Chapter IX: The Verdict (5)

3. Hence we further infer, that the essence of every created being is its _nature_ also. For _nature is a principle of motion_, according to Aristotle, whether motion is taken as the action proceeding from that nature itself, or as the reception of an action proceeding from an extrinsic agent. Now, we have seen that all creatures are manifestative of God's perfections, and therefore that they have in themselves an act which is a principle of action; on the other hand, we have also seen that every creature has its potential term, and therefore passivity, or receptivity of new determinations. Accordingly, every created being, by the very nature of its essential constituents, is a complete principle of motion. Essence and nature are, therefore, the same thing in reality, though they are distinguished from one another in our conception. S. Thomas considers that these three words, _nature_, _essence_, and _quiddity_, apply to one and the same thing viewed under three distinct aspects; the word _nature_ meaning the essence of the thing as connoting operation, since there is no natural being without active power; whereas the word _quiddity_ means the same essence viewed as an object of definition; and the word _essence_ is used to express the fact that in it and through it a thing has its own being.[286] Whence it follows that a complete being is no sooner endowed with existence than with activity, and is no sooner a being than an individual nature. And therefore a complete being and a concrete nature are really one and the same thing. Malebranche's theory, denying that creatures have any true causality, is therefore utterly untenable, as it cannot be reconciled with the first principles of metaphysics.

4. The entity of the active power contained in the nature of any being cannot be anything else than its essential act; that is, the very act produced by God in its creation. In fact, we have just seen that in all creatures the essence and the nature are the same reality, and that the constituents of the nature are nothing but the constituents of the essence. Accordingly, the nature of every creature consists of an essential act and an essential term; the one being its principle of activity, as the other is its principle of passivity. "The form," says S. Thomas, "is that by which the agent acts," and "By what a thing is, by that it acts," and "The principle of being is the principle of acting," and "Every agent acts inasmuch as it is in act." These axioms are accepted by all real philosophers. Hence the active principle of any complete being, and its essential act, are the same thing in reality, though they are distinguished from one another in our conception, in the same manner as are nature and essence; for the _essential act_ connotes the intrinsic term of the essence, to which the act is essentially terminated, whilst the _active principle_ connotes any extrinsic term to which the action proceeding from the same act is, or can be, accidentally terminated. This is what S. Thomas means when he says that "a natural form is a principle of operation, not inasmuch as it is the permanent form of the thing to which it gives existence, but inasmuch as it has a leaning towards an effect."[287] Such a _leaning_ (_inclinatio_) should be taken to mean a natural _ordination_ or _determination_ to act.

Philosophers agitate the question, whether created substances act by themselves immediately, or by the aid of accidents. The Scotistic school holds the first opinion, whilst the Thomistic supports the second. For reasons which it would take too long to develop in this place, we are inclined to believe that natural accidents are not active, and that their bearing on the action of substance is not of an efficient, but of a formal, character; by which we mean that accidents have no play in the production of effects, except inasmuch as their presence or absence entails a different formal determination of the conditions in which the agent is to exert its power. It is true, indeed, that created substances never act independently of accidental conditions; but it is true, at the same time, that they always act by themselves without the aid of accidents, inasmuch as the active power they exert is so exclusively owned by them that it cannot even partially reside in any of their accidents.

As the active principle is really nothing else than the act by which the agent is, so also the passive principle is really nothing else than the essential term by which that act is completed. Here again the same reality presents itself under two distinct aspects; for the phrase _essential term_ connotes the essential act by which the term is essentially actuated, whilst the phrase _passive principle_ connotes any accidental act by which the same term is liable to be accidentally actuated.

5. Since a being possessing its three intrinsic principles is so fully and adequately constituted as to require nothing additional to exist, it is obvious that such a being contains in its perfect constitution the sufficient reason of its aptitude to exist _non in alio et non per aliud_, but _in se et per se_; that is, in itself and by itself. Now, to exist in itself is to be a _substance_, and to exist by itself is to be what philosophers call _suppositum_--_i.e._, a thing having separate subsistence; and, therefore, such a being, if simply left to itself, will be both a substance and a suppositum. In fact, the essential act of a created being, though always needing positive conservation on account of its contingency, needs no termination to, or sustentation from, a subject, as it already holds under itself its own intrinsic term, by which it is sufficiently terminated and sustained. And in the same manner, the essence of a complete being needs no union with any extraneous nature to be made completely subsistent, as it is already sufficiently complete on account of its formal actuality and individuality. Thus it is manifest that _nothing positive is to be added_ to a complete being in order to make it a substance and a suppositum; it suffices to leave it alone without further sustentation and without further completion. By the first of these two negations, the being will exist _non in alio_, but in itself; and by the second it will subsist _non per aliud_, but by itself. Hence it is that the first negation is called _the mode of substance_, and the second _the mode of the suppositum_.

6. To be, to be true, to be one, to be good, to be a thing or a being, are convertible expressions so far as their real objective meaning is concerned, and are distinct only on account of their different connotations. A thing is called _a being_, inasmuch as it has existence. It is called _true_, inasmuch as its act suits its term, and _vice versa_. For the objective truth of things--_i.e._, their metaphysical truth--is nothing but their intelligibility; and the whole intelligibility of a being consists in the agreement of an essential act with its essential term; that is, in this: that the one adequately satisfies the wants of the other, and thus constitutes with it one perfect intelligible ratio or essence. Hence the termination of the proper act to the proper term makes a thing objectively true; just as the application of the proper predicate to the proper subject makes true a proposition. This objective or metaphysical truth is perfectly independent of our knowledge of it; it has, however, the reason of its being in God's intellect, in which the archetypes of all that is intelligible are contained, and to which the whole ideal order is to be traced as to its original source. A thing is called _one_ on account of the formal unity of its essence and of its existence. It is called _good_, objectively and metaphysically, inasmuch as it is materially and formally complete in the manner above described, and consequently perfect, so as to require no further intrinsic endowment to exist.

The objective goodness of any being arises from its truth; for it is the mutual fitness of the essential act and of the essential term that accounts for their mutual agreement in unity of existence; whence it follows that the being will naturally exist in itself, and subsist by itself, without any further addition, as though finding rest in its own reality. But, that in which anything finds rest is its own good; and therefore everything that exists in itself completely is good to itself, while its act and its term, as the intrinsic factors of such a goodness, are good also, but only of an initial and relative goodness--viz., so far as the one is good to the other. Lastly, the word _thing_ expresses the whole being as it is in its concrete essence--that is, the whole reality implied in its three intrinsic principles. _Thing_ in Latin is _res_; and _res_, as well as _ratio_, are connected with the verb _reor_ (to judge) in the same manner as _pax_ (peace) and _pactio_ (compact) are connected with the verb _paciscor_ (to make a compact); and accordingly, as peace implies the compact, of which it is the result, and by which its conditions are duly determined, so also _res_ implies the _ratio_, of which it is the concrete result, and by which it is confined between the bounds of a determinate quiddity. Whether the English words _thing_, _thought_, and _to think_ bear to one another the same relation as the Latin _res_, _ratio_, and _reor_, we are not ready to decide.

7. The verb _to be_ has not exactly the same meaning, when applied to a complete being, as when applied to its constituent principles. Of the complete being we say that _it is_ simply and completely. Of the essential act we also say that _it is_, but not absolutely nor completely, because it has no existence apart from its term; existence being the result of the position of the one in the other. Of the essential term we should not say precisely that _it is_, but rather that _it has being_. This adjective predication is here employed, because the being of the term is wholly due to its act, without which the term would be nothing, as we have already shown; and therefore the term _is not a being_, but only _has the being_ borrowed from its act, just as the geometric centre has no being but that which it receives from the circumference. Of the complement we do not say that _it is_, or that _it exists_, because the complement is the formal existence, not of itself, but of the being of which it is the complement, and therefore must be predicated of the existent being, not of itself. Thus we cannot correctly say that _loquacity talks_, nor that _velocity runs_: and for the same reason we should not say that _existence exists_; for as it is _the woman_ that talks by her loquacity, and _the horse_ that runs with its velocity, so it is _the complete being_ that exists by its own existence.

Nevertheless, the verb _to be_, when used in a logical sense to express the existence of an agreement between a predicate and a subject, or any other mental relation between objects of thought, applies equally to all things conceived, whatever their degree of reality; because, inasmuch as such things are actually known, they are all equally actual in our intellectual faculty.

And now, with regard to the essence itself of a complete being, the question arises whether it should be held _to be_, or to _have being_, in the sense of the distinction already made. S. Thomas seems to hold that the essence of creatures cannot be said _to be_, but only _to have being_; for he teaches that in creatures the essence is to its existence as a potency is to an act. If this doctrine were to be applied to _possible_ essences only, we might admit it without discussion; but the holy doctor seems to apply it to the _actual_ essence also; for "_to be_," says he, "is the most perfect of all realities, because it performs the parts of an act with regard to them all; as no thing has actuality but according as it is; and therefore _to be_ is the actuality of all things, even of the forms themselves; and for this reason existence is not compared to any existing thing as a recipient to that which is received, but rather as that which is received to its recipient. For when I mention the existence of a man, or of a horse, or of anything else, _existence_ stands for something formal and received, and not for that to which it belongs."[288]

It is clear, however, that the actuality of anything is not an act really received in the essence of the thing as in a potency. For, according to S. Thomas himself, nothing is educed from potency into act, except through an act which is not originated by that potency; and therefore _no potency contains in itself the formal reason of its actuation_, but all potency is actuated by an act originated by an extrinsic agent. Now, such is not the case with _real_ essences; for every _real_ essence contains in itself all that is required to give rise to its actuality, as we have proved; and consequently, as soon as the essential act actuates the essential term, the actuality of the essence springs forth by spontaneous resultation, as the consequence from the premises, with no need of an extrinsic agent producing a new act. Granting, then, that existence is something _formal_, as S. Thomas truly says, yet it does not follow that it is _an act received_; it is only a _resulting actuality_. And therefore the real essence is not the potency of existence, but its formal reason. Existence is the complement of real essence, and presupposes it; and consequently gives it nothing but the real _denomination_ of existent--and, perhaps, this is all that S. Thomas intended to teach, though his words seem to imply a great deal more. For, on the one hand, he very often employs the word _potentia_, not in the sense of passive potency, but in that of virtuality; and, on the other, he frequently gives the name of forms to those formalities from which things receive their proper denomination, and considers them as received in the things to which they give such a denomination. But in such cases their reception is of course only logical, not real, and accordingly the thing denominated by them is only a logical, not a real, potency, as it already possesses the reality of that by which it receives its special denomination. Thus we say that in man rationality is to animality as act is to potency; but this is true in a logical sense only, because man's animality implies in its constitution a rational soul, and therefore is already in possession of rationality.

To conclude: the essence of all actual beings is to be said _to be_ or _to exist_ rather than _to have being_ or _to have existence_; and in the same manner the essence of a possible being is to be called a potency _of existing_ rather than _of receiving existence_, so far, at least, as it is considered in connection with its intrinsic principles. The reader, if not accustomed to metaphysical investigations, will think that we, in this last question, have only amused ourselves with splitting hairs; to correct such a judgment, he has only to ask himself whether between _being rich_ and _holding borrowed riches_ the difference be important or trivial.

TO BE CONTINUED.

FOOTNOTES:

[276] CATHOLIC WORLD, Feb., 1874, page 578.

[277] S. Thomas says _intus-legere_, "to read within," which amounts to the same.

[278] This third proof and the following apply to created beings only; but creatures, as we hope to explain later, inasmuch as they are _beings_, are so many imperfect likenesses of their Creator, and unmistakably show that he himself is an infinite Act actuating (out of himself, not out of nothing) an infinite Term, and possessing an infinite Actuality. And accordingly, what we have said of the intrinsic constitution of a created being must be true, in an eminent manner, of the Creator also.

[279] _Omne agens agit in quantum est in actu; et omne patiens patitur in quantum est in potentia._--S. Thomas, _passim_.

[280] Pure potency is _quod potest esse et non est_, according to S. Thomas, _Opusc. De Princ. Naturæ_.

[281] We say _movement_, not _motion_, though we know that these two words are considered as synonymous. Motion corresponds to the Latin _motio_, whilst movement corresponds to the Latin _motus_. _Motio_ means the motive action--that is, motion properly--both as proceeding actively from the agent, and as passively received in the patient; _motus_, on the contrary, signifies the result of the _motio_ given and received; and this result is movement. As in philosophy we have to distinguish between action and its result, we must keep up a distinction between the words also. Very probably movement and motion would never have been accepted as synonymous, had the verb _to move_ exclusively retained its original active signification; but, as people imagined that movement was a kind of action, they thought it right to say not only that the horse moves the cart, but also that the cart _moves_, instead of saying that it is moved. Even Newton has been so misled by the popular use of this verb as to write more than once _corpus movet_, instead of _corpus movetur_. It was but natural that "movement," too, should be transformed into "motion." Are we too late to restore to these two words their distinct meanings?

[282] See Kleutgen, _The Old Philosophy_, diss. 2, c. 4.

[283] We cannot here explain the different kinds of identity; but we hope we shall take up this matter in one of our future articles.

[284] The same distinction may be very properly expressed by saying that the carving is _materially_ terminated to the marble, and _formally_ to the statue.

[285] _Dublin Review_, January, 1873, pp. 70, 71.

[286] Nomen naturæ videtur significare essentiam rei secundum quod habet ordinem vel ordinationem ad propriam operationem rei; quum nulla res propria destituatur operatione. Quidditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc quod per definitionem significatur. Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea res habet esse.--S. Thomas, _De Ente et Essentia_, c. 1.

[287] _Summa Theol._, p. 1, q. 14, a. 8.

[288] _Esse_ est perfectissimum omnium; comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus; nihil enim habet actualitatem nisi in quantum est; unde ipsum _esse_ est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum; unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens. Quum enim dico _esse_ hominis, vel equi, vel cujuscumque alterius, ipsum _esse_ consideratur ut formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse.--_Summa Theol._, p. 1, q. 4, a. 1.

THE JANSENIST SCHISM IN HOLLAND.

JANSENISM IN THE CHURCH OF UTRECHT.

FROM LES ETUDES RELIGIEUSES. BY C. VAN AKEN.

CONCLUDED.

II.

Such was the system of Jansenius, at least as to its main points; its five famous propositions forming the most important conclusions of the system. If they are not all to be found, _in so many words_, in the _Augustinus_--which neither pope nor theologian has ever pretended they are--they are the soul of the book, in the words of Bossuet. This soul, this breath of error, is revived in Quesnel and in the false Synod of Pistoia. Now, are the proofs called for of its existence in the pretended church of Utrecht? Then we have only to let the hierarchy intruded in Holland speak for itself through its letter addressed to Scipio Ricci. So far as I know, this letter has never before been published. We give it as faithfully transcribed from the original in the archives at Florence:[289]

"MONSEIGNEUR:

"We have just read with astonishment a bull of Pope Pius VI., in
which the Synod of Pistoia, held by you in 1786, is condemned, and
your episcopal administration calumniated, upon grounds which are
incomprehensible. Conduct such as this in regard to a bishop and an
ecclesiastical assembly of the highest repute in the church, and
the spirit of partisanship which characterizes the bull generally,
have certainly not been imitated from the great Doctor of Grace,
S. Augustine, whom the latter seems intended to honor, since it is
dated on his feast.

"Your synod, monseigneur, was for years, as the public well knew,
under examination by Roman censors; and it is evident that they
would not have occupied themselves with it for so long a time[290]
if, instead of laboriously seeking for pretexts to condemn it, they
had sought in it for that truth which is everywhere displayed in
it with clearness, dignity, and unction. We need not, therefore,
have expected a confirmation of this synod as the result of such
an examination. We are no longer in the days when the popes used
the authority of their see only for edification, and not for
destruction. Your synod, monseigneur, reveals nothing which is
unworthy of the full approbation of the head of the church, and
which would not have been cordially received by the popes of former
times. But God permits that those of later times should be swayed
by prejudices and by the dominating influence of a court which,
although foreign and even contrary to the divine institution of the
Holy See, pretends, nevertheless, to identify itself with the chair
of S. Peter, and has consequently taken upon itself to dictate the
bulls of the popes conformably to its own interests--interests
often greatly opposed to those of the church and of the Holy
See.[291] It finds that these human interests have not been made
much of by the Synod of Pistoia, which kept in view only the good
of souls and the disinterested exercise of the functions of the
pastorate. It could not, therefore, approve this synod, since its
decrees preach the new covenant, of which we are ministers, in the
spirit and not in the letter. The ancient one, in which the spirit
was sacrificed to the letter, and in which God was honored by the
lips, while the heart was far from him, is the only one in accord
with the political maxims and views of a court entirely devoted
to the _éclat_ of the pontifical throne, and to the externals of
religion. The fathers of the synod, most reasonably convinced
that the true and only object of the ministry established by
Jesus Christ is to give to God adorers in spirit and truth, have
endeavored, so far as these evil times permitted, to bring back
Christian worship to its primitive purity and simplicity. But this
could not be suffered by a court which applies itself exclusively
to fostering abuses in ecclesiastical discipline and in the
administration of the sacraments, and to all the new devotions and
superstitions[292] which give a false idea of Christian piety,
and cause the faithful to forget the true spirit of Christianity;
not reforming, as it ought, this Judaical worship, but making its
profit of it, and taking it under its protection, on all occasions.

"In the synod you held, monseigneur, there were useful reforms
proposed, and even commenced. Still greater ones were desired. If
the wise regulations made in it were put in practice and everywhere
adopted, as they deserve to be; if its wishes were attended
to, true piety would flourish again, the church would possess
good ministers, their labors would produce abundant fruits, the
observance of the canons would restore the salutary discipline of
the early days, the hierarchical order would enjoy all its rights,
its head, the Holy See, would be listened to and respected, but
the Roman court would become nothing. It is this, monseigneur,
which excites its resentment against you and your synod. It is the
court alone which has produced this extraordinary bull, which is
an injury to the chair of S. Peter, more even than to the Synod of
Pistoia, and the Pope has been dishonored by causing him to adopt
it.

"It was already sufficiently a scandal that Rome alone gave no sign
of approving this synod, while it was receiving praises everywhere
else; that she alone seemed to take no interest in the good
results of which it was susceptible, and appeared even aggrieved
and offended at that which gave joy to all true children of the
church.[293] But this was not enough for the jealous and vindictive
policy of the Roman court. It wished to brand, by a public and
solemn censure, the acts of the Synod of Pistoia; and although it
must have been infinitely painful to the censors to find no matter
for condemnation, yet, by condemning, at whatever detriment to
itself, that which all the world approved, it has capped the climax
of scandal--_scandali mensuram implevit_.

"Injustice vainly attempts a disguise: it often betrays itself
by the clumsy precautions it takes to disguise itself. This,
monseigneur, is what we see in the bull of August 28, in which God
permitted that its compilers should, against all prudence, depart
from their ordinary method of making qualifications _in globo_,
so convenient, and even so necessary, where there is question of
condemning good books. By applying to each of the propositions
censured by them particular qualifications, they have thought
to give to their censure an appearance of greater rectitude and
equity, and by this very means they have rendered evident to all
the spirit of deception and bad faith which characterizes them.
In fact, monseigneur, if the use of this kind of censure be even
just and equitable in itself, it would be impossible to abuse it
more grossly than they have done in the matter of your synod.
Every one knows that, when propositions are bad and condemnable,
they are so in themselves and in the sense they express. It is,
then, in themselves and in reference to this sense that they
should be condemned.[294] This, however, is not what has been
done in regard to the greater number of the propositions drawn
from the Synod of Pistoia. They are not condemned in themselves
nor in their proper sense, but relatively to the imaginary sense
attributed to them. The truths they express are passed over, in
order to condemn the errors they do not express; and while it
would be against all evidence to attribute to them an erroneous
sense, to which the words are repugnant, they are nevertheless
condemned conditionally--that is to say, by virtue of a gratuitous
and often absurd supposition that this erroneous or in some
wise reprehensible sense may be conveyed therein. They dare not
condemn Jesus Christ, or, what is the same thing, the truth in its
own name; but they give him the name and the dress of Barabbas,
in order to have the right of sending him to punishment as a
malefactor--_Et cum iniquis reputatus est_.

"We have just said, monseigneur, that the bull violated grossly in
your regard good faith and justice by this indirect and captious
manner in which it condemns the greater number of the propositions
drawn from your synod. But there are others, in the censure of
which the interests of the faith and of the teachings of the
church are equally disregarded. They do not hesitate to sacrifice
these to the pernicious opinions of obnoxious theological schools,
the defence of which is taken up against your decrees, under
the pretext that the Holy See tolerates them under the name of
Molinism--a _Pelagian doctrine_[295] rejected by all tradition.
Thus error, or rather a number of most dangerous errors, is put
on a level with truth; and the hand of Pius VI. is made use of to
replace beside the ark that idol of Dagon so often overturned to
its base by the censures of the church and the writings of her
doctors. What idea have they, then, of the teachings of the church,
and of the rights of bishops and their co-laborers in reference to
this doctrine? Because Paul V. did not choose to do in regard to
the doctrine of Molina _that which his successors did in regard to
the doctrine of S. Augustine in their bulls against Jansenius and
Quesnel_;[296] because they have not published, with condemnation,
the system of equilibrium, of _gratia sufficiens_, of the state
of pure nature, of the _scientia media_, of limbo, etc.; and have
allowed to be taught the sufficiency of attrition without the
love of God, and the ignorant devotion to the Sacred Heart to
be practised, shall pastors no longer be permitted to oppose to
these novelties the principles and the language of Scripture and
tradition? And shall they no longer warn the faithful of the snares
spread for their faith and piety, because those who spread them
have not yet been declared heretics by the Sovereign Pontiffs?

"They have not contented themselves, monseigneur, with making a
crime of your private sentiments, however irreproachable, but
have quarrelled with you for having, in your synod, adhered to a
doctrine so authoritative, so precious in all churches and all
states, as that contained in the four articles of the assembly of
the clergy of France in 1682. They have so poor an opinion of the
present clergy and of the Gallican Church itself as to imagine that
this clergy would feel offended at the praises you give to the
celebrated declaration of that assembly, and to take the insertion
you have made of it in the acts of the Synod of Pistoia as an
injury. But if the synod does an injury to the French clergy by
adopting its maxims, what does the Pope's bull do, which rejects
and condemns them?

"You may be sure, monseigneur, that a bull like this--a censure as
manifestly unjust at bottom as singular and indecent in form--is
not likely to shake or diminish in the least either our attachment
for you or our esteem and admiration for the acts of your synod,
_in the doctrine of which our clergy recognize their own_, through
the chapter of Utrecht, whose act of adhesion was sent to you
in November, 1789,[297] shortly after the French publication of
the synod. The efforts which are now being made to cry down its
results, and to render them abortive, are so much more a motive for
our confirming this adhesion, and of renewing to you the expression
of our interest in your cause, afflicted, as we are, to the bottom
of our heart, that our Holy Father, Pope Pius VI., who ought to
show us the example of like sentiments, shows himself in his bull
entirely opposed to them. We sympathize with you, monseigneur, no
less in the personal offence that has been offered you than in the
annoyances which cannot fail to arise to you as well as to the
faithful clergy of your ancient diocese. But God, who has enabled
you long to foresee these things, and who has already prepared you
for them by preliminary trials, will give you grace to bear all
this with continued courage and confidence in his protection and
assistance.

"Considering the affair in itself, nothing can be weaker than the
attack that has been made upon you by this bull, which is more
likely, in view of its whole contents, to justify your doctrine
than to render it an object of suspicion. But if we pay attention
to the fact that it is the very purity of this doctrine, and
your enlightened zeal for the house of God, that have drawn upon
you this unjust treatment; that it is the testimony you render
fearlessly and without disguise to the most important truths, so
combated in our days, of dogma, of morals, and of discipline in the
church, which renders the Synod of Pistoia odious to the enemies of
these truths, nothing can be grander nor more worthy of a bishop
than the cause you will have to defend. Consequently, nothing can
impel us more to invoke upon you, monseigneur, by our prayers,
and upon all those whom divine Providence will associate with you
in the same defence, the lights and graces of the Holy Ghost.
Ask them also for us, who long preceded you in the same career of
tribulations and trials, and whose cause has not been separated
from yours, since it has been attempted to injure your synod by
comparing it, in the new bull, to our council--a comparison most
just and natural, and which cannot but do honor to both.

"We are, with respect and tender attachment in our Lord Jesus
Christ, monseigneur, your most humble and obedient servants,

✠ GAULTH. MICH.,
_Archbishop of Utrecht_.

✠ ADRIEN JEAN,
_Bishop of Harlem_.

✠ NICHOLAS,
_Bishop of Deventer_.[298]

"UTRECHT, October 31st, All-Saints' Eve."

This letter renders evidence against the clergy of Utrecht that may justly be called crushing, and would be sufficient in itself to close the debate. It sheds light, also, on the whole history of the schismatical church of the United Provinces. Now, to complete the demonstration entered upon, let us retrace our steps, and make research into the origin and the peculiar character of the Jansenism of Holland.

III.

In the beginning of the XVIIth century the University of Louvain was in a most flourishing condition; the purity of doctrine that prevailed there, its attachment to the Holy See, and the example of loyal and perfect submission it had recently given before the world by repudiating the errors of Baius, gained for it the respect and good wishes of all Christendom. Some of its professors, however, had not entirely renounced Baianism; and unhappily, in their case, distinguished talents were joined with uncommon activity. The most eminent of these men was Jacques Janson, who was the professor and, as it were, the father of Jansenius. He made the third of the party of whom the future Bishop of Ypres and the Abbé de Saint-Cyran were the other two. Louvain then became the centre of a set of ideas of which the doctrines of Baius formed the basis, and which were ripened and developed by Jansenius during nearly thirty years, to be finally brought forth in his famous _Augustinus_. It was also at the school of Jacques Janson that Philip Rovenius and several eminent individuals among his clergy received their theological training; they therefore drank of Jansenism at its very source.

The _Augustinus_ was issued in 1640 from the press of Jacques Zegers, of Louvain. Immediately, Philip Rovenius, Archbishop of Philippi, _in partibus infidelium_, and Vicar Apostolic of the United Provinces; Jean Wachtelaer, his vicar-general; Baudoin Catz, afterwards the successor of Jacques de la Torre; Leonard Marius, professor in the College Hollandais at Cologne, and several besides, gave a public and entire approval to the book of Jansenius, coupled with the most flattering praises. There was at once in Belgium, as well as in Holland, and on the part of many virtuous and well-meaning priests, an infatuation, an enthusiasm, exhibited for the _Augustinus_, of which the reception given almost in our day to the first volume of the _Essai sur l'Indifference_ will give only a faint idea. But Holland distinguished herself in this concert of praises; S. Augustine himself, people said, had spoken by the mouth of Jansenius; Jean Wachtelaer averred that the Netherland priests were never wearied with reading and meditating this incomparable work; Rovenius went further, and formed a league with the Canon of Furnes, a nephew of Jansenius, and several other partisans of the new doctrines, to prevent the Council of Brabant from putting in execution the first measures taken by the Holy See against the _Augustinus_. These were the circumstances that preceded the bull _In eminenti_, published at Rome on the 19th of June, 1643, in which the famous work was proscribed as containing propositions previously condemned;[299] we are thus made aware of the sentiments of the clergy, and the spirit in which the young Levites of the United Provinces were formed. Rovenius submitted to the pontifical definition; in his book on the Christian Republic,[300] printed at Anvers, in 1648, he even renders solemn homage to the infallibility of the Vicar of Christ. This important doctrine was then, as always, held in honor at the University of Louvain. Rovenius had learned it there, and to this powerful preservative he owed the honor and fidelity that attended his last days.

The clergy of Holland seemed at first to imitate the humble obedience of its chief; but it soon became evident that this submission was neither as general nor as perfect as was desirable. Left to its ancient traditions of respect for the Holy See, the Church of Holland would perhaps have escaped shipwreck; but it shortly received as vicar apostolic a man of whom Sainte-Beuve has truly said that he was "the great auxiliary of Port Royal in Holland."[301] Jean Neercassel, priest of the Oratory, had had a share in the government of the mission since the year 1652. Consecrated Bishop of Castoria, _in partibus_, in 1662, he shortly after became, by the death of Baudoin Catz (1663), the sole vicar apostolic in the United Provinces, and continued so to be for the long period of twenty-three years. The illustrious Archbishop of Malines, who knew, by a painful but glorious experience, how greatly firmness and devotion on the part of a chief pastor were needed in those sad times, said: "I shall always commiserate those bishops who are even on terms with a single one of these innovators."[302] Neercassel invited these innovators all to Holland, and made it a place of refuge for them. Arnauld, du Vaucel, Gerberon, Quesnel, and a multitude of apostate monks and fugitive priests, all in revolt against the decisions of the church, cast themselves upon the poor mission as upon a prey provided for them. From Arnauld's correspondence, and the papers found on Gerberon, Quesnel, and others, we see that the direction of the most important affairs of the vicariate apostolic then passed into the hands of the patriarchs of Jansenism. In this school, the clergy of the Netherlands learned the wretched distinction between _right_ and _fact_ (le _droit_ et le _fait_). As this distinction tion forms one of the bases of the resistance offered by that clergy to the definitions of the Holy See, it would be proper to give a brief explanation of it.

The five famous propositions having been referred to the tribunal of the Sovereign Pontiff by eighty-five French bishops, the so-called disciples of S. Augustine sent a deputation to Rome to defend the sense of Jansenius. They prepared, on this occasion, the celebrated _Ecrit à trois Colonnes_, in order, said they, "to show fully the state of the controversy, and to furnish the Pope with the means of knowing exactly upon what he had to give judgment." For each proposition there is distinguished, 1st, the sense of Luther or of Calvin, which is condemned; 2d, the natural sense, _prout a nobis defenditur_, the sense of Jansenius--in a word, that said to be the sense of the church and of S. Augustine;[303] 3d, and last, the Pelagian or semi-Pelagian, which is rejected like the first. At this time, then, the party acknowledged, in an official and authentic document, that it defended the five propositions in the sense of Jansenius, and that this sense was the only natural and legitimate one. The whole question was to know if this sense were heretical or not. It was upon this point that the Pope's decision was invoked both by the bishops and by the partisans of Jansenius.

The decision was given the 31st of May, 1653, in the bull _Cum occasione_, which condemned the five famous propositions. The church evidently aimed a blow at the spirit of the book, which alone conveyed the error. The Jansenists understood it as every one else did at the time, and were confounded by it. But in their farewell audience, the deputies of the party asked the Pope if he had been understood to condemn the opinion in regard to efficacious grace by itself--the doctrine of S. Augustine. Certainly not, replied the Holy Father. The whole of Jansenism was embraced in this equivocal question; for the Jansenists reasoned thus: the _Augustinus_ contains nothing but the pure doctrine of S. Augustine; we can therefore submit to the bull without rejecting the sense of Jansenius.

To prevent and eliminate in advance every pretext for disobedience, Pope Alexander VII., in 1665, ordered, in a new bull, that the condemnation of the five propositions in the sense of Jansenius should be subscribed to; he directed at the same time, according to the ancient usage of the church, that the signature should be attached to a formula in these words: "I,----, submit to the Apostolic Constitution of Pope Innocent X., dated the 30th of May, 1653, and to that of the Sovereign Pontiff Alexander VII., dated the 16th of October, 1665; I condemn and reject heartily and in all sincerity the five propositions taken from the _Augustinus_ of Cornelius Jansenius in the same manner as they are condemned by the said constitutions; I condemn them in the sense of that author; thus I swear. May God help me and this holy Gospel!"

Then it began to be said in the camp of Jansenius: The pope and the bishops may well decide if the propositions are heretical; it is a question of _right_. _Créance au droit!_ But _are_ the propositions taken from the _Augustinus_, and do they convey its sense? That is a question of _fact_, in regard to which the church might be mistaken. Nevertheless, _respect au fait_! After this, it was signed, excluding (_en exceptant_) the sense of Jansenius. The more determined refused their signature; after the time of Pierre Codde, the successor of Neercassel, this was the general rule.

No one, in my opinion, has more fully set forth the state of this question than the author of the _Provincial Letters_, whose genius demonstrates conclusively the absurdity of this celebrated distinction.[304] He thus expresses himself in a passage wherein he maintains his opinion against Arnauld, Nicole, and others: "The whole dispute is in ascertaining if there be a fact and a right disconnected from one another, or if there be only a right; that is, if the sense of Jansenius ... does nothing but indicate the right. The Pope and the bishops are on one side, and they claim that it is a point of right and of faith to say that the five propositions are heretical in the sense of Jansenius; and Alexander VII. declares in his constitution that, to be in the true faith, we must say that the words, 'sense of Jansenius,' express only the heretical sense of the propositions, and that thus _it is a fact which carries with it a right_, and makes an essential part of the profession of faith; as if we should say: The sense of Calvin on the Eucharist is heretical, _which is certainly a point of faith_."[305]

Nothing could be better said. But what is the conclusion? It is this, and Sainte-Beuve himself says the same in other words:[306] the church must be denied all infallibility on the question of right; we must allege that she can be mistaken even as to the true and natural sense of her own decrees, if we would maintain that she could err as to the fact in Jansenius. In a word, we must either completely break with the church, or condemn the sense of Jansenius.

M. Réville seems to know very little of the question of fact as regards Jansenius. One might say that, to form his opinion on this point, he had consulted only a report of the Jansenist Bishop of Utrecht, which contains an account of the latter's interview in 1828 with the Papal nuncio, Mgr. Capaccini. In this, the representative of the Holy See is made to use absurd and ridiculous language; the author of _Port Royal_, who was not any too well versed in theology, had a better knowledge of the question than this nuncio. How could M. Réville regard this as a serious relation? Has a witness who could neither understand the Catholic theologians nor Pascal himself the right to be believed on his word when he reports, word for word, a long conversation with his opponent, a kind of diplomatic passage-at-arms, wherein it was greatly to his interest to make the best figure for himself? And, besides, what guarantee of exactitude have we in a relation published for the first time twenty-three years after the interview, and six after the death of Cardinal Capaccini, the only person able to rectify the assertions of his interlocutor?[307]

That a Protestant or a free-thinker should encourage the "Friends of Holland" in resisting the Holy See, that he should even go so far as to do honor to that resistance, I can conceive; but that he should share in the inveterate obstinacy of the Jansenists concerning fact and right defies logic and common sense. M. Réville seems likewise to confound the bull _Unigenitus_ with that of Alexander VII. concerning the formulary. This leads us to speak of the second point on which the opposition of the clergy of Utrecht to the Holy See is founded.

The Jansenist discussions on _le fait_ and _le droit_ were still proceeding, when the patriarch of the sect, the ex-Oratorian, Pasquier Quesnel, threw off the mask, and in his _Réflexions Morales_ renewed the principal dogmas of Baius and Jansenius.[308] Pope Clement XI. ordered the book to be examined; he proceeded in this affair, says Döllinger, "with perfect prudence and deliberation. The Jesuits had been charged with being bitterly opposed to the _Réflexions_; he chose examiners from religious orders whose teachings had the least affinity with those of the Society of Jesus. He himself presided at twenty-three sessions of the examiners, and the discussion lasted for nearly two whole years.[309] Finally, on the 8th of September, 1713, the bull _Unigenitus_ appeared, condemning one hundred and one propositions taken from Quesnel's book. Among them are some which at first sight appeared inoffensive; but they cunningly convey Jansenist error, and intimately coalesce with the system; in others, expressions are skilfully worded to infect the reader with prejudices against the teachings or the general discipline of the church; many clearly announce the dogmas of Jansenius."[310]

Here, seeing that the one hundred and one propositions were found word for word in the condemned book, the distinction of right and of fact (_du droit et du fait_) was impossible. Quesnel, on hearing of the decree condemning it, exclaimed: "The Pope has proscribed one hundred and one truths!" The whole party echoed this exclamation, and our Netherland sectaries followed the impulse given by the patriarch of Jansenism. This, then, in two words, is the attitude of Jansenism in Holland: it refuses to condemn the sense of Jansenius by signature to the formulary of Alexander VII.; it refuses adherence to the bull _Unigenitus_. All the efforts made by the Holy See to bring back the Jansenists of Utrecht to Catholic unity have failed, from a persistence in this double refusal. Among these efforts at reconciliation, there is one which deserves special mention.

In 1826, Mgr. Nazalli, Papal nuncio, opened a conference with the Holland Jansenists. He announced to them that Rome exacted of them nothing more than an adhesion pure and simple to the constitutions of Innocent X., Alexander VII., and Clement XI., and he proposed for their signature the formula previously referred to, with the following addition: "I moreover submit, without distinction, reticence, or explanation, to the constitution of Clement XI., dated September 8, 1713, and beginning with the word _Unigenitus_; I accept it purely and simply, and thus I swear. May God help me and this holy Gospel!"[311]

The bull _Unigenitus_ was, even under the Gallican point of view, obligatory on all Catholics, since it had been accepted by the entire episcopate with that _moral unanimity_ of which so much was said about the time of the last council. However, the schismatic archbishop and bishops of Holland declined the overtures of the Sovereign Pontiff. Their reply is a true model of Jansenist style; every member of a phrase hides a restriction or an equivocation:

"We replied frankly (_honnêtement_) that none of the bishops or clergy would hesitate to recognize with sincerity, by means of an unequivocal declaration in _general_[312] terms, all that the Holy See _might_ exact on their part, and that they would have no difficulty in declaring, for example, that they agree, and that they even swear, if needs be, to accept, without any exception whatever, all the articles of the Holy Catholic faith: not to maintain nor to teach, now or hereafter, any opinions but those which have been established, determined, and published at all times by our holy mother, the church, _conformably to Scripture, tradition, the acts of œcumenical councils, and, lastly, to that of Trent_; that, besides, they especially reprehend, reject, and condemn the five propositions which the Holy See has condemned, _and which are pretended to be found in the book of Jansenius, known as the Augustinus_." All the rest is in this spirit. But what follows was quite unforeseen:

"We therefore leave it to the decision of the world whether a declaration so frank and so sincere ... does not offer incontestable proof of entire submission to the Holy See; and whether the general terms in which it is conceived do not embrace all the specialties of which acknowledgment can reasonably be expected from us, but into the details of which we are not permitted to enter by citing bulls which we cannot in conscience accept--bulls which have not been recognized by the government, and which we are therefore not permitted to mention without incurring grave penalties.... It is, in fact, sufficiently well known that the said constitutions (of Innocent X., Alexander VII., and Clement XI.) are not only not adopted nor obligatory in several countries, but that they cannot be adopted or enforced in a country where they have never received the _placet_ of the government, and where their acceptance as such is interdicted under threat of severe punishments. In the northern countries, to the jurisdiction of which the clergy of Utrecht belonged, such acceptance was strictly forbidden by the edicts of the 24th February and 25th May, 1703, the 14th December, 1708, and of the 20th and 21st September, 1730--edicts in which the principle was established _that it belongs to the sovereign alone to permit the publication and execution of such bulls_, and that without his _visa_ or _placet_ neither is permitted."[313]

Can one imagine baser or more servile language? In presence of a heterodox power, the pretended successors of S. Boniface, of the martyrs and victims of Calvinist persecution, dare to take sides with power, and to concede to it a right to dominate over faith and ecclesiastical discipline! At that very time William I. was oppressing his Catholic subjects, and endeavoring to deprive the bishops of the right of bringing up in their seminaries young aspirants to the priesthood. Need it be added that no law in vigor in 1826 interdicted the acceptance pure and simple of the Apostolical Constitutions of Alexander VII. and Clement XI.?

The Revolution had overridden ancient laws, and not a single Catholic was molested on account of his adhesion to the decrees of the Holy See. But the worship of the state as God makes progress in proportion as respect for the church is banished. For a bishop especially independence is impossible; when he refuses to walk in the royal way of submission to the Vicar of Christ, he becomes, by a just punishment, the plaything of a party or the slave of the secular power.

And this is the church which the neo-Protestants declare is calumniated when the accusation of Jansenism is brought against it; the church which, infected with this poison at the very sources whence it poured itself abroad on the world, has always kept its arms open to receive the followers of Jansenius; which has always shown its readiness to sign formularies like those of Quesnel and Ricci, and has obstinately rejected the profession of Catholic faith; this, in fine, is the church which precipitated itself into schism in order to remain faithful to the errors of Jansenius, and of Saint-Cyran, and of Quesnel!

FOOTNOTES:

[289] Ricci Collection, vol. xcvii., No. 226. I have done nothing but add explanatory notes and underline the more important passages.

[290] When the popes hasten to condemn an error, they are accused of acting precipitately or from the influence of some passion; when they take their time, they are still found fault with.

[291] This distinction between the court of Rome and the Holy See, when there is question of solemn acts of pontifical authority, is highly ridiculous. The so-called "Old Catholics" of Germany have never committed the error of imitating the Jansenists in this.

[292] Evidently an allusion to the decrees of the synod concerning the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, the _cultus_ and invocation of the saints, etc.

[293] Aside from the Jansenists of Holland, who always took good care to be on good terms with their Calvinist government, we find none in communion with Ricci except a small number of worshippers of power in Tuscany, Austria, Portugal, and Spain. As to the French constitutionals, their approbation was a just chastisement for the Jansenists. De Potter, after stating that Ricci received on all sides the most flattering adhesions, cites as authorities only the schismatics of Utrecht and Prof. Le Bret, of Tübingen.