Chapter IV: Accusations And Objections (3)

Correct as these arguments were, it was nevertheless imprudent for the court mathematician to trespass upon grounds regarded by theologians as their own, instead of furnishing natural scientific proofs. Thus the matter was brought to Rome before the Congregation of the Inquisition. _Galileo_, worrying about his case, went voluntarily to Rome, in 1615. He failed to assuage the opposition against his theory, though he says he was received favourably by the princes of the Church. Moreover, heedless of the admonition of his friends, he pursued the matter with indiscreet zeal, with vehemence and impetuosity, practically provoking a decision. Cardinal _Bellarmin_ opposed the haste with which the matter was being pressed; the Jesuit _Grienberger_ thought that _Galileo_ should first set forth his proofs, and then speak about the Scriptures. Had scientific proofs been brought forth, theological difficulties would have been easily cleared away; but scientific proof was lacking, and what there perhaps was of it, _Galileo_ failed to offer.

The right of the Congregation to take up the matter can hardly be denied, for although the matter was one of natural sciences, yet, by introducing theology and Scripture, it had assumed the character of theology and exegesis. _Galileo_ personally was dealt with very leniently. During the discussions of 1616 he was never cited before the bar of the Inquisition, nor was his exterior freedom in any way restricted. Only one thing was done: he was cautioned by Cardinal _Bellarmin_, “by order of the Holy Congregation,” not to adhere to, nor teach any longer, the Copernican theory. The documents of the case say that “_Galileo_ submitted to this order and promised to obey.” The Congregation of the Index prohibited, March 5, 1616, all books defending the Copernican theory, declaring the doctrine to be against Holy Scripture. Even the work of _Copernicus_ was prohibited _donec corrigatur_—until it be corrected. A decision of the year 1620 declared which passages should be corrected. They are those in which the author speaks of his theory not as an hypothesis but as of an established truth: _non ex hypothesi, sed asserando_. The Protestant _Kepler_, upon hearing this, wrote: “By their imprudent acts some have caused the work of _Copernicus_ to be condemned, after it had been left unmolested for nearly eighty years; and the prohibition will last at least till the corrections are made. I have been assured, however, by competent authority, both ecclesiastical and civil, that the decree was not intended to put any hindrance in the way of astronomical research” (_A. Mueller_, J. Kepler, 1903, 105). The reproach of imprudence was intended for _Galileo_.

To teach the doctrine as an hypothesis was permitted even to _Galileo_, and this left the way clear for the development of the hypothesis, because whatever showed the usefulness of the hypothesis was sure to increase its value as a truth, but _Galileo_ would not keep within these limits. Instead of showing in a Christian spirit a submission to Providence, which even an erring authority may demand, he openly violated his promise and disobeyed the command he had received. In the spring of 1632 there appeared at Florence his “_Dialogue on the two most important systems of the world_.” It contained an open, though by no means victorious, defence of the Copernican system—seeking to hide under a confidence-inspiring mask. It contained many passages of caustic sarcasm, with the evident intention of arousing public opinion against the attitude of the Roman Congregations. It was a flagrant _violation of the command given him personally_.

The Pope under whom the proceedings against _Galileo_ took place was _Urban VIII._, who, when a Cardinal, had followed _Galileo’s_ discoveries with enthusiasm, though never partial to the system of _Copernicus_, and, in accord with the custom of the age, he had written an ode to _Galileo_.

Cited to Rome, _Galileo_ came only after repeated urging, on February 14, 1633. The story of his having been imprisoned and tortured on this second visit to Rome is false. _Galileo_ wrote on April 16 of that year: “I live in an apartment of three rooms, belonging to the Fiscal of the Inquisition, and am free to move in many rooms. My health is good.” This stay in the apartment belonging to the Inquisition lasted but twenty-two days; after that _Galileo_ was allowed to live in the palace of the Ambassador of Tuscany. During his whole life _Galileo_ was never even for an hour in a real prison.

_Galileo’s_ demeanour before the Inquisition bespeaks little truthfulness and manliness. It makes a painful impression. Many other events in his life cast dark shades of insincerity upon his character, especially his relations with _Kepler_. While in his dialogue he openly defended the truth of the Copernican system, while he had written, time and again, that the theory had been demonstrated by “forceful, convincing arguments,” whereas nothing but insignificant reasons could be pleaded for the contrary, he now assumes the attitude before the Inquisition of denying that he had championed that theory, at least not consciously; that he had never taught that doctrine otherwise than hypothetically. And this he asserts although he had taken the oath to say nothing but the truth. We even hear him declare that he considers the doctrine to be false, and that he was ready to refute it at once.

The judges were convinced of the untruthfulness of the defendant. In those times, in order to obtain further confessions, especially when the accused had been previously convicted of guilt, torture was resorted to. This regrettable practice was then in vogue at every European court; the Inquisition, too, had adopted it, but strict rules were laid down to guard against abuses. Very old persons were exempt from the rack; they were only threatened with it. This happened also in _Galileo’s_ case, he was never actually put on the rack. Moreover, one can safely presume that this threat did not terrify him much. His reading must have enlightened him on this point, and even without it he must have known the practice by his active intercourse with those theologians of the Curia who were friendly to him. In fact, he clung obstinately to his denial, to the very end of the hearing, although it must be surmised that he would not have aggravated his case by confession. The commissioner of Inquisition, _Macolano_, at the first stages of the trial had expressed his hope that in this event “it would be possible to show indulgence to the guilty, and whatever the result might be, he would realize the benefit received, apart from all other consequences to be expected from a desired mutual satisfaction” (Letter to Cardinal _Fr. Barberini_, April 28, 1633).

On June 22 _the final verdict_ was rendered: it told the defendant: “Thou art convicted by the Holy Congregation of being suspected of heresy, to wit, to have held for true, and believed in, a false theory, contrary to Holy Writ—which makes the sun the centre of the orbit of the earth, without moving from east to west, and which lets the earth, on the other hand, move outside the centre of the world, and to have believed that an opinion may be considered probable and be defended, though it had been expressly declared to be contrary to the Scripture.” _Galileo_ was declared suspect of heresy, because, in the opinion of the judges, he had assumed that a doctrine in contradiction to the Scriptures might be defended. _Galileo_ retracted by oath. That upon retraction he arose and exclaimed, stamping with his foot, “_Pur si muove!_” (“and yet it does move!”) is a fable. He was sentenced to be jailed in the Holy Office. But already the next day he was allowed to go to the palace of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and to consider that palace his prison. Soon after he departed for Siena, “in the best of health,” according to the report of the Tuscan ambassador, _Niccolini_, and there took up his abode with his friend the Archbishop _Piccolomini_. After a lapse of five months he was allowed to return to his villa at Arcetri, near Florence, where he remained, with the exception of occasional visits to Florence, till his death. Two of his daughters were nuns in the nearby cloister of S. Matteo. His literary activity was not suppressed by the surveillance of the Inquisition. His lively and fertile mind, cut off from polemics, turned to the completion of his researches in other directions. His lively intercourse with friends and disciples, of whom many belonged to various Orders, proved beneficial to him. In the year 1638 he published his “Dialogue on the New Sciences,” which he rightly pronounced to be his best effort, and by which he became the founder of dynamics. His productiveness continued until he became blind.

We may say without fear of contradiction that, apart from their theoretical error, the Roman Congregations had shown the greatest indulgence towards one guilty of having broken his pledge, and doubtless they would have been still more lenient had _Galileo_, confirmed by flattering friends in his anger at the supposed intrigues of his enemies, not himself made this impossible; if he had not continued to propagate secretly his views, verbally and in writing, which was bound to be discovered. Considering all this, Rome’s proceeding in the case appears to be quite indulgent. Here the position was taken that the spread of the doctrine would mean an imminent danger to the purity of the faith. The unfortunate scientist died on January 8, 1642, at the age of seventy-eight years, fortified by the holy Sacraments. _Urban VIII._ sent him his blessing. Undoubtedly _Galileo_ had nothing in common with the champions of that unbelieving freedom of science, which now tries to lift him upon its shield; notwithstanding his later bitterness he remained to his death steadfast in his Catholic faith.

Comments on the Galileo Case.

The above is a brief history of _Galileo’s_ conviction, and of the occurrences leading to it. An event regrettable to all, a stumbling-block for not a few; for others a welcome event to make the Church appear in the light of an enemy of science. Let us now give more particulars of the merits of the case.

We have before us two decisions of Roman Tribunals: the Index decree of 1616, announcing the rejection of the Copernican doctrine and prohibiting books maintaining it, and the conviction of _Galileo_ in 1633 by the Congregation of the Inquisition. It is freely admitted that these Roman Tribunals committed an _error_ in advocating an interpretation of the Bible which was false in itself, and is to-day recognized as false.

Well, _does this confute the infallibility of the Church?_ It does not. The matter in point is merely an error of the Congregations, of bodies of Cardinals, who were responsible for the transactions and decisions. The Congregations, however, are not infallible organs. There is no Bull or Papal decree designating the Copernican doctrine as false, much less is there extant a decision ex cathedra. Neither in 1616 nor in 1633, nor at any other time, has the Holy See ever manifested its intention of declaring, by a peremptory, dogmatic decision, the new system to be against Scripture.

It was thus the general understanding of that age that in the
present case there was no irrevocable dogmatic decision given. For
instance, the Jesuit _Riccioli_, wrote not long after the
decision: “Inasmuch as no dogmatic decision was rendered in this
case, neither on the part of the Pope nor on the part of a Council
ruled by the Pope and acknowledged by him, it is not made, by
virtue of that decree of the Congregation, a doctrine of faith
that the sun is moving and the earth standing still, but at most
it is a doctrine for those who by reason of Holy Writ seem to be
morally certain that God has so revealed it. Yet every Catholic is
bound by virtue of obedience to conform to the decree of the
Congregation, or at least not to teach what is directly opposed to
it” (Almagestum novum, 1651, 162). _Descartes_, _Gassendi_, and
others of that time expressed themselves similarly (_Grisar_, 165,
_seq._). There is an interesting letter of the Protestant
philosopher _Leibnitz_, written to the Landgrave _Ernest of
Hessia_, 1688, begging him to work for the repeal of the
condemnation of the Copernican theory, because of the growing
verification of this theory: “If the Congregation would change its
censure, or mitigate it, as one issued hastily at a time when the
proofs for the correctness of the Copernican theory were not yet
clear enough, this step could not detract from the authority of
the Congregation, much less of the Church, because the Pope had no
part in it. There is no judicial authority which has not at times
reformed its own decisions.”

But have we here not at least a _wilful attack on science_? or a manifestation of the Congregation’s narrow-mindedness and ignorance, which are bound to deprive it of all respect and confidence of sober-minded people?

This harsh judgment overlooks two points. In the first place, the error of the judges was quite _pardonable_. Could the liberal critics of to-day, who so harshly denounce the Cardinals of the Congregation, be suddenly changed into ecclesiastical prelates, and transferred back to the years of 1616-1633, and placed in the chairs of the tribunal which had to decide those delicate questions, it may be feared that, did they carry into the decision but a part of the animosity they now show, they would disgrace themselves and compromise the Church even more than the judges of _Galileo_ did. It is true that were we to judge the handling of the question by the knowledge of to-day, we might be astonished at the narrow-mindedness of the judges, trying to uphold their untenable views against the established results of scientific research. But it would be altogether unhistorical to look at the matter in that way. When the Copernican theory entered upon the battlefield, it was _by no means certain and demonstrated_.

The real arguments for the rotation of the earth were not then
known. There were no direct proofs for the progressive revolution
of the earth around the sun. _Galileo_ advanced three main
arguments for his theory. First, he advanced the argument from the
phenomenon of the tides, which, he said, could not be accounted
for but by the rotation of the earth: an argument rejected as
futile even at that time. Next he argued from certain observations
of the spots on the sun: another worthless argument, which others,
like _Scheiner_, looked upon as proof of the older theory. The
third argument was that the new theory simplified the explanation
of certain celestial phenomena; but the scope of this argument,
valid though it was in the abstract, could not be expressed or
grasped at the time, especially since the corrections of _Tycho de
Brahe_ had removed the greatest objections to the Ptolemaic
system. The Copernican theory could not be considered certain till
the end of the seventeenth century, after _Newton’s_ work on
gravitation.

Then there were difficulties, the greatest of which was probably
the old idea of inertia, which at that time meant only that all
bodies tend to a state of rest; hence it seemed impossible that
the earth could ceaselessly execute two movements at the same
time, around the sun and around its own axis. This notion of
inertia had not been doubted in 1616; even _Kepler_ adhered to it.
Later on _Galileo_ came very near to the new idea of inertia: that
bodies tended to retain their state of repose or motion. But this
new notion, like everything else new, gained ground but slowly.
Then it was only with great difficulty that he could dispose of
the objection that were the earth to speed through space, as the
new theory claimed, the atmosphere would take a stormlike motion.
Lastly, the philosophical objection had to be met: the sun and
other celestial bodies, as far as we can know by observation, are
moving; if they do not move, then we must admit that we can know
nothing by observation.

Thus the new doctrine was not at all proven at that time, as could
be easily shown by its opponents; although it cannot be denied
that they did not always enter into the discussion with
impartiality. The astronomer, _Secchi_, testifies that “none of
the real arguments for the rotary motion of the earth was known at
_Galileo’s_ time, also direct proofs for the progressive movement
of the earth around the sun were lacking at that time” (_Grisar_,
30). Another famous astronomer, _Schiaparelli_, writes: “In the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Ptolemaic as well as the
Copernican system could serve for the description of phenomena;
geometrically they were equivalent to each other and to _Tycho’s_
eclectic system” (_Schiaparelli_, Die Vorläufer des Copernicus im
Altertum (German, 1876), 86).

Hence no direct evidence could be pleaded against the decision of
the Congregation, not even _Galileo_ had that evidence. At any
rate no judge who observed his demeanour at the trial could have
suspected _Galileo_ of coming in conflict with his conscience by
swearing off the theory.

For this reason it would be wrong to call _Galileo_ a martyr for science, because he did not suffer any martyrdom. He has seen neither rack nor prison. But he was not a martyr chiefly for the reason that he could not have had any scientific conviction, apart from the fact that he did not claim any such conviction, even denied it expressly.

No wonder, then, that the heliocentric system had considerable opponents at that time; no wonder the opposite view was even the prevalent one. _A. Tanner_ wrote in 1626: “_Ita habet communis ac certa omnium theologorum ac philosophorum naturalium sentia_” (Theol. Schol. I, disp. 6, q. 4., dub. 3). Had valid argument been brought forth there never would have been a _Galileo_ case. In this respect a passage from a letter of _Bellarmin_ deserves attention: “If it could be really demonstrated that the sun be in the centre of the world ... then we would have to proceed quite cautiously in explaining the apparently opposite passages in the Scriptures, we would rather have to say that we do not understand them, than to say of things demonstrated that they are false” (to _Foscarini_, April 12, 1615). The Cardinals of that time could not be expected to anticipate the knowledge of a later period. They had to consult the judgment of their contemporaneous savants. When seeing the majority of them sharply rejecting the new theory and refuting the arguments of their opponents, it is little wonder that the Cardinals could not overcome their theological scruples.

The scruples arose from the opinion, then prevalent, that the Holy Scripture taught that the earth stood still and the sun moved; that the words of the Scripture must be taken literally till the contrary is demonstrated. The unanimous explanation of the Christian centuries was also cited. As a matter of fact, however, the Christian past had not taught this to be the only true sense of the words, but at that time the words were understood that way, because no one could arrive at any other sense in those days.

Under these circumstances, an error was hardly avoidable, if a decision was required. And a decision seemed to be urgent, and this is the second point we must not overlook, if we wish to judge fairly. It was a time eager for innovations, full of anti-religious ideas. A renaissance, sidling off into false humanism, was combating religious convictions, false notions were invading philosophy; in addition, Protestantism was trying to invade Italy. All this caused suspicion of any innovation apt to endanger the faith; interpretations of the Scriptures deviating from the accustomed sense were particularly distrusted. The _Galileo_ quarrel happened at an inopportune time. Indeed a sudden spread of the Copernican theory might have been accompanied by great religious dangers. Even now, after nearly three hundred years, the leaders of the anti-Christian propaganda are still pointing out that the progress of natural science has proved Holy Scripture to be erroneous, and many are impressed by the argument; many thousands would have been confused in those days by the sudden collapse of old astronomical views that were connected with unclarified religious ideas—dreading that victorious science might shatter all religious traditions. Now, if one is convinced that the damage to religion is to be estimated greater than any other, then one may also have the conviction that it was better for the nations of the new era to have their scientific progress a little delayed, than to have their most sacred possession endangered. Of course considerations of this kind will have no weight with representatives of the naturalistic view of the world. Then it can only be emphasized that a science that has no appreciation of the supernatural character of the Catholic Church cannot be in a position to render a fair judgment on many facts in the history of that Church.

What we have said shows sufficiently that the condemnation of _Galileo_ was not due to any hostility to science.

The idea that the Church’s attitude towards _Galileo_ and the
Copernican theory was a result of her antipathy to science is
entirely in contradiction with the character of that strenuous
period. In Catholic countries, especially in Italy, intellectual
life was zealously promoted by the Popes and their influence. It
was developing and flourishing even in the natural sciences. When
reading the correspondence of _Galileo_ one must be surprised to
see how popular astronomical, physical, and mathematical studies
were in the educated circles of the period. These studies belonged
to the curriculum of a general philosophical education, and it was
a matter of honour for many ecclesiastical dignitaries to remain
philosophers in that sense, notwithstanding their official duties.
We recall to mind the scientific discussion carried on with
_Galileo_ in Rome in 1611 and 1616, by Cardinals _Del Monte_,
_Farnese_, _Bonzi_, _Bemerio_, _Orsini_, and _Maffeo Baberini_,
and by clergymen like _Agucchi_, _Dini_, and _Campioli_. Similarly
in France we meet with names like _Mersenne_, _Gassendi_, and
_Descartes_. And in Italy, after _Galileo_ and at his time, we
meet with a long list of eminent naturalists like _Toricelli_,
_Cassini_, _Riccioli_, and others. In 1667 _Gemiani Montanari_
could write that in Italy there were continually forming new
societies of scientists. The advance in knowledge of truth was
made on safe grounds; at Naples, Rome, and elsewhere science was
enriched by a great variety of new experiences, inasmuch as the
scientists were making progress in the observation and the
investigation of nature. _Targioni-Tozzetti_ writes: “Astronomy
with us, about the middle of the sixteenth century, was a very
diligently cultivated branch of science” (Galileistudien (1882)
338 f.). The Church was by no means hostile to this newly awakened
life, not even holding aloof from it; on the contrary, it
flourished especially in ecclesiastical circles; a proof that
narrow-minded disappreciation of natural science did not prevail,
and that there was a different explanation for the _Galileo_ case.

Copernicus on the Index till 1835.

And what of the fact that _Copernicus_ remained on the Index until the nineteenth century? Does it not show a rigid adherence to old, traditional method and opposition to progress? The fact is true: The work of _Copernicus_, and other Copernican writings, remained on the Index until 1835. But it is also true that a great deal connected with this fact is not generally known or ignored. Let us mention here some of these facts.

To begin with, it must not be forgotten that we owe the new world
system, and with it the turning-point in astronomy, first of all
to representatives of the Catholic clergy. After the learned
Bishop _Nicholas Oresme_ had expressed with fullest certainty the
most important point of the Copernican system as early as 1377 (in
a manuscript hitherto unknown, discovered a short time ago by
_Pierre Duhem_ in the National Library at Paris. Cfr. Liter.
Zentralblatt (1909), page 1618), and after the learned Cardinal
_Nicholaus von Kues_ (d. 1474) adopted a rotary motion of the
earth in his cosmic system, it was _Copernicus_, a canon of the
diocese of Ermland, who became the father of the new theory, in
his work “De evolutionibus orbium coelestium.” He published it at
the urgent request of Cardinal _Nikolaus Schoenberg_. But the most
zealous promoter of his work was Bishop _Tiedemann Giese_ of Kulm.
Enthusiastic over the novel idea, he incessantly urged his friend
to publish his work, took care of its publication, and sent a copy
to Pope _Paul III._, who accepted its dedication. Again, it was a
prince of the Church, Bishop _Martin Kromer_, who, in 1851,
dedicated a tablet in the cathedral at Frauenberg to “The Great
Astronomer and Innovator of Astronomical Science.” All these men
knew that _Copernicus_ defended his work not as an hypothesis or
as fiction, but as true. Before _Copernicus_ issued his great
work, _Clement VIII._ showed a lively interest in his system and
had it explained to him by the learned _Johann Widmannstadt_ in
the Vatican Gardens (_Pastor_, Gesch. der Päpste, IV, 2 (1907)
550).

The first attack against the new system, as being contrary to Holy
Writ, came not from Catholic but from Protestant circles. Among
the latter the opposition against _Copernicus_ was being agitated,
while peaceful calm reigned among the former. Twelve Popes
succeeded _Paul III._, and not one interfered with this doctrine.
_Luther_, even in _Copernicus’_ time, hurled his anathema against
the “Frauenberg Fool,” and six years after the publication of
_Copernicus’_ chief work, _Melanchthon_ declared it a sin and a
scandal to publish such nonsensical opinions, contrary to the
divine testimony of the Scriptures. In fear of his religious
community the Protestant publisher _Osiander_ smuggled in the
spurious preface already mentioned, “On the hypothesis of this
work.” The Protestant _Rheticus_, a friend and pupil of
_Copernicus_, got into disfavour with _Melanchthon_ and had to
discontinue his lectures at Wittenberg. The genial _Kepler_,
finally, was prosecuted by his own congregation, because of his
defence of the theory. And when on the Catholic side the Index
decree of 1616 was already beginning to be regarded as obsolete,
Protestant theology still held to the old view even up to the
nineteenth century: a long list of names could be adduced in
proof.

Certainly no fair-minded person can see wilful hostility against
astronomy in this procedure. Likewise there should not be imputed
dishonourable intentions to Catholics, if in the course of history
they rendered tribute to human limitation.

But did not the decrees of 1616 and 1633 do _great harm to research_? Not at all. That this was hardly the case with _Galileo_ himself we have shown above. Soon after we find in Italy a goodly number of distinguished scientists; the Church in no way opposed the newly awakened life, nor even held aloof from it. _Galileo_ himself was honoured in ecclesiastical circles. Soon after _Galileo’s_ conviction the Jesuit _Grimaldi_ named a mountain on the moon after him.

Nor was there any considerable harm done to the development of the Copernican theory. Although after _Galileo_ the occasions were not lacking, still no further advocate of his theory was ever up for trial. Nor was any other book on the subject prohibited. Freedom was quietly granted more and more. In the edition of the Index of 1758, the general prohibition of 1616 of Copernican writings was withdrawn; it was an official withdrawal from the old position. But not until 1822 were the special prohibitions repealed, although they had long since lost their binding force. The occasion was given by an accidental occurrence. The Magister S. Palatii of the time intended to deny the Imprimatur to a book on the Copernican theory, on account of the obsolete prohibition. An appeal was made, which brought about the formal repeal of the prohibition. Of course there had been no hurry to revoke a decision once given. But according to the astronomer _Lalande’s_ report of his interview with the Cardinal Prefect of the Congregation of the Index, in 1765, the removal from the Index of _Galileo’s_ Dialogue had been postponed only on account of extraneous difficulties. _Leibnitz_, while in Rome, worked for a repeal of the decree. According to Eméry, there are extant statements of _Leibnitz_ vouching for the fact that he very nearly succeeded (_Eméry_, Pensées de Leibnitz, 1, 275). The name of _Copernicus_, too, was omitted in the next edition of the Index, which appeared in 1835.

But even while the prohibition was still in force, the works of _Galileo_ and _Copernicus_ were read everywhere. As early as 1619 _John Remus_ wrote from Vienna to _Kepler_ that the Copernican writings may be read by scientific men who had received special permission, and that this was done in all Italy and in Rome itself. Besides, it was allowed at any time to make use of the doctrine as an hypothesis. Thus it advanced continually nearer and nearer to the position of an established truth.

Soon after the publication of the decree, according to the report of _Kepler_, it was the general conviction in ecclesiastical and civil circles of Austria “that the censure was no obstacle to the freedom of science in the investigation of God’s work.” In 1685 we are assured by the Jesuit _Kochansky_, that any Catholic was free to “look for an irrefutable, mathematical, and physical demonstration of the movement of the earth.” It was also known that the condemnation of the theory had been aided by the supposition that there were no valid arguments in support of the new theory. Hence the Congregation’s decree had in the eighteenth century for the most part lost its force. The Jesuit _Boscovich_, a celebrated physicist and astronomer, wrote in 1755: “In consequence of the extraordinary arguments offered by the consideration of _Kepler’s_ laws, astronomers no longer look upon his theory as a mere hypothesis, but as an established truth” (Grisar, 347, 350).

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Thus in the light of history the condemnation of the Copernican theory appears quite differently from the picture presented by the superficial accusation that Rome up to the nineteenth century condemned this theory. There is no trace of callousness and oppression, but only submission to legitimate authority, in so far and as long as one deemed himself obliged. It was a science enlightened by Christianity, which, in questions not yet clearly decided, laid down upon the altar of the Giver of all wisdom the tribute of humble submission, for the sake of higher interests.

We shall have to class with _St. Augustine_ the uncertainty of human judgments and tribunals among the “troubles of human life,” and say with him: “It is also a misery that the judge is subject to the necessity of not knowing many things, but to the wise man it is not a fault” (De Civ. Dei, IX, 6). May we therefore infer that the teaching authority is an evil? Were that true, we should have to abolish the authority of the state and of parents, because they also make mistakes. We should have to conclude that there had better be no authority at all on earth. Where men live and rule, mistakes will certainly be made. The physician makes mistakes in his important office, yet patients return to him with confidence. Every pedagogue, every professor, has made mistakes, yet they still command respect. The state government is subject to mistakes, yet none but the anarchist will say that it must therefore be abolished. “That the judge is subject to the necessity of not knowing many things, is a misery, but to the wise man not a fault.”