Chapter X (2)

The intention of the _law_ is not to grieve the _delinquent_, for that which is past, and not to be undone; but to make him and others _just_, that else would not be so, and respecteth not the evil act _past_, but the _good to come_; insomuch as without the good intention for the future, no past act of a delinquent could justify his killing in the sight of God. But you will say, how is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what were done were _necessary_? To this I answer, that men are justly killed, not for that their _actions_ are not _necessitated_, but because they are _noxious_, and they are spared and preserved whose actions are not noxious. For where there is no law, there no killing nor anything else can be unjust; and by the right of nature, we destroy, without being unjust, all that is noxious, both beasts and men; and for beasts we kill them justly, when we do it in order to our own preservation, and yet my Lord himself confesseth, that their actions, as being only _spontaneous_, and not _free_, are all _necessitated_ and determined to that one thing they shall do. For men, when we make societies or commonwealths, we lay not down our right to kill, excepting in certain cases, as murder, theft or other offensive action; so that the right, which the _commonwealth_ hath to put a man to death for crimes, is not created by the _law_, but remains from the first right of _nature_, which every man hath to preserve himself; for that the law doth not take the right away in the case of criminals, who were by the law excepted. Men are not therefore put to death, or punished, for that their theft proceedeth from _election_; but because it was _noxious_ and contrary to men’s preservation, and the punishment conducing to the preservation of the rest, inasmuch as to punish those that do voluntary hurt, and none else, frameth and maketh men’s _wills_ such as men would have them. And thus it is plain, that from the _necessity_ of a _voluntary_ action, cannot be inferred the _injustice_ of the _law_ that forbiddeth it, or the magistrate that punisheth it.

Secondly, I deny that it maketh _consultations_ to be in _vain_; it is the _consultation_ that _causeth_ a man, and _necessitateth_ him to _choose_ to do one thing rather than another: so that unless a man say that that cause is in vain which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding from it. But it seemeth his Lordship reasons thus: If I must do this rather than that, I shall do this rather than that, though I consult not at all; which is a false proposition and a false consequence, and no better than this: If I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to-day. If there be a _necessity_ that an action shall be done, or that any effect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing necessarily requisite as a means to bring it to pass; and therefore when it is determined, that one thing shall be chosen before another, it is determined also for what _cause_ it shall so be chosen, which cause, for the most part, is _deliberation_ or _consultation_, and therefore consultation is not in vain, and indeed the less in vain by how much the election is more necessitated, if _more_ and _less_ had any place in _necessity_.

The same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience, namely, that _admonitions_ are in _vain_; for the admonitions are parts of consultation, the admonitor being a counsellor for the time to him that is admonished.

The fourth pretended inconvenience is, that _praise_, _dispraise_, _reward_, and _punishment_ will be in _vain_. To which I answer, that for _praise_ and _dispraise_, they depend not at all on the _necessity_ of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else to _praise_, but to say a thing is good? Good, I say, for me, or for somebody else, or for the state and commonwealth? And what is it to say an action is good, but to say it is as I would wish? or as another would have it, or according to the will of the state? that is to say, according to the law. Does my Lord think that no action can please me, or him, or the commonwealth, that should proceed from _necessity_? Things may be therefore _necessary_, and yet _praise-worthy_, as also _necessary_, and yet _dispraised_, and neither of them both in vain, because _praise_ and _dispraise_, and likewise _reward_ and _punishment_, do by example make and conform the will to good and evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion, that Velleius Paterculus (Lib. ii. 35) gives Cato, where he says that he was good by _nature_, _et quia aliter esse non potuit_.

To the fifth and sixth inconveniences, that _counsels_, _arts_, _arms_, _instruments_, _books_, _study_, _medicines_, and the like, would be _superfluous_, the same answer serves as to the former, that is to say, that this consequence, _if the effect shall necessarily come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its causes_, is a false one, and those things named counsels, arts, arms, &c. are the causes of these effects.

His Lordship’s _third_ argument consisteth in other _inconveniences_, which he saith will follow, namely, _impiety_ and _negligence_ of religious duties, as repentance, and _zeal_ to God’s service, &c.

To which I answer as to the rest, that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the greatest part of mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth, or preferment, or whom the appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth of things: I must, I say, confess that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety; and therefore if his Lordship had not desired this answer, I should not have written it, nor do I write it but in hopes your Lordship and his will keep it private. Nevertheless in very truth, the _necessity_ of events does not of itself draw with it any _impiety_ at all. For _piety_ consisteth only in _two_ things; one, that we honour God in our hearts, which is, that we think as highly of his _power_ as we can, for to honour anything is nothing else but to think it to be of great power; the other is, that we signify that honour and esteem by our words and actions, which is called _cultus_, or _worship of God_. He therefore that thinketh that all things proceed from God’s _eternal will_, and consequently are _necessary_, does he not think God _omnipotent_? Does he not esteem of his _power_ as highly as is possible? which is to honour God as much as may be in his heart. Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by _external_ acts and words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? yet is this external acknowledgment the same thing which we call _worship_. So that this opinion fortifies _piety_ in both kinds, external and internal; therefore is far from destroying it. And for _repentance_, which is nothing else but a glad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out of the way; though the cause that made him go astray were necessary, yet there is no reason why he should not grieve; and, again though the cause why he returned into the way were necessary, there remained still the causes of joy. So that the _necessity_ of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of _repentance_, grief for the error, and joy for returning.

And for _prayer_, whereas he saith that the _necessity_ of things destroy _prayer_, I deny it; for though _prayer_ be none of the _causes_ that _move_ God’s _will_, his will being unchangeable, yet since we find in God’s word, he will not give his blessings but to those that ask, the motive of prayer is the same. _Prayer_ is the gift of God no less than the _blessing_, and the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed. It is manifest that _thanksgiving_ is no cause of the blessing past, and that which is past is sure and necessary, yet even amongst men thanks is in use as an acknowledgment of the benefit past, though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God Almighty is but thanksgiving for God’s blessings in general, and though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause or means of it, but a signification that we expect nothing but from God, in such manner, as he, not as we, will; and our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray, _thy will_, not our will, _be done_, and by example teaches us the same; for he prayed thus, _Father if it be thy will, let this cup pass_, &c. The end of prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not to _move_ but to _honour_ God Almighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by him only.

_The fourth argument from reason is this: the order, beauty, and perfection of the world requireth that in the universe should be agents of all sorts; some necessary, some free, some contingent. He that shall make all things necessary, or all things free, or all things contingent, doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world._

In which argument I observe, first a _contradiction_; for seeing he that _maketh_ anything, in that he maketh it, maketh it to be _necessary_; it followeth that he that maketh all things, maketh all things necessarily to be: as if a workman make a garment, the garment must necessarily be; so if God make every thing, every thing must necessarily be. Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth, though we know it not, that some agents should work without deliberation (which his lordship calls _necessary_ agents) and some agents with deliberation (and those both he and I call _free_ agents) and that some agents should work, and we not know how (and their effects we both call _contingents_); but this hinders not but that he that electeth may have his _election_ necessarily determined to _one_ by _former_ causes, and that which is _contingent_, and imputed to fortune, be nevertheless _necessary_ and depend on _precedent_ necessary causes. For by _contingent_, men do not mean that which hath _no_ cause, but that which hath not for cause anything that we perceive; as for example, when a traveller meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause sufficient to produce it; but because the journey caused not the rain, nor the rain the journey, we say they were contingent one to another. And thus you see that though there be three sorts of events, _necessary_, _contingent_, and _free_, yet they may be _all_ necessary without destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe.

To the first argument from reason, which is, _That if liberty be taken away, the nature and formal reason of sin is taken away_; I answer by denying the consequence: the nature of sin consisteth in this, that the _action_ done proceed from our _will_ and be against the _law_. A judge in judging whether it be sin or no, which is done against the law, looks at no higher cause of the action, than the will of the doer. Now when I say the action was _necessary_, I do not say it was done _against_ the will of the doer, but _with_ his will, and _necessarily_, because man’s will, that is every volition or act of the will and purpose of man had a _sufficient_, and therefore a _necessary_ cause, and consequently every _voluntary_ action was _necessitated_. An action therefore may be _voluntary_ and a _sin_, and nevertheless be _necessary_; and because God may afflict by a right derived from his _omnipotence_, though sin were not, and because the example of punishment on voluntary sinners, is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less frequent, for God to punish such sinners, as I have said before, is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his Lordship’s objections both out of Scripture, and from reason.

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CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS, WHICH HIS LORDSHIP SUPPOSING
MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO EVADE HIS
ARGUMENTS, ARE BY HIM REMOVED.

He says a man may perhaps answer, that the _necessity_ of things held by him, is not a _stoical_ necessity, but a _Christian_ necessity, &c. But this _distinction_ I have not used, nor indeed ever heard before, nor could I think any man could make _stoical_ and _Christian_ two kinds of _necessity_, though they may be two kinds of _doctrine_. Nor have I drawn my answer to his Lordship’s arguments from the authority of any sect, but from the nature of the things themselves.

But here I must take notice of certain words of his Lordship’s in this place, as making against his own tenet. _Where all the causes_, saith he, _being joined together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one total cause, if any one cause, much more the first, in the whole series or subordination of causes, be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt maketh the effect necessary_. For that which I call the _necessary_ cause of any effect, is the _joining_ together of all causes subordinate to the first, into one total cause. _If any of these_, saith he, _especially the first, produce its effect necessarily, then all the rest_ are determined. Now it is manifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it, and therefore by his Lordship’s own reason all effects are necessary.

Nor is that distinction of necessary in respect of the _first cause_, and necessary in respect of _second causes_, mine; it does, as his Lordship well notes, imply a contradiction. But the distinction of _free_ into _free from compulsion_, and _free from necessitation_, I acknowledge. For to be _free from compulsion_ is to do a thing so as _terror_ be not the cause of his _will_ to do it; for a man is then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to it: as when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed. Thus all men that do anything for _love_, or _revenge_, or _lust_, are _free from compulsion_, and yet their actions may be as necessary as those that are done by compulsion; for sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear. But _free from necessitation_, I say, no man can be, and it is that which his Lordship undertook to disprove.

This _distinction_, his Lordship says, uses to be _fortified_ by two reasons, but they are not mine. The first he says, is, that it is granted by all divines, that an _hypothetical necessity_, or necessity upon supposition, may stand with _liberty_. That you may understand this, I will give you an example of _hypothetical necessity_. If _I shall live, I shall eat_. This is an _hypothetical necessity_. Indeed it is a necessary proposition, that is to say, it is necessary that that proposition should be true whensoever uttered, but it is not the necessity of the thing, nor is it therefore necessary that the man should live, nor that the man should eat. I do not use to _fortify_ my distinctions with such reasons; let his Lordship confute them how he will, it contents me; but I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how easy and plain a thing, but withal false, with the grave usage of such terms as _hypothetical necessity_, and _necessity_ upon _supposition_, and such like terms of Schoolmen, may be obscured and made to seem _profound learning_.

The second reason that may confirm the distinction of _free from compulsion_, and _free from necessitation_, he says is, that God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we. This reason, though I had no need of, yet I think it so far forth good, as it is true that God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are free; but because I find not in the articles of our faith, nor in the decrees of our church, set down in what manner I am to conceive God and good angels to work by necessity, or in what sense they work _freely_, I suspend my sentence in that point, and am content that there be a _freedom from compulsion_, and yet no _freedom from necessitation_, as hath been proved, in that a man may be necessitated to some action without threats and without fear of danger. But how my Lord can avoid the consisting together of _freedom_ and _necessity_, supposing God and good angels are freer than men, and yet do good necessarily, that we must examine: _I confess_, saith he, _that God and good angels are more free than we, that is, intensively in degree of freedom, not extensively in the latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise not of specification_.

Again, we have here two distinctions that are no distinctions, but made to seem so by terms invented by I know not whom to cover ignorance, and blind the understanding of the reader: for it cannot be conceived that there is any liberty greater, than for a man to do what he will. One heat may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than another; he that can do what he will, hath all liberty possible, and he that cannot, hath none at all. Also _liberty_, as his Lordship says the Schools call it, of _exercise_, which is as I have said before, a liberty to do or not to do, cannot be without a _liberty_, which they call, of _specification_, that is to say, a liberty to do, or not to do this or that in particular. For how can a man conceive he hath liberty to do anything, that hath not liberty to do this, or that, or somewhat in particular? If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this, and that, and every other particular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than he that hath no licence at all? You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the _Schools_, and I do not doubt but that the imposing of them, by authority of _doctors_ in the _Church_, hath been a great cause that men have laboured, though by sedition and evil courses, to shake them off; for nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannizing over men’s reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the Scriptures, but by the pretence of learning, and more judgment than that of other men.

In the next place his Lordship bringeth two arguments against distinguishing between _free from compulsion_ and _free from necessitation_.

The first is, that _election_ is opposite not only to _coaction_ or _compulsion_, but also _necessitation_ or determination to one. This is it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new argument to prove it; and to those brought formerly, I have already answered. And in this place I deny again, that election is opposite to either; for when a man is compelled, for example, to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he hath still election left him, and a deliberation to bethink which of the two he can better endure. And he that is led to prison by force, hath election, and may deliberate whether he will be hauled and trained on the ground, or make use of his own feet: likewise when there is no _compulsion_, but the strength of _temptation_ to do an evil action, being greater than the motives to _abstain_, it necessarily determines him to the doing of it; yet he deliberates while sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear, are working on him, and consequently he _electeth_ which he will. But commonly when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge _necessity_; but when we see not, or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not _causes_ but _liberty_ that produceth the action. Hence it is that they think he does not choose this, that of necessity chooses it; but they might as well say, fire doth not burn, because it burns of necessity.

The second argument is not so much an argument as a distinction, to show in what sense it may be said that _voluntary_ actions are _necessitated_, and in what sense not. And therefore his Lordship allegeth, as from the authority of the _Schools_, and that which rippeth up the bottom of the _question_, that there is a double act of the _will_. The one, he says, is _actus imperatus_, an act done at the command of the will, by some inferior faculty of the soul; as to open or shut one’s eyes; and this act may be compelled: the other, he says, is _actus elicitus_, an act allured or drawn forth by allurement out of the will, as to _will_, to _choose_, to _elect_; this he says cannot be compelled. Wherein, letting pass that metaphorical speech of attributing command and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family within themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of a question, you may observe, first, that to compel a _voluntary_ act, is nothing else but to will it; for it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of my eyes, or the doing of any other action; and to say, I have the will to shut my eyes: so that _actus imperatus_, here, might as easily have been said in English a _voluntary action_, but that they that invented the term, understood not anything it signified.

Secondly, you may observe, that _actus elicitus_, is exemplified by these words, to _will_, to _elect_, to _choose_, which are all one, and so to will is here made an act of the will; and indeed as the will is a faculty or power in a man’s soul, so to will is an act of it according to that power; but as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; so is it also to say, that to will is an act allured or drawn out of the power to will, which power is commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the sum of his Lordship’s distinction is, that a _voluntary_ act may be done by _compulsion_, that is to say, by foul means, but to will that, or any act, cannot be but by _allurement_, or fair means. Now seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements, produce the action which they do produce, as _necessarily_ as foul means and threatening; it follows, that to _will_ may be made as _necessary_ as anything that is done by _compulsion_. So that distinction of _actus imperatus_ and _actus elicitus_ are but words, and of no effect against necessity.

His Lordship in the rest of his discourse, reckoneth up the opinion of certain professions of men, touching the causes wherein the necessity of things, which they maintain, consisteth. And first he saith, the _astrologer_ deriveth his _necessity_ from the _stars_; secondly, that the _physician_ attributeth it to the _temper_ of the body. For my part, I am not of their opinion, because, neither the stars alone, nor the temperature of the patient alone, is able to produce any effect, without the concurrence of all other agents. For there is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is _in rerum naturâ_, which because it is a great paradox, and depends on many antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place. Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them that say, _external objects_ presented to men of such and such temperatures, do make their actions _necessary_; and says, the power such objections have over us, proceeds from our own fault: but that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power, and therefore that opinion may hold true for all that answer.

Further he says, _prayer_, _fasting_, &c. may alter our _habits_; it is true, but when they do so, they are _causes_ of the contrary _habit_, and make it _necessary_, as the former habit had been necessary, if _prayer_, _fasting_, &c. had not been. Besides, we are not moved or disposed to prayer or any other action, but by outward objects, as pious company, godly preachers, or something equivalent. Fourthly, he says a resolved mind is not easily surprised, as the mind of Ulysses, who when others wept, alone wept not; and of the philosopher, that abstained from striking, because he found himself angry; and of him that poured out the water when he was thirsty, and the like. Such things I confess have, or may have been done, and do prove only that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to weep, nor for that philosopher to strike, nor for that other man to drink; but it does not prove that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to abstain, as he did, from weeping, nor for the philosopher to abstain, as he did, from striking, nor for the other man to forbear drinking, and yet that was the thing his Lordship ought to have proved. Lastly his Lordship confesses, that the _dispositions_ of objects may be _dangerous_ to _liberty_, but cannot be _destructive_. To which I answer, it is impossible: for _liberty_ is never in any other danger than to be lost; and if it cannot be lost, which he confesses, I may infer, it can be in no danger at all.

The fourth opinion his Lordship rejecteth, is of them that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding; but it seems his Lordship understands that tenet in another sense than I do; for he speaketh as if they that held it, did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every action they do, great and small, to the least grain; which is a thing his Lordship, with reason, thinks untrue. But I understand it to signify, that the _will_ follows the _last_ opinion or _judgment_ immediately preceding the _action_, concerning whether it be good to do it or not, whether he have weighed it long before, or not at all, and that I take to be the meaning of them that hold it. As for example, when a man strikes, his will to strike follows necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroke, immediately before the lifting up of his hand. Now if it be understood in that sense, the _last_ dictate of the understanding does _necessitate_ the _action_, though not as the whole cause, yet as the last cause, as the last feather necessitates the breaking of a horse’s back, when there are so many laid on before, as there needed but the addition of one to make the weight sufficient.

That which his Lordship allegeth against this, is first, out of a poet, who in the person of Medea says,

“Video meliora, proboque,
Deteriora sequor.”

But that saying, as pretty as it is, is not true; for though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her children, yet the last dictate of her judgment was, that the present revenge on her husband outweighed them all, and thereupon the wicked action _necessarily_ followed. Then the story of the Roman, who of two competitors, said, one had the better reason, but the other must have the office. This also maketh against his Lordship, for the last dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing of the office, was this, that it was better to take a great bribe, than reward a great merit.

Thirdly, he objects that things nearer the sense, move more powerfully than reason; what followeth thence but this, the sense of the present good is commonly more immediate to the action, than the foresight of the evil consequence to come? Fourthly, whereas his Lordship says, that do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his son than for the sin of his soul, makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding; but it argues plainly, that sorrow for sin is not _voluntary_, and by consequence, that _repentance_ proceedeth from causes.

The last part of this discourse containeth his Lordship’s opinions about reconciling _liberty_ with the _prescience_ and _decrees_ of God, otherwise than some _divines_ have done, against whom, he says, he had formerly written a treatise, out of which he repeateth only two things: one is, _That we ought not to desert a certain truth, for not being able to comprehend the certain manner of it_. And I say the same, as for example, that his Lordship ought not to desert this certain truth, _that there are certain and_ necessary causes _which make every man to_ will _what he willeth, though he do not_ yet conceive in what manner the _will_ of man is _caused_. And yet I think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive, seeing we see daily, that _praise_, _dispraise_, _reward_, and _punishment_, _good_ and _evil_, sequels of men’s _actions_ retained in _memory_, do frame and make us to the _election_ of whatsoever it be that we elect, and that the memory of such things proceeds from the _senses_, and _sense_ from the operation of the objects of sense, which are external to us, and governed only by God Almighty; and by consequence all _actions_, even of _free_ and _voluntary_ agents, are necessary.

The other thing that he repeateth, is, that the best way to reconcile _contingence_ and _liberty_ with _prescience_ and the _decrees_ of _God_, is to subject future _contingencies_ to the _aspect of God_. The same is also my opinion, but contrary to what his Lordship all this while laboured to prove. For hitherto he held _liberty_ and _necessity_, that is to say, _liberty_ and the _decrees_ of _God_, irreconcileable, unless the _aspect of God_, which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse, signify somewhat else besides _God’s will_ and _decree_, which I cannot understand. But he adds that we must subject them, according to that _presentiality_ which they have in eternity, which he says cannot be done by them that conceive _eternity_ to be an _everlasting succession_, but only by them that conceive it as an _indivisible point_. To which I answer, that as soon as I can conceive _eternity_ to be an _indivisible point_, or anything but an _everlasting succession_, I will renounce all that I have written on this subject. I know St. Thomas Aquinas calls _eternity_, _nunc stans_, an _ever-abiding now_; which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, yet I could never conceive it: they that can, are more happy than I. But in the mean time his Lordship alloweth all men to be of my opinion, save only those that can conceive in their minds a _nunc stans_, which I think are none. I understand as little how it can be true his Lordship says, that God is not _just_, but _justice_ itself; not _wise_, but _wisdom_ itself; not _eternal_, but _eternity_ itself; nor how he concludes thence, that _eternity_ is a _point indivisible_, and not a _succession_, nor in what sense it can be said, that an _infinite point_, and wherein is no _succession_, can comprehend all _time_, though time be _successive_. These phrases I find not in the Scripture; I wonder therefore what was the design of the Schoolmen to bring them up, unless they thought a man could not be a true Christian unless his understanding be first strangled with such hard sayings. And thus much for answer to his Lordship’s discourse, wherein I think not only his _squadrons of arguments_, but also his _reserve of distinctions_, are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question, with my _reasons_ for it, positively, and as briefly as I can, without any terms of _art_, in plain English.

MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

First I conceive, that when it cometh into a man’s mind to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no time to _deliberate_, the doing it or abstaining _necessarily_ follow the _present_ thought he hath of the _good_ or _evil_ consequence thereof to himself. As for example, in sudden _anger_, the _action_ shall follow the thought of _revenge_; in sudden _fear_, the thought of _escape_. Also when a man hath time to _deliberate_, but deliberates not, because never anything appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the _action_ follows his opinion of the _goodness_ or _harm_ of it. These actions I call VOLUNTARY, my Lord, if I understand him aright that calls them SPONTANEOUS. I call them _voluntary_, because those _actions_ that follow immediately the _last_ appetite, are _voluntary_, and here where is one only appetite, that one is the last. Besides, I see it is reasonable to punish a _rash_ action, which could not be justly done by man to man, unless the same were _voluntary_. For no _action_ of a man can be said to be without _deliberation_, though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had time to _deliberate_ all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of _anger_, shall nevertheless be justly put to _death_, because all the time, wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual _deliberation_, and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from _election_.

Secondly, I conceive when a man _deliberates_ whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to _consider_ an action, is to imagine the _consequences_ of it, both _good_ and _evil_. From whence is to be inferred, that _deliberation_ is nothing else but _alternate_ imagination of the _good_ and _evil_ sequels of an _action_, or, which is the same thing, alternate _hope_ and _fear_, or alternate _appetite_ to do or quit the action of which he _deliberateth_.

Thirdly, I conceive that in all _deliberations_, that is to say, in all alternate _succession_ of contrary _appetites_, the last is that which we call the WILL, and is immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other _appetites_ to do, and to quit, that come upon a man during his deliberations, are called _intentions_ and _inclinations_, but not _wills_, there being but one _will_, which also in this case may be called the _last will_, though the _intentions_ change often.

Fourthly, I conceive that those _actions_, which a man is said to do upon _deliberation_, are said to be _voluntary_, and done upon _choice_ and _election_, so that _voluntary_ action, and action proceeding from _election_ is the same thing; and that of a _voluntary agent_, it is all one to say, he is _free_, and to say, he hath not made an end of _deliberating_.

Fifthly, I conceive _liberty_ to be rightly defined in this manner: _Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent_. As for example, the water is said to descend _freely_, or to have _liberty_ to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the _liberty_ to ascend, but the _faculty_ or _power_, because the impediment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsical. So also we say, he that is tied, wants the _liberty_ to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in his bands; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impediment is in himself.

Sixthly, I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from _itself_, but from the _action_ of some other immediate _agent_ without itself. And that therefore, when first a man hath an _appetite_ or _will_ to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the _cause_ of his _will_, is not the _will_ itself, but _something_ else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of _voluntary_ actions the _will_ is the _necessary_ cause, and by this which is said, the _will_ is also _caused_ by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that _voluntary_ actions have all of them _necessary_ causes, and therefore are _necessitated_.

Seventhly, I hold that to be a _sufficient cause_, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the _effect_. The same also is a _necessary_ cause. For if it be possible that a _sufficient_ cause shall not bring forth the _effect_, then there wanteth somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the _cause_ was not _sufficient_; but if it be impossible that a _sufficient_ cause should not produce the _effect_, then is a _sufficient_ cause a _necessary_ cause, for that is said to produce an effect _necessarily_ that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced _necessarily_; for whatsoever is produced hath had a _sufficient_ cause to produce it, or else it had not been; and therefore also _voluntary_ actions are _necessitated_.

Lastly, that ordinary _definition_ of a _free agent_, namely, _that a_ free agent _is that, which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the_ effect, _can nevertheless not produce it_, implies a contradiction, and is nonsense; being as much as to say, the cause may be _sufficient_, that is to say, _necessary_, and yet the _effect_ shall not follow.

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MY REASONS.

For the first five points, wherein it is explicated I, what _spontaneity_ is; II, what _deliberation_ is; III, what _will_, _propension_, and _appetite_ are; IV, what a _free agent_ is: V, what _liberty_ is; there can no other proof be offered but every man’s own experience, by reflection on himself, and remembering what he useth in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth when he saith an action is _spontaneous_, a man _deliberates_; such is his _will_, that _agent_ or that _action_ is _free_. Now he that reflecteth so on himself, cannot but be satisfied, that _deliberation_ is the _consideration of the good and evil sequels of an action to come_; that by _spontaneity_ is meant _inconsiderate action_, or else nothing is meant by it; that _will_ is the _last act of our deliberation_; that a _free agent_ is he _that can do if he will_, and _forbear if he will_; and that _liberty is the absence of external impediments_. But to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the pains to consider what they think when they hear such words, no argument can be sufficient, because _experience_ and _matter of fact_ are not verified by other men’s arguments, but by every man’s own _sense_ and _memory_. For example, how can it be proved that to _love_ a thing and to think it _good_ is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by those words? Or how can it be proved that _eternity_ is not _nunc stans_, to a man that says those words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the thing in his mind?

Also the sixth point, that a man cannot imagine anything to begin _without a cause_, can no other way be made known, but by trying how he can imagine it; but if he try, he shall find as much reason, if there be no cause of the thing, to conceive it should begin at one time as another, that he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible, and therefore he must think there was some special cause why it began then, rather than sooner or later; or else that it began never, but was _eternal_.

For the seventh point, which is, that all _events_ have _necessary_ causes, it is there proved, in that they have _sufficient_ causes. Further let us in this place also suppose any event never so casual, as the throwing, for example, _ames ace_ upon a pair of dice, and see, if it must not have been _necessary_ before it was thrown. For seeing it was thrown, it had a _beginning_, and consequently a _sufficient_ cause to produce it, consisting partly in the _dice_, partly in outward things, as the posture of the parts of the _hand_, the measure of _force_ applied by the caster, the posture of the parts of the _table_, and the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting which was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast, and consequently the cast was necessarily thrown; for if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been _sufficient_. In the like manner it may be proved that every other accident, how _contingent_ soever it seem, or how _voluntary_ soever it be, is produced _necessarily_, which is that that my Lord Bishop disputes against. The same may be proved also in this manner. Let the case be put, for example, of the weather. _It is necessary that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain._ If therefore it be not _necessary_ it shall rain, it is _necessary_ it shall not rain, otherwise there is no necessity that the proposition, _it shall rain or not rain_, should be true. I know there be some that say, it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come to pass, but not, singly that it shall rain, or that it shall not rain, which is as much to say, _one_ of them is _necessary_, yet neither of them is _necessary_; and therefore to seem to avoid that absurdity, they make a distinction, that neither of them is true _determinate_, but _indeterminate_; which distinction either signifies no more but this, one of them is true, but we know not which, and so the necessity remains, though we know it not; or if the meaning of the distinction be not that, it hath no meaning, and they might as well have said, one of them is true _Titirice_, but neither of them, _Tu patulice_.

The last thing, in which also consisteth the whole controversy, namely that there is no such thing as an agent, _which when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it_; or, which is all one, that there is no such thing as _freedom from necessity_, is easily inferred from that which hath been before alleged. For if it be an _agent_, it can _work_; and if it _work_, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the _action_, and consequently the cause of the action is _sufficient_; and if _sufficient_, then also _necessary_, as hath been proved before.

And thus you see how the _inconveniences_, which his Lordship objecteth must follow upon the holding of _necessity_, are avoided, and the _necessity_ itself _demonstratively_ proved. To which I could add, if I thought it good logic, the _inconvenience_ of denying _necessity_, as that it destroyeth both the _decrees_ and the _prescience_ of God Almighty; for whatsoever God hath _purposed_ to bring to pass by _man_, as an instrument, or foreseeth shall come to pass; a man, if he have _liberty_, such as his Lordship affirmeth, from _necessitation_, might frustrate, and make not to come to pass, and God should either not _foreknow_ it, and not _decree_ it, or he should _foreknow_ such things shall be, as shall never be, and _decree_ that which shall never _come to pass_.

This is all that hath come into my mind touching this question since I last considered it. And I humbly beseech your Lordship to communicate it only to my Lord Bishop. And so praying God to prosper your Lordship in all your designs, I take leave, and am,

My most noble and most obliging Lord,
Your most humble servant,
THOMAS HOBBES.

Rouen, _Aug. 20, 1652_.[A]

Footnote A:

In the first edition of 1654 this date is 1646.

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AN
ANSWER
TO A BOOK PUBLISHED BY
DR. BRAMHALL,

LATE BISHOP OF DERRY;

CALLED THE

“CATCHING OF THE LEVIATHAN.”

TOGETHER WITH AN

HISTORICAL NARRATION CONCERNING

HERESY,

AND THE PUNISHMENT THEREOF.

TO THE READER.

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As in all things which I have written, so also in this piece, I have endeavoured all I can to be perspicuous; but yet your own attention is always necessary. The late Lord Bishop of Derry published a book called _The Catching of the Leviathan_, in which he hath put together divers sentences picked out of my _Leviathan_, which stand there plainly and firmly proved, and sets them down without their proofs, and without the order of their dependance one upon another; and calls them atheism, blasphemy, impiety, subversion of religion, and by other names of that kind. My request unto you is, that when he cites my words for erroneous, you will be pleased to turn to the place itself, and see whether they be well proved, and how to be understood. Which labour his Lordship might have saved you, if he would have vouchsafed as well to have weighed my arguments before you, as to have shown you my conclusions. His book containeth two chapters, the one concerning Religion, the other concerning Politics. Because he does not so much as offer any refutation of any thing in my _Leviathan_ concluded, I needed not to have answered either of them. Yet to the first I here answer, because the words _atheism_, _impiety_, and the like, are words of the greatest defamation possible. And this I had done sooner, if I had sooner known that such a book was extant. He wrote it ten years since, and yet I never heard of it till about three months since; so little talk there was of his Lordship’s writings. If you want leisure or care of the questions between us, I pray you condemn me not upon report. To judge and not examine is not just.

Farewell.
T. HOBBES.

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AN ANSWER,
ETC.

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THAT THE HOBBIAN PRINCIPLES ARE DESTRUCTIVE TO CHRISTIANITY AND ALL
RELIGION.

_J. D._ The image of God is not altogether defaced by the fall of man, but that there will remain some practical notions of God and goodness; which when the mind is free from vagrant desires, and violent passions, do shine as clearly in the heart, as other speculative notions do in the head. Hence it is, that there was never any nation so barbarous or savage throughout the whole world, which had not their God. They who did never wear clothes upon their backs, who did never know magistrate but their father, yet have their God, and their religious rights and devotions to him. Hence it is, that the greatest atheists in any sudden danger do unwittingly cast their eyes up to heaven, as craving aid from thence, and in a thunder creep into some hole to hide themselves. And they who are conscious to themselves of any secret crimes, though they be secure enough from the justice of men, do yet feel the blind blows of a guilty conscience, and fear Divine vengeance. This is acknowledged by T. H. himself in his lucid intervals. _That we may know what worship of God natural reason doth assign, let us begin with his attributes, where it is manifest in the first place, that existency is to be attributed to him._ To which he addeth, _infiniteness_, _incomprehensibility_, _unity_, _ubiquity_. Thus for attributes; next for actions. _Concerning external actions, wherewith God is to be worshipped, the most general precept of reason is, that they be signs of honour_; under which are contained _prayers, thanksgivings, oblations, and sacrifices_.

_T. H._ Hitherto his Lordship discharges me of atheism. What need he to say that _all nations, how barbarous soever, yet have their Gods and religious rites, and atheists are frighted with thunder, and feel the blind blows of conscience_? It might have been as apt a preface to any other of his discourses as this. I expect therefore in the next place to be told, that I deny again my afore-recited doctrine.

_J. D._ Yet, to let us see how inconsistent and irreconcileable he is with himself, elsewhere reckoning up all the laws of nature at large, even twenty in number, he hath not one word that concerneth religion, or hath the least relation in the world to God. As if a man were like the colt of a wild ass in the wilderness, without any owner or obligation. Thus in describing the laws of nature, this great clerk forgetteth the God of nature, and the main and principal laws of nature, which contain a man’s duty to his God, and the principal end of his creation.

_T. H._ After I had ended the discourse he mentions of the laws of nature, I thought it fittest in the last place, once for all, to say they were the laws of God, then when they were delivered in the word of God; but before, being not known by men for any thing but their own natural reason, they were but theorems, tending to peace, and those uncertain, as being but conclusions of particular men, and therefore not properly laws. Besides, I had formerly in my book _De Cive_, cap. IV, proved them severally, one by one, out of the Scriptures: which his Lordship had read and knew. It was therefore an unjust charge of his to say, I had not one word in them that concerns religion, or that hath the least relation in the world to God; and this upon no other ground than that I added not to every article, _this law is in the Scripture_. But why he should call me (ironically) a great clerk, I cannot tell. I suppose he would make men believe, I arrogated to myself all the learning of a great clerk, bishop, or other inferior minister. A learned bishop, is that bishop that can interpret all parts of Scripture truly, and congruently to the harmony of the whole; that has learnt the history and laws of the Church, down from the apostles' time to his own; and knows what is the nature of a law civil, divine, natural, and positive; and how to govern well the parochial ministers of his diocese, so that they may both by doctrine and example keep the people in the belief of all articles of faith necessary to salvation, and in obedience to the laws of their country. This is a learned bishop. A learned minister, is he that hath learned the way by which men may be drawn from avarice, pride, sensuality, profaneness, rebellious principles, and all other vices, by eloquent and powerful disgracing of them, both from Scripture and from reason; and can terrify men from vice, by discreet uttering of the punishments denounced against wicked men, and by deducing, rationally, the damage they receive by it in the end. In one word, he is a learned minister that can preach such sermons as St. Chrysostom preached to the Antiochians, when he was presbyter in that city. Could his Lordship find in my book, that I arrogated to myself the eloquence or wisdom of St. Chrysostom, or the ability of governing the church? It is one thing to know what is to be done, another thing to know how to do it. But his Lordship was pleased to use any artifice to disgrace me in any kind whatsoever.

_J. D._ Perhaps he will say that he handleth the laws of nature there, only so far as may serve to the constitution or settlement of a commonwealth. In good time, let it be so. He hath devised us a trim commonwealth, which is founded neither upon religion towards God, nor justice towards man; but merely upon self-interest, and self-preservation. Those rays of heavenly light, those natural seeds of religion, which God himself hath imprinted in the heart of man, are more efficacious towards preservation of a society, whether we regard the nature of the thing, or the blessing of God, than all his _pacts_, and _surrenders_, and _translations of power_. He who unteacheth men their duty to God, may make them eye-servants, so long as their interest doth oblige them to obey; but is no fit master to teach men conscience and fidelity.