Chapter II (18)

The main events which have moved the world during the past year have now been touched upon hastily and crudely enough, but sufficiently, it may be hoped, to give the reader some idea of the mainsprings which move this busy world, of which we form a part, and in which each one is set to play a part and render an account of it. What was said at the beginning may be more readily appreciated now, or denied--that the year of our Lord 1873 is bigger with portent than event, and a portent that bodes ill, as far as human eye can see, for the church of Christ, built upon Peter. Mr. Disraeli's party-cry may contain more truth than the crier, wise man though he be, dreamed: there is such an intense, bitter, determined, and general hostility, on the part of "the kings and the princes of the world, against the Lord and against his Christ"; the opposition is fast becoming so intolerant and absolutely unbearable to Catholics; while protest and opposition in words alone seem vain and idle when addressed to ears that are deaf.

In the meanwhile, Catholics must not budge an inch. They are not only fighting for their religion, but for human freedom. To yield the smallest point of principle is to be false to their conscience. The more persistent is the non-Catholic world in false theories of human rights and human wrongs, the more persistent must they be in adhering, at any sacrifice, to what they know to be right, and what was right when modern nations were unborn. Catholics must remember that all are fighting the same battle, and all are bound to take a hand in the struggle. What the Pope fights for, that all Catholics fight for--from the bishop to the priest, from the priest to the one whose voice is heard in the halls of legislation, to the editor in his office, to the merchant in his counting-house, to the very beggar in the street. There is no difference, no line to be drawn. We must be one, and, if right must win, then victory is ours.

For, for what do we contend? To be Christian; to be free to obey the church which our Lord Jesus Christ founded. Allegiance to a foreign power? What folly! Allegiance to Pius IX. is allegiance to Jesus Christ. Nothing more, nothing less. Are Catholics not Americans, or Germans, or Irishmen, or Englishmen, for being Catholics? How, when, where, was it ever shown that they were not? Why, when Protestantism was not known, were Catholics not nationalists--when Christendom was one?

A new year is opening before us--a year of trial, not so much in this country, but to the universal church. Where freedom is left to Catholics, as in this country, they must never cease, by prayer, by the pen, by the voice, by every means that the occasion calls forth, to help their persecuted brethren; not looking to this government or to that to help them, but basing their cause on their natural rights. There is not a civil, religious, or political right anywhere existing on this earth, belonging to non-Catholics, which does not also belong to Catholics. They must get that idea fast in their minds, and fight on that which is a lawful and just issue. No Protestant can claim a right which does not belong equally to a Catholic. No Protestant, be he individual or government, can say to a Catholic: You must not believe this doctrine or that; you must not take the Pope for an infallible guide in religion, but yourself; you must not educate your children in your religion, and so on. This is the language, open or secret, of the day which is addressed to Catholics. It must be met with no hesitation, but with the response: Our freedom is your freedom; our rights are your rights; our interest is your interest; nay, after all, our God is your God. Let us fight our battles of opinion civilly. But when you issue paper constitutions every day, and tell us that we must obey such and such an iniquitous law--a law revolting to our conscience, our reason, and every aspiration of freedom--we throw your paper constitution to the winds, and refuse to obey it. _It is necessary to obey God rather than man!_ We conclude by wishing to all our readers a happy New Year, to our Holy Father a speedy triumph, and to ourselves the pleasure of recording, at the end of 1874, the history of the confusion and rout of the enemies of the church.

Of events accidentally omitted in the preceding record of the year, were the ravages of the yellow fever in the South, particularly at Memphis and Shreveport, where many Catholic priests and religious sacrificed their lives in the service of the sick. To the list of disasters at sea resulting from carelessness must be added the recent wreck of the _Ville du Havre_, with a loss of upwards of 200 lives. The festival of the Catholic Union at Boston also deserved mention, as it evoked a demonstration of Catholic strength and Catholic feeling that was an honest source of pride. Among names omitted in the death-roll were those of Dr. H. S. Hewit, a noble man who sacrificed much for his country and his faith; Hiram Powers, the sculptor; Laura Keene, the actress, an estimable woman and a good Catholic; Sir Henry Holland, Henry W. Wilberforce, brother of the Anglican bishop, and for a long time editor of the London _Weekly Register_ (Catholic); General Hardee, and a name once very famous, Abdel-Kader. A new Atlantic cable was this year laid by the _Great Eastern_ between Valentia and Heart's Content, N. F.

FOOTNOTES:

[176] "Church and State in Germany," _Catholic World_, July, 1872.

[177] See the response of the German Emperor to the Pope, in the correspondence recently published.

[178] The New York _Tablet_, July 19, 1873--"A Truly Liberal Government."

[179] The London _Times_, January, 1873.

[180] Possibly the spelling of the name is incorrect; but there is such a variety to choose from that the correct form is a nice question.

NEW PUBLICATIONS.

THE ARK OF THE PEOPLE. By Plato Punchinello. Translated from the
French by a Friend of Christian Civilization. Philadelphia: P. F.
Cunningham. 1873.

A very timely book, whose publication is very welcome. It is one of a class very numerous at present in France, which we hope to see becoming common in our own country. That is to say, it treats of the horrible consequences in the social order flowing from the prevalent infidel, heretical, anti-Catholic theories, maxims, errors, and illusions of the age, vamped up by sophists and charlatans, and palmed off upon their dupes and victims as philosophy, science, advanced ideas, principles of progress and improvement in civilization. It treats also of Catholic principles as the principles of true social and political order and well-being. It is lively and brilliant, and we recommend it most earnestly as a book most useful and entertaining, specially fitted to counteract the false notions which are but too current even among Catholics.

LASCINE. By an Oxford Man. New York: Appletons. 1873.

SEVEN STORIES. By Lady Georgiana Fullerton. London: Burns & Oates.
1873. (New York: Sold by The Catholic Publication Society.)

MARIE AND PAUL. By "Our Little Woman." Same publishers.

THE BARON OF HERTZ. A Tale of the Anabaptists. From the French of
Albert De Labadye. New York: O'Shea. 1873.

GORDON LODGE. By Miss M. Agnes White. Baltimore: Kelly & Piet. 1873.

Here is quite a supply of works of fiction by Catholic writers to help while away the dreary winter months. _Lascine_ is a story whose incidents are taken from the experience of an Oxford convert. A number of very good stories of this kind have appeared since the great movement began; and the movement itself, besides its serious importance, is certainly very fertile in romantic incidents, and furnishes abundant stuff for a skilful novelist. _Lascine_ is a book which can be read with great interest, and is by no means lacking in cleverness. Its principal fault is an excess of sentimentality. We think it promises a great deal for the future success of its young author.

Anything written by Lady Georgiana Fullerton must of course be excellent. The first and last of these stories are particularly good, and the last one ought to be read by all our young people, especially young ladies who aspire to become literary stars.

_Marie and Paul_ is a very pretty and pathetic tale.

_The Baron of Hertz_ has a great deal of historical instruction about the crimes and horrors of the German Reformation, couched in the form of a stirring and most tragic story.

Miss White's _début_ is very creditable to her. She has originality of conception and power of delineation and description. There are certain inaccuracies in respect to the English titles of nobility, and some other minor faults of style which indicate the need of a more careful attention to details and a more accurate revision. As a whole, the story is a very successful effort.

THE REAL PRESENCE. By Rev. P. Tissot, S.J. New York: P. O'Shea.
1873.

An excellent little book, solid, simple, and pious, good alike for old and young. The doctrinal gravity of the treatise is relieved in an agreeable and edifying manner by some interesting narrations of miraculous events relating to the Blessed Eucharist. F. Tissot has chosen these incidents with great judgment, selecting those which are both extremely wonderful and at the same time very well authenticated, and taking care to give the proof as well as the history. There cannot be anything more stupid or more provoking than the ignorant, supercilious, and flippant manner in which the writers for the secular and _soi-disant_ religious press, sneer at these Catholic miracles, without pretending to reason about the evidence on which the truth rests. There are some who think it the best policy to keep silent about them; but it is our opinion that we ought to bring them constantly before the face and eyes of the unbelieving world, although the light which flashes from them may be disagreeable to many who do not wish to be disturbed in their fatal slumber.

SAXE HOLM'S STORIES. New York: Scribner. 1874.

A most peculiar school of fiction, which we may call the "transcendental," has grown up among the New Englanders and their _semblables_ within our own remembrance. Some of its productions are of fine quality, and it oscillates in morality between the two extremes of Catholicity and pantheism. Nevertheless, as a dear friend, who lived and died a Unitarian minister, once remarked to us, the prevailing tendency of this entire transcendental movement is a very circuitous return to the religion of our Catholic forefathers. The stories of this volume, written, we conjecture, by a lady, are a sample of the kind of literature referred to. The first story, "Draxy Miller," is a _chef d'œuvre_. It may seem odd that we should perceive a Catholic undertone in a story the heroine of which, after marrying a minister in a wild country hamlet of New Hampshire, takes charge of the preaching for a year after her husband's death. Female preaching, and the whole set of strong-minded female notions, we abominate, of course. But Draxy Miller's last epoch of life, as the passing _umbra_ of her husband, is so described that the repulsive aspect of the pastoral office in petticoats is hidden. And as an ideal character Draxy is exquisite. "Reuben Miller's Daughter" wins the heart of the reader, as she did the hearts of the old captain, the stage-driver, the elder, and the elder's parishioners.

"The One-Legged Dancers" is capital also, and the other stories are written with skill and effect. There is rather too strong an infusion of transcendental notions about love, yet the moral tone is much higher than is usually found in novels, and the author appears to recognize the stringent obligation of wedlock. We rank this volume of stories decidedly in the first class.

In the advertisements at the end of the volume we perceive the announcement of a translation of Jules Verne's _De la Terre à la Lune_, together with another similar book, describing a journey to the centre of the earth. The first of these extraordinary _jeux d'esprit_ has given us so much pleasure in the original, overflowing, as it is, with humor, poetry, and scientific knowledge, that we call the attention of our readers, in a spirit of purely disinterested philanthropy, to the fact that they can get this book and its fellow in English. They will help very materially the effort to pass a merry Christmas.

THE ARENA AND THE THRONE. By L. T. Townsend, D.D., author of
_Credo_, etc. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1873.

The principal object of this book is one in which we heartily sympathize, being the refutation of the ordinary shallow arguments which some persons consider as conclusive in favor of what is known as the "plurality of worlds" and the maintenance of the dignity of man as a worthy possessor of the universe of God. The material universe is insignificant compared with a single soul. We need not take so much pains to try to utilize it. The convenience of one man would be a sufficient reason for its existence. The physical arguments, drawn from actual observation, in favor of the uninhabitability of the worlds with which we have become in any degree acquainted, are well put.

RHODA THORNTON'S GIRLHOOD. By Mary E. Pratt. Boston: Lee & Shepard.
1873.

A pretty, simple story of New England life; a good book for a school prize. The usual hearty country pleasures--husking and quilting parties, Thanksgiving, etc., are well and truly described; a healthy tone runs through the story, which is a natural and probable one. The little heroine, Rhoda, a thoughtful, womanly child, begins her life in an alms-house, and then spends a few years on an old-fashioned farm. She turns out to be the great-granddaughter of a lost member of an old family, whose heirs and representatives she and her brother become. The incidents are not violently improbable, and the disintegration naturally arising in such a family through imprudent marriages and removals to distant and unreclaimed territories very adequately accounts for the mystery. The style is free and simple; studied ornament or any silly rhetorical flourish is avoided.

RITUALE ROMANUM PAULI V. PONTIFICIS MAXIMI JUSSU EDITUM ET A
BENEDICTO XIV. AUCTUM ET CASTIGATUM: CUI NOVISSIMA ACCEDIT
BENEDICTIONUM ET INSTRUCTIONUM APPENDIX. Baltimori: Excudebat
Joannes Murphy. 1873. 12mo, pp. 546.

This is the first entire edition of the _Rituale_ published in this country, and we take pleasure in commending it as one very creditable to the publisher. The type is large, the paper white and clear, and very excellent register is observed in printing the rubrics. If there is any suggestion we would offer, it is that the next edition be printed on thinner paper, so that the volume may be reduced to a more portable size without any diminution in legibility. The _imprimatur_ of the archbishop of Baltimore obviates any necessity for comment on the text.

THE ACTS OF THE EARLY MARTYRS. By J. A. M. Fastré, S.J. Third
series. Philadelphia: P. Cunningham & Son. 1873.

The first and second series of this valuable and suggestive work have received due notice in these pages at the time of their publication. We have before us now the third series, chiefly treating of the martyrs of the IVth century, under the tenth general persecution--that of Diocletian. The contents are most interesting, the more so as some of the saints here mentioned are less known than those whose acts filled the first two volumes. The great and foremost reason why we rejoice to see the sufferings and constancy of the early martyrs brought before the remembrance of our people is that these sufferings have some analogy with the present condition of the church in many lands. Although the physical tortures of early days are out of fashion, the moral persecution is not less ingeniously spread over the whole life of a Catholic than it was in former times. The same kind of constancy is required to conquer the latter as was needed by the martyrs to overcome bodily pain. In those early times social ostracism, exile from honorable professions, and confiscation of property, were as frequently as now the guerdon of him who embraced the unpopular religion, as we see in the case of S. Tarachus and his companions. In every instance the bribe held out by Satan to the confessors of the faith was the favor of the emperor, the honors and emoluments of the magistracy, great riches, and high position, as we see specially in the case of S. Clement of Ancyra. His is the most wonderful life recounted in this little book. Eighteen years of incessant martyrdom; the most heroic constancy and patience; the most singular and miraculous Providence watching over him; the powers of persuasion which converted his jailers, his executioners, and thousands of pagans in the various places where he was tortured and confined; the manner in which it pleased God to make him whole no less than six times after the devil had done his best to render his body unrecognizable--all contribute to make of his life a tissue of a more wonderful and awful romance than any imaginary tale of mediæval marvel. To S. Blasius of Sebaste we would also call attention, as having forestalled S. Francis of Assisi in his god-given power over the lower creation. In the story of S. Polyeuctus the reader will recognize the foundation of Corneille's sublime Christian drama of _Polyeucte_, written at the instance of Mme. de Maintenon. The style of this book is flowing and correct; simple, as befits the subject, which cannot be raised higher by any flight of human fancy or adornment of human fashion; is accessible to the understanding of the unlearned, and cannot fail involuntarily to touch the hearts of all. Is it not a strange thought to dwell upon, that, among all the conversions wrought on the spot by the supernatural courage of the martyrs, there should be hardly one instance on record of it having converted their judge? The sudden judgment executed on some governors and prætors is indeed mentioned in a few cases. Are we to suppose that they were really beyond persuasion, being possessed by a devil who had complete control over their faculties? It is a very awful thing whereon to meditate, but these stories of our forerunners in the good fight certainly strongly suggest the idea.

* * * * *

ANNOUNCEMENT.--We shall begin in our next number the publication of a new story by Mrs. Craven, author of _A Sister's Story_, _Fleurange_, etc. The work will be issued simultaneously with its appearance in _Le Correspondant_, the translation being made from the original MS. with the special sanction of the author from whom the exclusive right of publication in this country has been purchased.

The continuation of _Grapes and Thorns_, which has been delayed by the departure of the author on an European tour, will be resumed in the February number.

THE

CATHOLIC WORLD.

VOL. XVIII., No. 107.--FEBRUARY, 1874.[181]

THE PRINCIPLES OF REAL BEING.

II.

EXTRINSIC PRINCIPLES OF BEING.

As in chemistry, so also in metaphysics, the labor and difficulty attending the analysis of complex things is proportional to the degree of their complexity. Hence in the search after the principles of real being, which we are about to make, we judge it expedient, for the greater convenience and satisfaction of our philosophical readers, to start from the principles of the most simple among the subjects of metaphysical analysis--that is, from the principles of primitive beings.

By "primitive" being we mean a being not made up of other beings, but "strictly one in its entity"--_unum per se in ratione entis_--and therefore having nothing of which it can be deprived without ceasing to be altogether.

It is to be observed that a primitive being may be conceived to exist either contingently or through the necessity of its own nature. Of course, a being which exists through the necessity of its own nature is perfectly independent of all extrinsic things, as it contains in its own nature the adequate reason of its being, and therefore admits of no extrinsic principles of any kind. But a being which exists contingently is a being which has not within itself the adequate reason of its existence; whence it follows that its existence cannot be accounted for but by recourse to some extrinsic principle or principles. As the knowledge of extrinsic principles is calculated to throw much light also on the intrinsic constitution of primitive contingent beings, let us make such principles the subject of our first investigation.

We affirm that the extrinsic principles of every primitive contingent being are three; for to the question, "Whence any such being proceeds," three different answers can be given, and three only.

First, we can assign the reason why, or the end _for the sake of which_, a being has been made to exist.

Secondly, we can point out the agency _through which_ a being has been made to exist.

Thirdly, and lastly, we can mention the term _out of which_ a being has been brought into existence.

These three principles virtually contain the whole theory of creation. If we were now writing for unbelievers, we would be obliged to commence by establishing some preliminary truths, such as God's existence, the contingency of the world, and the philosophical impossibility of accounting for its origin without recourse to the dogma of creation. But as our habitual readers are presumed to be sufficiently instructed about these fundamental truths, we think we may here dispense with a direct demonstration of the same, and avoid a digression which would lead us too far from the subject now under examination. As, however, this article may possibly fall into the hands of some dupe of modern infidelity, we propose to make a few incidental remarks on their usual objections, and to lay down, before we conclude, some of the arguments by which unbelievers can be convinced of the absolute truth of what we now assume as the ground of our explanations.

We assume, then, that there is a Creator, a God, a being infinitely intelligent and infinitely powerful, eternal, and independent. Such a being, as infinitely perfect, is infinitely happy, and experiences no need whatever of anything outside of himself. He therefore does not create anything, unless he freely wills; nor wills he anything, unless it is for some good which he freely intends; for nothing but good can be the object of volition. Now, the only good which God in his infinite wisdom can freely intend is the exterior manifestation of his divine perfections. It is, therefore, for this end that creatures were brought into existence.

Our first answer to the question above proposed points out this _final principle_ of creation--that is, the manifestation of God's perfections in such a degree and manner as he himself was pleased freely to determine. To attain this end, it is obvious that God was obliged to bestow upon his creatures such a degree of reality as would enable them to show in themselves and in their finite perfections a finite image, and, so to say, a reflex of the perfections of their Creator. Hence the final principle, on which the existence of contingent beings originally depends, comprises not only the manifestation of God's perfections in a determinate degree, but also, and more immediately, the bestowal of a proportionate degree of entity upon creatures, that they may carry on such a manifestation according to the design of their Creator. Thus the _ultimate_ end of creation is indeed God's glory, or the manifestation of his perfections; but the _proximate_ end of creation, and that which is immediately obtained in the very act of creation, is the existence of the created things with that degree of reality and with those endowments which make them fit instruments for the aforesaid manifestation. Accordingly, when asked whence a primitive contingent being proceeds, our first answer must be that it proceeds from God's design of showing his existence and infinite perfection by communicating contingent existence and finite perfections outside of himself.

Let us here take notice that "modern thought" ignores final principles altogether, and pretends that arguments from design have no value in science. In this pretension we unmistakably recognize the materialistic propensities and the lack of philosophical reasoning by which our age is afflicted. When our modern sages will prove that creation does not proceed from a will, or that a will can act without an object, then they will be entitled to the honor of a serious refutation. As it is, their negative position is sufficiently refuted by a simple appeal to common sense.

To those who, without denying final causes, maintain that we cannot ascertain them, nor make them an object of science, we reply that, although we do not know _all_ the particular ends which each creature may be destined to fulfil, we nevertheless know perfectly well the general end of creation. Now, nothing more is needed for establishing the reality of the first extrinsic principle on which the existence of every contingent being depends.

Our second answer points out the _efficient principle_ of creation--that is, God's omnipotent power. Rationalists and materialists have tried to do away with this most necessary principle. Besides the old pagan assumption of self-existent matter, which many of them adopted in order to supersede the necessity of a creator, they have tried to popularize other inventions of more recent thinkers, who for the God of the Bible have substituted what they style the _Absolute_, and pretend that what we call "contingent beings" are mere apparitions of the _Absolute_--that is, the _Absolute_ manifesting itself. Without stopping here to refute such a strange theory, we shall content ourselves with observing that what is altogether _absolute_ is intrinsically _unmodifiable_--a truth which needs no demonstration, as it immediately results from the comparison of the two terms; whence it follows that, if the _Absolute_ wishes to manifest itself, it cannot do so by assuming any new form, but only by means of something extraneous to its own nature, and consequently through the instrumentality of some being _produced_ by it, perfectly _distinct_ from it, and which may admit of such modifications as we witness everywhere around us, and as we know to be irreconcilable with the nature of the _Absolute_. This suffices to show that no apparition or manifestation of the _Absolute_ can be conceived without implying an exertion of efficient power.[182] We say, then, in our second answer, that it is through divine omnipotence that contingent beings were actually brought into existence by such a communication of reality as was proportionate to the design of their Creator. In other terms, God's omnipotent power is the _efficient_ principle of all primitive contingent being.

Our third answer points out the _terminus ex quo_ of creation--that is, the term out of which every contingent being is primarily educed. Such a term is mere nothingness; for whatever primarily begins to exist must come out of absolute non-existence. It is against this that our modern pseudo-philosophers most loudly protest, as they stoutly proclaim that "nothing comes out of nothing"--_ex nihilo nihil fit_. We may well smile at their useless protestation; for the fact is that nothing is ever brought into existence but from its contrary--that is, from its non-existence. It would be vain to object that, to build a house or a ship, materials are needed. Of course they are needed, but a house is a compound, not a primitive, being; and to build a house is not _to produce_ the house, but only to effect _the artistic arrangement_ of its materials. Now, undoubtedly, before the house is built, such an arrangement has no existence. The only thing, therefore, that the builder efficiently produces springs out of non-existence. We fully admit that a physical compound cannot be made up without materials--viz., without pre-existent components--but, to be sure, the first components do not themselves depend on other components, because the first components are _primitive_ beings, and, as such, cannot be made of any pre-existing material. Yet they must have been made, since they exist and are contingent; and, if made of no pre-existing material, certainly brought out of nothing.

But as our readers need none of our arguments to be convinced of a truth of which they are already in possession, we will set aside all further discussion on this subject, and conclude, from the preceding remarks, that when we are asked whence a contingent being originally comes, our last answer must be that it comes out of nothing as the _term_ of its eduction. Nothingness, in this case, holds the place of the _material_ principle, which is wanting.

It is clear, then, that all primitive contingent beings can, and must, be traced to three extrinsic principles. This doctrine contains nothing difficult, far-fetched, or mysterious, and its great simplicity proves that metaphysics, after all, may be less frightfully abstruse than some people are apt to believe. This same doctrine is also the universal doctrine of all philosophers who did not lose themselves in the dreams of visionary systems. It is true that they do not always mention, as formally as we do, the final object of creation as a distinct principle; but they do not deny it. In treating of the origin of things, they usually consider the final and the efficient principle of creation as a single adequate principle, on the ground that finality and efficiency, viewed absolutely as they are in God, are but one and the same thing. They also omit very frequently the mention of the term out of which things are educed, not because they do not acknowledge it, but because they know that it has no positive causality. Nevertheless, a little reflection will show that such a course is not the best calculated to give a distinct idea of the principiation of things; on the contrary, the very nature of the metaphysical process demands that each of the three extrinsic principles be kept in view very distinctly and explicitly.

We admit, of course, that the final and the efficient principle of creation, viewed absolutely as they are in God, are really and entitatively the same thing; but we consider that the intention, or volition of the end, has its connection with created beings, not on account of its absolute entity, which is necessary, but on account of its extrinsic termination, which is contingent; for, evidently, no act can be conceived as the principle of a being, except inasmuch as it is connected with the same being. Accordingly, God's volition is the principle of things, not inasmuch as it is an absolute act, entitatively necessary, but inasmuch as it is an act having a contingent termination. On the other hand, God's infinite power must indeed be conceived as connoting an infinity of beings that _can_ be created, but is not conceivable as connoting determinate beings that _will_ be created, unless something be found that connects it especially with the same determinate beings. Now, what is it that connects God's omnipotence with any determinate being which is to be created but his volition of a contingent determinate object--that is, his volition as having a contingent termination? Omnipotence, therefore, acquires a special connection with a determinate contingent being only on account of the extrinsic termination of divine volition; and thus divine omnipotence and divine volition have, under this consideration, a kind of relative opposition, on account of which the one that induces the special connection is to be distinguished from the other that acquires it.

Moreover, in the investigation of first principles we must continue our analysis as far as we can--that is, until we reach the ultimate terms into which the subject of our investigation can be resolved. Now, it is evident that omnipotence, as freely connected with the production of a determinate being, is not the ultimate term of analysis; for we can go further, and assign the reason of that free connection--viz., the actual volition of an end. Hence the final and the efficient principle of creation, though not really distinct in God, afford a real ground for two distinct concepts, and are to be considered as two distinct extrinsic principles with respect to all created things.

The third extrinsic principle--that is, the term out of which contingent beings are originally educed--is very frequently overlooked as irrelevant, because it has no reality. We are of opinion that it should be kept in view by all means, and prominently too, for many reasons which will be hereafter explained, and especially for the easier refutation of pantheism. Such a term has, indeed, no reality; but it is not necessary that all the extrinsic principles of being should be realities. Common sense teaches, on the contrary, that when a thing is to be first brought into existence, it is necessary that it should pass from its non-being into being; whence it is manifest that _its non-being_ is the proper term out of which it has to be educed. Now, the non-being of a thing is its nothingness; and, therefore, its nothingness is the proper term out of which it must be educed. For the same reason, the schoolmen uniformly taught with Aristotle that _privation_ also was to be ranked among the principles of things, although privations are not positive beings;[183] and therefore the nothingness of the term from which creatures are educed is no objection to its being placed among the extrinsic principles of contingent beings.

As, however, that which is looked upon as a principle is always conceived to connote the thing principiated, and, on the other hand, _absolute_ nothingness has no such connotation (for connotation is virtual relativity, and cannot spring from nothing), it follows that _nothingness_, when conceived as a term out of which a being is educed, is to be looked upon, not as an absolute negation of being, but as _a negation out of which divine omnipotence, by the production of an act, brings the creature into being_. In other terms, nothingness is to be considered, under God's hand, as _a negative potency of something real_, which can be actuated; and, with regard to any individual reality, as the potency of that individual reality. When viewed in this manner, nothingness assumes a relative aspect, in opposition to that reality of which it is the potency, and thus becomes apt to connote that same reality, in the same way as silence connotes talk, darkness light, absence presence, informity form. Hence we took care to say that a thing is brought into being out of _its_ non-being; because, as the fool only by divesting himself of _his_ foolishness can grow wise, so a reality which is to come out of nothing--say, a point of matter--cannot be educed out of the non-being of an angel or of any other thing, but only out of _its own_ non-being. Consequently, non-being, or nothingness, as the term out of which a point of matter is to be educed, means nothing but _the potency of that real point_; and thus nothingness, under the hand of the Omnipotent, acquires, in regard to that which is educed out of it, that relativity which is sufficient to make it a principle, according to the nature and manner of its principiation.

Some may ask why, among the extrinsic principles of things, we did not mention God's _archetypal ideas_; for it seems that, when we are asked whence a contingent being primarily proceeds, we might answer by pointing out God's ideas as the patterns to which creatures must conform, and by saying that things primarily proceed _from the divine ideas_ as from their archetypal principle; and if this answer--which is by no means absurd--be admitted, the extrinsic principles of contingent beings will be four, and not three.

But it is to be observed that God's ideas precede all decrees concerning creation, and are the archetypes not only of all the things that are created, but of all the things also which will never be created; and, therefore, God's ideas have, of themselves, no connection with the _existence_ of contingent beings, but only with their _intelligibility_. Hence we may argue in the following manner: The extrinsic principiation of a contingent being cannot be traced back to any _special_ principle prior to that which is the first reason of their creation. But God's ideas are prior to God's volition, which is the first reason of creation; therefore, the principiation of contingent beings cannot be traced back to divine ideas as a _special_ extrinsic principle.

Nevertheless, since God cannot intend to create anything but according to his own idea of it, we must own that the divine ideas share in the causality of things, inasmuch as such ideas are implied in the volition of producing the objects they represent; and though, of themselves, they are not a distinct and special principle of creation, yet, as included in the Creator's volition, they make up the whole plan of creation, and thus they have a bearing on the nature, number, and order of all created things.

Such is the doctrine which we find in S. Thomas' _Theological Summa_, where he explains how God's ideas are the cause of things. "God's ideas," says he, "are to all created things what the artist's ideas are to the works of art. The artist's ideas are the cause of a work of art, inasmuch as the artist acts through his understanding; hence the form or idea which is in his understanding must be the principle of his operation, in the same manner as heat is the principle of the heating. But it must be remarked that a natural form is a principle of operation, not inasmuch as it is the permanent form of the thing to which it gives existence, but inasmuch as it has a leaning towards an effect. And in a similar manner the form which is in the understanding is a principle of action, not inasmuch as it is in the understanding simply, but inasmuch as it acquires, through the will, a leaning towards an effect; for an intellectual form is not more connected with the existence than with the non-existence of the thing of which it is the form (since one and the same is the science of contraries); and, therefore, such a form cannot produce a determinate effect, unless it be brought into connection with one of the two contraries; which is done by the will. Now, God, as we know, causes all things through his understanding, for his understanding is his being; and, therefore, his science, _as united with his will_, must be the cause of all things."[184]

It might be here objected that if, for the reason just alleged, archetypal ideas are not to be considered a distinct principle of creation, then neither can omnipotence be considered as a distinct principle; for as archetypal ideas do not principiate anything unless through free volition, so, also, omnipotence principiates nothing but in consequence of the same volition; and, therefore, if archetypal ideas on this account are not a distinct principle of things, on the same account omnipotence cannot be taken as a distinct principle.

To this we answer that the assumed parity has no legs to stand on. That archetypal ideas are not a distinct principle of creation was proved above, not simply by arguing that they cannot principiate anything independently of free volition, but by showing that it is not from them, but from the volition alone, that the real principiation of things begins. Now, this proof applies to ideas, but not to omnipotence. In fact, ideas, even in God, must be conceived as having a certain priority with respect to volitions; for it is true, even in God, that nothing is willed which is not foreknown--_nihil est volitum, quin præcognitum_. If, therefore, God's ideas were a _distinct_ principle of creation, there would be something in God, prior to his will, which would entail the existence of created beings; which is impossible to admit so long as we maintain that God's will must remain free in its extrinsic operations. We cannot, therefore, admit, without absurdity, that the archetypal ideas constitute a _distinct_ principle of things. But, as to divine omnipotence, no such absurdity is to be feared; for God's omnipotence has no priority with respect to God's will; and thus the above argument cannot be used to prove that omnipotence is not a distinct principle of creation.

We conclude that the extrinsic principles, to which the first origin of contingent beings is to be traced, are not fewer, and not more, than three. Our Catholic readers will be satisfied, we hope, that this conclusion has been fairly established on what they know to be secure foundations. Infidels, of course, will object; for they will think that the whole of our discussion has been based on hypothetical grounds. In fact, we have supposed that there are "primitive" beings, that they are "contingent," that they need "a creator," and that the creator must be an "infinite being," a god. If a Comtist or a materialist happens to read the preceding pages, he will surely say that we have built nothing but a cob-house. But we do not care much what may be objected by such a class of frivolous and unreasonable philosophers. We know that their favorite theories have been a hundred times exploded, and their futile objections a hundred times answered. When a foe is defeated, what is the use of prolonging the contest? And when noonday light is dazzling the world, what need is there of lighting candles? Let them, therefore, only open their eyes, if they really want light. There is no scarcity of good philosophical works, which, if consulted by them in a spirit of candor, will afford them all the light that a man can reasonably desire for the full attainment of truth.

Yet the solidity of the ground on which we have taken our stand may be established in a very few words.

That there are _contingent_ beings is quite certain; for nothing which necessarily exists is liable to change or modification. But all that surrounds us in this world is liable to change and modification; therefore, nothing that surrounds us in this world necessarily exists. Accordingly, all that we see in this world exists contingently.

That contingent beings are either _primitive_ or made up of _primitive_ beings is, again, a well-known fact; for all being which is not primitive is a compound, and can be traced to its first physical components--that is, to the first elements of its composition. But the _first_ elements of composition cannot possibly be made up of other elements, and accordingly must be primitive beings. Therefore, primitive beings exist everywhere, at least (if nowhere else) in all the compounds of which they are the first physical components.

That every primitive contingent being must have had its _origin from without_ is a plain truth; for that which has no origin from without must have the adequate reason of its existence from within; and, therefore, it carries in its essence the necessity of its existence. But evidently contingent and changeable beings do not carry within their essence the necessity of their existence; therefore, contingent beings must have had their origin from without.

That every such being must have come _out of nothing_ is not less evident; for a primitive being cannot possibly come out of pre-existent beings as its material principles. It must, therefore, be _produced_ either out of God's substance or out of nothing. But not out of God's substance, for divine substance is not susceptible of contingent forms; therefore, out of nothing--that is, by creation properly.

Lastly, that the Creator is _an eternal, infinite being_ can be easily proved, independently of many other arguments, by the following general theorem, to which modern philosophers are invited to pay close attention. The theorem is this: _All efficient cause is infinitely more perfect, and of an infinitely better nature, than any of its effects_. If this proposition be true, it immediately follows that the Creator of the universe is infinitely more perfect than the whole universe, and has a nature infinitely better, nobler, and higher than that of any contingent being, and therefore is a necessary and independent being, the supreme being--God. Let us, then, demonstrate our theorem.

It is a known and incontrovertible truth that every efficient cause eminently contains in itself (that is, possesses in an eminent degree) all the perfection which it can efficiently communicate to any number of effects; and it can be proved, moreover, that the efficiency of a cause is never exhausted, and not even weakened, by its exertions, however long continued and indefinitely multiplied. The earth, after having for centuries exerted its attractive power and caused the fall of innumerable bodies, has preserved to this day the same power whole and undiminished, and is still acting, with its primitive energy, on any number of bodies, just as it did at the time of its creation. Our soul is not exhausted or weakened by its operations; but, after having made any number of judgments, reasonings, or any other mental actions, still retains the whole energy and perfection of its faculties without waste, effeteness, or decay. A molecule of oxygen, after having for ages, either free in the air or confined in water or in other compounds, produced such a number of effects as bewilders and beats all power of imagination, retains yet its efficient causality as entire and unimpaired as if it were of quite recent creation. These facts show that the efficient cause suffers no loss whatever by the exertion of its power, and therefore is fully equal to the production of an endless multitude of effects.

Some may say that this conclusion cannot be universal, as we see that natural forces are very often exhausted by exertion. We answer that, when _natural forces_ are said to be exhausted, the _efficient powers_ from which those forces result remain as intact and as active as before. We say, indeed, that a man or a horse is exhausted by fatigue; that our brain, after hours of mental work, needs rest to recover its lost energy, and many other such things; but, in all such cases, what we call _exhaustion_ is not a diminution of efficient power in the agents from the concurrence of which the natural forces result, but either the actual disappearance (by respiration, perspiration, etc.) of a number of those agents, or a perturbance of the arrangements and conditions necessary for their united conspiration towards the production of a determinate effect. _Natural force_, in the sense of the objection, is a combination of agents and of efficient powers, which produce their effect by many concurrent actions giving a different resultant under different conditions; and as any given effect proximately depends on the resultant of such actions, the same powers, though unaltered in themselves, must, under different conditions, give rise to different effects. Take a car and four horses. If the horses act all in the same direction, the car will move easily enough; but if two of the horses act in one direction, and two in the other, the result will be very different. Yet the powers applied to the car are in both cases the same. Again, take an army of fifty thousand men facing the enemy. If the men are well arranged so as to present a good line of battle, the action of the army will be strong; but if the men are disorderly scattered, the action will be weak, though the men are the same and their powers and exertions undiminished. Now, all bodies and all complex causes are in the same case; which is evident from the fact that with all of them a favorable change of conditions, all other things remaining the same, is always attended by an increase of the effect. Therefore, the so-called _exhaustion_ of natural forces is not a diminution of the efficient powers of which they are the result, but a state of things in which _the same_ active powers are exerted in a different manner, or have to perform a different work, according to the different conditions to which they are actually subjected. We therefore repeat that efficient causes suffer no loss whatever by the exertion of their efficient powers, and that consequently they are fully equal to the production of an infinite multitude of effects; and since every efficient cause, as we have premised, must contain within itself, in an eminent manner, the whole perfection which it can communicate to its effects, we are forced to conclude that the nature of every efficient cause _infinitely transcends_ in perfection the nature of its effects.

The theorem could be further confirmed by considering that all the acts produced by efficient causes of the natural order, either spiritual or material, are mere accidents, whereas the causes themselves are substances; and it is manifest that the nature of substance infinitely transcends the nature of accident.

It might be confirmed, again, by another very simple consideration. The efficient cause does not communicate any portion of itself to its effect.[185] In fact, efficient causation is production; and production is not a transfusion, translocation, or emanation of a pre-existing thing, but the origination of a _new_ entity which had no previous formal existence. It follows that the efficient cause, while producing an effect, retains its _entire_ entity, and therefore is never exhausted. Thus a syllogism is not a portion of the mind that makes it; and the making of it leaves intact the substance and the faculty from which it proceeds. Thus, also, the actual momentum of a falling body is not a portion of the terrestrial power by which it is produced; the power remains whole and undiminished in the substance of the earth, as already remarked, always ready to produce any number of changes, and always unchanged in itself. This is the reason why every efficient cause infinitely transcends the nature of its effects.

Our theorem is, then, demonstrated both by facts and by intrinsic reasons. We are confident that all honest philosophers, no matter how much their intellectual vision may have been distorted by false doctrines, will see their way to the right conclusion, and confess the absolute necessity of an independent, self-existent, infinite Creator, from whom all beauty, goodness, and perfection proceed, and to whom all creatures--philosophers not excepted--owe allegiance, honor, and glory.

TO BE CONTINUED.

FOOTNOTES:

[181] Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1874, by Rev. I. T. HECKER, in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C.

[182] This argument could be employed against all other forms of pantheism; but we must abstain at present from the discussion of particular systems, as we cannot deal fairly with them within the narrow compass of a single article.

As for _self-existent_ matter, we need only say that nothing which can receive new determinations is self-existent; and since matter receives new determinations, therefore matter is not self-existent. Hence the conception of eternal and uncreated matter cannot be styled a philosophical opinion, but only a dream of unreflecting or uneducated minds.

[183] The Aristotelic meaning of the word _privation_ will be easily understood from the following example: If a cylindrical piece of wax be made to assume a spherical form, the sphericity will be educed, as the schools say, from the cylindrical wax, not inasmuch as it is cylindrical, but inasmuch as it is non-spherical. Such a non-sphericity is a _privation_, which is more than a _negation_, as it implies not only the absence of sphericity, but also the presence of its contrary--that is, of the cylindrical form. Privation is usually defined _carentia formæ in subjecto apto_. It is a principle _per accidens_.

[184] We give the original text: _Sic enim scientia Dei se habet ad omnes res creatas, sicut scientia artificis se habet ad artificiata. Scientia autem artificis est causa artificiatorum, eo quod artifex operatur per suum intellectum. Unde oportet quod forma intellectus sit principium operationis, sicut calor est principium calefactionis. Sed considerandum est, quod forma naturalis, in quantum est forma manens in eo cui dat esse, non nominat principium actionis, sed secundum quod habet inclinationem ad effectum. Et similiter forma intelligibilis non nominat principium actionis secundum quod est tantum in intelligente, nisi adjungatur ei inclinatio ad effectum, quæ est per voluntatem. Quum enim forma intelligibilis ad opposita se habeat (quum eadem sit scientia oppositorum) non produceret determinatum effectum, nisi determinaretur ad unum per appetitum, ut dicitur in 9. Metaph. Manifestum est autem quod Deus per intellectum suum causat res, quum suum esse sit suum intelligere; unde necesse est quod sua scientia sit causa rerum secundum quod habet voluntatem conjunctam_ (p. 1, q. 14, a. 8).

[185] Parents, however, communicate a portion of their substance to their offspring. The reason is that parents are not only the _efficient_, but also the _material_, cause of their offspring. As material causes, they supply the matter of which the fœtus will be formed; but, as efficient causes, they only put the conditions required by nature for the organization of this matter. The position of such conditions is an accidental action as well as the subsequent organization. Therefore, parents, as efficient causes, produce nothing but accidental acts. The matter of which the fœtus is formed is, of course, all pre-existing.

DANTE'S PURGATORIO.

CANTO TWELFTH.