Chapter VIII: Front Matter (8)

John Laurens was the son of Henry Laurens, whose Correspondence is printed in the second volume of this work. He was born in Charleston, South Carolina, in the year 1755. At the age of sixteen he accompanied his father to Europe, where he was left to pursue his education first at Geneva, and afterwards at London. He was diligent in his studies, and made rapid attainments in the different branches of knowledge, as well as in the other accomplishments of a scholar and a gentleman. In 1774 he became a student of law in the Temple, but the stirring events, that were causing so much excitement on this side of the Atlantic, drew his attention strongly to the interests and claims of his native country, and determined him to return and connect his destiny with hers. After a voyage of considerable peril, he arrived in Charleston in 1777, and immediately resolved to join the army.

As the army then abounded with officers, and there was no opening suited to him in their ranks, General Washington took him into his family as a supernumerary Aid-de-camp. In this capacity he was at the battles of Germantown and Monmouth. He soon afterwards attached himself to the army on Rhode Island, where he had the command of a small body of light troops, and displayed so much bravery and good conduct, that Congress, on the 5th of November, 1778, resolved, "that John Laurens, Aid-de-camp to General Washington, be presented with a continental commission of lieutenant-colonel, in testimony of the sense, which Congress entertain of his patriotic and spirited services as a volunteer in the American army; and of his brave conduct in several actions, particularly in that of Rhode Island on the 29th of August last; and that General Washington be directed, whenever an opportunity shall offer, to give Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens a command agreeable to his rank." The next year he repaired to the southern army, was present at the unsuccessful attack on Savannah, and was among the prisoners at the capitulation of Charleston. He was soon after exchanged and reinstated in the army. On the 28th of September, 1779, he was chosen by Congress Secretary to the Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States to the Court of Versailles, but he did not accept the appointment.

In the year following, Congress became so much pressed for the want of means in money and military supplies, that they resolved to send a special Minister to France for the purpose of representing, in a strong and just light, the extreme necessities of the United States, and soliciting new aid from the French Court. It was supposed, that a person going directly from the scene of action and suffering, and with a full knowledge of all the particulars from personal observation, would be more likely to succeed in such an application than the resident Minister Plenipotentiary, who could only speak from his general instructions. As the assistance was chiefly wanted for the relief of the army, it was moreover considered that this messenger should be selected from that body. The choice fell on Colonel Laurens, who, on the 23d of December, 1780, was appointed a special Minister to the Court of Versailles for the above purpose. He was then only twentyfive years old. He sailed from Boston in February, and arrived in Paris on the 19th of March, and immediately applied himself with great assiduity to the objects of his mission. His success, though not to the extent of his wishes, or the hopes of Congress, was yet more complete than could reasonably have been expected, considering the liberal grants, which the French government had recently made to the solicitations of Dr Franklin. All that could be effected by zeal, activity, perseverance, and intelligence, was accomplished by Colonel Laurens; but so great was his eagerness to do his duty on the occasion, and to render the most essential service to his country, that his forwardness and impatience were somewhat displeasing to the French Ministry, as not altogether consistent with their ideas of the dignity and deference belonging to transactions with Courts. They made allowance, however, for the ardor and inexperience of youth, and seem not to have been influenced by these objectionable points of manners, in their estimation of his noble and generous traits of character, or in their disposition to listen to his requests.

Having compassed the aims of his mission with uncommon despatch, Colonel Laurens left Paris, and reached Philadelphia towards the end of August, having been absent from the country but little more than six months. As soon as he had made a report of his doings to Congress, he repaired again to the army in time to be present at the memorable siege of York Town. Here he displayed great courage and gallantly in storming and taking a British battery, as second in command to Hamilton. After the capitulation he joined the southern army under General Greene, having previously acted as a representative in the legislature of his native State, which convened at Jacksonborough in January, 1782. While with the army, during the following summer, he was ill with a fever, from which he had hardly recovered when intelligence came, that a party of the British were out on a marauding excursion to Combakee. He went in pursuit of the enemy, and while leading an advanced party, he received a mortal wound, which terminated his life on the 27th of August, 1782, in the twentyseventh year of his age. His death was deeply lamented by the army and the nation.

THE

CORRESPONDENCE

OF

JOHN LAURENS.

* * * * *

INSTRUCTIONS TO JOHN LAURENS.

In Congress, December 23d, 1780.

Sir,

You will herewith receive a commission appointing you our Minister at the Court of Versailles; in pursuing the objects of which, you will conform to the following instructions.

Upon your arrival you will communicate fully to our Minister Plenipotentiary at that Court the business on which you are sent, and avail yourself of his information and influence for obtaining the aids mentioned in the estimate delivered to you. Instructions to him for that purpose are herewith transmitted, which you will deliver immediately on your arrival. You will convey to his Most Christian Majesty the grateful sense Congress have of the noble and generous part he has taken, with regard to the United States, and use every possible means to impress him with the urgent and critical state of our affairs at present, which induced the appointment of a special Minister to solicit his effectual aid.

You will, in particular, give him full information of the present state of our military affairs, and the measures taken for providing a respectable force for the ensuing campaign. It will be proper, at the same time, to point out the causes which rendered the last campaign unsuccessful.

You are to use every effort in your power to enforce the necessity of maintaining a naval superiority in the American seas. You will assure his Most Christian Majesty on our part, that if he will please to communicate to us his intentions respecting the next campaign in America, we will use every effort in our power for an effectual co-operation. You are to give his Majesty the most positive and pointed assurances of our determination to prosecute the war for the great purposes of the alliance agreeable to our engagements.

Should his Majesty grant the aids requested, and send to our assistance a naval force, you will take advantage of that conveyance for forwarding the articles furnished. If no naval armament should be ordered to America, you will endeavor to obtain some vessels of force to transport the said articles, or take advantage of some convoy to America, which may render the transportation less hazardous. You will call upon William Palfrey, our Consul in that kingdom, for such assistance as you may stand in need of for forwarding any supplies which you may obtain. You are authorised to draw upon our Minister Plenipotentiary for such sums as you may from time to time stand in need of, giving him early notice thereof, that he may aid you from funds procured on our account, without doing injury to our other concerns. You may also draw upon any other funds, which you may know to have been procured for us to Europe.

You will, on your arrival at the Court of Versailles, present the letter to his Most Christian Majesty, which you will herewith receive. Previous to your departure from the United States, you are to confer with the Commander in Chief of the American army, the Minister Plenipotentiary of France, the commanders in chief of his Most Christian Majesty's fleet and army at Rhode Island, the Marquis de Lafayette, if it should not retard your voyage, upon the subject of your commission, and avail yourself of every information you may obtain from them respectively. You will embrace every opportunity of informing us of the success of your negotiations, and receive and obey such instructions, as you may from time to time receive from Congress.

When the purpose of your mission shall be as fully effected as you may deem practicable, you are to return, and report your success to Congress without delay, unless you shall previously receive other orders.[15]

We pray God to further you with his goodness in the several objects hereby recommended and that he will have you in his holy keeping.

SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, _President_.

FOOTNOTES:

[15] For Additional Instructions to Dr Franklin respecting Colonel Laurens's mission, see _Franklin's Correspondence_, Vol. III. p. 185.

* * * * *

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO JOHN LAURENS.

In Congress, December 27th, 1780.

Sir,

With respect to the loan, we foresee that the sum which we ask will be greatly inadequate to our wants. We wish, however, to depend as much as possible on our internal exertions. In this negotiation, the state of our finances require that you should endeavor to procure as long a respite after the war, for payment of the principal, as may be in your power. You may agree for an interest not exceeding the terms allowed or given on national security in Europe, endeavoring to suspend the discharge of the interest for two or three years, if possible.

You are hereby empowered to pledge the faith of the United States, by executing such securities or obligations for the payment of the money, as you may think proper, and also that the interest shall not be reduced, nor the principal paid during the term for which the same shall have been borrowed, without the consent of the lenders or their representatives.

You are to stipulate for the payment of both principal and interest in specie.

The loan must prove ineffective unless the specie is actually remitted. Experience has shown, that the negotiation of bills is attended with unsupportable loss and disadvantage. His Most Christian Majesty, we are persuaded, will see in the strongest light the necessity of despatching an effective naval armament to the American seas. This is a measure of such vast moment, that your utmost address will be employed to give it success. By such a conveyance, the specie may be remitted in different ships of war with a prospect of safety.

SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, _President_.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Philadelphia, January 3d, 1781.

Sir,

Although my instructions relative to the objects of my mission do not explicitly direct what conduct I am to observe, in case the aids solicited from the Court of France cannot be obtained in their full extent, yet I presume it is not the intention of Congress to confine me without alternative to the precise demands which they have made. There is the more reason that this matter should be clearly understood, as my prospects, especially in the important article of pecuniary succors, are far from being flattering. I apprehend then, that I shall have satisfied my duty by aspiring, with every effort, to complete success, and upon failure of that, by approaching it as nearly as shall be found practicable.

With regard to the estimate of the Board of War, as it descends into the minutest detail, and includes a great variety of articles, it appears to me that it will be necessary to attach myself in preference to the objects of first necessity for the ensuing campaign, that the most indispensable supplies may not be retarded by those of a secondary nature, and that the former being secured as far as possible, and the latter left in a train of execution, I may the sooner be at liberty to return and make my report. As I apprehend that these ideas need only to be submitted to Congress to obtain their sanction, I shall consider myself authorised to act in consequence, unless I receive new orders to the contrary.

I have the honor to be, with the profoundest respect, &c.

JOHN LAURENS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Boston, February 4th, 1781.

Sir,

I do myself the honor of informing Congress, that I arrived at this place on the 25th ultimo.

After passing two days at Morristown in fruitless expectation of meeting the Commander in Chief, I proceeded to head quarters, where my conference with the General, on the objects of my mission, detained me three days. The impediment of floating ice in the North River, which induced the necessity of crossing it much higher than at the usual place, and other difficulties of the season, will account for the rest of my delay on the journey.

Upon delivering my despatches to the Navy Board, I found, that the two indispensables, men and money, were wanting to fit the Alliance for sea. I urged the necessity of the most prompt and decisive exertions on their part. They returned me such assurances as left me no reason to doubt, that the General Court would authorise an impressment to complete the deficiency of our crew, and that a sufficient supply of money would be procured. This determined me to devote the interval of preparation to making my visit to New York. On my return this day, I learned with great surprise and mortification, that the motion for an impressment had been rejected, private motives having superseded those of general good. In these circumstances I was obliged to apply to General Lincoln for authority to engage such recruits of this State, and such soldiers of the invalid corps, as might be qualified for the marine service. This resource however has afforded us but a few men. I have just obtained permission from Governor Hancock to enlist volunteers from the guard of the Castle. The Navy Board has commissioned a merchant of popularity and influence among the seafaring men, to offer a tempting bounty, with such precautions as will prevent uneasiness among those who entered for a smaller consideration. I am now addressing the principal merchants to spare a few men from their ships, to be replaced from the Navy Board. In the mean time the rendezvous of the frigate continues open.

But these are all precarious expedients, and my expectations are by no means sanguine. Nothing however shall be left unattempted; if my prospects do not brighten, I shall try the effect of a second memorial to the General Court, and finally insist upon Captain Barry's putting to sea with the crew he can obtain by the middle of the week. There is an additional difficulty in procuring the remainder of the ship's compliment, which is the necessity of hiring not only seamen, but natives, as a counterbalance to the bad composition of the men already on board, too many British prisoners having been admitted; their numbers, the value of the ship, and the business on which she is employed, are temptations to an enterprise, in favor of their ancient connexions.

Several gentlemen go as passengers, on condition of serving on the quarter deck in case of an encounter, and they will reinforce the party of the officers in case of a mutiny. I have endeavored to procure every useful information in the several conferences directed by Congress. The General and Admiral at Newport received me with that politeness, which characterises their nation, and professed an earnest desire to promote, as far as depends on them, the objects of my mission. I must however apprize Congress, that the French army and navy are demanding in the most pressing terms, pecuniary supplies for themselves. Their bills of exchange sell at a discount of from twentyfive to twentyeight per cent. This demand and the tenacity of the Spaniards in pursuing their favorite object, Gibraltar, are unfavorable to my negotiation. Upon the whole I am more than ever convinced, that the most powerful and unremitting efforts at home will be required to accomplish the great objects of the war.

I have the honor to be, with the profoundest respect, &c.

JOHN LAURENS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Boston, February 7th, 1781.

Sir,

Since my letter to your Excellency on the 4th instant, the measures taken by Governor Hancock relative to the Castle guard proving insufficient, I addressed a Memorial to the General Court. Their permission to engage volunteers from that corps, and a sum of specie granted for the purpose, the volunteer draft from the continental troops, and the unremitting exertions of General Lincoln, have put us at length barely in condition to go to sea. I shall embark today, and expect Captain Barry will sail with the first fair wind. I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 12th ultimo, and the letter and packets enclosed. Particular attention shall be paid to your instructions relative to the latter.

I have the honor to be, with the profoundest respect, &c.

JOHN LAURENS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

L'Orient, March 11th, 1781.

Sir,

I have the honor of informing Congress, that I arrived at this place on the afternoon of the 9th instant; and should have proceeded, without an instant's repose, to Passy, had not the commandant of the town assured me, that the Marquis de Castries would arrive here that evening on his way to Brest, where he was going to accelerate by his presence the execution of his naval disposition. The prospect of an immediate conference with the Minister on the objects of my mission, which relate to his department, the danger of missing him by our travelling different routes, and the repeated assurances of his expected arrival, have detained me till this morning; but as the delay has been much greater than I apprehended, and the Minister's approach is not announced, I have determined to pursue my journey.

The accounts, which the commandant has communicated to me of the naval preparations at Brest, are, that twentyfive sail of the line are ready for sea, with ninety transports, on board of which are six thousand troops; that the ships of war are destined part for the West Indies, and part with the troops for North America.

The rupture between England and the United Provinces has hitherto proved very prejudicial to the latter, as they were exceedingly vulnerable by having so great a number of merchant ships at sea. On our voyage we captured a British privateer in company with a Venetian ship, of which she had made a prize, contrary to the laws of nations. This appeared to me a happy opportunity for manifesting the determination of Congress to maintain the rights of neutral powers, as far as depends on them. After a short consultation, Captain Barry and his officers very readily acceded to the liberation of the Venetian, and the complete restoration of the cargo and property, which were very valuable. The captain was accordingly left to pursue his voyage, and the privateer was brought into port. Mr Palfrey, our consul, is not yet arrived at this port; it is generally feared that this ship foundered in a storm, which separated her and the Franklin in the commencement of their voyage, as she has not been heard of since.

I have the honor to be with the profoundest respect, &c.

JOHN LAURENS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Passy, March 20th, 1781.

Sir,

I had the honor to write to your Excellency from L'Orient the 11th instant. On my journey hither, I met the Marquis de Castries, and obtained a hasty conference with him, in which I insisted principally on the necessity of a constant naval superiority on the American coast. He observed on his pert, that the dispositions of the fleet were already made; that it was not in his power to alter them; that it was necessary at the present juncture to make naval exertions in more places than one; that the French West India possessions, a nearer interest, must naturally be first secured; at the same time he repeatedly assured me, that the United States had a very considerable share in the present armament, the movements of which he was going to accelerate; that he hoped a maritime superiority would exist on the part of the allies, but that it must depend upon the events of war. He excused himself from descending into particulars, and urged me to proceed with all possible despatch to Versailles. Upon my arrival here, I found that the letter of Congress to his Most Christian Majesty, of the 22d of November, 1780,[16] had been delivered by our Minister Plenipotentiary; that he had proceeded to negotiate the succors solicited by Congress, and had received the following communication from the Count de Vergennes.

"It is impossible for his Majesty to favor a loan in this kingdom, because it would prejudice those which he has occasion to make himself for the support of the war; but his Majesty, in order to give a signal proof of his friendship for the United States, grants them under the title of a donation, a sum of six millions livres tournois. As the American army is in want of arms, clothing, &c. Dr Franklin will be so good as to deliver a note of them. The articles will be procured of the best quality, and on the most reasonable terms. General Washington will be authorised to draw for the remaining sum, but the drafts are at long sight, in order to facilitate the payment at the royal treasury. The Courts of Petersburg and Vienna have offered their mediation. The King has answered, that it will be personally agreeable to him, but that he could not accept it as yet, because he has allies whose concurrence is necessary. Dr Franklin is requested to acquaint Congress of this overture and the answer, and to engage them to send their instructions to their Plenipotentiaries. It is supposed that Congress will eagerly accept the mediation."

In my first interview with the Count de Vergennes, I represented to him, in the strongest terms, the insufficiency of the above mentioned succor, and the danger to which France was exposed of losing all her past efforts in favor of America, unless the requests of Congress were complied with. I afterwards addressed to him the enclosed letter, in which I transcribed the result of my conference with General Washington on the objects of my mission, contained in a letter from the General to me of the 15th of January. In consequence of the Count de Vergennes' desire, that I would select from the estimate of the Board of War the articles of most urgent necessity, I extracted a list in which I confined myself to the artillery, arms, military stores, clothing, tents, cloth, drugs, and surgical instruments, and accompanied it with a letter.

My personal solicitations have not been wanting to hasten an answer to these letters, and render them favorable. The constant language of the Count de Vergennes is, that our demands are excessive, that we throw the burthen of the war upon our ally, that the support of it in different parts of the world has cost France exertions and expenses, which fully employ her means, that the public credit, however well established, has its limits, to exceed which would be fatal to it. He adds, at the same time, the strongest assurances of the good will of our ally. This Minister and M. de Maurepas inform me, that nothing can be determined until the return of the Marquis de Castries, which will be the day after tomorrow; that the matter must be deliberated, and that they will consider what can be done. My expectations are very moderate.

We have received no intelligence of the sailing of the Brest fleet. It consists of twentyfive sail, five of which are destined for the East Indies with troops, but it is said they will be detained for want of transports. The remaining twenty are to proceed to the West Indies, where ulterior dispositions will be made, of which the Chevalier de la Luzerne is instructed. The British fleet, of twentyeight sail of the line, with the convoy for Gibraltar, sailed the 13th instant, and Commodore Johnston's squadron put to sea the same day. The Spanish fleet is likewise at sea.

I am firmly of opinion, that the British in the present moment of success will not accede to those preliminaries, which France and the United States can never depart from, and, consequently, that the news of the mediation of Petersburg and Vienna should have no other effect, than to redouble our ardor and exertions for the campaign.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN LAURENS.

FOOTNOTES:

[16] See this letter in the Secret Journals of Congress, Vol. II. p. 343.

* * * * *

_Memorial to the Count de Vergennes._

As in presenting a Memorial to your Excellency on the objects of my mission, I should necessarily repeat in part a conference, which I had by order of Congress with General Washington, previous to my departure, I prefer presenting your Excellency with such extracts from it as relate to my purpose. They are as follows.

"1. That considering the diffused population of these States, the composition and temper of a part of its inhabitants, the want of a sufficient stock of national wealth as a foundation for credit, and the almost extinction of commerce, the attempts we have been compelled to make for carrying on the war, have exceeded the national abilities of this country, and by degrees brought it to a crisis, which render immediate assistance and efficacious succor from abroad indispensable to its safety.

"2. That notwithstanding from the confusion always attendant on a revolution, from our having had governments to frame, and every species of civil and military institution to create, from that inexperience in affairs necessarily incident to a nation in its commencement, some errors may have been committed in the administration of our finances, to which a part of our embarrassments are to be attributed; yet they are principally to be attributed to our essential want of means; to the want of a sufficient stock of wealth as mentioned in the first article, which, continuing to operate, will make it impossible, by any merely interior exertions, to extricate ourselves from these embarrassments, restore public credit, and furnish the funds requisite for the support of the war.

"3. That experience has demonstrated the impracticability of maintaining a paper credit, without funds for its redemption; the depreciation of our currency was in the main a necessary effect of the want of those funds, and its restoration is impossible for the same reasons, to which the general diffidence, that had taken place among the people, is an additional, and in the present state of things, an insuperable obstacle.

"4. That the mode, which for want of money has been substituted for supplying the army, by assessing a proportion of the productions of the earth, has hitherto been found ineffectual, has frequently exposed the army to the most calamitous distress, and from its novelty and incompatibility with ancient habits, is regarded by the people as burthensome and oppressive, has excited serious discontents, and, in some places, alarming symptoms of opposition. This mode has besides many particular inconveniences, which contribute to make it inadequate to our wants, and ineligible but as an auxiliary.

"5. That from the best estimates of the annual revenues, which these States are capable of affording, there is a balance to be supplied by credit. The resource of domestic loans is inconsiderable, because there are, properly speaking, few monied men, and the few there are can employ their money more profitably otherwise; added to which, the instability of the currency and the deficiency of funds have impaired the public credit.

"6. That the patience of the army, from an almost uninterrupted series of complicated distress, is now nearly exhausted, their wants carried to an extremity, which has recently had very disagreeable consequences, and demonstrate, the absolute necessity of speedy relief, a relief not within the compass of our means. You are too well acquainted with all their sufferings, for want of clothing, for want of provisions, for want of pay.

"7. That the people being dissatisfied with the mode of supporting the war, there is danger to apprehend, that evils actually felt in prosecuting it may weaken the cause which began it, evils founded not on immediate sufferings, but on a speculative apprehension of future sufferings from the loss of their liberties; there is danger that a commercial and free people, little accustomed to heavy burthens, pressed by impositions of a new and odious kind, may not make a proper allowance for the necessity of the conjuncture, and may imagine they have only exchanged one tyranny for another.

"8. That from all the foregoing considerations result, 1st, the absolute necessity of an immediate, ample, and efficacious succor of money, large enough to be a foundation for substantial arrangements of finance to revive public credit, and give vigor to future operations. 2dly, the vast importance of a decided effort of the allied arms on this continent the ensuing campaign, to effectuate once for all the great object of the alliance, the liberty and independence of these United States. Without the former, we may make a feeble and expiring effort the next campaign, in all probability the period to our opposition; with it we should be in a condition to continue the war as long as the obstinacy of the enemy might require. The first is essential; both combined, would bring the contest to a glorious issue, crown the obligations which America already feels to the magnanimity and generosity of her ally, and render the union perpetual by all the ties of gratitude and affection, as well as mutual interest, which alone render it solid and indissoluble.

"9. That next to a loan of money, a constant naval superiority is the most interesting; this would instantly reduce the enemy to a difficult, defensive war, and by removing all prospects of extending their acquisitions, would take away the motives for prosecuting it. Indeed, it is not to be conceived, how they could subsist a large force in this country if we had the command of the seas to interrupt the regular transmission of supplies from Europe. This superiority, with an aid of money, would enable us to convert the contest into a vigorous offensive war. I say nothing of the advantages to the trade of both nations, nor how much it would facilitate our supplies. With respect to us, it seems to be one of two deciding points, and it appears to be the interest of our allies, abstracted from the immediate benefits to this country, to transfer the naval war to America. The number of ports friendly to them and hostile to the British, the materials for repairing their disabled ships, the extensive supplies towards the subsistence of their fleet, are circumstances which would give them a palpable advantage in the contest of the sea. No nation will have it more in its power to repay what it borrows than this. Our debts are hitherto small. The vast and valuable tracts of unlocated lands, the variety and fertility of climates and soils, the advantages of every kind, which we possess for commerce, insure to this country a rapid advancement in population and prosperity, and a certainty (its independence being established) of redeeming in a short term of years the comparatively inconsiderable debts, it may have occasion to contract. Notwithstanding the difficulties under which we labor, and the inquietudes among the people, there is still a fund of inclination and resource in the country equal to great and continued exertions, provided we have it in our power to stop the progress of disgust, by changing the present system, and adopting another more consonant with the spirit of the nation, and more capable of activity and energy in measures of which a powerful succor of money must be the basis.

"The people are discontented, but it is with the feeble, oppressive mode of conducting the war, not with the war itself; they are not unwilling to contribute to its support, but they are unwilling to do it in a way that renders private property precarious, a necessary consequence of the fluctuation of the national currency, and of the inability of government to perform its engagements oftentimes coercively made. A large majority are still firmly attached to the independence of these States, abhor a re-union with Great Britain, and are affectionate to the alliance with France. But this disposition can ill supply the means customary and essential in war, nor can we rely on its duration amidst the perplexities, oppressions, and misfortunes, that attend the want of them."

From those extracts it will appear to your Excellency, that the fate of America depends upon the immediate and decisive succor of her august ally, in the two points of a specific loan and a naval superiority. The most accurate calculation of the expense requisite for a vigorous campaign, and the interior means which Congress have of defraying that expense, prove that there is a deficiency of the full sum solicited by Congress. The grant of six millions, which his Majesty is pleased to make under the title of a donation to the United States, will be acknowledged with the liveliest emotions of gratitude by affectionate allies, at the same time it would be frustrating the gracious intentions of his Majesty towards his allies, and betraying the common cause of France and America, to encourage a belief, that the above mentioned aid will enable the United States to surmount the present perilous juncture of our affairs. The reasoning in the foregoing extracts will evince how inadequate the sum is to the present exigency.

I must likewise remark to your Excellency, that the credit in bills of exchange is subject to difficulties and disadvantages, which render such a resource very unfit for the conduct of the war. Bills are obnoxious to the vicissitudes and speculations of commerce, and it is easy to foresee, that his Majesty's allies would be great sufferers by their drafts, and at the same time be incapable of giving that vigor and energy to their operations, which would be derived from specie. The same enlightened policy and generous regard for the rights of mankind, which prompted France to espouse the cause of America, still dictate the conduct which she is to pursue; they demand every effort on her part to prevent America from being reduced to the British domination, her commerce, and those sources of wealth being restored to the tyrant of the European seas, the ancient rival of France; but on the contrary, the abasement of this rival, and the establishment of a faithful ally, united by all the ties of gratitude, affection, and the most permanent mutual interests. To those invaluable purposes give me leave to repeat to your Excellency, that the decisive measures in the foregoing extracts are necessary.

I submit to your Excellency, whether the objection to his Majesty's favoring a loan in the name of Congress, may not be obviated by an additional loan in the name of his Majesty, on account of the United States, for which Congress will be accountable. The excellent state of the finances of this kingdom, the exalted state of public credit, must unquestionably give the greatest facility for this purpose, and it may be clearly proved, that giving decisive succor in this article at the present juncture will be infinitely more advantageous, than suffering the war to languish, by affording partial and inadequate assistance. Supposing that fortunate casualties, at this time very improbable, should enable us to continue the war upon its present footing, I beg leave to repeat to your Excellency, that the greatest promptness in this business is essential. The British, by being in possession of two States, fertile in grain, timber, and naval stores, have acquired new animation, and fresh resources for the war, and every day, according to present appearances, brings America nearer to the period of her efforts.

JOHN LAURENS.

* * * * *

_Questions proposed to Colonel Laurens; with his Answers to them._

Paris, March 29th, 1781.

"1st. To what number can the United States increase their continental troops?

"2dly. What will be the expense of the number fixed?

"3dly. This expense is to be distinguished into pay and appointments, clothing, arms, ammunition, and provision.

"4thly. What does the artillery of the United States consist of, and what is the number of carriages?

"5thly. What is the number of provision wagons?

"6thly. What are the plans of General Washington, in case his army should amount to fifteen, twelve, or ten thousand men, independently of the French troops?"

After answering the foregoing questions generally, both with respect to the northern and southern army, I added the following remarks.

The plans of General Washington are absolutely subordinate to the succors, which his Most Christian Majesty will be pleased to grant to his allies. If Congress obtain the succor in money and military effects, and the naval superiority which they solicit, they will be enabled to revive public credit, to make solid arrangements of finance, to give activity to the resources of the country, to augment their troops, to appease their discontents, and to reinforce General Washington with a select corps of ten thousand militia.

With the addition of this force and the French troops, the General will be in condition to undertake the siege of New York. It is unnecessary to say how glorious and decisive the success of this operation would be for the common cause; it is equally unnecessary to add, how much the promptness of succor from France would contribute to it.

The expense of artillery required for this operation will be found in the estimate delivered; that of clothing, &c. for the army in its present state, will be found in deducting a quantity proportioned to the number of men; but it is impossible to represent too strongly, that this excess far from being superfluous, is absolutely necessary to recruit the army in general; a precaution which is indispensable, unless we should choose to hazard all upon the event of a single operation. That the Congress besides, owes great arrearages of clothing to the soldiers, and that as the estimate of Indian presents has not been included in the present demand, we may be obliged perhaps to sacrifice a part of the clothing now solicited, to maintain the friendship of some of the tribes attached to France and America, and that it is of the greatest importance to prevent them from joining the hostile tribes, who in conjunction with the English tories ravage the country, destroy our harvests, put to flight and massacre all the inhabitants on the western frontier, from New York to Virginia. We may more especially expect, that this diversion will be employed during the siege of New York. It is to be added, that a number of men will be found who have already served, who would eagerly rejoin their ancient standards, provided they had the assurance of proper treatment, instead of the misery and sufferings which they have hitherto experienced. That the army would be augmented, notwithstanding the daily loss in the trenches, by levies perfectly accustomed to fire.

The extreme weakness of the southern army is attributable to the following causes.

1st. That two of the States that furnish quotas to this army are invaded by the British.

2dly. That they have all a great many prisoners in the hands of the enemy, and that their troops in general have been wasted, as well by the excessive marches, which they have undergone in carrying succors to the southward, as by the different misfortunes which have happened there.

The naval superiority of the British, and the rapidity of their movements by sea, secured to them the capture of Charleston, and all their southern successes; enjoying the advantages they have had in their power, to transport a body of troops, with all requisites in ammunition and provision, from one end of the continent to the other in fourteen days, to attack a feeble point; while the American succors, wasted by a march of two months, commenced in the rigors of winter, and without intermission from the fatigues of a campaign, could only arrive to increase the public calamity, by being beat in detail.

JOHN LAURENS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Versailles, April 9th, 1781.

Sir,

Since I had the honor of writing to your Excellency, on the 23d ultimo, I have employed the most unremitting efforts to obtain a prompt and favorable decision relative to the objects of my mission. After many difficulties and delays, with the details of which it is needless to trouble Congress, the Count de Vergennes communicated to me yesterday his Most Christian Majesty's determination to guaranty a loan of ten millions, to be opened in Holland, in addition to the six millions granted as a gratuitous gift, and the four millions appropriated for the payment of bills of exchange drawn by Congress on their Minister Plenipotentiary. The purchase money of the clothing, which must be an affair of private contract, and the value of the military effects which may be furnished from the royal arsenals, are to be deducted from the six millions.

I shall use my utmost endeavors to procure an immediate advance of the ten millions from the treasury of France, to be replaced by the proposed loan, and shall renew my solicitations for the supplies of ordinance and military stores on credit, that the present of six millions may not be absorbed by those objects, and the purchase of necessary clothing. The providing this article I fear will be attended with great difficulties and delays, as all the woollen manufactories of France are remote from the sea, and there are no public magazines of cloth suitable to our purposes. The cargo of the Marquis de Lafayette will I hope arrive safe under the convoy of the Alliance; and by satisfying our immediate necessities prevent the delays above mentioned from having any disagreeable consequences.

The Marquis de Castries has engaged to make immediate arrangements for the safe transportation of the pecuniary and other succors destined for the United States, and has repeatedly assured me, that the naval superiority will be established on the American coast the ensuing campaign. The French fleet, he informs me, was on the 27th ultimo sixty leagues west of Cape Finisterre, proceeding to its destination, in good order and with a favorable wind.

I do myself the honor to transmit to your Excellency extracts of the most conspicuous letters of an intercepted mail, taken in a packet bound from Falmouth to New York. Your Excellency will have been informed, that the Court of London have referred the offered mediation of Russia, between England and the United Provinces, to a general pacification. I have been some days stationary at Versailles for the facility of seeing the different Ministers, and accelerating their deliberations. Being just apprized of an opportunity from Nantes to America, I take the liberty of sending this short provisional letter, lest upon my return to Passy I should not have time to write more fully.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN LAURENS.

* * * * *

_Memorial from Colonel John Laurens to Count de Vergennes._

The underwritten, special Minister of the United States of America, has the honor to represent to his Most Christian Majesty in behalf of Congress and by their orders, that the crisis is extreme, and that it demands prompt and decisive succors.

The United States claim with confidence the power and good will of their august ally. They had requested,

1st. A loan of twentyfive millions.

2dly. A naval superiority on the American coast.

3dly. Arms and ammunition, materials for clothing, equipments and tents, estimates of which have been laid before the Ministry.

The underwritten, being informed by the Count de Vergennes of the King's intentions with regard to pecuniary succors, earnestly offers in the name of the Congress the homage of the most lively gratitude, but at the same time it is his duty to represent, that although this succor tends to the object which his Majesty has in view, it is nevertheless demonstrated in the present state of affairs, that it is insufficient, considering the urgent necessities of the army and the administration, its engagements and debts, the exhausted condition of America, the absolute deficiency of resources and specie, and the enormous expense essential to the vigorous support of the war. It is on this account, that the underwritten earnestly entreats his Majesty to grant, on credit to the United States of America, the artillery, arms, ammunition, &c. which shall be drawn from his Majesty's arsenals and magazines, as a very considerable sum must be absorbed for the payment of clothing and other articles to be collected in France.

The underwritten further entreats his Majesty to consider, that the operation of a loan in Holland cannot be terminated in less than three months, that the delay of this result may commit the safety of America, and the common cause, lose the fruit of all the expense and sacrifices hitherto made; a single instant is precious, the least delay becomes of the most dangerous consequence, while the successes of the British multiply their resources and give them new energy.

The loan which will be opened in Holland under the auspices of his Majesty, favored by the guarantee which he is pleased to grant, cannot fail of success.

The underwritten flatters himself, therefore, that his Majesty will find no inconvenience in ordering the immediate advance of ten millions to be delivered at the disposal of the United States, which will be returned to his royal treasury by means of the loan in question.

Events of the greatest importance depend upon this disposition equally good and indispensable. The underwritten would think himself deficient in his duty, if he did not persevere in entreating his Majesty to adopt and order it.

The arrival of this sum is necessary to give a vigorous impulse to the organisation of administration in the present state of things, renew the tone of parts which have lost their energy, and revive public credit by making the resources of the country concur in the expenses of the war, which resources cannot be turned to account without coin to determine them.

If it is impossible to make it a part of the general arrangement to grant safe means of conveyance for the whole of this sum, the underwritten entreats his Majesty to cause as considerable a portion as possible to be remitted immediately, and to fix a very early date for the departure of the remainder.

The underwritten further earnestly solicits, that a naval superiority be permanently maintained on the American coast. The practicability and success of all military operations and the event of the war, depend directly and even exclusively on the state of the maritime force in America.

The British, by preserving this advantage, will be able to accomplish all their plans by the rapidity of their movements. The facility of transporting themselves everywhere secures them a series of successes, which are rendered still more decisive by the certainty of finding no opposition in defenceless points.

It is by these means that they have been able lately to possess themselves of a very important maritime point in North Carolina, and, by effecting a sudden junction between two divisions of their army, have been able to penetrate to the granary of that State. This position is the more favorable to the enemy, as he encloses between his army and the port of Wilmington, of which he is master, a considerable number of Scotch colonists attached to the interests of England, and who will be determined, perhaps, by his successes to declare themselves openly. Such consequences are to be expected from great successes in all civil wars. If his Majesty thinks proper to oppose a naval superiority to the British, they will be obliged to recall their troops from the interior country to reunite for the defence of the most important maritime points, the communication between which will be cut off, and the choice of attacks left to the allies.

The abasement of Great Britain, the dismemberment of its empire, the inestimable commercial advantages arising to France, present great interests, and merit powerful efforts. If this opportunity be neglected, if too much be left to chance, if time be lost, and the means employed be insufficient, the British pride will know neither bounds nor restraint; our object will be missed perhaps forever; it is easy to foresee how fatal the consequences would be to the French islands.

The underwritten renews the assurances of the most inviolable attachment on the part of the United States. Whatever may be the decision of his Majesty on these representations, his goodness towards his allies will never be effaced from their hearts; they will support the common cause with the same devotion to the last extremity, but their success must necessarily depend upon their means.

JOHN LAURENS.

_Paris, April 18th, 1781._

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, April 24th, 1781.

Sir,

I had the honor of addressing to your Excellency a letter on the 9th instant, conformably to which I presented the Memorial now sent, after preparing the way for it by as many conferences as an intervening vacation would permit. In the course of these I discovered that it was impossible to obtain any further detachment of ships of force from hence; consequently, that the sum of specie to be sent immediately to America would be limited by the means of conveyance, and that successive epochs must divide a risk, which would be too considerable if simultaneous.

In pursuance of these ideas Count de Vergennes declared to me, that it had been solemnly determined to send no more than two millions in a frigate with me, and to have the remainder transmitted afterwards at different periods; this sum appeared to me so inconsiderable, compared with our necessities, that I thought it my duty to make the warmest remonstrances on the subject, and the succeeding day I delivered the Memorial above mentioned. In the mean time I have been employed in engaging a conveyance from Holland, which is so unexceptionable as to enable me to demand with confidence an additional sum for the first remittance of specie. The conveyance alluded to is the Indian, a vessel having the dimensions of a seventyfour gun ship, mounting twentyeight French thirtysix pounders on her main deck, and twelve twelves on her quarter deck and forecastle, sold by the Chevalier de Luxembourg to the State of South Carolina for the term of three years, loaded in part with articles of clothing, &c. on said State's account, nearly ready for sea, but reduced to the impossibility of sailing for want of ten thousand pounds sterling to discharge an accumulation of debts contracted in port. In these circumstances Captain Gillon, her present commander, has applied to me in the most pressing terms for assistance, and has offered to cede me the cargo which he has on board, on condition of furnishing the means of extricating himself from his present difficulties. As there appeared to me a happy coincidence in this matter, of the interests of the State and the Continent, I determined to accept his offer, annexing certain conditions, as will be seen in the enclosure.[17]

The advantages in favor of the continent are in the first place a very important and considerable gain of time in forwarding supplies of clothing, as no considerable quantity could have been obtained at the proper seaport of France at an earlier date than the 10th of June. Secondly, the excellence of the conveyance removes a powerful objection on the part on the Ministry against augmenting the first remittance of specie.

The advantages on the part of the State are, that she will be able to avail herself of the services of her ship, of which without the present interposition there would not be the least prospect, and besides, she will derive her share in common with the other members of the Union from the general advantages.

I have not as yet received a definitive answer from the Count de Vergennes to my last Memorial and subsequent applications, but I learn from M. Necker, that the following will be the distribution of what relates to his department, viz. that two millions will be sent in the frigate with me, one million on board the Indian, and that it is besides in agitation to make an arrangement with Spain for assigning a sum of specie at Vera Cruz, to be transported from thence by a frigate to be ordered on that service from one of the West India Islands.