Chapter X (3)

_T. H._ He has not yet found the place where I contradict either the existence, or infiniteness, or incomprehensibility, or unity, or ubiquity of God. I am therefore yet absolved of atheism. But I am, he says, inconsistent and irreconcileable with myself; that is, I am (though he says not so) he thinks, a forgetful blockhead. I cannot help that: but my forgetfulness appears not here. Even his Lordship, where he says, “those rays of heavenly light, those seeds of religion, which God himself hath imprinted in the heart of man (meaning natural reason), are more efficacious to the preservation of society, than all the _pacts, surrenders_, and _translating of power_,” had forgotten to except the old pact of the Jews, and the new pact of Christians. But pardoning that, did he hope to make any wise man believe, that when this nation very lately was an anarchy, and dissolute multitude of men, doing every one what his own reason or imprinted light suggested, they did again out of the same light call in the king, and peace again, and ask pardon for the faults, which that their illumination had brought them into, rather than out of fear of perpetual danger and hope of preservation?

_J. D._ Without religion, societies are like but soapy bubbles, quickly dissolved. It was the judgment of as wise a man as T. H. himself, though perhaps he will hardly be persuaded to it, that Rome owed more of its grandeur to religion, than either to strength or stratagems. _We have not exceeded the Spaniards in number, nor the Gauls in strength, nor the Carthaginians in craft, nor the Grecians in art, &c. but we have overcome all nations by our piety and religion._

_T. H._ Did not his Lordship forget himself here again, in approving this sentence of Tully, which makes the idolatry of the Romans, not only better than the idolatry of other nations; but also better than the religion of the Jews, whose law Christ himself says he came not to destroy but to fulfil? And that the Romans overcame both them and other nations by their piety, when it is manifest that the Romans overran the world by injustice and cruelty, and that their victories ought not to be ascribed to the piety of the Romans, but to the impiety as well of the Jews as of other nations? But what meant he by saying “Tully was as wise a man as T. H. himself, though perhaps he will hardly be persuaded to it?” Was that any part of the controversy? No: then it was out of his way. God promiseth to assist good men in their way, but not out of their way. It is therefore the less wonder that his Lordship was in this place deserted of the light, which God imprints in the hearts of rudest savages.

_J. D._ Among his laws he inserteth _gratitude_ to men as the third precept of the law of nature; but of the gratitude of mankind to their Creator, there is a deep silence. If men had sprung up from the earth in a night, like mushrooms or excrescences, without all sense of honour, justice, conscience, or gratitude, he could not have vilified the human nature more than he doth.

_T. H._ My Lord discovers here an ignorance of such method as is necessary for lawful and strict reasoning, and explication of the truth in controversy. And not only that, but also how little able he is to fix his mind upon what he reads in other men’s writings. When I had defined ingratitude universally, he finds fault that I do not mention ingratitude towards God, as if his Lordship knew not that an universal comprehends all the particulars. When I had defined equity universally, why did he not as well blame me for not telling what that equity is in God? He is grateful to the man of whom he receives a good turn, that confesseth, or maketh appear he is pleased with the benefit he receiveth. So also gratitude towards God is to confess his benefits. There is also, in gratitude towards men, a desire to requite their benefits; so there is in our gratitude towards God, so far to requite them, as to be kind to God’s ministers, which I acknowledged in making sacrifices a part of natural divine worship; and the benefit of those sacrifices is the nourishment of God’s ministers. It appears therefore, that the bishop’s attention in reading my writings, was either weak in itself, or weakened by prejudice.

_J. D._ From this shameful omission or preterition of the main duty of mankind, a man might easily take the height of T. H. his religion. But he himself putteth it past all conjectures. His principles are brim full of prodigious impiety. _In these four things, opinions of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion to what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of religion_; the culture and improvement whereof, he referreth only to _policy_. Human and divine politics, are but politics. And again, _mankind hath this from the conscience of their own weakness, and the admiration of natural events, that the most part of men believe that there is an invisible God, the maker of all visible things_. And a little after he telleth us, that _superstition proceedeth from fear without right reason, and atheism from an opinion of reason without fear_; making atheism to be more reasonable than superstition. What is now become of that divine worship which natural reason did assign unto God, the honour of existence, infiniteness, incomprehensibility, unity, ubiquity? What is now become of that dictate or precept of reason, concerning _prayers_, _thanksgivings_, _oblations_, _sacrifices_, if uncertain opinions, ignorance, fear, mistakes, the conscience of our own weakness, and the admiration of natural events, be the only seeds of religion?

He proceedeth further, that _atheism itself, though it be an erroneous opinion, and therefore a sin, yet it ought to be numbered among the sins of imprudence or ignorance_. He addeth, that _an atheist is punished not as a subject is punished by his king, because he did not observe laws: but as an enemy, by an enemy, because he would not accept laws_. His reason is, because _the atheist never submitted his will to the will of God, whom he never thought to be_. And he concludeth that man’s obligation to obey God proceedeth from his weakness, (De Cive, XV. 7: vol. II. p. 336): _Manifestum est obligationem ad prestandam ipsi_ (Deo) _obedientiam, incumbere hominibus propter imbecilitatem_. First, it is impossible that should be a sin of mere ignorance or imprudence, which is directly contrary to the light of natural reason. The laws of nature need no new promulgation, being imprinted naturally by God in the heart of man. _The law of nature was written in our hearts by the finger of God, without our assent_; or rather, _the law of nature is the assent itself_. Then if nature dictate to us that there is a God, and that this God is to be worshipped in such and such a manner, it is not possible that atheism should be a sin of mere ignorance.

Secondly, a rebellious subject is still a subject _de jure_, though not _de facto_; by right, though not by deed: and so the most cursed atheist that is, ought by right to be the subject of God, and ought to be punished not as a just enemy, but as a disloyal traitor. Which is confessed by himself: _this fourth sin_ (that is, of those who do not by word and deed confess one God, the supreme King of Kings) _in the natural kingdom of God is the crime of high treason, for it is a denial of Divine power, or atheism_. Then an atheist is a traitor to God, and punishable as a disloyal subject, not as an enemy.

Lastly, it is an absurd and dishonourable assertion, to make our obedience to God to depend upon our weakness, because we cannot help it, and not upon our gratitude, because we owe our being and preservation to him. _Who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? And who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?_ And again, _Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created_. But it were much better, or at least not so ill, to be a downright atheist, than to make God to be such a thing as he doth, and at last thrust him into the Devil’s office, to be the cause of all sin.

_T. H._ Though this bishop, as I said, had but a weak attention in reading, and little skill in examining the force of an argument, yet he knew men, and the art, without troubling their judgments, to win their assents by exciting their passions. One rule of his art was to give his reader what he would have him swallow, a part by itself, and in the nature of news, whether true or not. Knowing that the unlearned, that is most men, are content to believe, rather than be troubled with examining, therefore, a little before, he put these words, _T. H. no friend to religion_, in the margin. And in this place, before he offer at any confutation, he says my principles are brim full of _prodigious impieties_. And at the next paragraph, in the margin, he puts that _I excuse atheism_. This behaviour becomes neither a bishop, nor a Christian, nor any man that pretends to good education. Fear of invisible powers, what is it else in savage people, but the fear of somewhat they think a God? What invisible power does the reason of a savage man suggest unto him, but those phantasms of his sleep, or his distemper, which we frequently call ghosts, and the savages thought gods; so that the fear of a God, though not of the true one, to them was the beginning of religion, as the fear of the true God was the beginning of wisdom to the Jews and Christians? Ignorance of second causes made men fly to some first cause, the fear of which bred devotion and worship. The ignorance of what that power might do, made them observe the order of what he had done; that they might guess by the like order, what he was to do another time. This was their prognostication. What prodigious impiety is here? How confutes he it? Must it be taken for impiety upon his bare calumny? I said superstition was fear without reason. Is not the fear of a false God, or fancied demon, contrary to right reason? And is not atheism boldness grounded on false reasoning, such as is this, _the wicked prosper, therefore there is no God_? He offers no proof against any of this; but says only I make atheism to be more reasonable than superstition; which is not true: for I deny that there is any reason either in the atheist or in the superstitious. And because the atheist thinks he has reason, where he has none, I think him the more irrational of the two. But all this while he argues not against any of this; but enquires only, what is become of my natural worship of God, and of his existency; infiniteness, incomprehensibility, unity, and ubiquity. As if whatsoever reason can suggest, must be suggested all at once. First, all men by nature had an opinion of God’s existency; but of his other attributes not so soon, but by reasoning, and by degrees. And for the attributes of the true God, they were never suggested but by the Word of God written. In that I say atheism is a sin of ignorance, he says I excuse it. The prophet David says, _the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God_. Is it not then a sin of folly? It is agreed between us, that right reason dictates, there is a God. Does it not follow, that denying of God is a sin proceeding from misreasoning. If it be not a sin of ignorance, it must be a sin of malice. Can a man malice that which he thinks has no being? But may not one think there is a God, and yet maliciously deny him? If he think there is a God, he is no atheist; and so the question is changed into this, whether any man that thinks there is a God, dares deliberately deny it? For my part I think not. For upon what confidence dares any man, deliberately I say, oppose the Omnipotent? David saith of himself, _My feet were ready to slip when I saw the prosperity of the wicked_. Therefore it is likely the feet of men less holy slip oftener. But I think no man living is so daring, being out of passion, as to hold it as his opinion. Those wicked men that for a long time proceeded so successfully in the late horrid rebellion, may perhaps make some think they were constant and resolved atheists: but I think rather that they forgot God, than believed there was none. He that believes there is such an atheist, comes a little too near that opinion himself; nevertheless if words spoken in passion signify a denial of a God, no punishment preordained by law, can be too great for such an insolence; because there is no living in a commonwealth with men, to whose oaths we cannot reasonably give credit. As to that I say, _an atheist is punished by God not as a subject by his king, but as an enemy_; and to my argument for it, namely, _because he never acknowledged himself God’s subject_, he opposeth, that if nature dictate that there is a God, and to be worshipped in such and such manner, then atheism is not a sin of mere ignorance: as if either I or he did hold that nature dictates the manner of God’s worship, or any article of our creed, or whether to worship with or without a surplice. Secondly, he answers that a rebel is still a subject _de jure_, though not _de facto_: and it is granted. But though the king lose none of his right by the traitor’s act, yet the traitor loseth the privilege of being punished by a precedent law; and therefore may be punished at the king’s will, as Ravaillac was for murdering Henry IV of France. An open enemy and a perfidious traitor are both enemies. Had not his Lordship read in the Roman story, how Perseus and other just enemies of that state were wont to be punished? But what is this trifling question to my _excusing of atheism_? In the seventh paragraph of chapter XV. of my book _De Cive_, he found the words in Latin, which he here citeth. And to the same sense I have said in my _Leviathan_, that the right of nature whereby God reigneth over men, is to be derived not from his creating them, as if he required obedience, as of gratitude; but from his irresistible power. This he says is absurd and dishonourable. Whereas first all power is honourable, and the greatest power is most honourable. Is it not a more noble tenure for a king to hold his kingdom, and the right to punish those that transgress his laws, from his power, than from the gratitude or gift of the transgressor. There is nothing therefore here of dishonour to God Almighty. But see the subtilty of his disputing. He saw he could not catch _Leviathan_ in this place, he looks for him in my book _De Cive_, which is Latin, to try what he could fish out of that: and says I make our obedience to God, depend upon our weakness; as if these words signified the _dependence_, and not the _necessity_ of our submission, or that _incumbere_ and _dependere_ were all one.

_J. D._ For T. H. his God is not the God of Christians, nor of any rational men. Our God is every where, and seeing he hath no parts, he must be wholly here, and wholly there, and wholly every where. So nature itself dictateth. _It cannot be said honourably of God that he is in a place; for nothing is in a place, but that which hath proper bounds of its greatness._ But T. H. his God is not wholly every where. _No man can conceive that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time, for none of these things ever have or can be incident to sense._ So far well, if by _conceiving_ he mean _comprehending_; but then follows, _That these are absurd speeches taken upon credit, without any signification at all, from deceived philosophers, and deceived or deceiving Schoolmen_. Thus he denieth the ubiquity of God. A _circumscriptive_, a definitive, and a repletive being in a place, is some heathen language to him.

_T. H._ Though I believe the omnipotence of God, and that he can do what he will, yet I dare not say how every thing is done, because I cannot conceive nor comprehend either the Divine substance, or the way of its operation. And I think it impiety to speak concerning God any thing of my own head, or upon the authority of philosophers or Schoolmen, which I understand not, without warrant in the Scripture: and what I say of omnipotence, I say also of ubiquity. But his Lordship is more valiant in this place, telling us that God is _wholly here_, and _wholly there_, and _wholly every where_; because he has no parts. I cannot comprehend nor conceive this. For methinks it implies also that the whole world is also in the whole God, and in every part of God. Nor can I conceive how any thing can be called _whole_, which has no parts, nor can I find anything of this in the Scripture. If I could find it there, I could believe it; and if I could find it in the public doctrine of the Church, I could easily abstain from contradicting it. The Schoolmen say also, that the soul of man (meaning his upper soul, which they call the rational soul) is also _wholly_ in _the whole man_, and _wholly_ in _every part_ of the man. What is this, but to make the human soul the same thing in respect of man’s body, that God is in respect of the world? These his Lordship calls here rational men, and some of them which applaud this doctrine, would have the high court of parliament corroborate such doctrines with a law. I said in my _Leviathan_, that it is no honourable attribute to God, to say he is _in a place_, because infinite is not confined within a place. To which he replies, _T. H. his God is not wholly every where_. I confess the consequence. For I understand in _English_, he that says any thing to be _all here_, means that _neither all nor any of the same thing is elsewhere_. He says further, I take a _circumscriptive, a definitive, and a repletive_ being in a place to be heathen language. Truly, if this dispute were at the bar, I should go near to crave the assistance of the court, lest some trick might be put upon me in such obscurity. For though I know what these Latin words singly signify, yet I understand not how any thing is in a _place definitively_ and not _circumscriptively_. For _definitively_ comes from _definio_, which is to set bounds. And therefore to be in a place definitively, is when the bounds of the _place_ are every way marked out. But to be in a place circumscriptively, is when the bounds of the place are described round about. To be in a place repletively, is to fill a place. Who does not see that this distinction is canting and fraud? If any man will call it pious fraud, he is to prove the piety as clearly as I have here explained the fraud. Besides, no fraud can be pious in any man, but him that hath a lawful right to govern him whom he beguileth; whom the Bishop pretends to govern, I cannot tell. Besides, his Lordship ought to have considered, that every Bishop is one of the great Council, trusted by the King to give their advice with the Lords temporal, for the making of good laws, civil and ecclesiastical, and not to offer them such obscure doctrines, as if, because they are not versed in School-divinity, therefore they had no learning at all, nor understood the English tongue. Why did the divines of England contend so much heretofore to have the Bible translated into English, if they never meant any but themselves should read it? If a lay-man be publicly encouraged to search the Scriptures for his own salvation, what has a divine to do to impose upon him any strange interpretation, unless, if he make him err to damnation, he will be damned in his stead?

_J. D._ Our God is immutable without any shadow of turning by change, to whom all things are present, nothing past, nothing to come. But T. H. his God is measured by time, losing something that is past, and acquiring something that doth come every minute. That is as much as to say, that our God is infinite, and his God is finite; for unto that which is actually infinite, nothing can be added, neither time nor parts. Hear himself: _Nor do I understand what derogation it can be to the Divine perfection, to attribute to it potentiality, that is in English, power_ (so little doth he understand what potentiality is) _and successive duration_. And he chargeth it upon us as a fault, that we will not have eternity to be an _endless succession of time_. How, _successive duration, and an endless succession of time in God_? Then God is not infinite, then God is older to-day than he was yesterday. Away with blasphemies! Before, he destroyed the ubiquity of God, and now he destroyeth his eternity.

_T. H._ I shall omit both here and henceforth his preambulatory, impertinent, and uncivil calumnies. The thing he pretends to prove is this. That it is a derogation to the Divine power to attribute to it potentiality (that is in English power) and successive duration. One of his reasons is, God is infinite, and nothing can be added to infinite, neither of time nor of parts: it is true. And therefore I said, God is infinite and eternal, without beginning or end, either of time or place; which he has not here confuted, but confirmed. He denies potentiality and power to be all one, and says I little understand what potentiality is. He ought therefore in this place to have defined what potentiality is: for I understand it to be the same with _potentia_, which is in English power. There is no such word as potentiality in the Scriptures, nor in any author of the Latin tongue. It is found only in School-divinity, as a word of art, or rather as a word of craft, to amaze and puzzle the laity. And therefore I no sooner read than interpreted it. In the next place he says, as wondering: _How, an endless succession of time in God_! Why not? _God’s mercy endureth for ever_, and surely God endureth as long as his mercy; therefore there is duration in God, and consequently endless succession of time. _God who in sundry times and divers manners spake in time past_, &c. But in a former dispute with me about free-will, he hath defined eternity to be _nunc stans_, that is an _ever standing now_, or _everlasting instant_. This he thinks himself bound in honour to defend. What reasonable soul can digest this? We read in Scripture, that a thousand years with God, is but as yesterday. And why? but because he sees as clearly to the end of a thousand years, as to the end of a day. But his Lordship affirms, that both a thousand years and a day are but one instant, the same _standing now_, or eternity. If he had showed an holy text for this doctrine, or any text of the book of _Common Prayer_ (in the Scripture and book of _Common Prayer_ is contained all our religion), I had yielded to him; but School-divinity I value little or nothing at all. Though in this he contradict also the School-men, who say the soul is eternal only _a parte post_, but God is eternal both _a parte post_, and _a parte ante_. Thus there are parts in eternity; and eternity being, as his Lordship says, the Divine substance, the Divine substance has parts, and _nunc stans_ has parts. Is not this darkness? I take it to be the kingdom of darkness, and the teachers of it (especially of this doctrine, that God, who is not only _optimus_, but also _maximus_, is no greater than to be wholly contained in the least atom of earth, or other body, and that his whole duration is but an instant of time) to be either grossly ignorant or ungodly deceivers.

_J. D._ Our God is a perfect, pure, simple, indivisible, infinite essence; free from all composition of matter and form, of substance and accidents. All matter is finite, and he who acteth by his infinite essence, needeth neither organs nor faculties (_id est_, _no power, note that_), nor accidents, to render him more complete. But T. H. his God is a divisible God, a compounded God, that hath matter, or qualities, or accidents. Hear himself. I argue thus: _The Divine substance is indivisible; but eternity is the Divine substance. The major is evident, because God is_ actus simplicissimus; _the minor is confessed by all men, that whatsoever is attributed to God, is God_. Now listen to his answer: _The major is so far from being evident, that_ actus simplicissimus _signifieth nothing. The minor is said by some men, thought by no man; whatsoever is thought is understood._ The major was this, _the Divine substance is indivisible_. Is this far from being evident? Either it is indivisible, or divisible. If it be not indivisible, then it is divisible, then it is materiate, then it is corporeal, then it hath parts, then it is finite by his own confession. _Habere partes, aut esse totum aliquid, sunt attributa finitorum._ Upon this silly conceit he chargeth me for saying, that _God is not just_, but justice itself; not eternal, but eternity itself; which he calleth _unseemly words to be said of God_. And he thinketh he doth me a great courtesy in not adding _blasphemous and atheistical_. But his bolts are so soon shot, and his reasons are such vain imaginations, and such drowsy phantasies, that no sober man doth much regard them. Thus he hath already destroyed the ubiquity, the eternity, and the simplicity of God. I wish he had considered better with himself, before he had desperately cast himself upon these rocks.

But _paulo majora canamus_. My next charge is, that he destroys the very being of God, and leaves nothing in his place, but an empty name. For by taking away all incorporeal substances, he taketh away God himself. The very name, saith he, of an incorporeal substance, is a _contradiction_. And _to say that an angel or spirit, is an incorporeal substance, is to say in effect, that there is no angel or spirit at all_. By the same reason to say, that God is an incorporeal substance, is to say there is no God at all. Either God is incorporeal; or he is finite, and consists of parts, and consequently is no God. This, that there is no incorporeal spirit, is that main root of atheism, from which so many lesser branches are daily sprouting up.

_T. H._ God is indeed a perfect, pure, simple, infinite substance; and his name incommunicable, that is to say, not divisible into this and that individual God, in such manner as the name of man is divisible into Peter and John. And therefore God is individual; which word amongst the Greeks is expressed by the word indivisible. Certain heretics in the primitive church, because special and individual are called particulars, maintained that Christ was a particular God, differing in number from God the Father. And this was the doctrine that was condemned for heresy in the first council of Nice, by these words, _God hath no parts_. And yet many of the Latin fathers, in their explications of the Nicene creed, have expounded the word _consubstantial_, by the community of nature, which different species have in their genus, and different individuals in the species; as if Peter and John were _consubstantial_, because they agree in one human nature; which is contrary, I confess, to the meaning of the Nice fathers. But that in a substance infinitely great, it should be impossible to consider any thing as not infinite, I do not see it there condemned. For certainly he that thinks God is in every part of the church, does not exclude him out of the churchyard. And is not this a considering of him by parts? For dividing a thing which we cannot reach nor separate one part thereof from another, is nothing else but considering of the same by parts. So much concerning indivisibility from natural reason; for I will wade no further, but rely upon the Scriptures. God is nowhere said in the Scriptures to be indivisible, unless his Lordship meant division to consist only in separation of parts, which I think he did not. St. Paul indeed saith (1 Cor. i. 13): _Is Christ divided?_ Not that the followers of Paul, Apollos, and Cephas, followed some one part, some another of Christ; but that thinking differently of his nature, they made as it were different kinds of him. Secondly, his Lordship expounds simplicity, by not being compounded of matter and form, or of substance and accidents, unlearnedly. For nothing can be so compounded. The matter of a _chair_ is _wood_; the form is the figure it hath, apt for the intended use. Does his Lordship think the chair compounded of the wood and the figure? A man is rational: does it therefore follow that reason is a part of the man? It was Aristotle deceived him, who told him that _a rational living creature_, is the definition of a man, and that the definition of a man was his essence; and therefore the Bishop and other Schoolmen, from this that the word rational is a part of these words, _man is a rational living creature_, concluded that the essence of man was a part of the man, and a _rational man_ the same thing with a rational soul. I should wonder how any man, much more a doctor of divinity, should be so grossly deceived, but that I know naturally the generality of men speak the words of their masters by rote, without having any ideas of the things, which the words signify. Lastly, he calls God an _essence_. If he mean by _essence_ the same with _ens_, τὸ ὄν, I approve it. Otherwise, what is _essence_? There is no such word in the Old Testament. The Hebrew language, which has no word answerable to the copulative _est_, will not bear it. The New Testament hath οὐσία, but never for _essence_, nor for _substance_, but only for riches. I come now to his argument in mood and figure, which is this, _the Divine substance is indivisible_. That is the _major_. _Eternity is the Divine substance._ That is the _minor_. _Ergo_, the Divine substance is indivisible. The major, he says, is evident, because God is _actus simplicissimus_. The minor is confessed, he thinks, by all men, because whatsoever is attributed to God, is God. To this I answered, that the major was so far from being evident, that _actus simplicissimus_ signifieth nothing, and that the minor was understood by no man. First, what is _actus_ in the _major_? Does any man understand _actus_ for a substance, that is, for a thing subsisting by itself? Is not _actus_, in English, either an _act_ or an _action_, or nothing? Or is any of these _substance_? If it be evident, why did he not explain _actus_ by a definition? And as to the minor, though all men in the world understand that the _Eternal_ is God, yet no man can understand that the _eternity_ is God. Perhaps he and the Schoolmen mean by _actus_, the same that they do by _essentia_. What is the _essence_ of a _man_, but his _humanity_; or of God, but his _Deity_; of _great_, but _greatness_; and so of all other denominating attributes? And the words, God and Deity, are of different signification. John Damascene, a father of the church, expounding the Nicene creed, denies plainly that the Deity was incarnate; but all true Christians hold that God was incarnate. Therefore God and the Deity signify divers things; and therefore _eternal_ and _eternity_ are not the same, no more than a wise man and his wisdom are the same; nor God and his justice the same thing: and universally it is false, that the attribute in the abstract is the same with the substance, to which it is attributed. Also it is universally true of God, that the attribute in the concrete, and the substance to which it is attributed, is not the same thing.

I come now to his next period or paragraph, wherein he would fain prove, that by denying incorporeal substance, I take away God’s existence. The words he cites here are mine: _to say an angel or spirit is an incorporeal substance, is to say in effect there is no angel nor spirit at all_. It is true also, that to say that God is an incorporeal substance, is to say in effect there is no God at all. What alleges he against it, but the School-divinity which I have already answered? Scripture he can bring none, because the word incorporeal is not found in Scripture. But the Bishop, trusting to his Aristotelian and Scholastic learning, hath hitherto made no use of Scripture, save only of these texts: 1 Cor. ix. 7: _Who hath planted a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof; or who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?_ and Rev. iv. 11: _Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, honour, and power: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they were created_: thereby to prove that the right of God to govern and punish mankind is not derived from his omnipotence. Let us now see how he proves incorporeity by his own reason without Scripture. _Either God_, he saith, _is incorporeal or finite_. He knows I deny both, and say he is _corporeal_ and _infinite_: against which he offers no proof, but only, according to his custom of disputing, calls it the root of atheism; and interrogates me, what real thing is left in the world, if God be incorporeal, but body and accidents? I say there is nothing left but corporeal substance. For I have denied, as he knew, that there is any reality in accidents; and nevertheless maintain God’s existence, and that he is a most pure, and most simple corporeal spirit. Here his Lordship catching nothing, removes to the eternity of the Trinity, which these my grounds, he says, destroy. How so? I say the Trinity, and the persons thereof, are that one pure, simple, and eternal corporeal spirit; and why does this destroy the Trinity, more than if I had called it incorporeal? He labours here and seeketh somewhat to refresh himself in the word _person_; _by the same grounds_, he saith, _every king hath as many persons as there be justices of peace in his kingdom, and God Almighty hath as many persons as there be kings_. Why not? For I never said that all those kings were that God; and yet God giveth that name to the kings of the earth. For the signification of the word _person_, I shall expound it by and by in another place. Here ends his Lordship’s School-argument; now let me come with my Scripture-argument. St. Paul, concerning Christ (Col. ii. 9) saith thus: _In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily_. This place Athanasius, a great and zealous doctor in the Nicene Council, and vehement enemy of Arius the heretic, who allowed Christ to be no otherwise God, than as men of excellent piety were so called, expoundeth thus: _The fulness of the Godhead dwelleth in him bodily_, (Greek σωματικῶς), _id est_ θεϊκῶς, _id est, realiter_. So there is one Father for corporality, and that God was in Christ in such manner as body is in body. Again, there were in the primitive church a sort of heretics who maintained that Jesus Christ had not a true real body, but was only a phantasm or spright, such as the Latins call _spectra_. Against the head of this sect, whose name I think was Apelles, Tertullian wrote a book, now extant amongst his other works, intituled _De Carne Christi_; wherein after he had spoken of the nature of phantasms, and showed that they had nothing of reality in them, he concludeth with these words, “whatsoever is not _body_, is _nothing_.” So here is on my side a plain text of Scripture, and two ancient and learned Fathers. Nor was this doctrine of Tertullian condemned in the Council of Nice; but the division of the divine substance into God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. For these words, _God has no parts_, were added, for explication of the word _consubstantial_, at the request of the dissenting Fathers, and are further explained both in Athanasius his creed, in these words, _not three Gods but one God_, and by the constant attribute ever since of the _individual_ Trinity. The same words nevertheless do condemn the Anthropomorphites also; for though there appeared no Christians that professed that God had an organical body, and consequently that the persons were three individuals, yet the Gentiles were all Anthropomorphites, and there condemned by these words, _God has no parts_.

And thus I have answered his accusation concerning the eternity and existence of the Divine substance, and made it appear that in truth, the question between us, is whether God be a phantasm (_id est_, an idol of the fancy, which St. Paul saith is nothing) or a corporeal spirit, that is to say, something that has magnitude.

In this place I think it not amiss, leaving for a little while this theological dispute, to examine the signification of those words which have occasioned so much diversity of opinion in this kind of doctrine.

The word _substance_, in Greek ὑπόστασις, ὑποσταν, ὑποσταμενον, signify the same thing, namely, a ground, a base, any thing that has existence or subsistence _in itself_, anything that upholdeth that which else would fall, in which sense God is properly the hypostasis, base, and substance that upholdeth all the world, having subsistence not only _in himself_, but _from himself_; whereas other substances have their subsistence only in themselves, not from themselves. But metaphorically, faith is called (Heb. xi. 1) a substance, because it is the foundation or base of our hope; for faith failing, our hope falls. And (2 Cor. ix. 4) St. Paul having boasted of the liberal promise of the Corinthians towards the Macedonians, calls that promise the ground, the hypostasis of that his boasting. And (Heb. i. 3) Christ is called the image of the substance (the hypostasis) of his Father, and for the proper and adequate signification of the word hypostasis, the Greek Fathers did always oppose it to apparition or phantasm; as when a man seeth his face in the water, his real face is called the hypostasis of the phantastic face in the water. So also in speaking, the thing understood or named is called hypostasis, in respect of the name; so also a body coloured is the hypostasis, substance and subject of the colour; and in like manner of all its other accidents. Essence and all other abstract names, are words artificial belonging to the art of logic, and signify only the manner how we consider the substance itself. And of this I have spoken sufficiently in my _Leviathan_ (vol. III. page 672). _Body_ (Latin, _corpus_, σῶμα) is that substance which hath magnitude indeterminate, and is the same with corporeal substance; but _a body_ is that which hath magnitude determinate, and consequently is understood to be _totum_ or _integrum aliquid_. _Pure_ and _simple body_, is body of one and the same kind, in every part throughout; and if mingled with body of another kind, though the total be compounded or mixed, the parts nevertheless retain their simplicity, as when water and wine are mixed, the parts of both kinds retain their simplicity. For water and wine can not both be in one and the same place at once.

_Matter_ is the same with _body_; but never without respect to a body which is made thereof. _Form_ is the aggregate of all accidents together, for which we give the matter a new name; so _albedo_, _whiteness_, is the form of _album_, or _white body_. So also humanity is the essence of man, and Deity the essence of Deus.

Spirit is thin, fluid, transparent, invisible body. The word in Latin signifies breath, air, wind, and the like. In Greek πνεῡμα from πνέω, _spiro_, _flo_.

I have seen, and so have many more, two waters, one of the river, the other a mineral water, so like that no man could discern the one from the other by his sight; yet when they have been both put together, the whole substance could not by the eye be distinguished from milk. Yet we know that the one was not mixed with the other, so as every part of the one to be in every part of the other, for that is impossible, unless two bodies can be in the same place. How then could the change be made in every part, but only by the activity of the mineral water, changing it every where to the sense, and yet not being every where, and in every part of the water? If then such gross bodies have so great activity, what shall we think of spirits, whose kinds be as many as there be kinds of liquor, and activity greater? Can it then be doubted, but that God, who is an infinitely fine Spirit, and withal intelligent, can make and change all species and kinds of body as he pleaseth? But I dare not say, that this is the way by which God Almighty worketh, because it is past my apprehension: yet it serves very well to demonstrate, that the omnipotence of God implieth no contradiction; and is better than by pretence of magnifying the fineness of the Divine substance, to reduce it to a spright or phantasm, which is nothing.

A _person_ (Latin, _persona_) signifies an intelligent substance, that acteth any thing in his own or another’s name, or by his own or another’s authority. Of this definition there can be no other proof than from the use of that word, in such Latin authors as were esteemed the most skilful in their own language, of which number was Cicero. But Cicero, in an epistle to Atticus, saith thus: _Unus sustineo tres personas, mei, adversarii, et judicis_: that is, “I that am but one man, sustain three persons; mine own person, the person of my adversary, and the person of the judge.” Cicero was here the substance intelligent, one man; and because he pleaded for himself, he calls himself his own person: and again, because he pleaded for his adversary, he says, he sustained the person of his adversary: and lastly, because he himself gave the sentence, he says, he sustained the person of the judge. In the same sense we use the word in English vulgarly, calling him that acteth by his own authority, his own person, and him that acteth by the authority of another, the person of that other. And thus we have the exact meaning of the word _person_. The Greek tongue cannot render it; for πρὸσωπον is properly a face, and, metaphorically, a vizard of an actor upon the stage. How then did the Greek Fathers render the word _person_, as it is in the blessed Trinity? Not well. Instead of the word _person_ they put _hypostasis_, which signifies substance; from whence it might be inferred, that the three persons in the Trinity are three Divine substances, that is, three Gods. The word πρὸσωπον they could not use, because face and vizard are neither of them honourable attributes of God, nor explicative of the meaning of the Greek church. Therefore the Latin (and consequently the English) church, renders _hypostasis_ every where in Athanasius his creed by _person_. But the word _hypostatical union_ is rightly retained and used by divines, as being the union of two hypostases, that is, of two substances or natures in the person of Christ. But seeing they also hold the soul of our Saviour to be a substance, which, though separated from his body, subsisted nevertheless in itself, and consequently, before it was separated from his body upon the cross, was a distinct nature from his body, how will they avoid this objection, that then Christ had three natures, three hypostases, without granting, that _his resurrection was a new vivification, and not a return of his soul out of Heaven into the grave_? The contrary is not determined by the church. Thus far in explication of the words that occur in this controversy. Now I return again to his Lordship’s discourse.

_J. D._ When they have taken away all incorporeal spirits, what do they leave God himself to be? He who is the fountain of all being, from whom and in whom all creatures have their being, must needs have a real being of his own. And what real being can God have among bodies and accidents? For they have left nothing else in the universe. Then T. H. may move the same question of God, which he did of devils. _I would gladly know in what classes of entities, the Bishop ranketh God?_ Infinite being and participated being are not of the same nature. Yet to speak according to human apprehension, (apprehension and comprehension differ much: T. H. confesseth that natural reason doth dictate to us, that God is infinite, yet natural reason cannot comprehend the infiniteness of God) I place him among incorporeal substances or spirits, because he hath been pleased to place himself in that rank, _God is a Spirit_. Of which place T. H. giveth his opinion, that it is unintelligible, and all others of the same nature, _and fall not under human understanding_.

They who deny all incorporeal substances, can understand nothing by God, but either nature, (not _naturam naturantem_, that is, a real author of nature, but _naturam naturatam_, that is, the orderly concourse of natural causes, as T. H. seemeth to intimate,) or a fiction of the brain, without real being, cherished for advantage and politic ends, as a profitable error, howsoever dignified with the glorious title of _the eternal cause of all things_.

_T. H._ To his Lordship’s question here: _What I leave God to be?_ I answer, I leave him to be a most pure, simple, invisible spirit corporeal. By corporeal I mean a substance that has magnitude, and so mean all learned men, divines and others, though perhaps there be some common people so rude as to call nothing body, but what they can see and feel. To his second question: _What real being He can have amongst bodies and accidents?_ I answer, the being of a spirit, not of a spright. If I should ask any the most subtile distinguisher, what middle nature there were between an infinitely subtile substance, and a mere thought or phantasm, by what name could he call it? He might call it perhaps an incorporeal substance; and so _incorporeal_ shall pass for a middle nature between _infinitely subtile_ and _nothing_, and be less subtile than infinitely subtile, and yet more subtile than a thought. It is granted, he says, that the nature of God is incomprehensible. Doth it therefore follow, that we may give to the Divine substance what negative name we please? Because he says, the whole Divine substance is here and there and every where throughout the world, and that the soul of a man is here and there and every where throughout man’s body; must we therefore take it for a mystery of Christian religion, upon his or any other Schoolman’s word, without the Scripture, which calls nothing a mystery but the incarnation of the eternal God? Or is incorporeal a mystery, when not at all mentioned in the Bible, but to the contrary it is written, _That the fulness of the Deity was bodily in Christ_? When the nature of the thing is incomprehensible, I can acquiesce in the Scripture: but when the signification of words is incomprehensible, I cannot acquiesce in the authority of a Schoolman.

_J. D._ We have seen what his principles are concerning the Deity, they are full as bad or worse concerning the Trinity. Hear himself: _A person is he that is represented as often as he is represented. And therefore God who has been represented, that is personated thrice, may properly enough be said to be three persons, though neither the word Person nor Trinity be ascribed to him in the Bible._ And a little after: _To conclude, the doctrine of the Trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance this, that the God who is always one and the same, was the person represented by Moses, the person represented by his Son incarnate, and the person represented by the apostles. As represented by the apostles, the holy spirit by which they spake is God. As represented by his Son, that was God and man, the Son is that God. As represented by Moses and the High-priests, the Father, that is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God. From whence we may gather the reason why those names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the signification of the Godhead, are never used in the Old Testament. For they are persons, that is, they have their names from representing, which could not be till divers persons had represented God, in ruling or in directing under him._

Who is so bold as blind Bayard? The emblem of a little boy attempting to lade all the water out of the sea with a cockle-shell, doth fit T. H. as exactly as if it had been shaped for him, who thinketh to measure the profound and inscrutable mysteries of religion, by his own silly, shallow conceits. What is now become of the great adorable mystery of the blessed undivided Trinity? It is shrunk into nothing. Upon his grounds there was a time when there was no Trinity: and we must blot these words out of our creed, _the Father eternal, the Son eternal, and the Holy Ghost eternal_: and these other words out of our Bibles, _Let us make man after our image_: unless we mean that this was a consultation of God with Moses and the apostles. What is now become of the eternal generation of the Son of God, if this sonship did not begin until about four thousand years after the creation were expired? Upon these grounds every king hath as many _persons_, as there be justices of peace and petty constables in his kingdom. Upon this account God Almighty hath as many _persons_, as there have been sovereign princes in the world since Adam. According to this reckoning each one of us, like so many Geryons, may have as many _persons_ as we please to make procurations. Such bold presumption requireth another manner of confutation.