desirability of relieving the tedium of imprisonment on board ship.

The feeding of the men in the days of the Great War is generally considered to have been villainous. It was one of the causes of the Mutiny; but there is some reason to believe that it was not invariably bad. Rodney’s fleet is said to have been excellently provisioned, and much of what has been written about “thieving pursers” in the past is now known to be mythical. It was a classical legend that the purser stole and swindled with bad food. He might do so, and many did. But all did not, either from honesty or because they did not get the chance. Under Nelson or Rodney an unscrupulous purser stood to have a very bad time indeed, and there were others very keenly alive to the fact that good feeding and efficiency went hand in hand. The bad food at the time of the mutinies seem to have been a feature of that particular time, and even so due rather to mismanagement than much else. For the rest, the real culprits were economists on shore, who had no connection whatever with the Fleet, and were merely interested in husbanding the financial resources of the country.

The provisions as made were almost uniformly good, and the stories of unscrupulous contractors who, in league with the pursers, foisted inferior food on the Fleet, may mostly be dismissed. Such cases occurred now and again, but comparatively rarely. “Rogues in authority” were mainly mythical. There are yarns by the score. There are corresponding yarns to-day, quite as plentiful, which the careless historian of the future will no doubt swallow. For example, at the present day it is an article of faith with every bluejacket that the first lieutenant pockets odd sixpences out of the canteen, and nothing ever can or ever will remove the impression.

It is absolutely absurd; but within the last ten years I have had it chapter and verse all about the peculation of 1s. 4d. by a first lieutenant whose private income ran well into five figures! It is a sea-legend so hoary that bluejackets honour it, no matter how ridiculously improbable. The purser of the days of the Great War was not perhaps entirely clean handed, but as Commander Robinson has pointed out,[71] even at the Spithead Mutiny, when the provision question was very much to the fore, the mutineers did not complain of the purser, but of the system and regulations. It was people on shore, not the man afloat, who, when it came to the point, mixed up the instrument with the handlers thereof.

The Spithead trouble, which was purely naval (the Nore Mutiny was more or less political) arose entirely, so far as food was concerned, out of the economists already referred to. Vast stores of provisions had been accumulated, and many were going bad. Pursers received very strict orders to use up the old “likely to decay soon” before touching the new. The result was the issue of decayed pork, stinking cheese, and mildewed biscuits to an unprecedented degree. A badness that had hitherto been more or less occasional chanced just about the Mutiny period to be general.

The men were by no means starved or badly fed, presuming the food to be good. The usual scale was somewhat as follows:--A daily issue of a pound of biscuit and a gallon of beer or else pint of wine; and when these were exhausted, one gill of Navy rum diluted with three of water twice a day. On Tuesdays and Saturdays an issue of 2lbs. of beef was made; on Sundays and Thursdays 1lb. of pork. Over the week the issue of other articles was 2lbs. pease, 1½lbs. oatmeal, 6ozs. of butter, an equal amount of sugar, and 12ozs. of cheese and half-a-pint of vinegar nominally per man; but actually every four men took the provisions of six. Nine pounds of meat a week could hardly be called starvation fare even to-day, and in those times it was an extraordinarily liberal diet for men who at home would not have had anything like it.[72] Except in cases with admirals like Collingwood (who in the matter of understanding the ratio of health to efficiency was about the most incompetent admiral the British Navy ever had), it was generally seen to that, whenever possible, fresh provisions could be purchased from traders who regularly visited blockading fleets.

Furthermore, rations were normally varied so far as circumstances would permit, and when possible fresh beef and mutton were substituted for the salt meat allowance. Nelson went to almost extravagant lengths in these directions; but the majority of other officers were not far behind. Whatever hell the Lower Deck of the Fleet entailed, the blame in hardly any case lay with the officers, executive or otherwise, but entirely with civilian officials and Members of Parliament with ideas of their own about economy. All the reliable evidence is to the effect that the responsible authorities desired their fighting men to live (relatively speaking) like fighting cocks, that the difference between the ideal and the real was due to civilian influence, and that even so it was only really thoroughly bad just before the Great Mutiny. Had it been a regular thing the Mutinies would probably never have happened, the men would have been too used to the conditions to find in them a special cause of complaint.

The whole trouble in messing in the old days arose out of quality, not quantity. The beef and pork were almost invariably bad, owing to the system of using up the old provisions first, with a view to economy. Every ship carried tons of good provisions going bad, while those already bad and decayed were being consumed. Consequently the men starved in the midst of relative plenty.

It remains to add that the officers fared little better.[73] On the whole, taking their general shore food into consideration, it may be argued that they fared worse. As a rule, they had to eat what the men ate, a fact too often forgotten by those who believe that the officers of those days generally peculated on provisions for the men.

Both aft and forward there was one consolation. Liquor was plentiful enough for anyone who wanted to be half seas over by eventime. So was the hard life lived, with an occasional battle to break the monotony.

To both officers and men battle seems to have been the “beano” of to-day. Conditions on board were not rosy enough to make life worth clinging to, while battle meant a good time afterwards to those who got through unscathed. There was only one terror--being wounded. The horrors of the cockpit are beyond exaggeration. The surgeons did their best. They were poorly paid men[74] and expected to find their own instruments: only if they could not did they borrow tools from the carpenter.[75]

They heated their instruments before use so as to lessen the shock of amputation; they doped their patients with wine or spirit so far as might be. They took all as they came in turn, whether officer or man. If anyone seemed too badly wounded to be worth attention they had him taken above and thrown overboard. If, at a hasty glance, taking off an arm or a leg, or both, seemed likely to promise a cure, they gave the wounded man a tot of rum and a bit of leather to chew, and set to work! The wounded who survived were treated with a humanity which makes the “more humanity to the wounded” of the Spithead mutineers a little difficult to understand at first sight. They were fed on delicacies; and anything out of the ordinary on the wardroom table was always sent to them. They also got all the officers’ wine.

On the other hand, time in the sick bay was deducted from their pay,[76] and they were liable to all kinds of infectious diseases caught from the last patient.

To satisfy the demands of the economists, lint was forbidden and sponges restricted, so that a single sponge might have to serve for a dozen wounded men. Blood-poisoning was thus indiscriminately spread, and a wounded man thus infected with the worst form of it, was mulcted in his pay for medicines required. When the Spithead mutineers demanded “more humanity to the wounded” those were the things that probably they had in mind. It has further to be remembered that a man wounded too badly to be of any further use afloat was flung ashore without pension or mercy. The surgeons were fully as humane as their brethren ashore, possibly much more so, from the mere fact that any community of men flung together to sink or swim together compels common sympathies. To the men the purser was classically a thief, the surgeon a callous brute, the officers generally brutes of another kind. This cheap view of the situation has been perpetuated _ad lib_. But all the best evidence is to the effect that, as a rule, and save in exceptional cases, most of those on board a warship pulled together, and that all strove to make the best of things. Things to be made the best of were few, no doubt, and the grumblers and growlers are the folk who have left most records. Allowing for the different era, similar growls can be found to-day. To-day the contented man says nothing; the discontented says a little, and outside sympathisers say a great deal. The truth probably lies with the actually discontented’s version somewhat discounted. In the days of the Great War, the same fact probably obtained. Unquestionably the seaman proper loved the sea and his duty, despite all hardships and drawbacks. To this fact is to be attributed the easy victories of the Great Wars, and, relatively to corresponding shore life, sea life afloat can hardly have been quite so black as most people delight to paint it.[77]

The pay of the Navy of the period remains to be mentioned. It ran as follows:--

Captain--6s. to 25s. a day, according to the ship, plus a variety of
allowances.

Midshipmen--£2 to £2 15s. 6d. a month.

Surgeons--11s. to 18s. a day, with half-pay when unemployed.

Assistant-Surgeons--4s. and 5s., with half-pay when unemployed.

Chaplains--about 8s. 6d. a day, with allowances.

Schoolmasters--£2 to £2 8s. a month, with bounties.

Boatswains--£3 to £4 16s. a month.

Boatswain’s Mate--£2 5s. 6d. a month.

Gunner--£1 16s. to £2 2s. a month.

Carpenter--£3 to £5 16s. a month, according to the ship.

Quartermaster--£2 5s. 6d. a month.

Sailmaker--£2 5s. 6d. a month.

Sailmaker’s Assistant--£1 18s. 6d. a month.

Master-at-Arms--£2 0s. 6d. to £2 15s. 6d. a month.

Ship’s Corporals--£2 2s. 6d. a month.

Cook--11s. 8d. a month and pickings.

Able Seaman--11s. a month (33s. a month after 1797).

Ordinary Seaman--9s. a month (25s. 6d. a month after 1797).

Landsman--7s. 6d. a month (23s. a month after 1797).

Ship’s Boy--13s. to 13s. 6d. a month.

As a rule the men received their pay in a lump when the ship paid off. Hence those extraordinary scenes of dissipation with which the story books have made us sufficiently familiar. Jews[78] and women soon fleeced the Tar, who was generally too drunk to know what he was doing, there being dozens of willing hands ready to see to it that he was well plied with liquor.

_FLAGS._

In the year 1800 the Union flag was altered to its present form by the incorporation of the red cross of St. Patrick. This flag, the Union Jack, was used for flying on the bowsprit,[79] and at the main masthead by an Admiral of the Fleet. To hoist it correctly, _i.e._, right side up, was a special point of importance in the Fleet of Nelson’s day, and many a foreigner seeking to use British colours got bowled out from hoisting the flag incorrectly, _i.e._, without the greater width of white being uppermost in the inner canton nearest the staff. To this day many people on shore do the same.

The ensign was coloured according as to whether the Admiral was “of the white,” “blue,” or “red.” It was flown, as till quite recently, from the mizzen peak.

For battle purposes this variety ensign died out after Trafalgar, where, in order to avoid confusion, Nelson ordered all ships to fly the white ensign--he himself being a Vice-Admiral of the white, while Collingwood was Vice-Admiral of the blue. Trafalgar was thus the first battle to be fought deliberately under the white ensign.

IX.

THE BIRTH OF MODERN WARSHIP IDEAS.

In 1816 took place the bombardment of Algiers, whereby 1,200 Europeans who were in slavery were released. None of these, however, proved to be British subjects. A noticeable feature of the bombardment was the heavy damage done by the large ships engaged.

For the year 1817 the _personnel_ stood at 21,000 only. Ships in commission were fourteen of the line and 100 lesser craft. Two hundred and sixty-three (of which eighty-four were of the line) were laid up “in ordinary” and the remaining ships were condemned.

In this year a new rating of ships was introduced. Up till now the carronades had not been included in the armament of ships. Under the new rating they were included, and so the thirty-eight gun ship actually carrying fifty-two guns appeared for the first time with her proper armament.

Although the Navy was so reduced, considerable attention was paid to shipbuilding and improvement of construction. Trussed frames were introduced, and a variety of other inventions which had long been in use in France. Much attention was paid to the strong construction of the bow, with a view to resisting raking fire.[80] Sterns were also made circular to enable more guns to bear aft. A curious objection to this was made on the grounds that in time of war it was the enemy who would be in retreat and most in need of stern fire, and that by the introduction of this into the British Navy the enemy would copy and so have the advantage of being better able to defend himself than heretofore! It was, however, pointed out that perhaps war vessels propelled by steam might be met with in blockades, and that it would be extremely important to sail away from these and be able to destroy them while so doing!

The years 1818 and 1819 passed uneventfully. The _personnel_ was 20,000, and the estimates averaged between six and seven million pounds. They remained at about this figure for several years, and beyond some slight operations in Burmah, in 1824, the British Navy performed no war services till the year 1827. In the Burmese operations, the _Diana_, a small steam paddle vessel took part. It is also of some interest to record that Captain Marryat, the naval novelist, commanded the _Lorne_ (twenty) in these operations.

In 1827, the combined fleets of England, France and Russia met those of the Turks and Egyptians at Navarino, in connection with the war between Turkey and Greece. The allied fleet consisted as follows:--

{ Three ships of the line.
BRITISH { Four frigates.
{ Several other vessels.

{ Three ships of the line.
FRENCH { Two lesser vessels.
{ Two schooners.

RUSSIAN { Four ships of the line.
{ Four frigates.

The combined Turko-Egyptian fleet consisted of three ships of the line, fifteen large frigates, eighteen corvettes, and a number of gunboats, etc.

The Turkish fleet was anchored in the harbour. The combined fleet sailed into the harbour and anchored to leeward of the Turks. These fired upon some English boats and a general action ensued, in which the greater part of the Turko-Egyptian fleet was destroyed with the loss of somewhere about 4,000 men. The Allies lost 650, and the principal English ships were so damaged that they had to be sent home for repairs.

At and about this time, and right on for some years, an enormous number of experiments were carried out between ship and ship with a view to improving the sailing qualities, and side by side with this, the question of propulsion other than by sail was first seriously considered. A certain number of small steam tugs had been added to the Navy, there being no less than twenty-two such built in the reign of George IV. Of these the largest was built in 1835. Very little reliance was placed on steam at first for any possibilities outside towing and harbour work, and a great deal of energy was expended in devices to enable ships to be moved by manual labour. In place of the “sweeps” of ancient history, paddles were fitted, and in 1829 the _Galatea_ (forty-two) frigate was thus moved at a speed of three knots in a dead calm.

The _Galatea_ was commanded by Captain, afterwards Admiral Sir Charles, Napier, who so long ago as 1819 had been concerned in financing an unsuccessful attempt to run iron steamers on the Seine. The first ship in which hand paddles were tried was the _Active_, frigate. No success was met with, but Napier evolved a different system for the _Galatea_. Those of the _Active_ were worked by the capstan; Napier installed a series of winches along each side of the main deck. It took about two-thirds of the ship’s company to work them.

The earliest known use of steam was as long ago as in the year 1543. The account of it was in the original records which had been preserved in the Royal Archives of Simancas, among the State Papers of the city of Catalonia, and those of the Naval Secretary of War, in the year 1543, and was extracted on the 27th August, 1825, by the keeper, who signed his name “Tomas Gonzalez.”

The inventor, a naval officer named Garay, never revealed the secret of his invention, but mention is made of a “cauldron of boiling water” and “wheels of complicated movement on each side of the vessel.” He succeeded in obtaining a speed of “two leagues in three hours,” also “at least a league an hour” with his device, fitted to a 200-ton vessel named _Trinidad_.[81] Honours were bestowed on Garay, but the monarch who had patronised him, being busy with other matters, did not follow up the invention. Otherwise much naval history might have been different from what it is.

In 1736, Jonathan Hulls took out a patent in England for a stern wheel. It should be remembered that at this time the question of means of propulsion other than by sail was eagerly considered, and that paddles came to be tried in the place of oars, with a view to more continuity of action. Steam ideas somewhat trended to the idea of sucking water in forward and ejecting it aft. The screw propeller also was known certainly at as early a date as the paddle.

In 1789, a sixty-feet boat was driven for nearly seven miles an hour with a twelve horse-power engine, but for a very long time nothing was expected except canal work and towing. Even as steam progressed, it did so in the merchant service first.

By the year 1818, however, the Americans had built a sea-going steamer, _Savannah_, which crossed the Atlantic to Russia. On her return voyage the United States was reached twenty-five days after leaving Norway.

In England, in the year 1821, a steam mail service, between Holyhead and Dublin, was established, and in 1823 a steam mail service between England and India was seriously asked for, and in 1829 the subject again came upon the _tapis_.

In 1839, the steam liner _Great Britain_, was laid down. She was 322 feet long overall and a beam of fifty-one feet, and a displacement of 2,984 tons, with 1,000 horse-power. It was originally intended to make her a paddle-vessel. Instead of that, however, she was made a screw-steamer, and made her first trip in December, 1844, when she succeeded in exceeding her anticipated speed.

This serious attention to steam in the mercantile marine naturally attracted considerable interest in the Navy, the more so as two naval officers, Captains Chappel and Claxton, were the principal promoters of the mercantile enterprises. It was, however, generally pointed out that useful as steam might be for such purposes, it was unsuitable for warships proper, on account of the liability of the machinery to damage, and the practical impossibility of combining paddles with sailing. It was laid down that the first essential of a warship was to be able to sail, that if steam power could be usefully applied as an auxiliary it might be “desirable.”

After considerable experiments and investigations, it was found possible to place the machinery under the water-line, but the paddle-wheels were still exposed, and the armament space available was so slight that steam did not gain much favour.

The first steam vessel actually brought into the British service was the _Monkey_, built about the year 1821. She was bought into the service and used as a tug.

In the following year, the _Comet_ was specially built for the packet service,[82] but none of these were steam warships.

In 1843, the success of the _Great Britain_ influenced the Admiralty, and the _Penelope_ (forty-six) was cut apart and lengthened by sixty-five feet, and had engines of 650 horse-power fitted to her.

In 1844, the Earl of Dundonald (Cochrane) submitted plans to the Admiralty for a steamer of 760 tons, called the _Janus_. This vessel was built with an engine of his own design, but as this was a failure, ordinary engines were fitted.

In all these steamers the gun-fire was chiefly end-on, but in 1845 the _Odin_ and the _Sidon_, especially designed for broadside fire, were put in hand.

So long ago as the year 1825, the paddle was recognised as a source of danger for warships, and in that year a two-blade propeller, designed by Commander Samuel Brown, was accepted.

In 1836, Ericsson (subsequently to be of _Monitor_ fame) patented some propellers in England, but as he met with very little sympathy from the authorities, he retired to America. The main objections to the propeller appears not to have been due to any lack of appreciation so much as opposition from those who had invested heavily in paddle-propulsion plant.

In 1842, however, the Admiralty seriously took the question up. The _Rattler_, of 777 tons, and 200-horse-power, was lashed stern-to-stern with the paddle-yacht _Electro_ of the same displacement and horse-power. Both ships were driven away from each other at full speed, and the _Rattler_ succeeded in towing the _Electro_ after her. After this, in 1844, a screw frigate, the _Dauntless_, was ordered to be constructed; but as late as the year 1850, steam was merely regarded as an auxiliary, and received little or no consideration outside that.

The use of iron instead of oak as a material for shipbuilding was first seriously considered about the year 1800. In 1821, an iron steamer was in existence, and in 1839 the _Dover_ was ordered to be built for Government service as a steam packet. In 1841, the _Mohawk_ was ordered by the Admiralty for service on Lake Huron, but the first iron warship for the Royal Navy proper was the _Trident_, of 1850 tons and 300 horse-power, built at Blackwall, by Admiralty orders, in 1843.

Iron, as a material for warship construction, was looked on with considerable suspicion, both in England and in France. Experiments were conducted at Woolwich with some plates rivetted together like the sides of an iron ship, these plates being lined inside with cork and india-rubber (the first idea of a cofferdam). It was expected that this preparation, which was known as “kamptulicon,” would close up after shot had passed through and prevent ingress of water. This was found to be quite correct, but the egress of shot on the other side had quite the opposite result. The plates were sometimes packed with wood and sometimes cased with it, but the general result of the experiments was held prejudicial to the use of iron, which was supposed to splinter unduly compared to wood.

The importance of deciding whether warships should be built of iron or wood was accentuated by the necessity of replacing those heavy warships which had been converted to auxiliary steam vessels. All such proved to be cramped in stowage and bad sea boats.

So long ago as 1822 shell-guns had been adopted. Consequently, in the experiments as regards iron, shell-fire had to be taken into consideration.

In 1842, experiments were made with iron plates three-eighths of an inch thick, rivetted together to make a total thickness of six inches. It was, however, reported that at 400 yards these were not proof against eight-inch guns or heavy thirty-two pounders. These matters were taken into consideration by Captain Chads, whose official report was as follows:--

“The shot going through the exposed or near side generally makes a
clean smooth hole of its own size, which might be readily stopped;
and even where it strikes a rib it has much the same effect; but on
the opposite side all the mischief occurs; the shot meets with so
little resistance that it must inevitably go through the vessel,
and should it strike on a rib on the opposite side the effect
is terrific, tearing off the iron sheets to a very considerable
extent; and even those shot that go clean through the fracture
being on the off side, the rough edges are outside the vessel,
precluding the possibility almost of stopping them.

“As it is most probable that steam vessels will engage directly
end-on I have thought it desirable to try to-day what the effect of
shot would be on this vessel[83] so placed, and it has been such as
might be expected, each shot cutting aways the ribs, and tearing
the iron plates away sufficient to sink the vessel in an instant.”

Designed by Sir William Symonds. Launched 1840. Damaged at the bombardment of Fort Constantine, Sevastopol, 1854. Turned into hulk at Zanzibar, 1874.]

In 1849 an official report stated that:--

“Shot of every description in passing through iron makes such large
holes that the material is improper for the bottom of ships.

“Iron and oak of equal weight offering equal resistance to shot,
iron for the topsides affords better protection for the men than
oak, as the splinters from it are not so destructive.

“Iron offering no lodgment for shells in passing through the side,
if made with single plates it will be free from the destructive
effects that would occur by a shell exploding in a side of timber.”

Certain modifications were then introduced and tried in the year 1850, and Captain Chad’s report was that:--

“With high charges the splinters from the shot were as numerous and
as severe as before, with the addition in this, and in the former
case, of the evils that other vessels are subject to, that of the
splinters from the timber.

“From these circumstances I am confirmed in the opinion that iron
cannot be beneficially employed as a material for the construction
of vessels of war.”

As a result of this report, seventeen iron ships which were building, the largest being the _Simoon_, of nearly 2,000 tons, were condemned; and it was definitely decided that ships must be built of wood, and that iron in any form was disadvantageous.

The advantages of the shell were fully understood, and at least half of the guns of the ships of the line of the period were sixty-five cwt. shell guns. Experiments had fully taught what shell-fire might be expected to accomplish. General Paixham, the inventor of the shell gun, had long ago stated that armour was the only antidote to shell, and the fact that armour up to six inches had been experimented with indicates that this also was understood. Between the appreciation of the fact and acting upon it, there was, however, a decided gulf. In the British Navy, as in others also, the natural conservatism of the sea held its usual sway.

Matters were at about this stage when, in the year 1853, the Russian Admiral Nachimoff, with a fleet consisting of six ships of the line, entered the harbour of Sinope, on the 30th November, 1853, and absolutely annihilated, by shell fire, a Turkish squadron of seven frigates which were lying there. The damage wrought by this shell-fire was terrific. “For God’s sake keep out the shells!” is generally believed to have been the cry of most naval officers about that period, though there is some lack of evidence as to whether this demand was ever actually made, except by the Press. The terrible effect of shell-fire was, however, obvious enough; but as stated above it was really well-known before the war test that so impressed the world.

When the Crimean War broke out in 1854, the British _personnel_ stood at 45,500, and the Estimates were £7,197,804. On the 28th March, war was formally declared. Naval operations in the Crimean war were almost entirely of secondary note. Some frigates bombarded Odessa, in April, and a certain amount of damage was done along the Caucasian coast.

In September, the British fleet, consisting of ten ships of the line, two frigates and thirteen armed steamers, convoyed an enormous fleet of Turkish and French warships crammed with troops for an attack on Sebastopol. The Russian fleet lay inside that harbour and made no attempt whatever to destroy the invading flotilla, though it might easily have done considerable mischief, if not more. Instead of that, the ships were sunk at the entrance of the harbour, and the siege of Sebastopol presently commenced. On October 17th, the Allied fleet attempted to bombard Fort Constantine, but the ships were soon defeated by the shore defences and many of them badly injured.

The French, who had formed somewhat more favourable opinions of iron armour than we had, had, after Sinope, already commenced the construction of five floating batteries which were to carry armour. They were wooden ships of 1,400 tons displacement, with four-inch armour over their hulls. They carried eighteen fifty-pounder guns and a crew of 320. As originally designed they were intended to sail, although they were fitted with slight auxiliary steam power. When completed they were found unable to sail, so pole masts were fitted to them. Artificial ventilation was also supplied and their funnels were made telescopic. The designs of these vessels were sent to the British Admiralty, who, after considerable delay, built four copies, the _Glatton_, _Meteor_, _Thunder_, and _Trusty_. These, however, were not completed in time to take any part in the war.

So soon as the French armoured batteries were ready they were sent out to the Crimea, where they joined a large fleet which had been prepared to attack Kinburn, which was bombarded in October, 1855. In a very short while the forts were totally destroyed, and with very small loss to the armoured batteries. The effect created by this was so great that four more armoured batteries were ordered in England, the _Etna_, _Erebus_, _Terror_, and _Thunderbolt_.

In the Baltic, to which a British fleet, under Admiral Napier, had been sent, the Russians kept behind the fortifications at Kronstadt, and nothing was accomplished beyond the bombardment of Sveaborg, and the destruction of the town and dockyard. Some small bombardments also took place in the White Sea and on the Siberian coast, where Petropavlovsk was attacked and the attack was defeated, and such other actions as took place were generally unsuccessful. It had become abundantly clear that against fortifications wooden ships had very small chance of success.

Incidental items of naval interest are that in this particular war Captain Cowper Coles mounted a sixty-eight-pounder gun upon a raft named the _Lady Nancy_. This attracted so much attention from the small target, light draft and steady platform, that Coles was sent home to develop his ideas. In this war, also, mines appeared, the Russians dropping a good many off Kronstadt. Those used by the Russians were filled with seventy pounds of powder, and exploded on contact by the familiar means of a glass tube of sulphuric acid being broken and the acid falling into chlorate of potash.

No material damage was done to ships by this means, but a considerable number of those who had picked them up and investigated them were injured.

The ingenuity and new means of offence were, however, by no means confined to the Russians, for a Mr. Macintosh, after the failure of the first bombardment of Sebastopol, evolved a system of attacking fortifications with a long hose supported by floats, through which naptha was to be pumped. Being set alight with some potassium, the fort attacked would be immediately smoked out.

Experiments at Portsmouth having proved that this system was “simple, certain and cheap,” Mr. Macintosh proceeded to the Crimea with his invention at his own expense. He was eventually given £1000 towards his expenses, but no attempt was made to employ the system. It is by no means clear how the necessary potassium was to be got into the water at the requisite spot.

The same war also produced the fire-shell of the British Captain Norton. This appears to have been a resurrection of the old idea of Greek fire. It could be used from a rifle or from a shell-gun, and like the previous invention “rendered war impossible,” and again like the previous invention does not appear to have ever materialised into practice.

On the practical side more results were achieved. The Lancaster gun which fired an oval shot was actually used with success in the war. From it the rifled gun presently emerged. There also emerged the then amateur invention of one Warry, who invented a new type of gun capable of firing sixteen to eighteen rounds per minute. The idea of wire wound guns was also apparent, and Mr. Armstrong[84] (as he then was), suggested the idea of percussion shell. It is interesting to note that these last were received with extreme dissatisfaction in the Navy on the grounds that they might go off at the wrong time.

Of the Crimean War, however, it may be said that though it was not noted for naval actions, it was probably the most important war in its indirect results on the Navy that ever took place. It brought in the armoured ship, the rifled gun, and what was ultimately to develop into the torpedo. It saw the crude birth of “blockade mines” and rapid fire guns; everyone of them inventions that, judging by the slow progress of steam, would--failing war to necessitate swift development--have been still in the experimental stage even to-day.

In our own times war having ever been a nearer possibility than in the 1850 era, peace progress has always been more rapid, and no invention of practical value ever failed to secure full tests. Yet there were not wanting those who prophesied that the Dreadnoughts of to-day merely reproduced in another form the 120 screw ships of the line of sixty years ago; and that the next great naval war might well bring about changes every whit as drastic as any that the Crimean War caused to come into being.

The torpedo had become fully as great a menace to the modern ship of the line as the shell gun was to the big ship of 1853. The submarine was an infinitely greater menace to it than the crude Russian mines of the Crimean War ever were. Endless potentialities resided in aircraft.

Wherefrom it was well argued that out of the next great naval war (despite whatever lesser wars in between may have taught), the battleship was likely to be profoundly modified.

That it will be swept out of existence was improbable. The whole lesson of history is that the “capital ship” will ever adjust itself to the needs of the hour. It has always been the essential rallying point of lesser craft--the mobile base to meet the mobile base of the enemy.

Meanwhile, it is beyond question that at the time of the Crimean War the British Navy from one cause and another was little better than a paper force. It is plain enough that little remained of the fleet of the Nelson era. The fleet “worried through,” but very clearly it had reached the end of its tether.

The reason why will be found in the next chapter.

* * * * *

The above paragraphs were originally written in 1912. Since then
much has happened. In this edition they have only been revised to
the extent of substituting the past for the present tense. Nothing
has occurred to alter what then was the obvious.

X.

THE COMING OF THE IRONCLAD.

The period immediately following the Crimean War saw a gradual change in the relations between England and France. In 1858 a panic similar to those with which later years have familiarised us began to arise, and in December, 1858, and January, 1859, a committee sat under the Administration of Lord Derby “to consider the very serious increase which had taken place of late years in the Navy Estimates, while it represented that the naval force of the country was far inferior to what it ought to be with reference to that of other Powers, and especially France, and that increased efforts and increased expenditure were imperatively called for to place it on a proper footing.”

This committee found that whereas in 1850 there were eighty-six British ships of the line to forty-five French ones, this ratio had altogether ceased to exist; and that both Powers had now twenty-nine screw ships of the line. Any other large ships had ceased to count.

In 1859 there also appeared the famous “Leipsic Article,” commenting on the decline of the British Fleet and the rise of the French. Certain extracts from this, though dealing with the past for the most part, are here given _en bloc_, for they indicate very clearly the circumstances in which, _under pressure from German influences, the modern British Navy came to be founded_. It is, to say the least of it, questionable whether but for this Teutonic agitation public opinion in England would ever have been aroused from its lethargy in time. This epoch-making article appeared in the _Conversations Lexicon_, of Leipsic.

After some prelude the article referred to the appearance of the French Fleet in the Crimean War:--

“The late war in the East (Crimean) first opened the eyes of
Englishmen to the true position of affairs, and it was not without
some sensation of alarm that they gazed at this vision of the
unveiled reality. Here and there, indeed, an allusion, having
some foundation in fact, had been heard, during the Presidency of
Louis Napoleon, and had drawn attention to the menaced possibility
of an invasion of the British Isles; but such notions were soon
overwhelmed by the derision with which they were jeeringly greeted
by the national pride.

“Those expressions of contempt were, however, not doomed to be
silenced in their turn by the sudden apparition in the autumn
of 1854 of thirty-eight French ships of the line and sixty-six
frigates and corvettes, fully manned and ready for immediate
action. During the three preceding years Louis Napoleon had built
twenty-four line-of-battle ships, and in the course of the year
1854 alone thirteen men-of-war were launched, nine of which were
ships of the line. In addition to these, the keels of fifty-two
more, comprising three ships of the line and six frigates, were
immediately laid down. The English had thus the mortification to
be obliged not only to cede to their allies the principal position
in the camp, but also reluctantly to acknowledge their equality on
that element whereon they had hoped to reign supreme....

* * * * *

“If we carried our investigation no further than this we should
naturally conclude that, with such a numerical superiority,
sufficient in itself to form a very respectable armament for a
second-rate power, England has very little to fear from the marine
of France. We must not forget, however, that quality as well as
numbers must be considered in estimating the strength of a Fleet.
When we take this element into our calculations, we shall find
the balance very soon turned in favour of France. We perceive,
then, that while the English list comprises every individual sail
the country possesses, whether fit for commission or altogether
antiquated and past service (and some, like the _Victory_, built
towards the close of the last or the beginning of this century),
the French Navy, as we have observed, scarcely contains a single
ship built prior to the year 1840; so that nearly all are less than
twenty years old. This is a fact of the greatest importance, and
indicates an immense preponderance in favour of France. Though many
of England’s oldest craft figure in the ‘Navy List’ as seaworthy
and fit for active service, we have no less an authority than
that of Sir Charles Napier (in his Letter to the First Lord of
the Admiralty in 1849) that some are mere lumber, and many others
cannot be reckoned upon to add any appreciable strength to a Fleet
in case of need. Independently, too, of the introduction of the
screw, such fundamental changes have been introduced, within the
last fifty years, both into the principles of naval architecture
and of gunnery, that a modern 120-gun ship, built with due regard
to recent improvements, and carrying guns of the calibre now in
ordinary use, would in a very short space of time put _ten_ ships
like the _Victory_ _hors de combat_, with, at the same time, little
chance of injury to herself.

“It is time, however, to turn our attention to another important
part of the _material_, namely, artillery. Under this head we
purpose designating, not only to the number of guns and their
calibre, but also the mode in which they are served, for in
actual warfare this, of course, is a primary consideration. If we
take the received history of naval warfare for the basis of our
investigation, we cannot fail to remark one notable circumstance
in favour of the English, which can only be ascribed to their
superiority in the use of this arm. That circumstance is the
important and uniform advantage they have had in the fewer number
of casualties they have sustained as compared with other nations
with whom they may have chanced to have been engaged. To prove that
our assertions are not made at random, we subjoin some statistics
in support of this position. In April, 1798, then, the English ship
_Mars_ took the French _L’Hercule_; the former had ninety killed
and wounded, the latter 290. In the preceding February there had
been an engagement between the English _Sybil_ and French _La
Forte_, in which the killed and wounded of the former numbered
twenty-one, and those of the latter 143. In March, 1806, the
English ship _London_ took the French _Marengo_; the English with
a loss of thirty-two, the latter of 145 men. On the 4th November,
1805, two English ships of the line engaged four French vessels,
and the respective losses were, again, 135 and 730. On the 14th
February, 1797, in an action between the Fleets of England and
Spain, the English lost 300 and the Spaniards 800. On the 11th of
October of the same year, in the engagement off Camperdown between
the English and Dutch, the respective losses were 825 and 1,160. On
the 5th July, 1808, the English frigate _Seahorse_ took the Turkish
frigate _Badere Zuffer_, and of the Turks there fell 370 against
fifteen English. Finally, in the same year the Russian ship of the
line _Wsewolod_ was taken by two English ships of the line, with a
loss to the latter of 303, and to the former of only sixty-two.