Chapter III

1. That men stand to their covenants. 2. Injury defined. 3. That
injury is done only to the covenantee. 4. The signification of
those names, just, unjust. 5. Justice not rightly divided into
commutative, and distributive. 6. It is a law of nature, that he
that is trusted, turn not that trust to the damage of him that
trusteth. 7. Ingratitude defined. 8. It is a law of nature, to
endeavour to accommodate one another: 9. And that man forgive
upon caution for the future: 10. And that revenge ought to
respect the future only: 11. That reproach and contempt
declared, is against the law of nature: 12. That indifference of
commerce is of the law of nature: 13. That messengers employed
to procure or maintain peace, ought to be safe by the law of
nature.

[Sidenote: That men stand to their covenants.]

1. It is a common saying that nature maketh nothing in vain. And it is most certain, that as the truth of a conclusion, is no more but the truth of the premises that make it; so the force of the command, or law of nature, is no more than the force of the reasons inducing thereunto. Therefore the law of nature mentioned in the former chapter, section 2, namely, _That every man should divest himself of the right_, &c. were utterly vain, and of none effect, if this also were not a law of the same nature, _That every man is obliged to stand to, and perform, those covenants he maketh_. For what benefit is it to a man, that any thing be promised, or given unto him, if he that giveth, or promiseth, performeth not, or retaineth still the right of taking back what he hath given?

[Sidenote: Injury defined.]

2. The breach or violation of covenant, is that which men call _injury_, consisting in some action or omission, which is therefore called _unjust_. For it is action or omission, without _jus_, or right, which was transferred or relinquished before. There is a great similitude between that we call _injury_, or _injustice_ in the actions and conversations of men in the world, and that which is called _absurd_ in the arguments and disputations of the Schools. For as he, which is driven to contradict an assertion by him before maintained, is said to be reduced to an absurdity; so he that through passion doth, or omitteth that which before by covenant he promised to do, or not to omit, is said to commit injustice; and there is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so called. For he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the time to come. And he that doth any action, willeth it in that present, which is part of the future time contained in the covenant. And therefore he that violateth a covenant, willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing, at the same time, which is a plain contradiction. And so _injury_ is an _absurdity_ of conversation, as absurdity is a kind of injustice in disputation.

[Sidenote: That injury is done only to the covenantee.]

3. In all violation of covenant, (to whomsoever accrueth the damage) the injury is done only to him to whom the covenant was made. For example, if a man covenant to obey his master, and the master command him to give money to a third, which he promiseth to do, and doth not, though this be to the damage of the third, yet the injury is done to the master only. For he could violate no covenant with him, with whom none was made, and therefore doth him no injury. For injury consisteth in violation of covenant by the definition thereof.

[Sidenote: The signification of those names, just and unjust.]

4. The names of _just_, _unjust_, _justice_, _injustice_, are equivocal, and signify diversly. For justice and injustice, when they be attributed to actions, signify the same thing with _no injury_, and _injury_, and denominate the action _just_, or _unjust_, but not the man so. For they denominate him _guilty_, or _not guilty_. But when justice or injustice, are attributed to men, they signify _proneness_, and affection and inclination of nature, that is to say, passions of the mind, apt to produce just and unjust actions. So that when a man is said to be just, or unjust; not the action, but the passion and aptitude, to do such actions, is considered. And therefore a just man may have committed an unjust act; and an unjust man may have done justly, not only one, but most of his actions. For there is an _oderunt peccare_ in the unjust, as well as in the just, but from different causes. For the unjust man who abstaineth from injuries for fear of punishment, declareth plainly, that the justice of his actions dependeth upon civil constitution, from whence punishments proceed, which would otherwise in the estate of nature be unjust, according to the fountain from whence they spring. This distinction therefore of _justice_, and _injustice_, ought to be remembered, that when injustice is taken for guilty, the action is unjust, but not therefore the man; and when justice is taken for _guiltlessness_, the actions are just, and yet not always the man. Likewise when justice and injustice are taken for habits of the mind, the man may be just, or unjust, and yet not all his actions so.

[Sidenote: Justice not rightly divided into commutative, and
distributive.]

5. Concerning the justice of actions, the same is usually divided into two kinds, whereof men call the one _commutative_, and the other _distributive_; and are said to consist, the one in proportion _arithmetical_; the other in _geometrical_: and _commutative_ justice, they place in permutation, as buying, selling, and bartering; _distributive_, in giving to every man according to their deserts. Which distinction is not well made, inasmuch as injury, which is the injustice of action, consisteth not in the inequality of the things changed, or distributed, but in the inequality that men, contrary to nature and reason, assume unto themselves above their fellows. Of which inequality, shall be spoken hereafter. And for _commutative_ justice placed in buying and selling, though the thing bought be unequal to the price given for it, yet forasmuch as both the buyer and the seller are made judges of the value, and are thereby both satisfied, there can be no injury done on either side, neither party having trusted, or covenanted with the other. And for _distributive_ justice, which consisteth in the distribution of our own benefits, seeing a thing is therefore said to be our own, because we may dispose of it at our own pleasure, it can be no injury to any man, though our liberality be farther extended towards another, than towards him; unless we be thereto obliged by covenant: and then the injustice consisteth in the violation of that covenant, and not in the inequality of distribution.

[Sidenote: It is a law of nature, that he that is trusted, turn not
that trust to the damage of him that trusteth]

6. It happeneth many times that man benefitteth, or contributeth, to the power of another, without any covenant, but only upon confidence and trust of obtaining the grace and favour of that other, whereby he may procure a greater, or no less benefit, and assistance to himself. For by necessity of nature, every man doth in all his voluntary actions intend some good unto himself. In this case it is a law of nature, _That no man suffer him, that thus trusteth to his charity, or good affection towards him, to be in the worse estate for his trusting_. For if he shall so do, men will not dare to confer mutually to each other’s defence, nor put themselves into each other’s mercy upon any terms whatsoever, but rather abide the utmost and worst event of hostility; by which general diffidence, men will not only be enforced to war, but also afraid to come so much within the danger of one another, as to make any overture of peace. But this is to be understood of those only, that confer their benefits (as I have said) upon trust only, and not for triumph or ostentation. For as when they do it upon trust, the end they aimed at, namely to be well used, is the reward; so also when they do it for ostentation, they have the reward in themselves.

[Sidenote: Ingratitude defined.]

7. But seeing in this case there passeth no covenant, the breach of this law of nature is not to be called _injury_. It hath another name, to wit, _ingratitude_.

[Sidenote: It is a law of nature, to endeavour to accommodate one
another.]

8. It is also a law of nature, _That every man do help and endeavour to accommodate each other as far as may be, without danger of their persons, and loss of their means, to maintain and defend themselves_. For seeing the causes of war and desolation proceed from those passions, by which we strive to accommodate ourselves, and to leave others as far as we can behind us, it followeth, that that passion by which we strive mutually to accommodate each other, must be the cause of peace. And this passion is that charity defined chapter IX. section 17.

[Sidenote: And that man forgive, upon caution for the future.]

9. And in this precept of nature, is included and comprehended also this, _That a man forgive and pardon him that hath done him wrong, upon his repentance and caution for the future_. For _pardon_ is peace granted to him, that, having provoked to war, demandeth it. It is not therefore charity, but fear, when a man giveth peace to him that repenteth not, nor giveth caution for maintaining thereof in the time to come. For he that repenteth not, remaineth with the affection of an enemy; as also doth he that refuseth to give caution, and consequently, is presumed not to seek after peace, but advantage. And therefore to forgive him is not commanded in this law of nature, nor is charity, but may sometime be prudence. Otherwise, not to pardon upon repentance and caution, considering men cannot abstain from provoking one another, is never to give _peace_. And that is against the general definition of the law of nature.

[Sidenote: And that revenge ought to respect the future only.]

10. And seeing the law of nature commandeth pardon, when there is repentance and caution for the future, it followeth, that the same law ordaineth, _That no revenge be taken upon the consideration only of the offence past, but of the benefit to come_; that is to say, that all revenge ought to tend to amendment, either of the person offending, or of others, by the example of his punishment; which is sufficiently apparent, in that the law of nature commandeth pardon, where the future time is secured. The same is also apparent by this, that revenge when it considereth the offence past, is nothing else, but present triumph and glory, and directeth to no end: and what is directed to no end, is therefore unprofitable; and consequently the triumph of revenge, is vain glory: and whatsoever is vain, is against reason; and to hurt one another without reason, is contrary to that, which by supposition is every man’s benefit, namely peace; and what is contrary to peace, is contrary to the law of nature.

[Sidenote: That reproach and contempt declared is against the law of
nature.]

11. And because all signs which we shew to one another of hatred and contempt, provoke in the highest degree to quarrel and battle, (inasmuch as life itself, with the condition of enduring scorn, is not esteemed worth the enjoying, much less peace) it must necessarily be implied as a law of nature, _That no man reproach, revile, deride, or any otherwise declare his hatred, contempt, or disesteem of any other_. But this law is very little practised. For what is more ordinary than reproaches of those that are rich, towards them that are not? or of those that sit in place of judicature, towards those that are accused at the bar? although to grieve them in that manner, be no part of the punishment for their crime, nor contained in their office. But use hath prevailed, that what was lawful in the lord towards the servant whom he maintaineth, is also practised as lawful in the more mighty towards the less; though they contribute nothing towards their maintenance.

[Sidenote: That indifference of commerce is of the law of nature.]

12. It is also a law of nature, _That one man allow commerce and traffic indifferently to one another_. For he that alloweth that to one man, which he denieth to another, declareth his hatred to him, to whom he denieth. And to declare hatred is war. And upon this title was grounded the great war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. For would the Athenians have condescended to suffer the Megareans, their neighbours, to traffic in their ports and markets, that war had not begun.

[Sidenote: That messengers employed to procure or maintain peace,
ought to be safe by the law of nature.]

13. And this also is a law of nature, _That all messengers of peace, and such as are employed to procure and maintain amity between man and man, may safely come and go_. For seeing peace is the general law of nature, the means thereto, such as are these men, must in the same law be comprehended.

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