Chapter XI: The Reed Era 264 (7)

“This contrast, so favourable to England, has been constantly
maintained, and can only be attributable to her superior artillery.
Her seamen not only aimed with greater precision, and fired more
steadily than those of the French and of other nations, but they
had the reputation of loading with far greater rapidity. It was
remarked, in 1805, that the English could fire a round with ball
every minute, whereas it took the French gunners three minutes
to perform the same operation. Then, again, the English tactics
were superior. It was the universal practice of the French to seek
to dismast an adversary; they consequently aimed high, while the
English invariably concentrated their fire upon the hulls of their
adversaries; and clearly the broadside of a vessel presents a much
better mark to aim at than the mere masts and rigging. British guns
were also usually of higher calibre, for though they bore the same
denomination, they were in reality much heavier. Thus, the English
_Lavinia_, though nominally a frigate of forty guns, actually
carried fifty; and thirty-six and 38-gun frigates nearly always
carried forty-four and forty-six. The English ship _Belleisle_,
at Trafalgar, though said to be a seventy-four, carried ninety
pieces of ordnance, while the Spanish ship she engaged, though
called eighty-four had, in fact, only seventy-eight guns. From this
disparity in the number and calibre of their guns, as well as in
the mode in which they were served, it resulted that France and her
allies lost eighty-five ships of the line and 180 frigates, while
her antagonist only suffered to the extent of thirteen ships of the
line and eighty-three frigates.

“It was not until the close of the war that France became fully
aware to what an extent her inferiority in the above respects had
contributed to her reverses; otherwise the unfortunate Admiral
Villeneuve would not invariably have ascribed his mishaps to the
inexperience of his officers and men, and to the incomplete and
inferior equipment of his vessels. The truth was, that not only was
the artillery, as we have shown, inferior, but the whole system in
vogue at that period on board French ships was antiquated, having
continued without reform or improvement for two hundred years; it
was deficient, too, in enforcing subordination, that most essential
condition of the power and efficiency of a ship of war.”

The French _inscription maritime_ is then dealt with at great length, after which occur the following passages, even more interesting perhaps to-day than when they were written:--

“In considering, then, what perfect seamanship really is, we
must first adopt a correct standard by which to estimate it. The
English sailor has been so long assumed as the perfect type of
the _genus_ seaman, that the world has nearly acquiesced in that
view, and _even we in Germany have been accustomed to rank our
crews below the English, though it is an unfair estimate_. _There
are no better sailors in the world than the German seamen, and
there is no foreign nation that would assert the contrary._[85] On
the other hand, it has also been the fashion universally to abuse
French seamanship, and to speak of her sailors as below criticism.
None proclaimed this opinion more loudly than the English; but
in doing so they recurred to the men they had beaten under the
Revolution and Bonaparte. The Crimean War, however, opened their
eyes, and taught them that the French sailors of to-day were no
longer the men of 1806, and that, to say the least, they are in
no respect inferior to the British. England had for years been
compelled to keep up a large effective force always ready for
action, in consequence of the nature of her dependencies, which, as
they consist of remote colonies across distant seas, required such
a provision for their protection. This gave her an immeasurable
superiority in days gone by. But since France in 1840 discovered
her deficiency, it has been supplied by the maintenance of a
permanent _experimental Fleet_, which, under the command of such
Admirals as Lalande de Joinville, Ducas, Hamelin, and Bruat, has
been the nursery of the present most effective body of officers
and men; which, since 1853, have not ceased to humble the boasted
superiority of England, besides causing her many anxious misgivings.

“Anyone who had the opportunity of viewing the two Fleets together
in the Black Sea or the Baltic, and was in a position to draw
a comparison, could not fail to be convinced that everything
connected with manœuvring, evolutions, and gunnery was, beyond
comparison, more smartly, quickly, and exactly executed by the
French than by the English, and _must have observed the brilliant
prestige which had so long surrounded England’s tars pale sensibly
beside the rising glories of her rival_.”[86]

That this was not merely captious criticism is borne out by the following extracts from “The Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.”:--

“We have great reason to be afraid of France, because she possesses
a large disposable army, and our arsenals are comparatively
undefended--London entirely so--and we have no sufficient naval
force at home. Of ships (with the exception of steamers) we have
enough; but what is the use of them without men? They are only
barracks, and are of no more use for defence than if we were to
build batteries all over the country, without soldiers to put into
them.

* * * * *

“Such were our inadequate resources for defence, had the Russians
been able to get out of the Baltic, and make an attempt on our
unprotected shores.

* * * * *

“The great difficulty consisted in the manning of such a fleet.
Impressment was no longer to be thought of; but, strange to say,
the Bill which had passed through Parliament, empowering, in case
of war, the grant of an ample bounty to seamen, was not acted
upon, and consequently most of the ships were very inefficiently
manned--some of them chiefly with the landsmen of the lowest class.
Nothing had been done towards the training of the men, and no
provision was even made to clothe them in a manner required by the
climate to which they were about to be sent....

“Our Ambassador likewise warned the British Government that the
Navy of Russia could not with safety be under-estimated, and,
moreover, the Russian gunners were all well trained, while those
of the British Squadron were _most deficient in this respect_.
The object of the Russians, in wishing to get their best ships
to Sveaborg, was the impression that Cronstadt would be first
attacked; in which case, calculating on the strength of the forts
to repel an assault, _they would have fresh ships wherewith to
assail our disabled and weakened fleet, should they be obliged to
retreat_.[87] Sir Hamilton Seymour warned our Government of the
great number of gunboats the Russians could bring out, eighty of
which were to be manned by Finns, fifty men to each boat....

* * * * *

“Such,” says the author of the biography, “were the reasons, no
doubt powerful enough, for hurrying off, even without pilots, the
ill-appointed and under-manned squadron placed under Sir Charles
Napier’s command, at this inclement season of the year, when the
periodical gales of the vernal equinox might be daily expected. The
squadron, on leaving Spithead, consisted of four sail-of-the-line,
four blockships, four frigates, and four steamers (not a single
gunboat); and with this force, hastily got together, for the most
part manned with the refuse of London and other towns, destitute of
even clothing, their best seamen consisting of dockyard riggers and
a few coastguard men--and without the latter, it has been alleged,
the squadron could not have put to sea--with this inefficient force
did Sir Charles Napier leave our shores, to offer battle to the
Russian Fleet, consisting of seven-and-twenty well-trained and
well-appointed ships of the line, eight or ten frigates, seven
corvettes and brigs, and nine steamers, besides small craft and
flotillas of gunboats, supposed in the aggregate to number one
hundred and eighty....

* * * * *

“It is, probably, an unprecedented event in the annals of war, or,
at least, in those of our history, that a fleet should be sent out,
on a most momentous service so ill-manned that the Commander was
directed to endeavour to ‘pick up,’ if possible, foreign seamen
in foreign ports, and so ill-provided with munitions of war, that
he was restricted in the use of what he most required, in order
to render his inexperienced crews as efficient as possible. It is
equally worthy of record that the Board of Admiralty, throughout
the whole campaign, never supplied the Fleet with a single Congreve
rocket, although it was no secret that great numbers had been
made in London for the Russians, to whom they were of far less
use than to the British Fleet, which could not well undertake any
bombardment without them. The Board of Admiralty must have been
perfectly aware of the conditions, in these respects, of that Fleet
on whose efficiency so much depended, and from which so much was
expected, for, in a letter to Sir Charles Napier, from a member of
that Board, I find it recorded as his opinion, that the Emperor of
Russia ought either to burn his Fleet, or try his strength with
the British Squadron whilst he mustered double their numbers, and
whilst our crews were ‘so miserably raw!’ Yet this inefficiency
was fully and frankly admitted by Sir James Graham, from whom
infrequent instructions arrived to supply the deficiency of good
men by picking up foreign sailors in the Baltic. The anxiety of
the First Lord upon this point was excessive. He was continually
inquiring whether the Admiral had been able to ‘_pick up any Swedes
or Norwegians_, who were good sailors and quite trustworthy.’ He
was told to ‘enter them quietly.’ If he could not get Swedes and
Norwegians, ‘even Danes would strengthen him, for they were hardy
seamen and brave. There was, it is true, a difficulty with their
Governments, but if the men enlisted freely, and came over to
the Fleet, the First Lord did not see why the Admiral should be
over-nice, and refuse good seamen without much inquiry as to the
place from whence they came.’

“Admiral Berkeley, moreover, instructed the Admiral to the same
effect. ‘Have any of your ships tried for men in a Norwegian port?
_It is said that you might have any number of good seamen from that
country._’ On the 18th of March the Admiral had been apprised that
the _James Watt_, the _Prince Regent_ and _Majestic_ would now join
him; ‘_but men are wanting_, and it is impossible to say how long
it will be before they are completed.’ On the 4th of April Admiral
Berkeley stated: ‘Notwithstanding the number of landsmen entered,
we are come nearly to a dead standstill as to seamen; and after the
_James Watt_ and _Prince Regent_ reach you, I do not know when we
shall be able to send you a further reinforcement, _for want of
men_! _Something must be done, and done speedily, or there will be
a breakdown in our present rickety system._’”

The German article produced a great stir in England. This was followed up by the publication in 1859 of _The Navies of the World_, by Hans Busk, M.A., of Trinity College, Cambridge, who, while nominally casting cold water on the “Leipsic Article,” added fuel to the fire. This writer was one of the first to concentrate attention upon the fact that the French were building “iron-plated ships.”

From this scarce and remarkably interesting work I quote the following:--

“The determination of the French Government to build a number of
iron or steel-cased ships imperatively obliges us to follow their
example. The original idea of plating ships in this way, so as
to render them shot-proof, is due, not, as is generally supposed
in this country, to the present Emperor, but to a Captain in the
French Navy, who, about a quarter of a century since, suggested
that all wooden vessels should be sheathed with composite slabs of
iron of fourteen or fifteen centimetres in thickness; that is to
say, with stout plates of wrought-iron having blocks of cast metal
between. A similar suggestion was made among others by General
Paixhans; but one of the first to reduce it to practice was Mr.
Stevens, of New York, the well-known steamship builder, who about
ten years ago communicated to Mr. Scott Russell the results of a
long series of experiments, instituted by the American Government,
for the purpose of testing the power of plates of iron and steel
to resist cannon-shot. Mr. Lloyd, of the Admiralty, proposed the
adoption of plates 4ins. in thickness, instead of a number of
thinner sheets, as recommended by the Emperor. The English and
French floating batteries were, as is well known, protected upon
Mr. Lloyd’s plan. From trials recently made, however, it has been
pretty well ascertained that this iron planking, on whatever
principle applied, will only repel hollow shot or shells; heavy
solid projectiles of wrought iron, or those faced with steel,
having been found, on repeated trials, to perforate the thickest
covering which has ever been adopted, and that, too, even at
considerable ranges.

“Mr. Reed,[88] already alluded to, proposes to protect only the
midship portion of the ship, and to separate it from the parts fore
and aft by strong watertight compartments, so that, however much
the extremities might suffer, the ship would still be safe and
the crew below protected; but, as he himself admits, there would
obviously be no defence against raking shot.

“The French vessels last alluded to, follow the lines and
dimensions of the _Napoleon_ (one of the best, if not the
finest ship in their Navy); but they will only carry thirty or
thirty-six guns, and the metal sheathing will be from ten to eleven
centimetres (about 4¼ins.) in thickness. Two similar ships are to
be commenced here forthwith; and as the First Lord of the Admiralty
has prophetically warned us that they will be the most expensive
ships ever constructed in this country, it is earnestly to be hoped
that they may be found proportionately valuable, should their
powers ever come to be tested; they will each cost from £126,000
to £130,000, or £4,200 per gun; the ordinary expense of a sailing
man-of-war being about £1,000, and of a steamer from £1,800 to
£2,000 per gun.”

After this follow various statistics of the French Fleet of no particular interest here except for the following passage:--

“Irrespective of the above are the four _frégates blindées_, or
iron-plated frigates, two of which are now in an advanced state at
Toulon.

“These ships are to be substituted for line-of-battle ships;
their timbers are of the scantling of three-deckers; they will be
provided with thirty-six heavy guns, twenty-four of them rifled,
and 50-pounders, calculated to throw an eighty pound percussion
shell. Such is the opinion of French naval officers respecting
the tremendous power of these ships, that they fully anticipate
the complete abolition, within ten or a dozen years, of all
line-of-battle ships.”[89]

Here it is desirable to leave ships for a moment and deal with the corresponding stage of gunnery, which began to take on its modern form contemporaneously with the ironclad ship. In 1858–9 began that contest between the gun and armour, which can hardly be said to be ended even in our own day, for improved kinds of armour are still being sought and experimented with. To quote the work of Hans Busk and its contemporary summary:--

“A number of guns, cast at Woolwich, were sent to Mr. Whitworth’s
works at Manchester to be bored and rifled. In April, 1856,
trial was made with a brass 24-pounder of the construction above
described. The projectiles employed on that occasion varied from
two to six diameters in length, and a very rapid rotary motion
was communicated to them. The gun itself weighed 13cwt.; the
bore, instead of being of a calibre fitted to receive a spherical
24-pound shot, was only of sufficient capacity to admit one of
9 pounds. The hexagonal bore measured 4ins. in diameter, and
was rather more than 54ins. long. It was entirely finished by
machinery, and the projectiles were fitted with mathematical
precision, the spiral in both cases being formed with absolute
accuracy. The gun, externally, had only the dimensions of a
24-pound howitzer, but it projected missiles of 24 pounds, 32
pounds, and 48 pounds each, the additional weight having been
obtained by increased length. Upon this new system, then, it will
be seen that guns capable, under the old plan, of supporting
the strain of a 24-pound ball, may be made with ease to throw
a 48-pound shot; the reduction of the calibre allowing of a
sufficient thickness of metal being left to ensure safety. The
32-pound and 48-pound projectiles used in the above experiments
were respectively 11¾ins. and 16½ins. in length. They were pointed
at the foremost extremity, being shaped and rounded somewhat like
the smaller end of an egg. At the base they were flat, and slightly
hollowed towards the centre. The gun was mounted for the occasion
upon an ordinary artillery carriage, which shows no symptoms of
having been strained, nor of being in any way injured by the
concussions to which it had been subjected.

* * * * *

“Subsequently, some further experiments were made with the same
gun with reduced elevation, when the projectiles, striking the
ground at comparatively short distances, rebounded again and
again till their momentum was expended. The first shot thus fired
weighed 32 pounds, the charge of powder being only 3 ounces, and
the gun having an elevation of 2 degrees. The projectile made its
first graze at a distance of 92 yards, furrowing the ground for
about 7ft., and leaving distinct indications of its rotary axial
motion. It rose again to an elevation of about 6ft., grazing,
after a further flight of 64 yds. The third graze (owing probably
to the hard nature of the soil at the point struck) was at a
distance of 70yds. further; after which it traversed some ploughed
land, grazing several times, coming finally to rest after having
accomplished altogether a distance of 492yds.

“The second shot also weighed 32 pounds; the charge, as before,
consisted of 3 ounces of powder; but this time the elevation given
to the gun was 3 degrees. The projectile first grazed the ground
at a point 108yds. from the muzzle; the second graze was 126yds.
further; but happening to touch the lower bar of an iron fence--a
circumstance which appeared to affect its flight--it dropped
finally after having accomplished 490yds. Some further experiments
were then made with shot weighing 48 pounds each.

“These very reduced charges rendered it necessary to make use of
wooden wads to fill the cavities in the base of the projectiles.
This had a tendency to reduce very much the power of the gun.

“A further trial with the hexagonal gun was made at Liverpool on
the 7th of May. Several shots, varying from 24 to 48 pounds in
weight, were fired. The first, weighing 24 pounds, with a charge
of 11 pounds of powder, attained a distance of 2,800 yards, the
elevation given having been 8 degrees. These experiments could
hardly be said to have exhibited the _maximum_ capacity of the
gun, having been interrupted by the rapid rising of the tide. The
average range of several 48-pound shots was 3,000 yards, but there
is little doubt that a much greater distance will be achieved when
Mr. Whitworth has perfected some guns he is now constructing.

“A good deal of attention having previously been drawn to the
subject of Armstrong’s gun, respecting which few particulars
had been allowed to transpire, on the 4th of March last the
Secretary-at-War made an official statement to the House, and gave
some details as to its alleged capabilities. Without describing
its construction, he stated that one piece, throwing a projectile
of 18 pounds, weighed but one-third as much as the ordinary gun
of that calibre. With a charge of 5 pounds of powder, a 32-pounder
attained a range of 5¼ miles; at 3,000 yards its accuracy, as
compared with that of a common gun, was stated to be in the
proportion of 7 to 1. At 1,000 yards it had struck the target 57
times successively, and after 13,000 rounds the gun showed symptoms
of deterioration. In conclusion, it was said that the destructive
effects occasioned by this new ordnance exceeded anything that
had been previously witnessed, and that in all probability it was
destined to effect a complete revolution in warfare.”

Armstrong’s own statement was:--

“Schemers whose invention merely figure upon paper, have little
idea of the difficulties that are encountered by those who carry
inventions into practice. For my part, I had my full share of
such difficulties, and it took me nearly three years of continual
application to surmount them.... Early last year a committee was
appointed to investigate the whole subject of rifled cannon. They
consisted of officers of great experience in gunnery; and after
having given much time for a period of five months to the guns,
projectiles, and fuses which I submitted to them, they returned
a unanimous verdict in favour of my system. With respect to the
precision and range which have been attained with these guns, I may
observe that at a distance of 600 yards an object no larger than
the muzzle of an enemy’s gun may be struck at almost every shot. At
3,000 yards a target of 9ft. square, which at that distance looks
like a mere speck, has on a calm day been struck five times in ten
shots. A ship would afford a target large enough to be hit at much
longer distances, and shells may be thrown into a town or fortress
at a range of more than five miles. But to do justice to the weapon
when used at long distances, it will be necessary that gunners
should undergo a more scientific training than at present; and I
believe that both the naval and military departments of Government
will take the necessary measures to afford proper instruction, both
to officers and men. It is an interesting question to consider what
would be the effect of the general introduction of these weapons
upon the various conditions of warfare. In the case of ships
opposed to ships in the open sea, it appears to me that they would
simply destroy each other, if both were made of timber. The day
has gone by for putting men in armour. Fortunately, however, no
nation can play at that game like England; for we have boundless
resources, both in the production and application of iron, which
must be the material for the armour. In the case of a battery
against a ship, the advantage would be greatly in favour of the
battery, because it would have a steady platform for its guns,
and would be made of a less vulnerable material, supposing the
ship to be made of timber. But, on the other hand, in bombarding
fortresses, arsenals, or dockyards, when the object to be struck
is very extended, ships would be enabled to operate from a great
distance, where they could bid defiance to land defences.”

After some observations, the author continued:--

“Notwithstanding the high estimation in which Sir William
Armstrong’s guns are held, and deservedly so from their great
intrinsic merit, they have certainly in Mr. Warry’s great invention
a rival that may eventually be found to eclipse them.

“The Armstrong gun cannot be fired oftener than three times a
minute, and the bore, it is said, has to be constantly sluiced
with water; whereas Warry’s admits, as has been affirmed, of being
discharged 16 or 18 times a minute, or 1,000 an hour, without
difficulty, though of course not without heating, as some reporters
have misrepresented. Guns of the former description are expensive,
and must be made expressly by means of special machinery. Mr.
Warry, on the other hand, asserts that he can convert every
existing gun into a breech-loader upon his principle, and at a
moderate outlay: an advantage of the greatest moment at the present
time.

“This gun is fired by means of a lock. On one side of the breech
there is a lever, so contrived that by one motion of the hand it is
made to cock the hammer and to open the chamber. A second movement
closes the charger again, pierces or cuts the cartridge, places a
cap on the nipple, and fires the gun almost simultaneously.

“With a due supply of ammunition, therefore, a destructive torrent
of shot and shell may be maintained _ad libitum_. It is not
difficult to form a conception of the havoc even one such gun would
occasion if brought to bear upon the head of an advancing column.

“The inventor has, besides, made application for a patent for a
new coating he has devised for all kinds of projectiles, in lieu
of any leaden or metallic covering, which has been found very
objectionable in actual practice. The new coating, it is said,
reduces the ‘fouling’ to a minimum.

“But we cannot turn even from this very brief consideration of the
improvements in modern cannon without offering a few observations
relative to an invention of a different kind, but one that may
possibly prove of greater moment than either of the guns that
have been described. This is the composition known as ‘Norton’s
liquid fire.’ In the terrific character of its effect it rivals
all that has been recorded of the old Greek fire; at the same
time it is perfectly manageable, and may be projected from an
Enfield rifle, from a field-piece, or from heavier ordnance. The
composition Captain Norton uses consists of a chemical combination
of sulphur, carbon, and phosphorus. He merely encloses this in a
metal or even in a wooden shell, and its effect upon striking the
side or sails of a ship, a wooden building, or indeed any object
at all combustible, is to cause its instant ignition. This ‘liquid
fire’ has apparently the property of penetrating or of saturating
any substance against which it may be projected, and such is its
affinity for oxygen that it even decomposes water and combines with
its component oxygen. Water, consequently, has no power to quench
it, and if burning canvas, set on fire in this way, be trodden
under foot and apparently extinguished it soon bursts again into
flames.”

It is not uninteresting to reflect that although Norton’s liquid fire came to nothing, yet the present century has already seen three variations on the idea.

The first instance is the type of big shell used by the Japanese at Tsushima. Little is known as to their exact composition, but they were undoubtedly extremely inflammable. Captain Semenoff in “The Battle of Tsushima” thus describes them:--

“The Japanese had apparently succeeded in realising what the
Americans had endeavoured to attain in inventing their ‘Vesuvium.’

“In addition to this there was the unusual high temperature
and liquid flame of the explosion, which seemed to spread over
everything. I actually watched a steel plate catch fire from a
burst. Of course, the steel did not burn, but the paint on it did.
Such almost non-combustible materials as hammocks, and rows of
boxes, drenched with water, flared up in a moment. At times it was
impossible to see anything with glasses, owing to everything being
so distorted with the quivering, heated air.

* * * * *

“According to thoroughly trustworthy reports, the Japanese in
the battle of Tsushima were the first to employ a new kind of
explosive in their shells, the secret of which they bought during
the war from the inventor, a colonel in one of the South American
Republics. It was said that these shells could only be used in guns
of large calibre in the armoured squadrons, and that is how those
of our ships engaged with Admiral Kataoka’s squadron did not suffer
the same amount of damage, or have so many fires, as the ships
engaged with the battleships and armoured cruisers.”

The second instance is the Krupp fire shell designed for use against dirigible balloons. The third is the “Thermite shell,” which, early in 1912, was proposed for adoption in France. It was calculated that one 12-inch A.P. shell exploding would melt half a ton of steel.

The following passage from Hans Busk is of interest:--

“In 1855 Mr. Longridge, C.E., proposed to construct cannon of tubes
covered with wire wound round them so tightly as almost entirely
to relieve the inside from strain. On the 25th of June of the same
year Mr. Mallet read a paper advocating the construction of cannon
of successive layers of cylinders, so put together that all should
be equally strained when the gun is fired; thus the inside would
not be subject to fracture, while the outside would be useless
as in a cast mass. His method of effecting this was, as is well
known, to have each cylinder slightly too small to go over the one
under it till expanded by heat, so that when cool it compresses the
interior and is slightly strained itself. Thirty-six-inch mortars
have been made on the principle, and if they have failed with
40lbs. of powder, cast-iron must have failed still less. In 1856
Professor Daniel Treadwell, Vice-President of the American Academy,
read a paper to that body recommending the same principle of
construction; and Captain Blakely has himself for some years
been endeavouring to urge its adoption by argument and direct
experiments. In December, 1857, some trials were made with guns
constructed by that officer; and the result of a comparative trial
of a 9-pounder with a cast-iron service gun of similar size and
weight gave results proving the soundness of his views; for Captain
Blakely’s gun bore about double the amount of firing the service
gun did, and being then uninjured, was loaded to the muzzle, and
was thus fired 158 times before it burst.”

From these contemporary extracts it will be seen that by 1859 the germ of nearly every modern idea in connection with gunnery existed, and has since developed somewhat on “trial and error” lines for at any rate the greater part of the intervening period.

The contemporary situation as regards defence is also best summed up from the authority from whom the above gunnery extracts are taken:--

“The result of numerous trials appeared to convince those best
competent to judge of such matters that iron plates, or, rather,
slabs, eleven centimetres (about 4½ins.) in thickness, would offer
adequate protection to a ship from the effects of hollow shot.
Acting upon this impression, four floating batteries, resembling
in most respects those constructed here, were ordered to be built,
and notwithstanding the enormous difficulties connected with such
an undertaking, these four vessels were turned out, complete in all
respects, in ten months--an astonishing instance of the resources
of French dockyards and the ability of French engineers.

“From this event may be dated the commencement of a new epoch
in naval tactics. The next problem was to determine whether a
form better adapted for progression than that of these batteries
could not be given to vessels sheathed in a similar manner. Hence
originated the iron-plated frigates (_frégates blindées_). The
intention of their designer is, that they should have a speed
and an armament at least equal to that of the swiftest existing
frigates, but their colossal weight, and consequently their great
draught of water, must almost preclude the fulfilment of this
expectation. Should they prove successful, a number of larger ships
of the same kind are to be commenced forthwith. It is difficult to
understand how, in the case of these ships being found to answer,
it will be possible for us to avert a real “reconstruction” of
our Navy, or, how any other nation, aiming to rank as a maritime
Power, can avoid the adoption of a similar course. In fact, the
necessity has been appreciated, and we are already at work. But a
good deal has to be accomplished ere the use of such vessels become
universal. If these iron-plated vessels do resist shell, it seems
certain, as has been already stated, that solid shot will either
perforate at short ranges any thickness of metal that has yet been
tried, or will so indent the sheathing at longer distances that
the internal lining and rib-work of oak will be riven, shattered,
loosened, or crushed to an extent that would almost as speedily
put the ship _hors de combat_ as if she had but been built after
the old fashion, much, as in days gone by, upon the introduction
of gunpowder into warfare, the use of armour was found rather to
aggravate, than to ward off, the injuries inflicted by gunshot.
It was the result of the operations against Kinburn that more
particularly gave rise to the high opinion at present entertained
in favour of these _vaisseaux blindées_. Unwieldy and cumbersome
as they appeared, they were certainly a great improvement upon
the floating batteries used by the French and Spanish against
Gibraltar in 1782. Those were merely enormous hulks, destitute
of masts, sails, or rigging; their sides were composed of solid
carpentry, 6ft. 6ins. in thickness, and they carried from nine to
twenty-four guns. When in action, streams of water were made to
flow constantly over their decks and sides, but notwithstanding
every precaution, such an overwhelming storm of shell and red-hot
shot was poured upon them by the English garrison that they were
all speedily burnt. Not so the _Devastation_, _La Lave_, and _La
Tonnante_ before the Russian fortress above mentioned, on the
memorable 14th October, 1855. At 9 p.m. they opened fire, and in an
hour and twenty-five minutes the enemy was silenced, nearly all the
gunners being killed, their pieces dismounted, and all the ramparts
themselves being for the most part demolished. To accomplish this
destruction in so short a space of time, the three batteries, each
carrying eighteen fifty pounders (supported, of course, by the fire
of the English vessels), advanced in very shallow water within
800 yards of the walls, receiving themselves very little damage in
comparison with the immense havoc they occasioned.”

From the above extract it is clear that the “impenetrable coat of mail” idea, popularly supposed to have led to the introduction of ironclads, never existed to any appreciable extent. Indeed, when the Committee, alluded to on an earlier page, concluded its labours in 1859, it merely recommended the conversion of nineteen more sailing ships into steamers. It was Sir John Pakington who decided to lay down a couple of “armoured steam frigates,” and to build them of iron instead of wood.

The French _frégates blindées_ were wooden ships, armoured. John Scott Russell is said to have been Pakington’s chief adviser in this matter of building iron armoured ships and disregarding all the laborious conclusions of Captain Chads against iron hulls.

As regards the general recommendations of the committee already referred to, these had resulted in 1861 in there being no less than sixty-seven wooden unarmoured ships of the line building or converting into “screw ships.”

The two iron-plated steam frigates were decided on without any popular enthusiasm concerning them. Now and again retired Admirals paid surreptitious visits to the French “_blindées_” and returned with alarming reports; but, with the possible exception of flying machines, no epoch-making thing ever came in quite so quietly as the ironclad. The wildest dreamer saw nothing in it beyond a variation on existing types. The ironclad was something which, by carrying a great deal of weight, could keep out shell; beyond that no one seems to have had any particular ideals whatever, except perhaps Sir Edward Reed.

Early in 1859 designs for a type of ship to “answer” the French _frégates blindées_ were called for, and fourteen private firms submitted designs. All, however, were discarded.

Details of the designs submitted were as follows:[90]--

=============+=======+=======+==========+======+======+======+======
|Length.|Breadth|Displ’m’t.|Speed.|Wt. of|Wt. of|I.H.P.
Designer. | | | Tons. |Knots.|Armour| Hull | of
| | | | |Displ.|Displ.| Eng.
-------------+-------+-------+----------+------+------+------+------
Laird | 400.0 | 60.0 | 9779 |13½ | .11 | .51 | 3250
Thames Co. | 430.0 | 60.0 | 11180 | | .10 | .58 | 4000
Mare | 380.0 | 57.0 | 7341 | | .13 | .46 | 3000
Scott Russell| 385.0 | 58.0 | 7256 | | .18 | .38 | 3000
Napier | 365.0 | 56.0 | 8000 |13½ | | | 4120
Westwood & | | | | | | |
Baillie | 360.0 | 55.0 | 7600 |13½ | .16 | .36 | 4000
Samuda | 382.0 | 55.0 | 8084 |13½ | .16 | .57 | 2500
Palmer | 340.0 | 58.0 | 7690 |13½ | | | 4500
Abethell | 336.0 | 57.0 | 7668 | | | | 2500
Henwood | 372.0 | 52.0 | 6507 | | .18 | .40 | 2500
Peake | 354.9 | 56.0 | 7000 | | .14 | .46 | 3000
Chatfield | 343.6 | 59.6 | 7791 | | .14 | |
Lang | 400.0 | 55.0 | 8511 |15 | .14 | .53 | 2500
Cradock | 360.0 | 57.6 | 7724 | | .20 | .42 | 2500
Admiralty | | | | | | |
Office | 380.0 | 58.0 | 8625 |14 | | |
=============+=======+=======+==========+======+======+======+======

The Abethell and Peake designs were wooden hulled, all the others iron ships.

The two ships, _Warrior_ and _Black Prince_, as actually laid down, differed from the Admiralty design in certain details. The beam was increased slightly, and the displacement rose from 8625 to 9210.

The _Warrior_ was laid down on the 25th May, 1859, at the Thames Ironworks, Blackwall; the _Black Prince_ a little later at Glasgow.

In substances they were ordinary “wooden frigates,” built of iron instead of wood, with armour to protect most (but not all) of the guns. This was done by a patch of armour amidships, covering about 60% of the side. It was deemed advisable to protect the engines; otherwise as like as not the armour would have been over the battery only. Waterline protection was entirely unrealised, the steering gear of the _Warrior_ being at the mercy of the first lucky shot.

This, as Sir N. Barnaby has pointed out, was due to accepting existing conditions:--

“The tiller was necessarily above the water-line and was outside
of the cover of the armour. The wooden line-of-battle ships, with
which the designers of these first iron-cased ships were familiar,
had required no special water-line protection, and when wheel
ropes or tiller were shot away the ship did not cease to be able
to fight. The line-of-battle ships, which they knew so well, had
a lower, or gun deck about four feet above the water-line, and an
orlop deck about three feet below the water-line. Between these two
decks the ship’s sides were stouter than in any other part, and
shot did not easily perforate them. When a shot did enter there,
between wind and water, as it was called, ample provision was made
to prevent the serious admission of water.

“In this between-deck space the sides of the ship were kept free
from all erections or obstructions. The ‘wing passages’ on the
orlop were clear, from end to end of the ship, and they were
patrolled by the carpenter’s crew, who were provided with shot
plugs of wood and oakum and sail cloth with which to close any shot
holes. As against disabled steering gear there were spare tillers
and tiller ropes, and only injury to the rudder head itself was
serious.”

It is easy to-day to indicate where the old-time designers erred; and later on they realised and repaired their error with commendable promptitude. The really interesting point is that British designers evolved the ideal thing for the day, while the French evolved the idea of the ideal thing for the to-morrow. Unhappily for the latter, their evolution was unable to survive its birth till the day of its utility. _La Gloire_, the first French ironclad, was broken up more years ago than any can remember; the _Warrior_ and the _Black Prince_, though long ago reduced to hulk service,[91] still float as sound as when in 1861 the _Warrior_ first took the water. To the French belongs the honour of realising what armour protection might mean; but to England goes the credit of reducing the idea to practical application.

The _Warrior_ was designed by Messrs. Scott Russell and Isaac Watts, the Chief Constructor. Her length between perpendiculars was 380 feet. She carried originally a uniform armament of forty-eight 68-pounders smooth bores, weighing 95cwt. each. These fired shell and cast-iron spherical shot. The guns were carried as follows:--Main deck, thirty-eight, of which twelve were not protected by armour. On the upper-deck, ten, also unprotected.

This armament was subsequently changed to two 110-pounder rifled Armstrongs on pivot mountings, and four 40-pounders on the upper-deck; while the main-deck battery was reduced to thirty-four guns. At a later date it was again altered to four 8-inch 9-ton M.L.R., and twenty-eight 7-inch 6½-ton M.L.R.

In addition to her armour the _Warrior_ was divided into 92 watertight compartments, fore and aft. She had a double bottom amidships, considerably subdivided (fifty-seven of the compartments), but no double bottom in the modern sense.

The _Warrior’s_ engines, by Penn, were horizontal single expansion. On trial they developed 5,267 I.H.P., and the then excellent speed of 14.079 knots.[92] Her six hours’ sea speed trial resulted in a mean 5,092 H.P. and 13.936 knots.

FRENCH LA GLOIRE
WARRIOR & BLACK PRINCE
HECTOR
ACHILLES
MINOTAUR
NORTHUMBERLAND

EARLY BRITISH BROADSIDE IRONCLADS]

Save for her unprotected steering gear, the _Warrior_ may be described as a brilliant success for her era. She was launched on December 29th, 1860, and completed in the following year. The _Black Prince_ was completed in 1862.

The _Warrior_ and _Black Prince_, under a system which long endured in the British Navy, were followed by a certain number of diminutives, of which the first were the _Defence_ and _Resistance_, of 6,150 tons, with speeds of just under 12 knots, and an armament of 16 guns. The armour was the same, but the battery protection was extended fore and aft, so that all guns were inside it. These ships were completed in 1862.

Three more ships were projected, of which the _Hector_ and _Valiant_, completed in 1864 and 1865, were of precisely the same type as the _Resistance_, but displaced 6,710 tons, with about a knot more speed, and carried a couple of extra guns.

A third ship, originally intended to have been of the same class, was the _Achilles_, but, mainly owing to the influence of Mr. Reed (of whom more anon), who pointed out the danger of unprotected steering gear, her design was altered and a complete belt of 4½-inch armour given to her instead of a partial one.

Those changes in the design, together with an increased horse-power which produced on trial 14.32 knots, advanced the displacement of the _Achilles_ to 9,820 tons, while the armament was brought up to fourteen 12-ton guns and two 6½-ton. The weight of armour was 1,200 tons.

The _Achilles_, like many another ship that was to follow her, was the “last word” of her own day. No expense was spared in seeking to secure a maximum of efficiency in her. As originally completed she was a ship-rigged vessel, but with a view to improving her sailing efficiency, this was subsequently altered to a four-masted rig, which proved so little successful that eventually she reverted to three masts again.

In the meantime the authorities were so pleased with the _Achilles_ that three improved editions of her were designed. They were not completed until a new type of ship, which was completed before they were, replaced them; but chronologically they followed close upon the _Achilles_. They were laid down in 1861, and designed by Isaac Watts. They were named _Agincourt_, _Minotaur_, and _Northumberland_. They differed in minor details, but in substance were all about 1,000 tons more than the _Achilles_, and their increased displacement mostly went in one inch extra armour protection (5½-inch against 4½-inch).

As originally designed they were intended to mount seven 12-ton and twenty 9-ton guns, but at a very early date the first two were given a uniform armament of seventeen 12-ton. A small portion of this armament of the upper deck was provided with armoured protection for right-ahead fire.

Photographed about 1866.]

In appearance they were magnificent ships, fitted with five masts. Being 400 feet between perpendiculars they were the largest ships of their time, and at sea always proved very steady under both sail and steam.

These ships were the subject of violent disputes between the Controller of the Navy and their constructor. The Controller insisted that they were extravagantly large ships, as compared to French ships. The constructor insisted that it was essential that for any given power and protection a British ship must be larger than a foreign one, because of her more extended probable duties, and the consequent necessity of a larger coal supply.[93]

At and about this period there were a number of wooden ships-of-the-line building, which had been laid down from the year 1859 onwards. Following the French fashion, they were converted into ironclads. These ships, displacing from 6,100 to 6,830 tons, were the _Repulse_, _Royal Alfred_, _Zealous_ (laid down 1859), _Caledonia_, _Ocean_, _Prince Consort_, _Royal Oak_ (1860).[94]

The upper-decks of these ships were removed, and they were fitted with side armour, which was 4½ inches in the earliest to be treated, and 5½ inches in the latest. All of them carried sixteen 9-ton guns and four 6½-ton, with provision for ahead fire.

The experiment, though useful as a temporary expedient, was very expensive, and several of the ships had to be lengthened before anything could be done to them. None of them were very successful, and most of them disappeared from the Navy List at an early date.

This ends the period of “broadside ironclads”; of the best of which it may be said that they were nothing but efforts to adapt new ideals to old methods.

XI.

THE REED ERA.

In 1862 Mr. (afterwards Sir) E. J. Reed, was appointed Chief Constructor, and proceeded at once to produce the type of ship chiefly associated with his name. His ideals ran in the direction of short, handy ships of medium size, as heavily armed as possible, and with a good turn of speed. His arguments in favour of these ideals he afterwards described as follows:--[95]

“The merits of ironclad ships do not consist in carrying a large
proportion of weights to engine-power, or having a high speed in
proportion to that power; but rather in possessing great powers
of offence and defence, being comparatively short, cheap, and
handy, and steaming at a high speed, not in the most economical way
possible, but by means of a moderate increase of power on account
of the moderate proportions adopted in order to decrease the weight
and cost, and to increase the handiness.”

Generally speaking, his views were very revolutionary. The greatness of Sir E. J. Reed lay in the fact that he was the first man to conceive of the ironclad as a separate and distinct entity. Previously to him the ironclad was merely an ordinary steamer with some armour plating on her.

From a portrait made when he was Chief Constructor of the British Navy]

His first ship was the _Bellerophon_, of 7,550 tons displacement. She embodied distinct novelties in the construction of her hull, described by her designer in the following passages:--[95]

“The _Warrior_ and the earlier ironclads are constructed with deep
frames, or girders, running in a longitudinal direction through
the greater part of the length of the ship, combined with numerous
strong transverse frames, formed of plates and angle-irons,
crossing them at right angles. In fact, up to the height of the
armour the ship’s framing very closely resembles in its character
that of the platform or roadway of a common girder bridge, in
which the principal or longitudinal strength is contributed by
the continuous girders that stretch from pier to pier, and the
transverse framing consists of short girders fitted between and
fastened to the continuous girders. If we conceive such a platform
to be curved transversely to a ship-shape form, and the under
side to be covered with iron plating, we have a very fair idea of
the construction of the lower part of the _Warrior_. If, instead
of this arrangement, we conceive the continuous longitudinal
girders to be considerably deepened, and the transverse girders
to be replaced by so-called ‘bracket-frames,’ and then, after
curving this to a ship-form, add iron-plating on both the upper
and the under sides, we have a correspondingly good idea of
the construction of the lower part of the _Bellerophon_. The
_Bellerophon’s_ construction is, therefore, identical in character
with the cellular system carried out in the Menai and other tubular
bridges, which system has been proved by the most elaborate and
careful experiments to be that which best combines lightness and
strength in wrought-iron structures of tubular cross-section.
The _Warrior’s_ system, wanting, as it does, an inner skin of
iron--except in a few places, such as under the engines and
boilers--is not in accordance with the cellular system, and is
inferior to it in strength. As regards safety, also, no comparison
can be made between the system of the _Warrior_ and that of the
_Bellerophon_. If the bottom plating is penetrated, in most places
the water must enter the _Warrior’s_ hold, and she must depend for
safety entirely on the efficiency of her watertight bulkheads.
If the _Bellerophon’s_ bottom is broken through, no danger of
this kind is run. The water cannot enter the hold until the inner
bottom is broken through, and this inner bottom is not likely
to be damaged by an ordinary accident, seeing that it is two or
three feet distant from the outer bottom. Should some exceptional
accident occur by which the inner bottom is penetrated, the
_Bellerophon_ would still have her watertight bulkheads to depend
on, being, in fact, under these circumstances in a position
similar to that occupied by the _Warrior_ whenever her bottom
plating is broken through; while an accident which would prove
fatal to the _Warrior_ might leave the _Bellerophon_ free from
danger so long as the inner bottom remained intact.”

As to be related later, the _Vanguard_ disaster tended to contravert this optimism--but of that further on. The point of present interest is the recognition and establishment of a principle which, however commonplace to-day, was in those days a complete novelty and a special feature of the iron ship as a peculiar war entity.

Equally of interest, in some ways more so, are the following anticipations of torpedo possibilities. The torpedo is such a familiar thing to-day that it is hard to throw ourselves back into the point of view necessary to appreciate the prophetic instincts of the man who created the first vessels which can really be called “battleships.”

“It may be proper in this connection to draw attention to the
fact that the probable employment of torpedoes in a future naval
war has not been lost sight of in carrying out these structural
improvements. Up to the present time torpedoes have been used
almost solely for coast and harbour defence, and have, under
those circumstances, proved most destructive, as a glance through
the reports of the operations of the Federal Fleet at Charleston
and other Confederate ports will show. It is still doubtful,
however, whether these formidable engines of war can be supplied
with anything like the same efficiency at sea under the vastly
different conditions which they will there have to encounter.
The Americans have, it is true, proposed to fit torpedo-booms to
their unarmoured ocean-cruisers, such as the _Wampanoag_, and
a naval war would doubtless at once bring similar schemes into
prominence. Nothing less than actual warfare can be expected to
set the question at rest; but whatever the result of such a test
may be, it is obviously a proper policy of construction to provide
as much as possible against the dangers of torpedoes; and it must
be freely admitted that the strongest ironclad yet designed,
although practically impenetrable by the heaviest guns yet
constructed, would be very liable to damage from the explosion of
a submerged torpedo. No ship’s bottom can, in fact, be made strong
enough to resist the shock of such an explosion; and the question
consequently arises: How best can the structure be made to give
safety against a mode of attack which cannot fail to cause a more
or less extensive fracture of the ship’s bottom, even if it does no
more serious damage? In our recent ships, as I have said, attempts
have been made to give a practical answer to this question.
Seeing that the bottom must inevitably be broken through by the
explosion of a torpedo which exerts its full force upon the ship,
it obviously becomes necessary to provide, as far as possible,
against the danger resulting from a great in-flow of water. This
is the leading idea which has been kept in view in arranging the
structural details of our ships to meet this danger, and the reader
cannot fail to perceive that the double bottom and watertight
subdivisions described above are as available against injury from
torpedoes as they are against the injuries resulting from striking
the ground.”

Details of the _Bellerophon_ were as follows:--

Displacement--7,550 tons.

Length--300 ft. between perpendiculars.

Beam--56ft. 1in.

H.P.--6,520.

Mean Draught--26ft. 7ins.