Chapter IV: Industrial Evolution (1)

At all times within the historic period trade and industry have reacted profoundly on social life; and as we near the modern period in our own history the connection becomes more and more decisively determinant. In the oldest culture-history at all known to us, as we have seen, the commercial factor affects everything else; and at no time in European annals do we fail to note some special scene or area in which trade furnishes to politicians special problems. Thus the culture-history of Italy, as we have also seen, is in past epochs inseparably bound up with her commercial history. But as regards the north of Europe, it is in the modern period that we begin specially to recognise trade as playing a leading part in politics, national and international. The Mediterranean tradition is first seen powerfully at work in the history of the Hansa towns: then comes the great development of Flanders, then that of Holland, then that of England, which gained so much from the influx of Flemish and Dutch Protestant refugees in the reign of Philip II, but which was checked in its commercial growth, under Elizabeth and James alike, by their policy of granting monopolies to favourites.

Sir Josiah Child puts "the latter end of Elizabeth's reign" as the
time when England began to be "anything in trade" (_New Discourse
of Trade_, 4th ed. p. 73). Cp. Prof. Busch on English trade under
Henry VII, _England unter den Tudors_, i, 71-85, with Schanz,
_Englische Handelspolitik_, i, 328, where it is stated that in the
latter part of the sixteenth century there were 3,000 merchants
engaged in the sea trade. This seems extremely doubtful when we
note that the whole foreign trade of London was stated in
Parliament in 1604 to be in the hands of some 200 citizens
(_Journals of the House of Commons_, May 21, 1604), and the total
customs of London amounted to £110,000 a year, as against £17,000
from all the rest of the kingdom. As Hume notes (ch. 45, _note_), a
remonstrance from the Trinity House in 1602 declared that since
1588 the shipping and number of seamen in England had decayed about
a third. (Cit. from Anglesey's _Happy Future State of England_, p.
128.) This again, however, seems doubtful.

Broadly put, the fact appears to be that after a considerable
development of woollen manufacture in the towns during the Wars of
the Roses (above, p. 393), when sheep-rearing must have been
precarious and wool would be imported, there was a general return
to pasturage under the Tudor peace, the towns falling away, with
their manufactures. Attempts were made under Henry VIII and Edward
VI to develop the English mining industries by means of German
workmen and overseers, but apparently with no great success
(Ehrenberg, _Hamburg und England im Zeit. der Kön. Elisabeth_,
1896, pp. 4-6). It was after the persecution of Protestants in the
Netherlands under Charles V had driven many tradesmen to England
for refuge that manufacturing industry notably revived; and in
1564-65 we find the year's exports of England reckoned at £68,190
for wool and £896,079 for cloths and other woollen wares; the whole
of the rest of the export trade amounting only to £133,665 (Brit.
Mus. Lansdowne MS. 10, fol. 121-22, cited by Ehrenberg, p. 8; cp.
Cunningham, _Industry and Commerce_, ii, 82-83; Gibbins,
_Industrial Hist. of England_, 3rd. ed. pp. 132-33.) After the fall
of Antwerp, again, much of the commerce of that city fell to the
share of England, some of her commercial and artisan population
following it (Froude, _Hist. of England_, ed. 1872, xii, 1-2).

In the same period the commercial life of north Germany, which had
hitherto been far more widely developed than that of England
(Ehrenberg, pp. 1-11), was thrown back on the one hand by the
opening of the new ocean route to the East Indies, which upset the
trans-European trade from the Mediterranean, and on the other by
the new strifes between the princes and the cities (_id._ pp.
34-49); and here again English trade came to the front.

The "Merchant Adventurers," ready enough to accept monopolies for their own incorporations, were free-traders as against other monopolists;[1207] and not till all such abuses were abolished could England compete with Holland. And though they were never legally annulled even under the Commonwealth, "as men paid no regard to the prerogative whence the charters of those companies were derived, the monopoly was gradually invaded, and commerce increased by the increase of liberty."[1208] France at times promised to rival both Holland and England; but she at length definitely fell behind England in the race, as Flanders fell behind Holland, by reason of political misdirection. In the middle and latter part of the seventeenth century, all the northern States had their eyes fastened on the shining example of Holland;[1209] and commerce, which as an occasion of warfare had since the rise of Christianity been superseded by religion, begins to give the cue for animosities of peoples, rulers, and classes. The last great religious war--if we except the strifes of Russia and Turkey, which are quasi-religious--was the Thirty Years' War. Its very atrocity doubtless went far to discredit the religious motive,[1210] and it ranks as the worst war of the modern world. Commerce, however, for centuries supplied new motives for war to men whose ideas of economics were still at the theological stage.[1211] The eternal principle of strife, of human attraction and repulsion, plays through the phenomena of commerce as through those of creed. The profoundly insane lust for gold and silver, which had so largely determined the history of the Roman Empire, definitely shaped that of Spain; and Spain's example fired the northern nations with whom she came in contact.

Prof. Thorold Rogers is responsible for the strange proposition
(_Economic Interpretation of History_, p. 186; _Industrial and
Commercial History of England_, p. 321) that the chief source of
the silver supply of Europe, before the discovery of the New World,
was _England_. He offers nothing but his own conviction in proof of
his statement, to which he adds the explanation that the silver in
question was extracted from sulphuret of lead. It seems well to
point out that there is not a shadow of foundation for the main
assertion. That the argentiferous lead mines were worked seems
clear; but that they could produce the main European supply without
the fact being historically noted is incredible. On the other hand,
silver mines were found in Germany in the tenth century and later,
and there is reason to attribute to their output a gradual rise of
prices before the fifteenth century (Anderson's _History of
Commerce_, i, 67). In any case, there is no reason to doubt the
statement of the historians of the precious metals, that what
silver was produced in Europe in the Middle Ages was mostly mined
in Spain and Germany. See Del Mar, _History of the Precious
Metals_, 1880, pp. 38-43 and refs.; also Ehrenberg, _Hamburg und
England im Zeitalter der Königin Elisabeth_, 1896, pp. 4, 9;
Menzel, _Geschichte der Deutschen_, Cap. 276, _end_; and
Kohlrausch, _History of Germany_, Eng. tr. 1844, p. 261.

The direct search for gold as plunder developed into the pursuit of it as price; and wealthier States than Spain were raised by the more roundabout method which Spain disdained.

This was soon recognised by Spanish economists, who probably
followed the French physiocrats, as represented in the excellent
chapters of Montesquieu on money (cited above, p. 363). See the
passage from Bernard of Ulloa (1753) cited by Blanqui, _Hist. de
l'écon. polit._, 2e édit. ii, 28. Cp. Samber, _Memoirs of the Dutch
Trade_, Eng. tr. 1719, pref. Apart from the habits set up by
imperialism, the Spaniards were in part anti-industrial because
industry was so closely associated with the Moriscoes (Major Hume,
_Spain_, p. 195); and the innumerable Church holidays counted for
much. Yet in the first half of the sixteenth century Spain had a
great development of town industrial life (Armstrong, Introd. to
same vol. pp. 83-84). This is partly attributable to the new
colonial trade; but probably more to the connection with Flanders.
Cp. Grattan, _The Netherlands_, pp. 66, 88. About 1670, however,
manufacture for export had entirely ceased; the trade of Madrid,
such as it was, was mainly in the hands of Frenchmen; the Church
and the bureaucracy alone flourished; and although discharged
soldiers swarmed in the cities, what harvests there were had to be
reaped by the hands of French labourers who came each season for
the purpose. Hume, as cited, p. 285. This usage subsisted nearly a
century later (Tucker, _Essay on Trade_, ed. 1756, p. 25)

Holland in the seventeenth century presented to the European world, as we have seen, the new and striking spectacle of a dense population thriving on a soil which could not possibly be made to feed them. "Trade" became the watchword of French statesmanship; and Colbert pressed it against a froward nobility;[1212] while in England a generation later it had acquired the deeper rooting that goes with the voluntary activity and self-seeking of a numerous class; and already the gentry freely devoted their younger sons to the pursuits which those of France contemned.[1213]

The turn seems to have been taken in the most natural way, after Parliament was able to force on James I a stoppage of the practice of granting monopolies. At his accession, the King had sought popularity by calling in and scrutinising the many monopolies granted by Elizabeth, which constituted the main grievance of the time.[1214] Soon, however, he conformed to the old usage, which had in some measure the support of Bacon;[1215] and in 1621 it was declared that he had multiplied monopolies twentyfold.[1216] The most careful historian of the period reports that though they were continually being abused,[1217] they were granted on no corrupt motives, but in sheer mistaken zeal for the spread of commerce.[1218] It would be more plausible to say that when interests either of purse or of patronage lay in a certain direction, those concerned were very easily satisfied that the interests of commerce pointed the same way. At length, after much dispute, the Lords passed, in 1624,[1219] a Monopoly Bill previously passed by the Commons in 1621;[1220] and though some of the chief monopolies were left standing, either as involving patents for inventions or as being vested in corporations,[1221] mere private trade monopolies were for the future prevented.

It was a triumph of the trading class over the upper, nothing more. As for the corporations, they were as avid of monopolies as the courtiers had ever been; and independent traders hampered by monopolist corporations were only too ready to become monopolist corporations themselves.[1222] Under Charles I, for instance, there was set up a chartered company with a monopoly of soap-making, of which every manufacturer could become a member--a kind of chartered "trust," born out of due time--the price paid to the crown for the privilege being £10,000 and a royalty of £8 on every ton of soap made. For this payment the monopolists received full powers of coercion and the punitive aid of the Star Chamber. After a few years, in consideration of a higher payment, the King revoked the first patent and established a new corporation. Similar monopolies were granted to starch-makers and other producers; the Long Parliament pursuing the same policy, "till monopolies became as common as they had been under James or Elizabeth."[1223]

Part of the result was that about 1635 "there were more merchants to be found upon the exchange worth each one thousand pounds and upwards than there were in the former days, before the year 1600, to be found worth one hundred pounds each."[1224] The upper classes, as capitalists and even as traders, were not now likely to remain aloof. But all the while there was no betterment of the lot of the poor. "That our poor in England," writes Child after the Restoration, "have always been in a most sad and wretched condition ... is confessed and lamented by all men."[1225] Child's theory of the effect of usury laws in the matter is pure fallacy; but his estimate of men's fortunes is probably more accurate than the statement of the Venetian ambassador in the reign of Mary, that "there were many merchants in London with £50,000 or £60,000 each."[1226] Howell, in 1619,[1227] expresses a belief that "our four-and-twenty aldermen may buy a hundred of the richest men in Amsterdam." Yet, though it was also confessed that among the Dutch, and even in Hamburg and Paris, the poor were intelligently provided for,[1228] no such necessity was practically recognised in England,[1229] either by Puritan or by Cavalier, though before the Rebellion the administration of Charles had not been apathetic;[1230] and a century later there were the same conditions of popular misery and vice, with a new plague of drunkenness added.[1231] By that time, too, the corporation monopolies were strangling trade just as the private monopolies had formerly done;[1232] while France, which in the latter part of the seventeenth century gave such a stimulus to English and Dutch industry by the suicidal Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, had recovered both population and trade,[1233] and was on a commercial footing which, well developed, might have given her the victory over England in the race for empire.

Everywhere in the seventeenth century, however, the new development meant new strife. Protestant England and Holland, Catholic France and Protestant Holland, flew at each other's throats in quarrels of trade and tariffs; and for the monopoly of the trade in cloves, Dutch and Spanish and English battled as furiously as for constraint and freedom of conscience. The primitively selfish and mistaken notion men had formed of commercial economy was on a level with the religious impulse as it had subsisted from the beginning of Christendom; and even as each Christian sect had felt it necessary to throttle the rest, each nation felt that its prosperity depended on the others' impoverishment. To spite the Dutch, the Cromwellian party in 1651 passed the Navigation Act, prohibiting all imports of foreign goods save in English ships or those of the nations producing them. In practice it was a total failure, the effect being to injure the English rather than the Dutch trade; but the Dutch themselves, who were fanatical for their own Asiatic monopoly trade, believed it would injure them, and went to war accordingly.

The eulogy of the Navigation Act as "wise" by Adam Smith (put, by
the way, with a "perhaps") is one of his worst mistakes. Roger Coke
in 1672 testified (_Treatise on Trade_, p. 68, cited by M'Culloch)
that within two years of the passing of the Act England lost the
greater part of the Baltic and Greenland trades; and Sir Josiah
Child's _New Discourse of Trade_ shows in detail that the English
by about 1670 or 1690 had lost to the Dutch even much of the trade
they formerly had. (See Preface to second and later editions, and
compare M'Culloch, note xi to his edition of the _Wealth of
Nations_, and McCullagh, _Industrial History_, ii, 340.) The one
direction in which the Act seems to have been successful was in
stimulating shipbuilding and seafaring in the American colonies.
(See Prof. Ashley in the _Quarterly Journal of Economics_, Boston,
November, 1899, pp. 4-6.) Joshua Gee, in his _Trade and Navigation
of Great Britain Considered_ (1730, 6th ed. p. 113), expressly
ascribes a "prodigious increase of our shipping" to "the timber
trade between Portugal, etc., and our plantations," one result
being that English ships have "become the common carriers in the
Mediterranean, as well as between the Mediterranean, Holland,
Hambro', and the Baltic." He says nothing of the Navigation Act,
but lays stress on the cheap building of ships in New England, and
notes (p. 114) that the Dutch habitually hire English ships "to
transport their goods from Spain, etc., to Amsterdam, and other
places."

Even among expert merchants there was no true economic science, only a certain empirical knowledge, reduced to rule of thumb. Hence the traders were for ever tending to strangle trade, and the ablest administrators fell into the snare. Everywhere they tended to be possessed by the gross fallacy that they could somehow sell without buying,[1234] and so heap up gold and silver; and to secure at least a balance in bullion was considered an absolute necessity. This was the most serious error of the policy of Colbert, who secured a balance of social gain to France by stimulating and protecting shipping and new industries,[1235] but failed to learn the lesson that foreign commerce in the end must consist in an exchange of goods. Thus, though he resisted the ruinous methods of Louis XIV,[1236] he lent himself to the theory which, next to the hope of making the Netherlands a province of France and so an arm of French naval strength, stimulated the policy of war. By repeatedly raising his tariffs he forced the Dutch to raise theirs; whereupon France went to war. Had he known that the Dutch could not sell to France without buying thence, and _vice versa_, he would have rested content with establishing his new industries.

M. Dussieux (as cited, p. 127) frames a deplorable demonstration
that Holland was impoverishing France and destroying all industry
there by selling more articles than she bought. As if any country
could go on buying in perpetuity without selling in payment. M.
Dussieux goes on to admit that France before Colbert had some great
industries, and a great agricultural export trade, as must needs
have been. His argument shows the survival of the mercantilist
delusion that trade can drain a productive country of its bullion.
It is evident that Colbert helped trade more by checking fiscal
abuses and promoting canals and roads than by protecting new
industries. On the whole he seems to have gravely injured
agriculture (_id._ pp. 89, _note_, and 133); and Adam Smith's
criticism (_Wealth of Nations_, bk. iii, ch. ii; bk. iv, ch. ix)
remains valid. He was "imposed upon by the sophistry of merchants
and manufacturers, who are always demanding a monopoly against
their countrymen," and by prohibiting export of grain he depressed
agriculture, the natural and facile industry of France, and so
promoted the rural misery which at length inspired the Revolution.
It was essentially by way of reaction against his error that the
Physiocrats fell into theirs--the denial that any industry was
productive _except_ agriculture. Even if he had not prohibited
export of grain, his import duties, in so far as they excluded
foreign products, would have checked the grain exports which had
formerly paid for these. Thus, as M. Dussieux admits, Colbert
failed to secure prosperity for the peasantry while he was helping
industry. (Cp. Brandt, _Beiträge_, as cited.) Colbert in the
nineteenth century had the benefit of the doctrine that monarchism
prepared for democracy in France, and there is some truth in the
protest of Morin that on this and other grounds he became the
object of "un culte ridicule qui brave les notions les plus
élémentaires de l'économie publique" (_Origines de la démocratie_,
Introd.--written in 1854--p. 48). Morin goes so far as to charge on
Colbert equally with Louvois the misfortunes of France under Louis
XIV (_id._ pp. 88, 120).

Of course the rival nations were equally self-seeking. Prohibitive tariffs were necessarily lowest with the most specifically commercial State, the Dutch; and the free trade doctrine began early to be heard in England.

_E.g._, from Dudley North. Macaulay, ed. cited, i, 253. See the
quotations in M'Culloch, as above cited. Pepys, in his _Diary_,
under date 1664, February 29, tells how Sir Philip Warwick
expounded to him the "paradox" that it does not impoverish the
nation to export less than it imports. For earlier instances of
right thinking on the subject see the author's _Trade and Tariffs_,
p. 65 _sq_. The repeal in 1663 of statutes against exporting
bullion was carried in the interests of the East India Company, and
apparently on a false theory; see it in Child, _New Discourse_, p.
173. Cp. Shaftesbury, _Characteristics_, Treatise II, pt. i, § 2,
_end_, as to the advantage of a "free port." This had been
partially insisted on, as we have seen, by the Merchant Adventurers
in the days of Elizabeth and James; and Raleigh strongly pressed it
in his _Observations touching Trade and Commerce with the Hollander
and other Nations_, presented to James. Works, ed. 1829, viii,
356-57. Raleigh, however, was a bullionist.

But whether rulers leant in the direction of free trade or strove to heap up import duties as did France, they went to war for monopolies and for imposts. Holland had as determinedly sought the ruin of Antwerp as England did that of Holland. And as the race-principle embroiled nations on the score of trade, so the class-principle set up new feuds of class in all the nations concerned. The new trading class fought for its own hand as the trade gilds of the Middle Ages had done; and the fact of its connections with the gentry did not prevent animosity between gentry and traders or investors in the mass. Thus were the old issues complicated, for good or for ill.

Prof. Cunningham (_English Industry and Commerce_, ed. 1892, ii,
16-17) offers an unexpected defence of the "Mercantile System,"
under which bullion was striven for as "the direct means of
securing power." "The wisdom of the whole scheme," he writes, "is
apparently justified by the striking development of national power
which took place during the period when it lasted. England first
outstripped Holland and then raised an empire in the East on the
ruins of French dependencies." After this argument Dr. Cunningham
falters, observing: "But even if the logic of facts seems to tell
in its favour, there is a danger of fallacy: success was attained,
but how far was it due to the working of coal, and the age of
mechanical invention, and how far to the policy pursued?" There is
really no need to suppose such an antinomy between "the logic of
facts" and any other logic. The only legitimate logic of facts is
that which takes in all the facts. Now, seeing that France was as
much devoted as England to the Mercantile System, and that in the
terms of the case she failed, it cannot have been the Mercantile
System that secured success to England. The logic of facts excludes
the hypothesis. As for the "outstripping" of Holland, a country
with perhaps a fourth of England's population in the eighteenth
century, we have seen that the Mercantile System, as operating in
the Navigation Act, totally failed to attain its purpose, and that
Dutch decadence was largely due to monopolies--_i.e._, to
acceptance of the Mercantile System. The working of coal, on the
other hand, was a real wealth-making force, certainly conducive to
naval and other empire. But more allowance is to be made for the
fact that France had heavy continental quarrels on hand while she
was fighting England in Asia and America.

If at this stage we seek to discover the manner of life of the working class in England, we shall find it hard to reach a confident conception. Many phrases in Shakespeare remind us that as towns grew there grew with them a nondescript semi-industrial class, untrained for any regular industry and unable to subsist without industry of some sort. In the latter part of the seventeenth century we seem to see a process of elimination at work by which the organisms capable of enduring toil are selected from a mass to which such toil was too irksome. In 1668 Sir Josiah Child writes that the English poor in a cheap year "will not work above two days in a week; their humour being such that they will ... just work so much and no more as may maintain them in that mean condition to which they have been accustomed." That, accordingly, a high price for bread was a good thing, as forcing the poor to industry, became the standing doctrine of such publicists as Petty.[1237] In the next generation, Mandeville puts as indisputable the statement that "the poor" will not work any more than they need to maintain bare existence. When, late in the eighteenth century, we find Adam Smith, with French testimony to support him, denying that the pinch of poverty makes for industry, we are left in doubt as to whether the improvement came by a positive dying out of the lazy types through the new plague of alcoholism, or through the gradual exemplary force of a higher standard of comfort as seen among the more industrious. Probably both influences were at work. But it was at best in a grimy under-world of degeneracy and hunger, squalor and riot, that there were laid the roots of the new mechanical industries which were to make England the chief mill and counter of Europe.[1238] And when we find one of the acutest observers of the next generation arguing that a large body of the needy poor is the right and necessary basis of industry and public wealth,[1239] we realise that the new life was to be as hard for the toilers as that of any earlier age.

_Conclusion_

It is in the reign of the last of the Stuarts, whose sex made her perforce rely on ministers to rule for her, and whose unenlightened zeal[1240] thus missed the disaster which similar qualities had brought upon two of her predecessors--it is in the reign of Anne, swayed by favourites to an extent that might have made monarchy ridiculous[1241] if monarchists had gone by reason and not by superstition--that there begins recognisably the era of government by parliamentary leaders, representing at once, in varying degrees, monarch and people; and it is at this point that we begin the biographical studies[1242] to which the foregoing pages offer an introduction. But under new conditions and phases we are to meet for the most part repetitions and developments of the forces already recognised as at work from time immemorial. Thus early have we seen in action, on the field of English history, most of those primary forces of strife whose play makes the warp of politics, ancient and modern; and the distinct emergence, withal, of that spirit which, rare and transient in ancient times, seems destined to inherit the later earth--the spirit of science, which slowly transmutes politics from an animal to an intellectual process, raising it from the stage of mere passional life to the stage of constructive art, and from the social relation of rule and subjection towards the relation of mutuality and corporate intelligence. Politics, we formally say, is the process of the clash of wills, sympathies, interests, striving for social adjustment in the sphere of legislation and government. The earlier phases are crude and animalistic, and involve much resort to physical strife. The later phases are gradually humanised and intelligised, till at length the science of the past process builds up a new phase of consciousness, which evolves a conscious progressive art. That is to say, the conscious progressive art develops in course of time: it had not really arisen in any valid form at the period to which we have brought our bird's-eye view. It had transiently arisen in the ancient world, as in Solon and, far less effectually, in the Gracchi; but the conditions were too evil for its growth, and the course of things political was downward, the animal instincts overriding science, till even when there was compulsory peace the spirit of science could no more blossom. In English politics, soon after the beginning of the eighteenth century, the conditions brought about civil peace under a new dynasty, which it was the function of the statesmanship of the dynasty to maintain. At the same time the spirit of science had entered on a new life. It remains to trace, under successive statesmen and in the doctrine of successive politicians, the fluctuations of English progress towards the great Utopia, the state of reconciliation of all the lower social antipathies and interests, and of free scope for the inevitable but haply bloodless strifes of ideals, which must needs clash so far as we can foresee human affairs. The progress, we shall see, is only in our own day beginning to be conscious or calculated: it has truly been, so far as most of the actors are concerned, by unpath'd waters to undream'd shores. The hope is that the very recognition of the past course of the voyage will establish a new art and a new science of social navigation.

To make a new aspiration pass for a law of progress merely because it is new would, of course, be only a fresh dressing of old error. There is no security that the scientific form will make any ideal more viable than another; every ideal, after all, has stood for what social science there was among its devotees. The hope of a moral transformation of the world is a state of mind so often seen arising in human history that some distrust of it is almost a foregone condition of reflection on any new ideal for thoughtful men. A dream of deliverance pervades the earliest purposive literature of the Hebrews; a fabled salvation in the past is made the ground for trust in one to come. Wherever the sense of present hardship and suffering outweighs the energetic spirit of life in the ancient world, the young men are found seeing visions, and the old men dreaming dreams; and the thought of "the far serenity of Saturn's days" becomes a foothold for the Virgilian hope of a golden age to come. A hundred times has the hope flowered, and withered again. Confident rebellions, eager revolutions, mark at once its rise and its fall. In our own age the new birth of hope arises in the face of what might have seemed the most definitive frustration; it becomes an ideal of peaceful transformation under the sole spell of social science, with no weapons save those of reason and persuasion. The science of natural forces has widened and varied life without greatly raising it in mass. Yet the new science, we would fain believe, will conquer the heightened task. In the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of that hope lies for the coming age the practical answer to the riddle of existence.

Without such a hope, the study of the past would indeed be desolating to the tired spectator. Followed through cycle after cycle of illusory progress and conscious decline, all nevertheless as full of pulsation, of the pride of life and the passion of suffering, as the human tide that beats to-day on the shores of our own senses, the history of organised mankind, in its trivially long-drawn immensity, grows to be unspeakably disenchanting. Considered as a tale that is told, it seems to speak of nothing but blind impulse, narrow horizons, insane satisfactions in evil achievement, grotesque miscalculation, and vain desire, till it is almost a relief to reflect how little we know of it all, how immeasurable are the crowded distances beyond the reach of our search-light. Alike the known and the unknown, when all is said, figure for us as fruitless, purposeless, meaningless moments in some vast, eternal dream.

Poi di tanto adoprar, di tanti moti
D'ogni celeste, ogni terrena cosa
Girando senza posa,
Per tornar sempre là donde son mosse;
Uso alcuno, alcun frutto,
Indovinar non so.[1243]

The untranslatable cadence of Leopardi has the very pulse of the wearied seeker's spirit. Yet, through all, the fascination of the inquiry holds us, as if in the insistent craving to understand there lay some of the springs of movement towards better days. We brood over the nearer remains, so near and yet so far, till out of the ruins of Rome there rise for us in hosts the serried phantoms of her tremendous drama; till we seem to catch the very rasp of Cato's voice, and the gleam of Cæsar's eye, swaying the tide of things. Still, the sensation yields no sense of fruition; Rome the dead, and Greece the undying, drift from our reach into the desert distance. Beyond their sunlit fragments lies a shoreless and desolate twilight-land, receding towards the making of the world; and there in the shadows we dimly divine the wraiths of a million million forms, thronging a hundred civilisations. The vision of that vanished eternity renews the intolerable burden of the spirit baffled of all solution. For assuredly, in the remotest vistas of all, men and women desired and loved, and reared their young, and toiled unspeakably, and wept for their happier dead; and the evening and the morning, then as now, wove their sad and splendid pageantries with the slow serenity of cosmic change. Great empires waxed to the power of wreaking infinite slaughter, through the infinite labour of harmless animal souls; and seas of blood alternately cemented and sapped their brutal foundations; and all that remains of them is a tradition of a tradition of their destruction, and the shards of their uttermost decay. Not an echo of them lives, save where perchance some poet with struggling tongue murmurs his dream of them into tremulous form; or when music with its more mysterious spell gathers from out the inscrutable vibration of things strange semblances of memories, that come to us as an ancient and lost experience re-won, grey with time and weary with pilgrimage. But to what end, of knowledge or of feeling, if the future is not therefore to be changed?

Save for such a conception and such a purpose, the civilisations of to-day could have no rational hope to survive in perpetuity any more than those of the past. The fullest command of physical science, however great be the resulting power of wealth-production, means no solution of the social problem, which must breed its own science. The new ground for hope is that the great discipline of physical science has brought with it the twofold conception of the reign of law in all things and the sequence of power upon comprehension, even to the controlling of the turbulent sea of human life. With the science of universal evolution has come the faith in unending betterment. And this, when all is said, is the vital difference between ancient and modern politics: that for the ancients the fact of eternal mutation was a law of defeat and decay, while for us it is a law of renewal. If but the faith be wedded to the science, there can be no predictable limit to its fruits, however long be the harvesting.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1207: Schanz, _Englische Handelspolitik_, i, 332 ff. The Merchant Adventurers were incorporated under Elizabeth (_id._ i, 350).]

[Footnote 1208: Hume, _History of England_, ch. 62, near _end_.]

[Footnote 1209: Dr. Cunningham (ii, 101, 102, 104) notes the feeling under the first Stuarts.]

[Footnote 1210: See Buckle, 3-vol. ed. ii, 42, 1-vol. ed. pp. 308-9, and his citations, as to the anti-ecclesiastical character of the Peace of Westphalia.]

[Footnote 1211: Cp. Storch, quoted by M'Culloch, _Principles of Political Economy_, Introd., and Schoell's addition to Koch, _Hist. of Europe_, Eng. tr. 3rd ed. p. 110. On the tendency of economic science to promote peace, see Buckle, i, 217, 218; 1-vol. ed. pp. 120-25.]

[Footnote 1212: See the so-called _Political Testament of Colbert_, Eng. tr. 1695, p. 351.]

[Footnote 1213: Petty, _Political Arithmetic_, ch. x (_Essays_, ed. 1699, p. 273). Even noblemen are mentioned as sometimes putting their younger sons to merchandise. Cp. Toynbee, _Industrial Revolution_, p. 63; and Josiah Tucker, _Essay on Trade_ (1751), 4th ed. p. 43.]

[Footnote 1214: Gardiner, _History of England, 1603-42_, ed. 1893, i, 100.]

[Footnote 1215: _Id._ iv, 2.]

[Footnote 1216: _Id._ iv, 1.]

[Footnote 1217: See Gardiner, as cited, iv, 8, for a sample, and in particular pp. 41-43 for the notorious case of Sir Giles Mompesson and the inn licences.]

[Footnote 1218: _Id._ iv, 6, 7.]

[Footnote 1219: _Id._ v, 233.]

[Footnote 1220: _Id._ iv, 125.]

[Footnote 1221: _Id._ vii, 71.]

[Footnote 1222: _Id._ viii, 74, 75.]

[Footnote 1223: Hallam, _Constitutional History_, ii, 11.]

[Footnote 1224: Sir Josiah Child, _New Discourse of Trade_, 4th ed. p. 9.]

[Footnote 1225: _Id._ p. 87.]

[Footnote 1226: Lingard, _Hist. of England_, 6th ed. v, 262.]

[Footnote 1227: _Epistolæ Ho-elianæ_, ed. 1891, i, 25.]

[Footnote 1228: Child, _New Discourse of Trade_, p. 88. As to the good management of the Dutch in this regard, cp. Howell, as cited above, p. 334.]

[Footnote 1229: Child, whose main concern was to reduce the rate of interest by law, proposed (p. 98) to sell paupers as slaves on the plantations, "taking security for ... their freedom afterwards." An antagonist (see pref. p. xi) proposed a law limiting wages.]

[Footnote 1230: Above, p. 434.]

[Footnote 1231: Josiah Tucker, _Essay on Trade_, 4th ed. pp. 46, 105.]

[Footnote 1232: _Id._ pp. 28, 50, 51; Richardson's _Essay on the Decline of the Foreign Trade_ (often attributed to Decker), ed. 1756, pp. 46-64.]

[Footnote 1233: France also, of course, still kept up trade monopolies (Tucker, p. 36).]

[Footnote 1234: The fallacy was indeed soon exposed as such by the more enlightened economists. Thus the French writer Samber, in his _Memoirs of the Dutch Trade_ (Eng. tr. ed. 1719, p. 75), speaks of the French rulers of Colbert's day as having "entertained a notion that they could carry on trade after a new unheard-of method: they proposed to sell their goods to their neighbours, and buy none of theirs." But this was none the less the prevailing ideal of the age. Cp. Jansen's _General Maxims of Trade_, 1713, cited by Buckle, i, 217.]

[Footnote 1235: Cp. A. von Brandt, _Beiträge zur Geschichte der französischen Handelspolitik_, 1896, pp. 25-28.]

[Footnote 1236: L. Dussieux, _Étude biographique sur Colbert_, 1886, ch. vi, § 2.]

[Footnote 1237: Cp. Child, _New Discourse_, p. 17; Petty, Essays, p. 205; Tucker, _Essay on Trade_, 4th ed. pp. 45-57. For a general view of the discussion see Schulze-Gävernitz, _Der Grossbetrieb_, 1892, Einleitung.]

[Footnote 1238: As early as 1641 the Manchester woollen industry is noted as flourishing. Early in the next century it had immensely increased. Schulze-Gävernitz, as cited, pp. 26, 27.]

[Footnote 1239: Mandeville, _Fable of the Bees_, Remarks _Q_ and _Y_.]

[Footnote 1240: "That narrow and foolish woman." Hallam, _Constitutional History_, iii, 124, _note_. Cp. Buckle, i, 419: "a foolish and ignorant woman."]

[Footnote 1241: "It seems rather a humiliating proof of the sway which the feeblest prince enjoys even in a limited monarchy, that the fortunes of Europe should have been changed by nothing more noble than the insolence of one waiting-woman and the cunning of another. It is true that this was effected by throwing the weight of the Crown into the scale of a powerful faction; yet the house of Bourbon would probably not have reigned beyond the Pyrenees but for Sarah and Abigail at Queen Anne's toilet" (Hallam, iii, 210).]

[Footnote 1242: A work in course of preparation.]

[Footnote 1243: "Then as to all this activity, so many movements of all things celestial and all things earthly, turning without ceasing, only to return forever there whence they set forth, I can divine no use and no fruition" (Leopardi's _Nocturnal Song of a Nomad Shepherd in Asia_).]

INDEX

Aargau, 338, 346, 349

Abbott, Dr. E., 37, 106 _n._

Abderrahman I, 154

---- III, 153

Abdy, Prof., 201, 373

Abortion in Greece, 102, 117

Abyssinia, 179

Academy, the French, 444 _n._, 445

Achaian League, 51

Adams and Cunningham, 331, 351 _n._

Adrian IV, 235

Æschines, 50

Æschylus, 136

Aetius, 96, 185

Ætolian League, 51

_Ager publicus_, 77

Agis, 51, 104

Agrarian distress, 403-5

Agriculture, 88;
Egyptian, 56;
Roman, 76, 79, 82 _sq._, 94;
Greek, 99, 108, 117;
Feudal, 202;
Italian, 221;
Dutch, 328;
English, 88, 348 _n._, 403;
Scandinavian, 270, 283;
Swiss, 347, 348

Alaric, 185

Alba Longa, 14

Alboin, 188, 194

Albuquerque, 358

Alcibiades, 46, 50

Alcuin, 189

Alexander the Great, empire of, 111

---- of Parma, 307, 309, 310

Alexandria, 133, 134

Alfonso de Sousa, 362

Alfred, 370 _n._, 375

Algiers, French. 57 _n._, 156-7, 177

Alkman, 132

Allen, C.-F., 264 _n._

Almohades, the, 155

Almoravides, the, 155

Althusius, 441

Alva, 308

Amalfi, 194, 204

Ambrose, 194

Amphictyonic Councils, 53

Amsterdam, 315;
bank of, 324

Anabaptism, 306, 307

Anarchism, 424

Anastasius, 96 _n._

Anaxagoras, 46

Anglo-Saxons, 275, 369-76

Anne, 468

Anskar, 267

Antioch, 133

Antonines, 89, 113, 117, 166, 167

Antony, franchise policy of, 4 _n._

Antwerp, 308, 310, 311, 313

Anund Jakob, 267, 272

Anytus, 50

Appenzell, 337, 338, 344, 347

Apuleius, 167

Aquinas, Thomas, 118 _n._, 212, 235, 440

Arab character, 146 _sq._

Architecture, 150, 151, 192, 205, 220

Arianism, 97, 168

Aribert, 206

Ariosto, 230

Aristocracy, Roman, 17, 21, 22 _sq._, 29-30, 78;
and culture, 62, 166;
and politics, 70;
Greek, 42, 49, 98, 109;
Feudal, 200, 202, 209;
Italian, 236, 245, 255;
English, 288, 376, 379, 385, 390 _sq._, 396, 403, 410;
Dutch, 306;
Scandinavian, 275, 276, 277, 281;
Portuguese, 355;
Swiss, 336, 348;
French, 391, 415 _n._, 461

Aristotle, 50, 127, 448 _sq._;
on militarism, 45;
on slavery, 98, 133 _n._;
on Sparta, 101 _n._;
on population, 102;
on education, 126;
and Aquinas, 212

Aristophanes, 50, 135

Armada, 308, 311, 314, 399, 408

Arminianism, 310

Arnold of Brescia, 235, 246

Arnold, M., 434

Arnold, W.T., 78

Artaxerxes, 113

Art, evocation of, 63, 122, 134, 150, 159, 220, 327, 409;
in Athens, 48-49, 106;
in medieval Italy, 220-21, 225;
in Holland, 327;
in Portugal, 359;
in England, 409

Arteveldt, J. van, 299

Ashley, Prof., 379 _n._, 394

Asia Minor, 55, 123

Associations, religious, 113, 115

Assyria, 135

Aston, Sir A., 428

Astronomy, 149, 150, 151

Athaulf, 186

Athens, variety of stock in, 16;
social problem in, 40, 107;
reforms of Solon in, 40 _sq._, 99;
morals in, 47-48, 50;
superstition and ignorance in, 45 _sq._;
art and letters in, 48-49, 106, 124;
imports of, 84;
commerce of, 99;
buildings of, 105;
silver mines of, 105-6;
citizenship of, 124;
retrogression of, 134

Attila, 185, 191

Attraction and repulsion in politics, 5-7, 23, 28, 202, 207, 210, 257 _sq._, 299, 369, 377, 386, 460; modes of, 70

Augustine, 34, 118 _n._, 168, 261

Augustus, 81, 83, 164

Australian aborigines, 128

Aurelian, 87 _n._, 184, 185

Autocracy. See _Despotism_ and _Tyranny_

Avitus, St., 187

Babylonia, 68

Bacchic mysteries, 164

Bacon, 461

Bagaudæ, the, 175

Bagehot, cited, 23 _n._, 57 _n._

Bain, R.N., 264 _n._, 277 _n._

Balfour, A.J., 72 _n._, 171 _sq._, 180 _n._

Ball, John, 390

Banking, 218, 435

Barante, 292

Barneveldt, 310, 318

Barros, 359

Basle, 338, 344, 346, 348

Bayle, 326

Beaconsfield, 72

Becker, cited, 9

Becket, 377

"Beggars," Confederacy of, 306

Beghards, 305

Behn, Aphra, 442 _n._

Belgium, 260, 307

Belisarius, 96, 184, 191, 194

Bent, J.T., 181

Bentham, 449

Berbers, 154 _n._, 155

Berlin, University of, 139

Berne, 336, 337, 338, 343, 344, 345, 346, 349

Bertrand, A., cited, 64

Bibliolatry, 152, 154, 157, 396, 405, 410

Bijns, Anna, 326

Bikélas, cited, 143, 144

Bishops and Italian cities, 198, 206

Black Death, 380, 384, 386, 387, 388

Blackstone, 449

Blake, 420

Blok, P.J., 292, 296

Blossius of Cumæ, 81

Boccaccio, 226

Bodin, 449

Boeckh, 37, 41, 107, 108, 109

Boissier, cited, 159 _n._, 162

Bolingbroke, 437

Bologna, 205, 208, 211, 212

Bordier, 334, 335

Borghini, 217

Borgia, Cesare, 233, 253

Botta, cited, 229 _n._

Boulting, 195 _n._, 196, 202 _n._

Boyle, 447 _n._

Brazil, 317, 361-68;
population in, 362;
prospects of, 366-67

Brethren of the Common Lot, 305

Bribery in Rome, 22

Britain, economic basis of, 59, 79

Browning, O., 181

Bruce, 308

Bruges, 297

Brun, 336

Brunehild, 186

Brussels, 297

Brutus, 79

Bryce, cited, 4, 58, 189 _n._, 199, 201

Buchanan, 441

Buckingham, 415

Buckle, on national character, 1 _n._, 4;
on Montesquieu, 28 _n._;
on food and life conditions, 55;
on Spanish fanaticism, 155, 304;
on climate and civilisation, 361;
on Magna Carta, 392;
on Delolme, 392;
on Divine Right, 440 _n._;
on Anne, 468 _n._

Bullion delusion, 80, 464 _sq._

Burckhardt, 182;
as sociologist, 36;
on Greek happiness, 47;
on Sparta, 130;
on Spain and Italy, 230, 233 _n._

Burghley, 400, 406, 407

Burke, 453

---- U.R., cited, 119, 169, 191, 192

Burnet, 438, 439

Burrows, Prof., 123

Bursian, C., 65

Burton, Hill, 11, 414 _n._, 456

Bury, 38;
on Roman Empire, 34 _n._;
on Solon, 43;
on Christian disunion, 97 _n._;
on Heraclius, 116 _n._;
on Greek Art, 122 _n._;
on the Dorians, 130-31;
on Byzantine superstition, 145 _n._;
on Roman currency, 175 _n._

Busch, 392 _n._

Butler, W.F., 181, 196, 197 _n._, 206, 211

Byzantium, 34, 93, 95, 96, 114 _sq._, 143 _sq._, 152, 186

Cade, Jack, 388, 406

Cæsar, franchise policy of, 4 _n._;
revenue policy of, 73;
policy of doles of, 82;
policy in Campania of, 91;
and Corinth, 110

Calderon, 359, 413

Calvin, 301, 343, 344, 398, 435

Calvinism, 306, 310, 326, 344, 396 _n._, 398

Camden, 398, 407

Camoens, 359

Cantù, 181

Capitalism, in antiquity, 86, 104, 108;
in Florence, 218, 248 _sq._;
in Holland, 316, 318, 324; in America, 365;
in England, 393, 403, 434-35, 462

Caracalla, 4, 175

Carlyle, 264 _n._, 419, 429-30

Carmagnola, 249

Carrel, A., 436 _n._, 437 _n._, 444 _n._

Carthage, 28 _n._, 30, 86

Castruccio Castracani, 243, 255

_Cathari_, 220

Cato, 32

Cats, 307, 326

Catullus, 165, 166

Celibacy, Sacerdotal, 235

Celts, 187, 190, 192, 258, 279, 375, 378

Chancery, Court of, 432

Chapman, 412, 413

Charlemagne, 188, 189, 191, 192, 267, 295

Charles I of England, 410, 414 _sq._, 426, 443

---- II of England, 319, 320, 437, 438, 442, 443, 451

---- III of Spain, 363

---- IV, 246

---- V, 300, 301, 302, 304, 309 _n._, 311

Charleton, W., 444 _n._

Chasles, Ph., cited, 74

Chastity, barbaric, 184

Chaucer, 384, 386

Chemistry, 149, 150

Chievres, 302

Child, Sir J., 316, 458, 462, 463 _n._, 464, 467

Chilperic, 186

China, polity of, 56, 57, 59-60, 67, 73, 180, 260;
secret societies of, 26 _n._

Chinese and Europeans, repulsions of, 6

Chivalier, 294 _n._

Chivalry, 383

Christian II, 276

---- III, 277

Christianity, conditions of success of, 27, 114-15, 165;
effects of, 28;
and progress, 34-5, 179, 205, 272, 431;
and Roman Empire, 95, 96, 97, 265;
and heresy, 97, 115, 168, 300, 303, 344;
spread of, 112, 114-15;
and infanticide, 117-18;
and slavery, 118 _sq._, 214 _sq._, 372-73;
and culture, 142, 144, 168, 280;
and Islam, 149, 157;
in Gaul, 167;
and morals, 186, 210, 272, 431, 434;
and Italian disunion, 210;
in Scandinavia, 265 _sq._, 272, 274;
and fish eating, 293;
in modern Holland and Belgium, 307;
strife of sects in, 422

Chrysostom, 118

Church in politics, 96, 145, 152, 168-69, 198, 203, 206, 210, 223, 234, 235, 265, 274, 377, 391

Cicero, on Roman politics, 20-21;
on manumission, 215

Cimabue, 220

Cincinnatus, 12, 19

City States, 29, 38 _sq._, 52, 53, 124, 179, 198, 202 _sq._, 209 _sq._, 286 _sq._, 295

Civilisation and superstition, 46;
modern, roots of, 169

Civilisations, primary and secondary, 55 _sq._

Clans, Highland, 11, 67

Clarendon, 437, 451

Class degradation, effects of, 62, 68, 372;
relations in England, 376, 379;
as political factor, 70

Classes, strife of, in Rome, 17 _sq._;
in Greece, 38, 45;
in Florence, 229 _sq._;
in Flanders, 296-97;
in Switzerland, 336, 350;
in England, 393-94, 405

Claudian, 167

Claudius II, 185

Clémenceau, 271

Cleomenes, 51, 104

_Clientes_, Roman, 11

Climate and race, 193, 361

_Cloacæ_, the Roman, 14

Clothaire, 186

Clovis, 187

Coal civilisations, 79, 88, 365, 366

Coinage, alleged debasement of, by Solon, 41;
Roman debasement of, 175;
Papal debasement of, 223;
debasement of, by Henry VIII, 397.
See _currency_

Colbert, 140, 315, 445, 446, 461, 464, 465

Cologne, 288

Colonies, Greek, 39, 48, 100;
and culture, 63 _n._;
Roman, 86;
Scandinavian, 271;
Dutch, 312

Comines, 391

_Comitia_, Roman, 9 _sq._

Commerce, Roman, 76-7, 80;
Athenian, 99, 108;
Greek, under Roman Empire, 113;
Byzantine, 117;
Italian, 211, 218-19, 221, 256, 383;
Danish, 273;
Norwegian, 284;
Medieval, 288;
Dutch, 297, 310 _sq._;
Portuguese, 357 _sq._;
Anglo-Saxon, 370;
English, 380, 393, 404, 459;
Irish, 453;
Spanish, 461;
and civilisation, 70, 99, 104, 109, 113, 205, 211, 221, 287, 315,
457, 458;
and war, 297, 460

Compass, the, 205

Competition of societies, 58, 70

Comte, A., 2 _n._, 4

Conrad the Salic, 203

Conradin, 241

Conservatism and isolation, 56, 144;
Chinese, 60;
Egyptian, 125;
and militarism, 132-33;
English, 424

Constantine, 27 _n._, 114, 117, 215

Constantinople, evolution of, 116 _sq._

Consuls and Italian cities, 198, 203, 207

Corinth, 105, 110, 131 _n._

Corporations, religious, 160, 235, 377

Cox, Sir G., cited, 66, 161

Creed politics, 405, 415, 424

Creighton, Bishop, 401 _n._

Cremona, 216

Crete, polity of, 59 _n._, 131-32, 133

Crichton and Wheaton, 264 _n._, 272, 273, 275

Cromer, Lord, discussed, 177 _sq._

Cromwell, Oliver, 318, 417-21, 424-33, 453;
Richard, 436;
Thomas, 395

Crusades, effects of, 69;
and slavery, 214, 296;
and civilisation, 383

Culture, Greek, 46 _sq._;
and the sexes, 61;
importance of diffusion of, 62

Culture-contacts, effects of, 57, 63;
conditions of success of, 57, 58;
and Greek civilisation, 64, 122;
in Christendom, 69, 150;
in Japan, 69, 70;
in modern Europe, 138 _sq._;
and Saracen civilisation, 146;
and Roman civilisation, 158, 163, 164;
and post-Roman civilisation, 189, 193;
and medieval Italy, 211, 219, 254;
and England, 212 _n._;
and Scandinavia, 279;
and Holland, 326;
and Renaissance, 340;
and England, 375

Cunningham, Dr., on Greek civilisation, 36, 129;
on Roman expansion, 67;
on Roman wars, 76 _n._, 78 _n._;
on Roman decline, 93-4;
on Athenian expenditure, 106 _n._;
on Greeks and Phoenicians, 129, 150;
on Black Death, 388;
on the Tudors, 402;
on Puritanism, 433;
on the mercantile system, 466

_Curiæ_, the Roman, 8 _sq._, 203

Currency, Roman, 80, 175;
Byzantine, 96;
Dutch, 311

Curtius, E., 130

Cybele, cult of, 163

Dahn, F., cited, 188 _n._

Danby, 442

Dändliker, 331, 339 _n._

Dante, 213, 217, 226, 233, 240 _n._

Daremberg, Dr., cited, 147-48

Darien Company, 456

Daru, 255 _n._

D'Aubigné, 430-31

David, J., 292

Davies, 291

Davis, Sir J., 67

---- H.W. C., 378

"Death," political, 33-4, 59

Decay, social, 22, 25, 32, 59, 69, 170 _sq._;
socio-physiological, 186;
socio-psychological, 61, 112, 141, 280, 411-13

Defoe, 413

Dekker, 406 _n._

De la Chambre, 445

Delacourt, 313

Delaunay, cited, 10, 11

Della Torre, 241

Democracy, Roman, 19 _sq._;
Greek, 38 _sq._, 46 _sq._;
French, 72;
American, 38 _n._, 365, 366;
Scandinavian, 276, 278;
Flemish, 300;
Dutch, 306, 310, 311;
English, 388, 414 _sq._;
Italian, 209 _sq._, 225;
Swiss, 350 _sq._;
conditions of success of, 52;
and intellectual life, 139

Demosthenes, 50, 105, 136

Denmark, structure of, 265;
political evolution of, 268, 271, 273, 273-74;
religion in, 268;
slavery in, 273, 274;
commerce of, 273;
Reformation in, 276-77;
culture of, 280-81

Dennis, G., 185

Denton, Rev. W., 385

Descartes, 326, 446

Despotism, and food supply, 55-6;
as political factor, 70;
and art, 135 _sq._, 166, 220, 224 _sq._;
and culture, 141, 153, 224 _sq._;
and decadence, 173;
in Holland, 299;
in Portugal, 357-58;
spirit of, 455

Deutsch, cited, 149 _n._, 157 _n._

De Witt, 291, 317, 319, 324

Dicæarchus, 105

Dierauer, 331, 334

Diocletian, 96, 113, 175

Dionysos, cult of, 164

Diophanes, 81

"Divine Right," 440 _sq._

Doge, the title, 204 _n._

Dogma and intellect, 61

Doles, Roman, 26, 82, 87;
Byzantine, 116

Domesday Book, 371, 376

Domitian, 166

Dorians, 130 _sq._

Dozy, cited, 154 _n._, 155 _n._

Drama, Greek, 126-27, 135;
French, 140;
Elizabethan, 140, 406, 409-13;
Roman, 165;
Spanish, 359, 413

Draper, 34, 56, 67

Drogheda, siege of, 427-30

Droysen, 135 _n._, 148 _n._

Droz, E., cited, 3 _n._

Druidism, 266

Drunkenness, English, 463, 467;
Scandinavian, 278

Dryden, 439, 442

Duccio, 220

Duffy, Miss, 182

Dunham, 187, 195, 197 _n._, 264 _n._

Dureau de la Malle, 24, 91

Dussieux, 465

Earle, Prof., 385

East Indies, 312, 324

Ecclesia, Athenian, 41

Economic causation, ix, 71;
Roman, 75 _sq._;
Greek, 98 _sq._, 133 _sq._;
Italian and other, 212, 215 _sq._, 221;
Scandinavian, 270, 277;
Dutch, 293, 295, 306, 313 _sq._, 324;
Portuguese, 359-60;
Brazilian, 366;
English, 397, 411, 412

Education and democracy, 63;
Greek, 123, 126;
Saracen, 153, 154 _n._;
Italian, 231, 247 _n._;
Scandinavian, 276;
Dutch, 319, 325-26, 330;
Portuguese, 364, 365;
Swiss, 346, 353-54;
Brazilian, 367;
English, 391, 396, 419 _n._

Edward III, 380, 384, 394 _n._;
IV, 392, 393;
VI, 397

Effen, Van, 326

Egypt, effect of Nile on polity of, 56;
civilisation of, 64;
culture of, 68;
art of, 125, 135;
human sacrifice in, 129;
modern, 177;
Moslem, 222

Eichhorn, 191

Eleusinia, the, 132

Eliot, 415, 416

Elizabeth, 398, 399-402

Emerson, 457

Emigration, Greek, 100;
Scandinavian, 270-71;
Swiss, 348, 353

Emilius, Paulus, 78

Empire, sociological process of, in Rome, 25 _sq._, 33, 87 _sq._, 92,
166, 170 _sq._;
in Byzantium, 115 _sq._;
in Greece, 133 _sq._;
in Turkey, 176;
in Florence, 249, 252;
in Scandinavia, 265, 271;
in Holland, 316, 324;
in France, 320;
in Britain, 323, 384, 386;
in Portugal, 356 _sq._;
and literature, 359

Enclosures, 393, 403

England, evolution of, in Anglo-Saxon times, 61, 191, 192, 204, 370,
374-75;
after Conquest, 69 _n._, 212, 288, 371 _sq._, 376, 384;
in Tudor period, 392 _sq._;
process of Rebellion, 414-17;
Cromwell's rule, 417-23;
Restoration politics, 423, 436 _sq._;
influence on French culture, 138;
influence on German culture, 139;
and Spain, 406-7, 420;
in eighteenth century, 229;
Reformation in, 238, 396 _sq._;
Industrial evolution of, 458 _sq._;
present polity of, 72, 79, 87 _sq._, 261;
and Holland, 318, 319, 320, 323, 425, 463;
and France, 320, 384, 392

Ennius, 158, 165

Epicurus, 135

Epimenides, 133

Equality, schemes of, 104

Equilibrium, social, 71, 114

Erasmus, 348

Erik I and II, 268

Essex, 399 _n._, 406, 407

Etruscans and Romans, 16, 158, 159 _n._;
civilisation of, 25, 185;
unity of, 68

Euripides, 46, 131

Europe, political variety of, 59

Exposure of infants, 100, 270

Ezzelino, 239

Falkland, 423

Fatalistic reasoning in politics, 178

_Faustrecht_, 286, 378