Chapter II (8)

The first and most celebrated of all was of the illustrious house of Gondi. A branch of this family established itself in France at the commencement of the XVIth century, and from it descended the famous Cardinal de Retz.

The author, in devoting a short and interesting biography to some of the spiritual sons of S. Catharine, shows us what salutary influence she exercised over the chief persons of her country, and to what degree of eminent sanctity she conducted those souls who sought her direction. Faithful to all the suggestions of gratitude, she did not forget that the great Apostle of Tuscany had prophesied the glory of the monastery of Prato, and that twice she had been cured by his supernatural intervention; therefore, she forwarded in every way devotion to Savonarola. She charged Brother Nicholas Fabiani to revise the writings of that celebrated Dominican, and she addressed herself to Count Luis Capponi to procure a beautiful portrait of Savonarola. She had for that illustrious character the tenderness of a daughter and the admiration which a great life inspires in a soul capable of comprehending it.

The last years of the life of S. Catharine was a union the most intimate with God, a continual succession of ecstasies; her body was on earth, but her soul was in heaven.

Towards the month of January, she fell sick, and died on Friday, the 2d of February, in the same year. Numerous miracles attested the eminent sanctity of her life. She was beatified by Pope Clement XII. on the 30th of April, 1732, and was canonized by Benedict XIV. on the 20th of June, 1746.

This is an incomplete synopsis of the two volumes published by R. P. Bayonne. This work, destined to make known one of the greatest glories of the order, recommends itself to us by the grandeur of the subject itself, and unites a solid doctrine to a brilliant style, and all the charms of a perfect narration. We hope it will soon be translated into English, that the American public may become more fully acquainted with a book which takes an honorable place in modern literature.

FOOTNOTES:

[137] _Life of S. Catharine of Ricci_, Religious of the Third Order of S. Dominic. By R. P. Hyacinth Bayonne, O.S.D.

THE GREATEST GRIEF.

FROM THE FRENCH OF MARIE JENNA.

Yes, Father! on the altar of the past
We may lay down a joy, too sweet to last;
See the flowers wither that our pathway strewed,
Incline our brows beneath the tempest rude,
Behold the rainbow glory fade away
That made fair promise for our opening day:
And yet, like that poor stricken plant, survive,
Blighted by frost, half dead and half alive,
Give to the desert winds our morning dream,
And _still_ support our agony supreme!
We may behold, stretched on a bed of pain,
The form to which we minister in vain--
The last, the dearest, the _consoling_ friend--
Count every moment of his weary end,
Kiss the pale brow, and watch each wavering breath;
Close the cold eyelids, murmur, "This is death!"
And still _once more_ to life and hope belong.
O God! _thou_ knowest through faith the heart grows strong
But, ah! another human soul to love
So fondly that we tremble as above
Its purity and beauty we incline,
Then suddenly to mark its depths divine
Shadowed and chilled, and from our Paradise
Perceive an icy, vaporous breath arise,
Whence blew sweet zephyrs, odorous with grace!
To seek in vain religion's luminous trace
Amid the ashes of her ruined shrine,
To pray, to weep, to doubt, to hope, divine
All _but_ the truth; and at the last to dare
The long, deep look that tells us our despair,
Revealing vacancy, a faith withdrawn
Without a glance towards the retreating dawn,
Without a cry of grief, a sigh, a prayer--
O God! that loss is more than we can bear!

NEW PUBLICATIONS.

CATHOLICITY AND PANTHEISM--ALL TRUTH OR NO TRUTH. An Essay by the
Rev. J. De Concilio, etc., etc. New York: Sadliers. 1874.

This essay was first published in THE CATHOLIC WORLD, and we are glad to see it published in a separate volume. It is not a complete treatise, but only one complete part of a treatise, the _prima primæ_ of a more extensive work, which we hope the author may be able to write and publish. F. De Concilio is one of our most learned and acute philosophers and theologians, a disciple of no modern clique or innovating system, a vender of no patent contrivance of his own for reconciling contraries, but a modest yet intrepid advocate and defender of the old time honored scholastic wisdom of S. Thomas. In its own line, his essay is superior to anything ever before produced in this country, and we trust that due attention and a just meed of praise will be awarded to it by the few who will be able to understand it, in Europe as well as in America. If the author, who has for a long time struggled to bring his work into the light, is left in the lurch by everybody, as the learned Dr. Smith has been in England with his splendid unfinished work on the Pentateuch, it will be a sad proof of our intellectual degeneracy.

We will not make a critical review of F. De Concilio's argument in the present short notice, but we think a few words in reply to some criticisms which have been made, and may be repeated, either publicly or in private, are almost imperatively called for.

The only one of these criticisms really worth any attention relates to the argument from reason for the Trinity. It has been objected by some very respectable theologians that the rational argument for the Trinity professes to demonstrate from purely rational principles of natural human intelligence the entire revealed mystery of the Trinity. We admit frankly that, if the supposition is correct, the censure founded on it, that the author has undertaken something pronounced by Catholic doctrine impossible and unlawful, is just and inevitable. We have never, however, understood the author in this sense. We understand him to profess to argue in part from premises given by revelation, and thus merely to explicate a theological doctrine, and in part to furnish proofs from pure reason, first, that the rational objections against the dogma are invalid; and, second, that the dogma as disclosed by revelation taken as a philosophical hypothesis, and it alone, satisfactorily solves certain difficult problems respecting the divine nature, which otherwise would be insoluble. So far as any direct proof of the distinction and proprieties of the three persons in God is concerned, we understand that such proof is put forward as inadequate and only probable, but by no means either a complete or strictly demonstrative argument.

We think, therefore, with due submission to higher authority, that the author escapes the censures of the Syllabus and the Vatican Council, and attempts no more than has been done by Bossuet, Lacordaire, and other great thinkers, who have never been thought to have gone beyond the bounds of allowed liberty. We leave the author, however, to defend and advocate his own cause, if it requires to be further vindicated, and merely give this statement as an explanation of our own reason for admitting his admirable articles into this magazine without any alteration.

Another criticism, which the author himself has sufficiently answered, imputed to him the doctrine of a necessary creation and of _optimism_. It is only necessary to read his book carefully to see how unfounded is this imputation.

Still more futile is an objection, urged by the author of the criticism just now noticed, that F. De Concilio's opinion of the precedence of the decree of the incarnation to the decree of the redemption of fallen man is contrary to the opinion of S. Thomas and the _schola_ generally. Be it so! But what then? Must we follow the common opinion, or that which is extrinsically more probable, if the contrary opinion has a real intrinsic and extrinsic probability? _Minime gentium!_ F. De Concilio but follows S. Athanasius, Suarez, and other authors whose works have passed the Roman censorship, against S. Thomas; and he gives good intrinsic reasons for doing so. Let any one who wishes to attack him do so by refuting his arguments; but it is most untheological to find fault with his opinion as any less sound and orthodox than the contrary. Let us be rigorous in censuring opinions which are really unsound and untenable, but let us beware of that carping and unfriendly spirit which has always been the bane of theological discussions, and which throws out the imputation of unsoundness without a certain and sufficient warrant of authority. We do not concur in all the opinions which are held in the school which F. De Concilio follows, and which must inevitably come out with greater distinctness in the second part of his essay; but we shall look forward with pleasure to see him develop and defend them with his usual masterly ability, and we express our great desire that he should write as much as his pastoral duties will permit on philosophical and theological topics.

THE CHRISTIAN TRUMPET; or, Previsions and Predictions about
Impending General Calamities, the Universal Triumph of the
Church, the Coming of Antichrist, the Last Judgment, and the End
of the World. Divided into three parts. Compiled by Pellegrino.
"The testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy," Apoc. xix.
10. Boston: Patrick Donahoe. 1873.

It is beyond question among learned and devout Catholics that many saints and pious servants of God in all ages have received private revelations in which are contained predictions of events in a near or remote future time to the recipients of this supernatural light. It is, moreover, certain that a number of supernatural and miraculous events of a most extraordinary character, and evidently intended as warnings to the good as well as to the wicked, and some very credible revelations respecting great judgments and great mercies of God which are impending, have occurred in our own time. It must be, therefore, not only interesting, but useful, to have authentic and judicious accounts of grave and sacred matters of this kind published and circulated among the faithful. A collection of this sort has been published in France by a learned priest, the Abbé Curicque, with the approbation of several bishops, entitled _Voix Prophétiques_; and several other critical and judicious writers in Europe have published books or articles relating to different persons and events of this extraordinary class, which are truly valuable, instructive, and edifying. The end and object of the compiler of the book before us is, therefore, one which we must approve, although we are sorry not to be able to give an unqualified commendation to the manner in which he has executed his task. That he is a very pious and zealous priest is evident at first sight. That he has laid down in general terms the sound theological doctrine about the credibility of private revelations, and made some very just reflections and timely exhortations about the times in which we live, and the sentiments we ought to cherish and put in practice in view of the certain approach of the consummation of this world, is also obvious to any reader of his book. The research and painstaking which he has used in collecting his materials are very great, and the greatest part of them are undoubtedly derived from respectable and trustworthy sources of information, and therefore entitled to credit.

Nevertheless, as a whole, the compilation lacks the sobriety, discretion, and authority which a book of this kind ought to have, in order to give it proper credibility and weight with the general class of readers, who cannot judge for themselves or discriminate properly, and who need, therefore, that evidence should be given them by reference to standard authorities, and by the guarantee of names which are known to them and sufficient to warrant their belief in the genuineness and credibility of such remarkable documents as those contained in this compilation. An anonymous author, whose work appears without any ecclesiastical approbation or recommendation of persons known to the Catholic public, is entitled to no credit on his own mere assertion. He must cite his authorities and witnesses, and must exact no assent without giving a sufficient motive. A translation of the work of the Abbé Curicque would, in our opinion, have been much more likely to accomplish the end of the pious author than a compilation like the one he has made. Moreover, there are some things in this book, and these the very matters which make the most exorbitant demand on the credulity of the reader, for which no evidence whatever is furnished but the _on dit_ of certain unknown parties. Other things are very doubtful; some are contradictory to one another. The author mixes up with the citations he makes his own favorite view of the course of present and coming events, especially about the schism and the anti-popes, whose coming he forebodes; and a haze of the visionary, the wondrous, and the improbable is thus thrown over the whole, which envelopes even that which is really entitled to credence and pious veneration, and tends to bring the whole into suspicion and discredit. The hint thrown out that a certain cardinal, whose name might as well have been given, since every one will know who is meant, may become an anti-pope, is contrary to Christian charity and prudence; and, in general, we must notice with regret that the author's zeal is sadly lacking in discretion, and devoid of that delicate tact and discernment, more necessary in one who handles such difficult and perilous themes than in any other sort of writer or teacher of the people.

It is not the fault of the author, who is a foreigner, that he has fallen into many inaccuracies of language; but we think the publisher might have secured a revision of the text by some competent person, and that it would have been in better taste, as well as more befitting the reserve and sobriety due to matters which are so very serious, if he had made a less sensational announcement of the book. It is, however, notwithstanding these drawbacks, certainly a very curious collection of documents and pieces of information which are interesting to know about, and contains so much that is truly valuable and edifying that we hope it will not only gratify curiosity, but also do good to a great many of its readers, by turning their attention to the great subjects which it presents in such vivid colors, and in a startling proximity to the present and coming events of our own age.

In order to assist those of our readers who may wish to have some direction to guide them in perusing this book with discrimination and understanding, we will specify in part which are the most valuable and trustworthy portions, which are less so, and which are altogether without sufficient grounds of probability to entitle them to any regard.

First, there are the prophecies of canonized or beatified saints, whose authenticity is well established and their interpretation more or less clear. These are the prophecies of S. Remigius, S. Cesarius, S. Edward, S. John of the Cross, and the B. Andrew Bobola, S.J. In regard to those of S. Bridget of Sweden and S. Francis of Paul, they would be entitled to equal respect, if clearer evidence were furnished of their authenticity than that given by the author--a matter in regard to which we are not able to pronounce any judgment. The prophecy of S. Malachy is one in respect to which there is great difference of opinion. We give our own for what it is worth, after some reading on the subject, in its favor. After these come the prophecies of persons of recognized sanctity, which have gained credit with judicious and well-informed persons competent to form an enlightened opinion. The most valuable and trustworthy of these are from the V. Holzhauser, the V. Anna Maria Taigi, the V. Curé of Ars, F. Necktou, S.J., Jane le Royer, Sœur de la Nativité, and Mary Lataste. The prophecies of the Solitary of Orval and of the Nun of Blois have their warm partisans and opponents, the Abbé Curicque being among their defenders. The Signora Palma d'Orio is a person whose ecstatic state seems to be beyond reasonable doubt, yet it is difficult to ascertain with certainty what she has really predicted; so that what is reported from her, although interesting, is scarcely to be considered as having evidence enough to be classed among authentic predictions. The revelations made to Maximin and Melanie appear to us to belong to a similar category, as worthy of the greatest respect in themselves if we had an ample guarantee of their genuineness and authenticity, but as not yet placed in a sufficiently clear light to warrant a prudent assent. The remainder of the contents we pass over without any special remark, with the exception of those few matters which we have noted above as making an exorbitant demand on the reader's credulity without any evidence to warrant it. One of these points is the story of David Lazzaretti, another about Zoe Tonari, "destined soon to be a second Joan of Arc," and the most censurable of all is what is said about Antichrist having been born in 1860, and other things connected with the same. (Pp. 265-268.)

In connection with the wonderful narrative of David Lazzaretti the author has woven a very flimsy texture of conjectures out of the materials furnished by some of the curious documents which he cites for his hypothesis of a schism and two anti-popes to come immediately after the death of Pius IX. It is with regret that we are compelled to touch on these subjects in such a superficial manner; they require careful handling. Excessive and imprudent credulity in those who have faith and piety is certainly unreasonable, and may be blamable and hurtful.

But the utter incredulity and dogged refusal to admit anything miraculous and supernatural which is exhibited by our modern illuminati is the very _ne plus ultra_ of unreason, and the acme of wilful, despicable, and wicked folly. The most sensible, as well as the most pious rule is, to follow the church without reservation in all that she teaches and sanctions, and in those things concerning which she is silent to follow her saints and doctors, who are the most enlightened of all men.

SPAIN AND CHARLES VII.; or, "Who is the Legitimate Sovereign?" By
General Kirkpatrick. Published under the sanction of the Carlist
Committee. London: Burns, Oates & Co. 1873. (New York: Sold by
The Catholic Publication Society.)

This timely and clearly-written plea for Don Carlos places beyond a question his right to the Spanish throne. The Bourbons succeeded to the Spanish throne through the marriage of Louis XIV. with the Infanta of Spain, eldest daughter of Philip IV. Her grandson, Philip V., became king on the failure of direct issue from his grand-uncle, Charles II., the son of Philip IV. The Salic law, confirming the succession to the heirs male of the royal house, was established by Philip V. and his cortes, with the consent of all the great powers, in order to prevent the union of the French and Spanish crowns, the King of Spain relinquishing all his rights as a French prince. This law has never been validly repealed. Christina of Naples, the queen of Ferdinand VII., a most ambitious and unprincipled princess, had this law violently and illegally set aside in order to make way for her daughter Isabella to ascend the throne. The base and illegal nature of the intrigues by which Don Carlos and his family were exiled from Spain and deprived of their just rights is fully exposed by Gen. Kirkpatrick. Charles V., the brother of Ferdinand VII., was succeeded in his claim to the throne by his son, Charles VI., in 1845, who, dying in 1861 without issue, was succeeded by his brother, Don Juan, who abdicated October, 1868, in favor of his son, the present Don Carlos, who is now twenty-five years of age, and married to the niece of the Comte de Chambord. Charles V. would undoubtedly have succeeded in regaining his throne but for the shameful interference of Louis Philippe of France, and the English crown. The party of Christina was composed of all the liberals, communists, and enemies of the church, and Isabella was merely tolerated by the sound and Catholic majority of the nation from necessity.

The clergy, the ancient nobility, the peasantry, and most of the friends of order and religion in all classes, desire the restoration of Don Carlos to the throne, which belongs to him by the laws of the Spanish constitution. It is very true that a mere restitution of legitimate monarchy is not a certain guarantee for good government, and that many of the Bourbons have been bad rulers. It is, nevertheless, the only hope for Spain; and the character and principles of Don Carlos give reason to hope that, taught by adversity and trained by experience to value the sound Catholic traditions of Spain, he will prove to be a good sovereign. We wish him, therefore, most cordially, a speedy and complete triumph, which we believe he is in the way to win.

ESSAYS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS. By His Eminence Cardinal Wiseman. In
Six Volumes. Vols. V., VI. New York: P. O'Shea. 1873.

These two volumes complete the series of the famous cardinal's _Essays_. The Catholic reader is under great obligations to Mr. O'Shea for the reprint of these splendid compositions, the London edition being out of print. It is to be regretted, however, that the references adapted to that edition should not have been changed to suit the present issue. Having indicated one fault, we might as well inquire of the publisher why he _will_ use perfumed paper in his books? Though not a serious objection, it is an annoying one to reasonably fastidious readers, as we happen to know.

Vol. V. opens with an article on Spain, which takes up more than half the book. It is superfluous to remark that this essay is of peculiar interest at the present hour. Next we have a vindication of Pope Boniface VIII.--a very important subject. Then a review of Montalembert's _S. Elizabeth of Hungary_. The three remaining articles are specimens of the writer's scholarship as an antiquarian. Vol. VI. contains ten essays. The first treats learnedly of S. Peter's chair at Rome. A plate accompanies the article. The fifth administers flagellation to Charles Dickens for certain things in his _American Notes_; and also to Mrs. Trollope, for her _Visit to Italy_. Then follow four other essays on the subject of Italy: "Italian Guides and Tourists," "Religion in Italy," "Italian Gesticulation," and "Early Italian Academies." The volume concludes with "Sense _vs._ Science."

We are reminded, while noticing the completion of this work, of an article on the Donatist schism, "Catholic and Anglican Churches" (p. 199, v. iii.), which "caused in no slight degree" the doubt which first crossed the mind of Dr. John Henry Newman "of the tenableness of the theological theory on which Anglicanism is based," and which we cannot, therefore, do better than commend to the serious attention of all honest and conscientious Episcopalians.

BIBLE HISTORY, with Maps, Illustrations, Examination Questions,
Scriptural Tables, and Glossary. For the use of Colleges,
Schools, Families, and Biblical Students. By the Rev. James
O'Leary, D.D. _Permissu Superiorum_. ✠ John, Archbishop of New
York. New York: Sadliers. 1873.

We cordially recommend this excellent and beautifully printed manual to all those for whom the title states it has been prepared by its learned author. It will be a favorite, especially with young people and children, whether used as a class or a reading book, particularly on account of its pictures, which are generally good, and many of which are remarkably fine. Such a book, which, so far as we know, is much the best of the kind, must do incalculable good; and we hope it will be appreciated by parents and teachers, so as to find its way into every family and school throughout our country and elsewhere, wherever Catholics are found who use the English language. The author has done well by taking into account those generally received facts and hypotheses of natural science which have a bearing on topics handled, in their connection with the facts and truths of revelation, by the sacred writers. His statement, however, that the surface of the earth bears on it the marks of perturbations caused by the Deluge, and otherwise not capable of scientific explanation, is not one which geologists would admit, and we doubt very much its correctness.

On page 16 the author observes that, "as the divinity of Christ was doubted before the Council of Nice, so these [deutero-canonical] books and passages might have been doubted before the decision of the church."

The cases are not parallel. The divinity of Christ was an article of faith before the definition of the Council of Nice, and no good Catholic could doubt it. But the canonical authority of certain books was not an article of faith before it was defined, and might have been, as it indeed was, doubted by good Catholics.

We think the author would improve his work by inserting a good, succinct historical account of the events which occurred between the period of the Books of the Machabees and that of the Evangelists. Moreover, we do not like the termination "eth" in the index, which is unnecessarily quaint and old-fashioned, or approve all the rhymes which precede the chapters, although some of them are not without a quaint poetic vigor, and most of them are terse and ingenious, likely, therefore, to strike the fancy and stick in the memory of children.

It is seldom that we take the trouble to make so many criticisms on a book. This one, however, is so good and so very important that we would like to see the author continue to improve it in every new edition, and therefore offer our suggestions in the most kindly and respectful spirit to the reverend and learned author, adding to what we have already said in commendation of the _Bible History_ that it is not merely a good school-book, but a work of really sound and solid scholarship. We are very glad to see that the author has sought and obtained the approbation of the ecclesiastical authority before publishing his work, and we trust that his good example will be generally followed, and, moreover, that the law of the church will be enforced in every diocese and in all cases, requiring this approbation for all books treating _de rebus sacris_.

MEDITATIONS FOR THE USE OF THE CLERGY, for every day in the year.
On the Gospels for the Sundays. From the Italian of Mgr. Scotti,
Abp. of Thessalonica. Revised and edited by the Oblates of S.
Charles. Vol. II. From Septuagesima Sunday to the Fourth Sunday
after Easter. London: Burns & Oates. 1873. (New York: Sold by The
Catholic Publication Society.)

We have already noticed the first volume of these invaluable _Meditations_, and need not repeat what we then said. The present volume fully sustains the promise of the first, and makes us look eagerly for the completion of the work.

THE ILLUSTRATED CATHOLIC FAMILY ALMANAC FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE YEAR OF OUR LORD 1874. Calculated for different Parallels of
Latitude, and adapted for use throughout the Country. New York:
The Catholic Publication Society.

The season does not bring a brighter, pleasanter, or more useful and necessary book than this cleverly executed little work. From cover to cover the reader finds something to catch the eye and attract him in every page. For a wonder, the title is an exact index of the book; it is illustrated, and remarkably well illustrated; it is Catholic, and it is a _family_ almanac, which the children will pore over for hours, delighted with the pictures of famous Catholic men, women, and places, and the short but well-written sketches accompanying them; which their parents will consult in order to find all the information concerning feasts, fasts, and the like necessary for the coming year; which all will read who wish to obtain accurate information on matters relating to the spread and progress of the church, particularly in the United States. When this has been said, there is really nothing more to say, as far as recommending this almanac to Catholics goes; but there is a great deal to be said concerning this present number, which in many respects is an improvement even on its predecessors. For instance, in the matter of filling in a page with short but pithy notices of Catholic works, in the excellent but necessarily incomplete tables of statistics of the Catholic Church in the United States, and in the fulness of the Catholic chronology for the past year, which forms, as it were, the headlines of Catholic history in this country--all this displays enterprise, and the excellence of the whole speaks tact and care on the part of the editor.

Glancing at the illustrations, we find portraits and sketches of Abp. Odin; Rt. Rev. Michael O'Connor, first bishop of Pittsburgh and of Erie; Bishop Fitzpatrick, of Boston; Father Southwell, S.J., whose poems and writings are now being collected and given to the public; Father Lacordaire, Father De Smet, and others. Here is a head of Manzoni, in another place the Comte de Montalembert; here John Banim's well-known face looks out, and here is genial Thomas D'Arcy McGee smiling at us. In another place is a portrait of S. Ignatius in armor, and a sunny picture of his birth-place. Miss Honora Nagle, foundress of the Ursuline Order in Ireland, Mother Mary of the Incarnation, Blessed Margaret Mary Alacoque, Church of Our Lady of Lourdes, of S. Stephen of the Mount, Abbey of Cluny, and others, form subjects for illustrations and sketches, all careful, accurate, and finished. Looking again at the _Almanac_, and then considering its price, the publishers may congratulate themselves on having accomplished that miracle of presenting to a Catholic public something which is _cheap and excellent_ throughout.

SONGS FROM THE SOUTHERN SEAS, AND OTHER POEMS. By John Boyle
O'Reilly. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1873.

These _Songs_ have a rare charm of novelty about them. Australia is a land yet unconquered to the muse, but evidently as fruitful in poetic themes as any of "the shores of old romance."

Our author is peculiarly at home, perhaps, in the scenes from which his book is named. Yet some of the "other poems" are of considerable merit; such as "A Wail of Two Cities" (Chicago and Boston), "The Wreck of the Atlantic," and "The Fishermen of Wexford."

We thank him for his modest volume, and hope to hear from him again.

RECENT MUSIC AND MUSICIANS, as described in the Diaries and
Correspondence of Ignaz Moscheles. Edited by his wife, and
adapted from the original German by A. D. Coleridge. New York:
Henry Holt & Co. 1873.

Born in 1794, and living to the advanced age of seventy-six, this distinguished musician had the opportunity of cultivating an intimate acquaintance, or of holding more or less correspondence, with all the composers, artists, singers, and patrons of music who flourished during his long life. Reference is made in this exceedingly interesting memoir to the names of over five hundred of these, furnishing to the reader a vast amount of information concerning musicians and their works in this century. The book is written in an agreeable, vivacious style, and is altogether the best of the several memoirs of the kind which have appeared.

THE STORY OF WANDERING WILLIE. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co.
1873.

We have been attracted by the beauty and pathos of this simple tale, and by its high moral tone, in which it contrasts favorably with many more pretentious works.

THE LIFE OF THE MOST REV. M. J. SPALDING, D.D., ARCHBISHOP OF
BALTIMORE. By Rev. J. L. Spalding, S.T.L. New York: The
Catholic Publication Society. 1873.

We had contemplated an extended notice of this very interesting biography, but were unable to finish it in time for the present number. We fancy, however, that few intelligent Catholics who are made aware of the subject, author, and superior mechanical execution of the volume, will delay securing possession of a copy.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

From BURNS & OATES, London (through "The Catholic Publication
Society," New York): Meditations for the Use of the Clergy. From
the Italian of Mgr. Scotti. Vol. ii., 1873. 12mo, pp. viii. 280.

From WEED, PARSONS & CO., Albany: Fourteenth Annual Report of the
Superintendent of Insurance, Fire and Marine, pp. lviii.-463.
Life and Casualty, pp. lvii.-249. 8vo, 1873.

From SCRIBNER, ARMSTRONG & CO., New York: Lombard Street: A
Description of the Money Market. By Walter Bagehot. 12mo, pp.
viii. 359.

From KELLY, PIET & CO., Baltimore: Little Manual of the Holy
Angels' Sodality. 1873, 24mo, pp. 68.

From P. O'SHEA, New York: Mrs. Herbert and the Villagers. By the
Comtesse E. M. De Bondenham. 2 vols, in 1, 18mo, pp. xii. 341,
vii. 318.

From D. & J. SADLIER & CO., New York: The Irish on the Prairies,
and other Poems. By Rev. Thos. Ambrose Butler. 12mo, pp. 161.

THE

CATHOLIC WORLD.

VOL. XVIII., No. 106.--JANUARY, 1874.[138]

THE PRINCIPLES OF REAL BEING.

All knowledge which is truly scientific rests on demonstration, and all demonstration depends on principles or axiomatic truths. But, besides the principles of demonstration, there are other principles on which not only the knowledge, but the very existence of things, and their origin and constitution, essentially depend. These latter principles are nowadays less known than the former, as we may argue from the fact that they are scarcely ever alluded to in modern speculations; and yet they undoubtedly have the best claim to the attention of philosophical minds, for it is in such principles that the real germs of all true science are hidden. For this reason, we have determined to offer our readers a short but accurate summary of the philosophical doctrine on principles; which, if presented, as we shall try to do, with becoming perspicuity, will prove to be a kind of popular introduction to metaphysical studies.

I. NOTION OF PRINCIPLE.

By the name of _principle_ philosophers designate that whence anything originally proceeds in any manner whatever: _Id, unde aliquid quomodocumque procedit_. This definition implies that there are many different manners of proceeding, and consequently many different kinds of principles. And so it is. Aristotle, however, shows that principles of all kinds can be reduced to three classes; that is, to those principles of which a thing consists, those through which or out of which a thing is made, and those by which a thing is known: _Primum, unde aliquid est, aut fit, aut cognoscitur_.[139]--Arist. _Metaph._ 5.

The first class comprises the principles through which a thing is, viz., by which the thing is intrinsically constituted. These principles are called _constituent_ or _intrinsic_ principles, and are always present _by their own entity_ in the thing principiated; as the matter in the body, and the soul in the animal.

The second class contains the principles through which a thing _is made_. These principles serve to account for the origin of the thing, and are called _extrinsic_ principles, because they are not present by _their own entity_ in the thing principiated. Thus, the motive power of the sun is not, by its own entity, in the planets to which it imparts movement, but in the sun only; and the medical art is not in the person who has been cured through it, but in the doctor. There is, however, in the planets something proceeding from the motive power of the sun, and in the person cured something proceeding from the medical art, as every one will acknowledge. Whence it is obvious that the extrinsic principles by their very principiation must leave some mark or vestige of themselves in the thing principiated.

The third class consists of those principles through which any conclusion is _made known_. These principles are general truths, which are made to serve for the demonstration of some other truth, and are called principles _of science_.

Among the principles of this third class we do not reckon the principles from which the first apprehension and immediate intuition of things proceeds; to wit, either the power through which the object makes an impression on the cognoscitive faculty, or the faculty itself through which the object is apprehended. Our reason is that these principles, thus considered, do not form a class apart. The power of the object to make its impression on the subject is an _extrinsic_ principle of knowledge, and ranks with the principles of the second class above mentioned; whilst the power of the subject to perceive through the intelligible species is an _intrinsic_ principle of knowledge, as well as the species which it expresses within itself, and, therefore, is to be ranked among the principles of the first class. Accordingly, the third class is exclusively made up of those principles which serve for the scientific demonstration of truth; and this is what Aristotle himself insinuates, at least negatively, as he gives no instance of principles of this third class but the premises by which any conclusion is made known.

Before we advance further, we have to remark that, in metaphysics, the first principles of science are assumed, not as a subject of investigation, but as the fundamental base of scientific demonstration. Thus, the principles, _Idem non potest simul esse et non esse_,[140] _Non datur effectus sine causa_,[141] _Quæ sunt eadem uni tertio sunt eadem inter se_,[142] and such like, though usually styled "metaphysical" principles, are not the subject of metaphysical investigation, but are simply presupposed and admitted on the strength of their immediate and incontrovertible evidence. Such principles are perfectly known before all metaphysical disquisition, and need not be traced to other principles. On the other hand, metaphysics, which is the science of reality, deals only with the principles of _real_ beings; whence it follows that the principles of demonstration, which, like the conclusion deduced therefrom, exist in the intellect alone (and therefore are _beings of reason_, and principiate nothing but other beings of reason), are not comprised in the object of metaphysical inquiry. Hence, the only principles which metaphysics is bound to investigate are those that belong to the first and second class above mentioned; that is, the intrinsic and the extrinsic principles of things: _Primum unde aliquid est_, and _primum unde aliquid fit_.[143]

Principles and causes are often confounded, although it is well known that they are not identical. Hence, our next question is: In what does a cause differ from a principle?

It is commonly admitted that all causes are principles, but not all principles causes; which evidently implies that a cause is something more than a principle. In fact, when we use the word "cause," we wish to designate a being in which we know that there is a principle of causation; whence it is evident that the common notion of cause implies the notion of principle, _and something else besides_--that is, the notion of a subject to which the principle belongs. Thus, we say that the moon causes the tides by its attractive power; the moon is the _cause_, and the attractive power is its _principle_ of causation. In like manner, we say that an orator causes great popular emotion by his eloquence; the orator is the _cause_, and his eloquence is his _principle_ of causation.

From these instances it would be easy to conclude that the difference between a cause and a principle lies in this, that the cause is a complete being, whilst the principle is only an appurtenance of the cause. But as we know from theology that there are principles which cannot be thus related to causes, we cannot consider the above as an adequate and final answer to the question proposed.

Some of the best modern scholastics account for the difference between cause and principle in the following manner: A principle, they say, is conceived to differ from a cause in two things: first, in this, that a cause always precedes its effect by priority of nature,[144] whereas a principle does not require such a priority; secondly, in this, that the cause does not communicate its own identical nature to its effect, whereas the principle can communicate its own identical nature to that which it principiates.[145] From these two differences a third one might be gathered, viz., that the effect has always a real dependence _from_[146] its cause, whilst the thing principiated does not always really depend _from_ its principles.[147] These grounds of distinction between principles and causes have been thought of, with the avowed object of paving the way to explain how the Eternal Father can be the principle, without being the cause, of his Eternal Son, and how the Father and the Son can be the principle, without being the cause, of the Holy Ghost.

But we must observe that there are four genera of causes and of principles: the _efficient_, the _material_, the _formal_, and the _final_; and that the two differences alleged by these writers between principle and cause do not apply to principles and causes of the same genus, but are applicable only when some principle belonging to one genus is wrongly compared with some cause pertaining to another genus.

That there are four genera of causes we will take for granted, as it is the universal doctrine of philosophers. That there are also four genera of principles corresponding to the four genera of causes is evident; for every cause must contain within itself the principle of its causality; and, in fact, Aristotle himself clearly affirms that there are as many causes as principles, and that all causes are also principles,[148] in the sense which we have already explained. Lastly, that the two aforesaid differences between principle and cause do not apply to principles and causes of the same genus can be easily verified by a glance at each genus. Let the reader take notice of the following statements, and then judge for himself.

The efficient cause (the agent) and the efficient principle (its active power) are _both_, by priority of nature, prior to the thing produced or principiated, and _both_ have a nature numerically distinct from that of the thing produced or principiated.

In the same manner the final cause (the object willed) and the finalizing principle (the known goodness and desirability of the object) _both_ are, by priority of nature, prior to the act caused or principiated, and _both_ have a nature numerically distinct from that of the act caused or principiated.

Thus, also, the material cause (actual matter) and the material principle (the passiveness of matter) are _both_, by priority of nature, prior to the thing effected or principiated, and _both_ identify themselves with the thing effected or principiated.

Accordingly, with regard to these three kinds of causation and principiation, it is quite impossible to admit that the difference between a cause and a principle is to be accounted for by a recourse to the two aforementioned grounds of distinction, so long as the causes and principles, which are compared, belong to one and the same genus.

As to the formal cause and the formal principle, we shall presently see that they are not distinct things; but, even if we were disposed to consider them as distinct, such a distinction could not possibly rest on the two grounds of which we have been speaking; for the formal cause and the formal principle have no priority of nature[149] with respect to the thing caused or principiated, and _both_ identify themselves with the same. We are, therefore, satisfied that the opinion which we have criticised has no foundation in truth.

Let us, then, resume our previous explanation, and see how the difficulty above proposed against its completeness can be solved. We have shown that the notion of cause implies the notion of principle, together with that of a subject to which the principle belongs. We must, therefore, admit that a principle differs from a cause of the same genus, as an incomplete or _metaphysical_ entity differs from a complete or _physical_ being; or, in other terms, that a real cause, rigorously speaking, is a complete being, _which_ gives origin to an effect; whilst a real principle, properly speaking, is only that _through which_ the cause gives origin to its effect. The cause is _id quod causat_;[150] the principle is _id quo causa causat_.[151]

The formal principle, however, is an exception to this general doctrine, as formal principles do not differ from formal causes. The form, in fact, not only _has_ within itself something through which it is fit to cause its effect, but also _is_ itself that very something, and _through itself_ brings its effect into existence. Thus the soul, which is the form of the body, _through itself_, and not through any of its faculties, actuates the body and vivifies it. On this account, then, any form might be indifferently called either a formal _cause_ or a formal _principle_. But we must further consider that a form, as such, is an incomplete entity, since no formal act can exist apart from its essential term;[152] and on this ground we maintain that the name of _principle_ suits it better than the name of _cause_.

And this conclusion will be approved even by those philosophers whose opinion concerning the distinction between cause and principle we have just refuted; for the two differences which they allege as characteristic of cause in opposition to principle have no room in formal causation or principiation, since we have seen that the formal act has no priority of nature with respect to its essential term, and identifies itself with the thing of which it is the act. Consequently, the form, even in the opinion of said philosophers, is not a cause, but a principle.

We hope to give a fuller explanation of this point on a later occasion; but what we have just said suffices to show what we at present intend, viz., that the doctrine which considers principles as appurtenances of causes admits of a remarkable exception in the case of formal principles, and by such an exception is competent to account for the existence of other principles importing real principiation without real causation. Now, this is exactly what the theological doctrine on divine processions requires. The fact, therefore, that the procession of one of the divine Persons from another involves no causation, but only principiation, can be accounted for by a simple reference to the nature of formal principiation. The Eternal Father is certainly not the efficient, but the _formal_, principle of His Eternal Son; and this already suffices to explain how the being of the Son is not _a new being made_ by the Father, but is the very same being of the Father communicated identically to the Son. Thus, also, the Holy Ghost not efficiently, but _formally_, proceeds from the Father and the Son, through their conspiration into a simple actuality of love; and this suffices to explain how the Holy Ghost is not _made_ by the Father and the Son, but is the very actuality of the one in the other.

To sum up: Formal principiation is not causation; hence, that which immediately proceeds from a formal principle is not caused by it, but only principiated; it is not its effect, but its connatural term; it has not a distinct nature, but the very nature of its formal principle identically communicated; lastly, it has no real dependence _from_ its formal principle, but only real relative opposition; for real dependence has no place where there is identity of nature. This is eminently true of God, and, by imitation, of every primitive contingent being, which is strictly one in its entity, and consequently also of all the ultimate elements into which a physical compound can be resolved; for the ultimate elements of things cannot but be primitive beings.

The preceding remarks regard those formal acts which enter in the essential constitution of being as such, and which are called strictly _substantial acts_. Of accidental forms we have nothing to say in particular, as it is too evident to need explanation that they are not causes, but mere principles. It is, therefore, to be concluded that the distinction between cause and principle applies only to _efficient_, _material_, and _final_ causality and principiativity. Thus, as we have said, _the sun_ is the efficient cause of certain movements, and _its attractive power_ is the efficient principle of those movements; _the object_ is the final cause that moves the will, and _the goodness_, through which the object moves the will, is the finalizing principle of the volition: _the steel_ is the material cause of the sword, but the material principle of the sword is _the passive potency_ of the steel, which allows it to receive the form of a sword or any other form.

We must not forget, however, that the words _cause_ and _principle_ have been, and are, very frequently used without discrimination by philosophical writers, even of the highest merit. It is by no means uncommon to find, for instance, the premises described as the _cause_ of the conclusion, the rules of the art as the _cause_ of an artificial work, the exemplar as the _cause_ of that in which it is reproduced or imitated. In these examples, the word _cause_ stands for _principle_. The old Greek theologians even said that God the Father is the _cause_ of his Eternal Son; the word _cause_ being undoubtedly used by them in the sense of _principle_. We should not be astonished at this. Indeed, while we ourselves persist in giving the name of cause to the formal principle, we should be the last to be surprised at the Greek fathers doing the same.

And now, let us come to another part of our subject. Philosophers, when wishing to give a full account of things, besides principles and causes, point out _metaphysical reasons_ too. We think it our duty to show in what such reasons consist, and in what they differ from principles.

A reason, in general, may be defined as _that from which anything immediately results_; and since a formal result is not made, but simply follows as a consequence from a conspiration of principles, we can see at once that a reason, or the formal ground of a given result, must consist in a conspiration of given principles. There are logical reasons, which give rise to logical results; and there are metaphysical reasons, which give rise to metaphysical results. We will give an example of each.

In a syllogism, the consequence is the result of a conspiration of two propositions, called premises. The propositions themselves are the _principles_ from which the conclusion is to follow; but the actual following of the conclusion depends on the actual comparison of the two propositions, and on the actual perception of the agreement of two extreme terms with a middle one. It is, in fact, through the middle term that the two premises conspire into a definite conclusion. Hence, when we are asked the reason why a conclusion follows from two premises, we point out not only the fact that the two premises are true, but especially the fact that the extreme terms, which are to be directly united in the conclusion, are already both linked, in the premises, with the same middle term. For it is evident that the whole strength of a legitimate conclusion lies in the universality of the axiom, _Quæ sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem inter se_. The words, _sunt eadem uni tertio_,[153] express the formal reason, and the words _sunt eadem inter se_[154] express the formal result. In scholastic language, the premises would be called the _principium formale quod_[155] of the conclusion, and the suitable connection of their terms would be called the _principium formale quo_,[156] or the _ratio formalis_[157] of the conclusion; whilst the conclusion itself would be called the _rationatum_.[158]

For an example of the metaphysical order, we will take a known subject, _animal life_, and ascertain its formal reason. Every one knows that the soul is a principle of life; but animal life, besides the vivifying soul, requires also an organic body as its other principle. These two principles, however, are, with respect to animal life, in the same relation as the two premises with respect to their conclusion. For as the conclusion proximately results from the connection of the premises and their bearing on one another, as we have just explained, so, also, animal life results from the connection of soul and body--that is, from the actuation of the latter by the former, and consequently by the completion of the former in the latter. Hence, the formal reason, or the _principium formale quo_, of animal life is the very information of the body by the soul, while the soul and the body themselves, taken together, constitute the _principium formale quod_.