Chapter VI: Discussion of Kinship (2)

But even if the foremost importance of emotional elements and the possibility of treating them as collective feelings were granted, there is another objection to be met. Granted that these elements are actually quite essential in determining family relations, it might be objected that they are too shapeless and indeterminate in themselves to be of any practical use in scientific research, especially if our theories have to be based upon ethnographic observations in which the more tangible and the more unambiguous the facts chosen, the less the risk of being misled. Now, are not feelings of the most indeterminate character, the most misleading, and the most difficult to ascertain? In fact, the theory of feelings and emotions seems to be the least developed in individual as well as in social psychology. Especially it might be suggested that to pursue the investigation on double lines is useless; feelings always find adequate expression in ideas, in fact crystallize in them.[557] Without trying to give a general answer to these objections, they may be met as regards the special case under discussion. In Australia, as a matter of fact, they do not hold good. For our knowledge of the sentimental side of parental kinship is much better and much more determinate than our knowledge of any other aspect of this relation.

[557] It seems needless to add that the deep connection and
mutual dependence of both feelings and ideas is perfectly
acknowledged. This is not the place, of course, to pursue
any detailed psychological investigations. I would like
to remind the reader that all that is said here must be
judged by its application to the Australian facts given
below. In higher societies where art, poetry and thought
lend themselves much more to the expression of feelings,
the former afford objective documents of the latter. In
low societies we must look for such objective documents
elsewhere, in different sets of facts.

It may be here indicated why our knowledge on this point may be considered as a well-founded one. As stated below (pp. 249, 250) the agreement between the statements as to parental feelings is quite an exceptional one. Comparing it with the usual discrepancy between the reports of different observers on many other points, which would appear much less liable to any subjectivity, this complete agreement and the relative exactness of our information is highly remarkable.[558] It should be noted that on this point there is no extrinsic reason, or secondary motive, that would make us suspect an artificial cause of agreement. The point in question forms no part of any theory; it affects no moral or racial susceptibilities. And there was no special reason why so many observers should pay attention to it, and why they all should state the same thing: viz. extreme love and fondness towards the children on the part of the parents. This agreement shows that the facts which the ethnographers had under observation were so expressive of the underlying psychology, and they struck the writers so strongly that they simply felt compelled to notice them. And observing closely the facts through which those feelings of paternal affection found their expression, it becomes evident that these feelings are not so indeterminate as might _a priori_ be supposed; that, on the contrary, they find quite an unequivocal expression in a series of facts. Let us look more closely at these facts.

[558] Compare below, p. 250.

In the first place consider the facts of daily life[559]--the behaviour of parents towards children in all the cases where the latter want help or merit punishment. We read that on all such occasions both parents exhibit great kindness and extreme leniency. The children are carefully looked after by the father as well as by the mother; and they are very seldom punished. In one place it is even stated that the father is more lenient than the mother. Now is it not in agreement with all our every-day experiences that in such facts and features of daily life prominent and characteristic feelings find their adequate expression? And is the accordance of opinion among all our Australian informants on this point not a proof that they were able to judge with great certainty from these facts concerning the underlying feelings?--that these outer signs were unmistakable expressions of the inner facts? Undoubtedly our information is too little detailed, and particulars referring to treatment of children and other features of the aboriginal daily life in this connection would be of the highest value. But considering that the attention of the observers was never specially drawn to these questions by any theoretical writer, and comparing our information on this point with other parts of our evidence, it must be acknowledged that it is exceptionally good. And this reliability is doubtless in the first place due to the fact that the subject of observation was clear, unambiguous and well determined.

[559] Conys. _Statements_, pp. 238 _sqq._

We are, moreover, in possession of a few reports of actual occurrences in which the great love displayed by the parents for their children is shown in its full strength and under the stress of special circumstances. In a battle that took place between some aborigines and settlers, the former were put to flight. They had to cross a river, but in doing so they left a child behind them. It was seized by a Maori who was at the station, and it was shown to the blacks standing on the other bank of the river. The father of the child recognized it at once. He seemed almost frantic, held out his arms eagerly towards the child, making at the same time signs for it to be given to him. The Maori pretended to be willing to give it and made signs to the black to cross the river again. And the black swam across the river to rescue his child. Thus he did not hesitate to risk his life in order to save his child; in the end he was treacherously murdered by the Maori.[560] Another touching story is told by Rob. Dawson concerning a mother's grief after the loss of her son. He says that the woman was utterly transformed by the blow. "Before the catastrophe she was a remarkably fine woman, being tall and athletic beyond any other in the settlement; _now_, she was a truly wretched and forlorn spectacle, apparently wasted down by watching and sorrow. I have seen this poor creature often since our first meeting, at their different camps near us, and she has still the same wretched appearance."[561] These tales show that parental feelings could be as deep and pathetic among the Australian blacks as in any cultured society. We read another story in Howitt,[562] who tells us that when he was living one day in his camp in the Dieri country the father of a lad, who was visiting Howitt's camp the day before, came in a state of utmost alarm and terror. The lad, his son, was missing, and they could not find him. The father was terrified and, suspecting that the white men had concealed the lad and might carry him away, he looked through Howitt's luggage. It may be noted that this occurred among the Dieri, where it is said that individual paternity does not obtain. Nevertheless it was not a group of fathers that came worrying and striving to find the boy; neither was it a group of fathers that risked their lives for the child, nor a group of mothers that was grieving to death for their child. In the few anecdotes reported below with the other statements we see also how strongly paternal affection is marked. So in the story of the old man quite infatuated with his son and disconsolate after his death, and in the story of another man eager to rescue his boy, and the old man in Curr's story, who allowed his boy to do anything he liked.[563]

[560] Br. Smyth, ii. p. 311.

[561] _Loc. cit._, pp. 92, 93.

[562] _Kam. and Kurn._, p. 189.

[563] Compare pp. 248, 249; and 269 _sqq._

Such stories and anecdotes could be easily multiplied from the ethnographical material extant. They all corroborate our proposition, viz. that the sentimental side of the parental relation expresses itself quite clearly and tangibly in ever so many facts of different order, and that it would be easy for a well-informed observer to give a fairly exact account of the feelings in terms of facts. These facts, as said above, are in the first place the facts of daily life, which are quite unmistakable in their meaning and easily expressed in an accurate manner. The proof of it is that we have now relatively abundant data, although no methodical research was devoted to these facts. Then there are different occasions on which the limit of affection, the maximum and minimum of their range in a given society, is established. Such are the foregoing stories. I think we can safely conclude that the emotional side is on the one hand quite essential, and important enough to take the first place in our considerations.[564] On the other hand it can be accurately described in terms of objective data for the purpose of being chosen as the chief characteristic of the parental relation. It must be added that not a single other side or aspect of this relation appears to fulfil these conditions in the same degree. As will subsequently appear, our knowledge about the aboriginal _ideas_ on parental relationship are not so ample by far as our knowledge about their _feelings_ in that connection.

[564] The importance of the emotional character of parental
kinship has already been theoretically studied. Prof. K. Buecher
(_loc. cit._, p. 19) represents the primitive parents as
selfish, heartless, with no love or attachment for the
child, and draws important conclusions from this. Dr.
Steinmetz has subjected this assumption to a thorough
criticism; taking his stand on a rich collection of
ethnological data, he shows that this assumption is
without any ground; he fully acknowledges the importance
in sociological researches of behaviour, treatment and
emotional attitude in the parental relation. Compare his
important article in _Zeitschr. f. Soziologie_, i. pp. 608
_sqq._, and _Ethnologische Studien_, ii. pp. 186 _sqq._

The foregoing discussion has been mainly concerned with the collective ideas which define parental kinship, and the different sets of social facts in which these ideas find their expression have been enumerated. It also dealt with collective feelings, and the different facts in which these are to be looked for were surveyed. We must now emphasize the fact that just as we may say that the different ideas determining kinship converge towards one central concept, or rather flow out of one common central idea of kinship, so there is also an intimate connection between the ideas determining kinship and the feelings bound up with it. This becomes obvious if our own social conditions be considered. As mentioned above, a father in our society loves his child in a great measure because he knows that it is his own offspring. In societies in which the idea of consanguinity (in the social sense) does not exist, such a connection between feelings of paternal love and knowledge of a physiological procreation would be impossible. And it would be of the highest sociological interest to trace what form such connections assume. An attempt at such a study would be possible in our own society and in other higher societies, although there would be serious difficulties enough. But there would hardly be sufficient material to attempt it in any lower society, and there is absolutely no possibility of doing this for Australia.

A brief summary of the foregoing argument may now be given. It was stated at the beginning that parental kinship corresponds to a very complex and manifold set of phenomena; moreover in various societies this relationship is determined by various elements. The problem is to find in all this complexity the structural features, the really essential facts, the knowledge of which in any given society would enable us to give a scientifically valid description of kinship. In other words, the problem is to give a general formula defining kinship, which would state its constant elements and give heed to the essential varying elements therein; that formula being on the one hand not too narrow for application to the various human societies, it would be on the other hand not too vague to afford quite definite results when applied to any special case. A final solution of this problem cannot be arrived at _a priori_, but only by way of induction, after the facts in the different human societies have been studied. And in order to attempt such a preliminary study of the Australian facts, the foregoing remarks have been given; they aim at a general definition of the kind just described in the form of a tentative or preliminary sketch. Consequently in the first place the attempt was made to ascertain what could be taken as the constant elements in individual parental kinship. What appeared to be nearly universal in this connection is the fact that infants and small children are always specially attached, and stand in a specific close relation to a man and a woman.[565] The woman is invariably their own mother, who gave them birth; the man is the woman's husband. The existence of this group, which may be called the individual family, is the basis upon which kinship may be determined; it is the condition under which it is possible to speak of individual parental kinship in any given society.

[565] Compare the footnote above, p. 174.

But it was shown that the knowledge of these facts is not sufficient to yield a precise idea of maternal and paternal kinship, and that many of its manifold aspects of foremost sociological interest would remain unknown if the inquiry were broken off at this point. These latter aspects depend upon factors which are by no means constant in all societies, but have a very wide range of variation depending on the general social conditions. A discussion of the concept of consanguinity has shown that the variations go so far as to affect the main question of paternal kinship: "Who is the father (in the social sense) of a child, and how is he determined?"

In order to indicate in which direction the varying general conditions of society must be investigated so as to yield all that is essential for the sociological knowledge of kinship, it was found most convenient to range the facts in two main lines of inquiry: (1) The different sets of facts which express the central collective idea of what fatherhood is; and the various other collective ideas--legal, customary, moral--of a normative character referring to the relation in question. The social facts in which these ideas must be looked for are: Beliefs, traditions, customs referring to the relation in question (as for instance the couvade type), and functions of kindred such as legal duties and obligations between parent and child. (2) The facts in which the expression of the collective feelings characteristic of the relation in question is to be found. The facts of daily life, as well as the dramatic expression of feelings, come in here. The emotional character of the parental kinship relation is of the highest importance in determining the social feature of this relation, and for the comprehension of its social working.

These points of view will be applied hereafter to the discussion of the Australian parental kinship. But in order to illustrate here their theoretical bearing, a short discussion will be given of some of the ways in which the concept of kinship has been applied to low societies by sociologists. Morgan's way of dealing with the meaning of kinship must be first mentioned.[566] He assumes without further discussion that kinship was conceived always and in all societies, even the lowest ones, in terms of consanguinity.[567] Our discussion of consanguinity shows how great a mistake it was on the part of Morgan to impute to the primitive mind a whole series of ideas which absolutely and necessarily must have been foreign to it. As was said above, primitive mankind was certainly wholly ignorant of the process of procreation, and the relation of the sexes cannot possibly have been the source of kinship ideas. How great a part this assumption plays in Morgan's deductions it is easy to perceive.[568] And he was led to it by omitting to discuss and analyze the concept of kinship, and by applying to low societies our own social concept of it.

[566] Compare also above, p. 171.

[567] Compare especially _Systems, etc._, chap. ii.
pp. 10 _sqq._ "The family relationships are as ancient
as the _family_. They exist in virtue of the law of
derivation, which is expressed by the perpetuation of
the species through the marriage relations. A system of
_consanguinity_, which is _founded upon a community of
blood_, is but the formal expression and recognition of
these relationships." (The italics are mine.) This is
in other words the assumption that kinship was always
conceived as consanguinity, or community of blood through
procreation. Compare also _Ancient Society_, pp. 393, 395.

[568] _Systems, etc._, pp. 474 _sqq._, where the only
source of the classificatory system is attributed to
different "customs" referring to the sexual aspect of
marriage. As we saw, precisely this aspect is quite
irrelevant to the formation of primitive kinship ideas,
consequently also of primitive kinship terms.

J. F. MacLennan uses also the kinship concept as identical with that of blood relationship.[569] But it must be emphatically stated that MacLennan recognizes both the importance of feelings in relation to kinship[570] and the fact that consanguinity was not known to primitive man,[571] although he unfortunately does not develop these two important ideas.

[569] See _loc. cit._, pp. 83 _sqq._ It is difficult to
pick out any one clear statement to show that the author
identifies kinship with consanguinity. But a glance at the
pages quoted is enough to prove this. I quote a phrase from
the table of contents: "The most ancient system in which
the _idea of blood relationship_ was embodied was a system
of kinship through females only." (The italics are mine.)

[570] Men are always "bound together by a feeling of
kindred. The filial and paternal affections may be
instinctive. They are obviously independent of any theory
of kinship, its origin and consequences ... they may have
existed long before kinship became an object of thought,"
_op. cit._, p. 83. From these remarks it is only one step
to say that feelings ought to be considered as determining
elements, and that even if ideas corresponding to them did
not exist, kinship could not be denied.

[571] "No advocate of innate ideas will maintain their
existence on relationship by blood," _op. cit._, p. 83.

The same use of the concept of kinship (Verwandtschaft) was pointed out above as a mistake of Dargun's. The ideas on kinship of Prof. Frazer and Mr. Thomas were also dealt with above, where it was found that they were not adapted to the complexity of the facts.

Mr. Sidney Hartland rightly sees that kinship is not necessarily identical with consanguinity in our sense. But he wrongly restricts kinship to a specific kind of ideas about community of blood. "Though kinship, however, is not equivalent to blood relationship in our sense of the term, it is founded on the idea of common blood which all within the kin possess, and to which all outside the kin are strangers. A feeling of solidarity runs through the entire kin, so that it may be said without hyperbole that the kin is regarded as one entire life, one body whereof each unit is more than metaphorically a member, a limb. The same blood runs through them all, and 'the blood is the life.'"[572] This definition, illustrated as it is by many examples, is one more instance showing that the idea underlying kinship may be different from the idea of consanguinity in our sense, _i. e._ consanguinity of blood through procreation. But the affirmation that kinship is always based on some idea of common blood, seems to be not in accord with the facts. Moreover this passage, which is the only one designed to define kinship, is quite inadequate to the importance of the subject, especially in a treatise devoted to primitive paternity, and the result is that in this admirable work the purely sociological side presents some obscurities. The following remark: "Kindred with the father is first and foremost juridical--a social convention"[573] is also incorrect in the light of the foregoing discussion of the legal aspect of kinship.

[572] _Primitive Paternity_, i. pp. 257-258.

[573] Sidney Hartland, ii. p. 99.

Dr. Rivers defines: "Kin and Kinship.--These terms should be limited to the relationship ... which can be demonstrated genealogically." This is quite a formalistic definition and does not at all meet the full facts of the case. Moreover it seems that in this way we define the unknown by what is still more indeterminate. For to draw up a genealogy we must first know who are the individuals between whom the line of descent is to be drawn; in other words we must know how fatherhood is defined in a given society. Among the Todas, Dr. Rivers had to ascertain in what way the father of a given child is determined, before he could proceed to draw up the genealogies.[574] In any case the problem of kinship requires in the actual state of things not only a purely formal definition, but a detailed analysis. Much more important as regards the present problem is the way in which Dr. Rivers has described the kinship of the Torres Straits Islanders.[575] In introducing the study of the functions of kin he points to a series of important facts which determine some social aspect of kinship and afford an insight into some of the collective ideas concerning this relation. It must be borne in mind, however, that the set of functions described by Dr. Rivers gives us only a partial knowledge of the social aspect of kinship. The every-day functions corresponding to treatment, behaviour, feeding and so forth, which characterize the intimate or home aspect of the kinship relation, ought not to be omitted. They correspond, according to our analysis, to feelings which make an essential part of the relation in question. The social functions of kin collected by Dr. Rivers, expressing certain duties and privileges of the kinsmen involved, correspond to certain customary norms. A complete collection of all legal norms and all moral rules would be an essential addition. That such moral rules do exist among the Torres Straits Islanders appears certain from the precepts given at initiation to youths.[576]

[574] Of course I insist here only upon the logical and
methodological priority of the psychological determination
of kinship over the genealogical. In reality, wherever
individual paternal kinship exists, the genealogies may be
drawn first, and they possess an independent value, even
if we did not know what is the content of the aboriginal
idea of kinship. There is a series of highly valuable
sociological conclusions that may be drawn from a system of
genealogies (compare Dr. Rivers' article on this subject in
_Sociological Review_, 1910, pp. 1 _sqq._).

I do not, therefore, agree with the following remark of
Sir Laurence Gomme (_op. cit._, p. 232): "It is of no use
preparing a genealogical tree on the basis of civilized
knowledge of genealogy if such a document is beyond the
ken of the people to whom it relates. The information for
it may be correctly collected, but if the whole structure
is not within the compass of savage thought it is a
misleading anthropological document." If it is possible
at all to collect a genealogy, that means that individual
kinship exists in such a community; in other words the
"structure is within the compass of savage thought," only
it is not apprehended by them in the same manner as by us.
It is certainly true that in many cases the knowledge of
this aboriginal apprehension is essentially needful for a
sociologist. This has been argued in the text.

[575] _Camb. Univ. Exp._, v. chap. iii. on Kinship, pp. 129
_sqq._ In particular, pp. 142-152, under the headings "The
Functions of certain Kin," and "Kinship Taboos."

[576] Recorded by Dr. Haddon, _loc. cit._, v. p. 210.

Messrs. Fison and Howitt in their treatise on Australian kinship[577] do not give anywhere a clear definition of the concept in question. The only place where something like definition is given is page 121, where kinship is said to be "membership in the same tribal division," and where there is an acknowledgment that beyond "kinship" there still lies "personal relationship" between the parent and child. This is true, but this is only the first distinction upon which the actual discussion of the problem ought to be based. That the want of such a discussion is a serious defect in the book is obvious.

[577] _Kam. and Kurn._

The important distinction between kinship (_parenté_) and consanguinity, which is one of the chief results of the foregoing pages, has been made already by Prof. Durkheim.[578] Nevertheless the exclusive stress that M. Durkheim lays upon the legal aspect of kinship would not seem adapted to the complexity of the facts. "La parenté est essentiellement constitué par des obligations juridiques et morales que la société impose à certains individus." This is not enough. There are certain ideas which affirm a strong bond between parent and child, and undoubtedly these ideas, although neither of legal nor moral character, exercise a strong influence on the relation in question. Possibly the difference could be reduced to the broader sense in which Prof. Durkheim uses the words _legal_ and _moral_; as his remarks are necessarily short, being contained in a review, it is difficult exactly to ascertain their sense. We have tried to show that, especially in reference to low societies, both these terms must be used with caution, and that a definite sense must be given to them. Besides, I do not share Prof. Durkheim's view that by substituting the word "kinship" for the word "consanguinity" all Morgan's deductions could be rectified.[579] The constitution of the family is something quite different from and much more complicated than the sexual aspect of marriage, and it cannot be at once seen whether the nomenclature of kinship (systems of kinship terms) could be shown to be rooted in the former with the same ease as it can be shown in the latter case. This would require a special study.

[578] _A.S._, i. p. 316.

[579] _Ibid._, p. 318.

M. A. van Gennep also clearly establishes the distinction between _parenté sociale_ and _parenté physique_.[580] According to our terminology the latter would correspond to physiological consanguinity, while the former would be identical with what we called parental kinship. We see that this distinction is quite in agreement with our theory. Only we called social consanguinity a special case of kinship, where the collective ideas on procreation play the essential rôle. Obviously these ideas may be more or less physiologically correct or erroneous. But where they are completely absent (as in Australia) we prefer not to use the suggestive term _consanguinity_, and to distinguish these cases from the former we use the term _kinship_. M. A. van Gennep remarks further that the Central Australians do not know the real cause of procreation in spite of some illusory appearances (we shall deal with this question in detail below and solve it quite in agreement with the author in question); he shows the wide extension of this negative belief in the Australian continent, and speaking of the South Australian tribes, points out that the most important aspect is that they prove the independence of kinship and consanguinity.[581]

[580] _Loc. cit._, p. lxiii. (of the Introduction).

[581] "L'indépendance réciproque du point de vue biologique
et du point de vue social chez les Australiens." (_Ibid._,
p. lxv.)

The same distinction between consanguinity and kinship is also made by Prof. Westermarck in his discussion of the classificatory system of relationship, and Prof. Westermarck has already brought the important objection against Morgan, viz. that the latter has "given no evidence for the truth of his assumption that the classificatory system" is a system of blood ties,[582] an objection which has appeared also to us as fundamental. Unfortunately, Prof. Westermarck has not given any exhaustive discussion of the concept of kinship.

[582] _H.H.M._, p. 89.

Finally, I wish to mention a passage by Sir Laurence Gomme, which contains suggestive remarks nearly identical with some views set forth in this chapter. "It is of no use translating a native term as 'father,' if father did not mean to the savage what it means to us. It might mean something so very different. With us fatherhood connotes a definite individual with all sorts of social, economical and political associations, but what does it mean to the savage? It may mean physical fatherhood and nothing more, and physical fatherhood may be a fact of the veriest insignificance. It may mean social fatherhood ... and thus becomes" (in some cases), "much more than we can understand by the term father."[583]

[583] _Loc. cit._, pp. 232, 233; compare also above
p. 182, footnote. Apart from the naturally somewhat loose
terminology (the passage about kinship is intended as an
example only, and does not aim at a full treatment of the
subject)--the passages quoted express the same ideas which
served as a starting-point for this chapter.

I came across the paragraph in question unfortunately only
after the MS. of the present chapter had been finished
and the foregoing chapters had been printed. The opinion
of Sir Laurence Gomme would also have been of value in
support of the views expressed in the Introduction, pp. 6,
7, where I try to show that it is meaningless to use the
word "family" as a rigidly determined concept of universal
application. "The family as seen in savage society, and
the family as it appears among the antiquities of the
Indo-European people, are totally distinct in origin, in
compass and in force" (Sir Laurence Gomme, _loc. cit._,
pp. 236, 237). And the author applies his criticism to the
same two writers who have been the objects of my attacks
(Mr. A. Lang and Mr. N. W. Thomas, see _op. cit._, p. 236,
footnote 1). And, again, Sir Laurence Gomme argues that
the unqualified use of the term "family" is very harmful,
"because of the universal application of this term to the
smallest social unit of the civilized world, and because of
the fundamental difference of structure of the units which
roughly answer to the definition of family in various parts
of the world" (_op. cit._, p. 235). Certainly there is also
a _fundamental analogy_ of structure between all forms of
human family; but the problem must be set forth and it
must be acknowledged that this social unit undergoes deep
changes as other elements of social structure change.

It may also be pointed out for the sake of completeness that in the great majority of human societies parental kinship assumes the form of consanguinity; the ideas that underlie kinship are generally gathered round the facts of procreation. These facts are connected with such deep and powerful instincts and feelings that in the majority of cases they naturally shape and influence the ideas of maternity and paternity. But the few exceptions to this rule which we meet with in very primitive societies are of the highest theoretical interest, both from the evolutionist's and psychologist's point of view. The final remark I would like to make here is on the well-known fact that physiological maternity is much more easily ascertainable than physiological paternity. Paternal kinship, therefore, will much more frequently differ from what we called consanguinity than maternal kinship. But some of the Australian examples and our previous general considerations should make us cautious in laying down _a priori_ any assertion of the purely physiological character of maternity.

II

SOME EXAMPLES OF KINSHIP IDEAS SUGGESTED BY THE AUSTRALIAN FOLK-LORE

The foregoing remarks on kinship, and the sketch of a general definition of kinship given above, of course bear upon the whole of the present investigations, since parental kinship being one of the relationships involved in the individual family, all that refers to this latter unit relates more or less immediately to parental kinship. In the other chapters we attempt to discuss the existence of the individual family, and of those of its features which appear to be universal, and which have, therefore, been adopted as the basis of parental kinship. The general features of the Australian individual family are given in the concluding chapter, and a comparison of the results presented there with the foregoing general definition of kinship[584] will be sufficient to satisfy the first point of this definition, _i. e._ to prove the existence of individual parental kinship in Australia and to describe its constant elements. In the following chapter (Chap. VII.) attention will be paid to the functions of kin, which correspond to the collective feelings of parents to children. Here we shall discuss the data taken from Australian folk-lore, which bear upon the parental kinship, and shall thus satisfy that part of our definition in which it was laid down that the ideas of kinship must be investigated.

[584] pp. 198 _sqq._

The survey may commence with the Central tribes, the folk-lore of which we know best, owing to the excellent information given by Messrs. Spencer and Gillen, subsequently confirmed in its main lines by the joint publication of Herr Strehlow and Frhr. von Leonhardi. In these works we possess a very detailed description of the aboriginal views on conception and birth, which are connected with their totemic beliefs. These views will not be reproduced here _in extenso_, and the reader is referred to the sources and the special works.[585] The reader is therefore, supposed to be acquainted with the aboriginal views on conception, and only the ideas which in these theories refer directly to our subject, _i. e._ those underlying parental kinship, will be dealt with here.

[585] Here in the first place must be mentioned the works
of Spencer and Gillen, _Nat. Tr._, pp. 123-127, 255; _Nor.
Tr._, pp. 144, 163 _sqq._, 169 _sqq._, 174-176, 150, 330,
331; Mrs. Parker, pp. 50 _sqq._, 61, 98.

Strehlow, _loc. cit._, i., on the second and third pages
of the Preface by Frhr. von Leonhardi (there is no
pagination), ii. pp. 51 _sqq._, iii. pp. x.-xi. of the
Preface by Frhr. von Leonhardi. A short notice on totemic
conception and on local distribution of spirit-children
is communicated by Rev. L. Schultze, _Trans. and Proc.
R.S.S.A._, xiv. p. 237 (1891). R. H. Mathews communicated
in several places beliefs in reincarnation and totemic
conception. See _Jour. and Proc. R.S.N.S.W._, xl. pp. 108
_sqq._, _ibid._, xli. p. 147. And _Queensland Geographical
Journal_, xx. p. 73, and xxii. pp. 75, 76. _Am. Anthr._,
xxviii. p. 144. _Bull. Soc. of Anthr._, Paris, vii. serie
v. p. 171. Herbert Basedow, _Trans. R.S.S.A._, xxxi.
(1907), p. 4. (Short communication concerning the Larrekiya
tribe of the Northern territory, South Australia.) Amongst
the sources must be quoted the communications given by
Prof. Frazer on the authority of Dr. Frodsham, Bishop
of North Queensland, and the Rev. C. W. Morrison, which
refer to the Northern and North-Eastern tribes in general.
Frazer, _Tot. and Exog._, i., p. 577.

In fact, the theory of totemic conception is so closely
connected with the whole of the aboriginal totemic beliefs
that it is necessary to be acquainted with the latter in
order to understand the former; and for this the perusal
of both the works of Messrs. Spencer and Gillen and of
Strehlow is necessary.

Among the theoretical works dealing with primitive views
of conception and paternity (in Australia and in general),
we must place first the treatise of Mr. E. S. Hartland,
_Primitive Paternity_, which is the most extensive
and thorough examination of all beliefs, referring
to a supernatural cause of birth and all its social
consequences. The beliefs in question play an important
rôle in Prof. Frazer's work on _Totemism and Exogamy_. See
especially vol. iv., on origins of Totemism.

We may mention also the works of van Gennep, _Mythes et
Légendes d'Australie_, especially chaps. v. and vi. of
the Introduction, pp. 44-67, in which the ignorance of
the natives is illustrated by several interesting remarks
and inferences from other facts (for example, the beliefs
of the aborigines about the rôle and nature of the sexual
organs, pp. 111 _sqq._). Compare also the article of
Frhr. v. Reitzenstein, _Z.f.E._, xli., pp. 644 _sqq._ Mr.
A. Lang's views (comp. above, p. 181, footnote 1) are
expounded in _Anthrop. Essays_, pp. 203 _sqq._, and in _The
Secret of the Totem_, chap. xi.

Roughly speaking it may be said that these totemic beliefs and theories of conception prevent the aboriginal mind from forming the idea of physiological paternity and even probably weaken the social importance of maternity. For the only cause of pregnancy is that a "spirit-child" entered the body of a woman. "The natives one and all in these tribes believe that the child is the direct result of the entrance into the mother of an ancestral spirit individual. They have no idea of procreation as being directly associated with sexual intercourse, and firmly believe that children can be born without this taking place. There are, for example, in the Arunta country certain stones which are supposed to be charged with spirit children, who can, by magic, be made to enter the bodies of women, or will do so on their own accord."[586] Accordingly no tie of blood can be supposed to exist between the father and his child; there is no room for any ideas of physiological paternity; in other words, using our terminology, social consanguinity between father and child does not exist.[587] This is the most general conclusion that can be drawn from the beliefs quoted. But in connection with this question there are still some details, some controversial points into which we must enter in order to dissipate any doubts as to the correctness of our general conclusions just mentioned, as well as of some subsequent reasonings.

[586] This refers to the whole Central and North Central
area. Spencer and Gillen, _Nor. Tr._, p. 330. In a short
note of recent date (_Athenæum_, Nov. 4, 1911, p. 562), we
read that Prof. B. Spencer has found the same absence of
physiological knowledge in the tribes living North-West of
the "Northern Tribes" (from Roper River to Port Darwin).
According to his opinion this belief obtains from the South
Coast of Australia over a broad belt right through the
Centre to the North Coast. (_Ibid._)

[587] It may be remembered here that this is not in
contradiction with the passage in M. A. von Gennep's work,
_Mythes and Légendes d'Australie_, p. lxiii, implying
that there is social but not physiological consanguinity
between father and child in the Central Australian tribes.
The difference in terminology is explained above, p. 178,
footnote 1, and reasons are given explaining why I did not
adopt M. A. von Gennep's terminology, although I completely
share his views.

(1) There seems to be some incertitude as to the complete absence among the natives of any knowledge regarding the physiology of procreation. We read in Strehlow,[588] "Übrigens wissen die alten Männer, wie mir versichert wurde, dass die cohabitatio als Grund der Kinderkonzeption anzusehen sei, sagen aber davon den jüngeren Männern und Frauen nichts." This phrase might evoke some doubts as to whether we should attribute so much importance to the alleged ignorance.[589] But according to subsequent information in the same publication,[590] we must not attach to this phrase too much weight. Possibly the knowledge of the old men comes from alien sources; at any rate we see from the explanation given below by Frhr. von Leonhardi that this phrase does not rest on any concrete facts, or any well-founded information. From the point of view of collective ideas it must always be remembered that it is in the social institutions of a given people and in the whole of their beliefs that we must look for the foundation and confirmation of a given creed. It would be a superfluous digression to point out how deeply the totemic theory of conception is connected with all the other beliefs and the whole social life of the Australian aborigines--as this has been done by so many students of the subject, and pre-eminently by Prof. Frazer in his recent work on _Totemism and Exogamy_. Some doubts might also arise from the fact that the natives apparently know the real process of propagation in the case of the animals. There is undoubtedly some difficulty here; and additional information on this point would be most valuable. Nevertheless the case is not quite hopeless: if we assume that this correct physiological knowledge is of a relatively late origin, it is quite natural that it would arise first in relation to the animal world, because the ideas about man, being the most important and elaborate, would be the most conservative. Anyhow this point requires further elucidation.[591]

[588] _Loc. cit._, ii. p. 52, footnote 7.

[589] Attention was drawn to this phrase by P. W. Schmidt
in his article in _Zeitschrift für Ethnologie_ (1908),
p. 866 _sqq._, where the theory of conception among the Arunta
is discussed. He doubts: "Ob wirklich eine vollständige
Unkenntniss des Zusammenhanges von Koitus und Konzeption in
primitivem Zustande vorhanden ist."--_Loc. cit._, p. 883.

[590] Strehlow, iii. pp. x., xi.

[591] Frhr. von Reitzenstein shares the view here accepted;
comp. his review of Mr. Hartland's "Primitive Paternity" in
_Zeitschr. f. Ethnologie_, 43 Jhg. (1911), p. 175.

(2) We must insist upon another point, which might at first sight cast some shadow of suspicion even on the foregoing one. We read in Spencer and Gillen[592] that sexual intercourse "prepares the mother for the reception and birth also of an already formed spirit-child who inhabits one of the local totem centres." And this belief of "preparation," although at first denied by Strehlow,[593] was substantiated by him after a more careful investigation and emphatically affirmed.[594] Although there might seem to be at first sight some room for doubt, whether this belief does not create some connection between copulation and pregnancy, and so a bridge for the formation of ideas of paternity, a moment's reflection dissipates these doubts. For in this belief there is absolutely nothing that would point to any _individual_ male as the father of the child. We do not know whether, according to the native beliefs, there must be this preparation for each incarnation, or whether it means only that a female cannot conceive without being deflorated. Considering the emphasis with which, according to Spencer and Gillen, the natives deny any causal connection between copulation and birth, the second supposition seems to be the more probable. But even if the first supposition were the right one, it does not imply any knowledge that a given man has contributed to the body or soul of the child. The latter, already formed (although diminutive in form) enters the womb of a woman. We see therefore that our general conclusion of page 209 is by no means contradicted by this detail in the aboriginal beliefs.

[592] _Nat. Tr._, p. 265.

[593] _Loc. cit._, ii. p. 52, footnote 7.

[594] _Loc. cit._, iii. p. xi.

(3) In the third place I would like to deal with the question whether the totemic beliefs concerning conception contain the idea of any reincarnation of ancestors, as this point will be subsequently of importance to us. And on this important question there is controversy too. Spencer and Gillen emphatically state: "In the whole of this wide area, the belief that every living member of the tribe is the reincarnation of a spirit ancestor is universal. This belief is just as firmly held by the Urabunna people, who count descent in the female line, as in the Arunta and Warramunga, who count descent in the male line."[595]

[595] _Nor. Tr._, p. xi. Compare also pp. 145, 606. Spencer
and Gillen's statement is corroborated by various other
independent authors, some of them being even critically
disposed. The reincarnation of ancestors is asserted by the
missionaries Teichelmann and Schürmann, in reference to the
Adelaide tribe (compare below, p. 217, note 4). Mr. Thomas
has shown (_Man_, 1904, § 68, pp. 99, 100) that the belief
in reincarnation is implied in the Rev. L. Schultze's
statement. Mrs. Parker quotes also beliefs containing the
idea of reincarnation (_loc. cit._, pp. 50, 56, 73, 89;
quoted by Mr. E. S. Hartland, _loc. cit._, i. p. 243). Mr.
R. H. Mathews also emphatically affirms the existence of a
belief in reincarnation amongst the Central and even all
the other Australian tribes (_Trans. R.S.N.S.W._, 1906,
xi. pp. 110 _sqq._). He says: "In all aboriginal tribes
there is a deeply-seated belief in the reincarnation of
their ancestors." And he gives illustrations of this belief
among the Arunta. Mr. Mathews also draws attention to a
series of analogous statements from older authors (Taplin,
_loc. cit._, p. 88, Schürmann, _loc. cit._, p. 235). Prof.
B. Spencer has ascertained the existence of ideas about
reincarnation in his recent investigations among the
natives of the extreme North Roper River to Port Darwin.
_Athenæum_, Nov. 4, 1911, p. 562.

On the other hand, the belief in reincarnation is expressly and explicitly denied by Strehlow and Leonhardi: "Den Glauben an eine immer wiederkehrende Reincarnation dieses altjirangamitjina (= alcheringa of Spencer and Gillen), den Spencer and Gillen gefunden haben wollen, hat Herr Strehlow nicht feststellen können."[596] In another passage of the same work the expression of Spencer and Gillen, "in every tribe without exception there exists a firm belief in the reincarnation of ancestors," is simply designated as misleading ("irreführend") by the editor (Frhr. v. Leonhardi).[597]

[596] Bn. Leonhardi in Strehlow, i. Introduction (third
page; there is no pagination).

[597] Strehlow, ii. p. 57, end of the long footnote.

We seem here to be again at a loss. For behind the mere assertions of both parties there is a considerable amount of fact which seems to corroborate each of them. Spencer and Gillen do not give us bare statements. Such concrete and detailed accounts of beliefs as those quoted below[598] are very cogent. We see by them that Spencer and Gillen's assertion concerning the existence of reincarnation is the general expression of a series of positive facts; as there cannot be any doubt as to the authenticity of the latter, the general assertion of our authors is convincing! But if we inquire more precisely into the nature of this reincarnation we find certain "contradictions" and "inconsistencies" in these beliefs, and we can quite safely agree with Frhr. von Leonhardi that if we "take the expression exactly to the letter"[599] we are compelled to deny the existence of any ideas of reincarnation. The only objection is that any attempt to give "strict" or "exact" sense to aboriginal ideas is completely misplaced. The aborigines are not able to think exactly, and their beliefs do not possess any "exact meaning." And if an attempt be made to interpret them in this way, we shall always fail to understand them and to trace their social bearing. We must accept those beliefs as they stand in their quaint concreteness, full of contradictions and inconsistencies, and endeavour to mould our ideas upon the given folkloristic material, of which an adequate knowledge is indispensable for sociological purposes and gives us a very deep insight into the mechanism of different social groups. So, for instance, the aboriginal beliefs of reincarnation will be found to be of some importance as regards the idea of kinship.

[598] Compare p. 216.

[599] _Loc. cit._, ii. p. 56.

But let us return to our analysis of this aboriginal idea of reincarnation. To define the word _exactly_ the expression of Baron Leonhardi may be accepted; reincarnation means "that the given totemic ancestor himself continually undergoes rebirth." In other words the belief in reincarnation logically defined consists in a strict identification of a given man with a given ancestor. From this it is obvious that one would look in vain for such a belief amongst the Australian savages, who do not know anything of logic, and can neither affirm identity nor perceive contradictions.[600] Instead of identifying two things, they feel only a strong but mystical bond of union between them. In this sense the new-born child is obviously a reincarnation of a given ancestor. For it is "identical" with the spirit-child or _ratapa_ of which it is the incarnation, and this again is "identical" with a given Alcheringa: obviously using the word "identity" in the sense indicated above, _i. e._ that there is some mystical tie between the Alcheringa and the spirit-child which has emanated from him or her.[601] That this tie exists, we know from the data,[602] from those given by Strehlow as well as from those of Spencer and Gillen.[603] And consequently it may be said that the Central Australians regard each man as the reincarnation of a given ancestor; this being, of course, understood with the restriction here laid down. Thus, any doubt as to this point--namely that all human beings are reincarnations of _Alcheringa ancestors_--may easily be set at rest.

[600] M. Lévy-Bruhl writes: "En appelant la mentalité
primitive 'prélogique,' je veux seulement dire qu'elle ne
s'astreint pas avant tout comme notre pensée, à s'abstenir
de la contradiction. Elle obéit d'abord a la loi de
participation."--_Loc. cit._, p. 79.

[601] In primitive thinking the identification is
accomplished not according to logical categories, but
according to the _loi de participation_ introduced by
M. Lévy-Bruhl. (Compare foregoing footnote.) To this work
the reader must be referred for a deeper insight into the
standpoint adopted in the present discussion.

[602] This assertion ought to be proved by a detailed
analysis of the beliefs mentioned. As the problem is of no
immediate importance, this discussion cannot be undertaken.
The aboriginal ideas of reincarnation have been treated
from the point of view of the _loi de participation_ by
M. Lévy-Bruhl.--_Loc. cit._, pp. 396 _sqq._

[603] Spencer and Gillen themselves in many places make
statements that stand in direct contradiction with a
theory of reincarnation _literally_ understood. Frhr. von
Leonhardi takes the trouble to adduce several instances of
these contradictions (ii. p. 56, footnote 1). They might
easily be multiplied, but as argued in the text they do
not affect in the least the value of the information. The
description of these beliefs given by Strehlow (_loc.
cit._, ii. pp. 51 _sqq._), does not differ radically from
what we know about them from Spencer and Gillen, although
Strehlow's account is more detailed.

There still remains, however, the question, much more important to us, whether there be amongst these tribes the belief in the reincarnation of _human ancestors_. Strehlow's information seems absolutely to deny any idea of repeated reincarnation;[604] a man after death goes to the _ltjarilkna-ala_, where after a certain time his ghost undergoes perfect and final destruction.[605] A man who has lived his life never returns. I confess that to assume amongst savages the existence of such a neatly defined and categorically-formulated belief in absolute destruction or annihilation seems to me rather suspicious; and there is perhaps some misunderstanding of a rather theoretical character on the part of the Rev. C. Strehlow. Moreover, we are informed by this latter author that besides this belief in annihilation there are ideas according to which the souls of "good" men go to heaven to Altjira,[606] and the souls of the "bad" people are eaten up by the _atna ntjkantja_.[607] Consequently not all souls perish after death, and reincarnation is from this standpoint not impossible. And even if there were some belief as to this annihilation, it might perfectly well be connected by the natives with the ideas of reincarnation. The primitive mind, as has often been urged, does not perceive contradictions. It is not to negative instances that we must look for an answer, but always to positive ones: if we do find indications of a belief, we are then sure that it exists, even if it were in contradiction with ever so many others. If we do not find it, we can say nothing, and especially we are not justified in proving its absence by showing that it stands in contradiction with any of the beliefs ascertained.

[604] _Loc. cit._, ii. p. 56.

[605] _Loc. cit._, i. 16, ii. 7.

[606] The Altjira is the "good god (?) of the Aranda," i.
p. 2.

[607] I cannot help feeling that this very belief in future
rewards (by the _good god_) and punishment appears somewhat
tinged by Christian teachings.