Chapter II: The Authority Of Faith And The Free Exercise Of Research (1)

Preliminary Remarks.

We must not stop at what we have just said in general about the relation between the freedom of research and the obligation to believe. We must go further into detail, in order to give a more exact explanation of how and where the authority of faith clashes with research and restrains it. Is it true that the believing scientist cannot move freely in his research, that there are barriers on all sides which he may not overstep? Is it true that the Church may prescribe for the Catholic scientist what he is allowed to defend and approve, what he ought to refute and reprove, suppress or advocate, so that his eyes must ever be turned towards Rome, to inquire and ascertain what might there be approved? And what a chain of proscriptions of free thinking is attached to the name of Rome! Index, Syllabus, _Galileo_—link after link is added to this chain of miserable slavery!

We shall say something more about this chain later on. First we must consider the principal question: Where and how do faith and science come in contact? And what we are going to say we shall condense into four points. Thus freedom of science will be more precisely defined; it will be shown what freedom revelation, and especially the guardian of revelation, the Church, offers to science: there can be no doubt that its natural freedom of exercise must be left to science intact.

We shall deal in the first place with the _profane sciences_, and, at least for the present, leave aside the discussion of theology, since it is clear that theology, being the science of faith, must assume a peculiar position in regard to the authority of faith: theology, moreover, is a special mark for attack; accordingly we shall deal with it particularly later on. However, the principles to be cited, being of a general nature, refer also to the science of faith, and for this reason we shall have occasion to refer to them.

1. Authority of Faith and Private Authority.

We often meet with the most inconceivable notions. We are told quite seriously that the Church teaches, and that the Catholic has therefore to believe, that the earth is a flat disc surrounded by the sea, as the ancients believed; above it is a vault, below it hell-fire; that the earth stands still and the sun and stars revolve about it, just as _Ptolemy_ of Egypt taught; that God created the whole world just as it is now in exactly six days of twenty-four hours each; that He made the sun and moon, just as they are now illuminating the skies; that the strata, just as they now look when bared by the geologist’s hammer, even the coal-fields and petrified saurians and fossils—all were made, just as they now are, well nigh six thousand years ago. The Scriptures teach this, the Fathers of old and the theologians believe this: and that is where the Catholic must get his science. And then they are astonished, and consider dogma retreating before science, when they see other notions prevailing, when they see Catholic scientists defend without prejudice the evolution of the solar system, and even the system of the whole universe, from some primitive matter, or assume an organic evolution, as far as science supports it (cf. _Braun_, Ueber Kosmologie u. Standpunkt christlich. Wiss., 2d ed., 1906, etc.). They would be still more astonished perhaps to learn that similar ideas had long ago been proposed by _St. Augustine_ and _St. Thomas_ (cf. Summa c. G. l. 3, c. 77; _Knabenbauer_, in Stimmen a. M. Laach xiii, 75 _seq._).

A distinction must be made between the teaching of the Church and the private views of individuals, schools, or periods. Only the teaching of the Church is the obligatory standard of Christian and Catholic thought, not the opinion of individuals. Hence not everything that Catholic savants have held to be true belongs to the teaching of the Church. Only when theologians unanimously declare something to be contained in the deposit of revealed truth, or the teaching of the Church,—only then is their teaching authoritative; not because it is the teaching of theologians, but because it is contained in revelation or the teaching of the Church. Else the maxim holds good: _Tantum valet auctoritas, quantum argumenta_. Nor is all that which a former age found in Holy Scripture, therefore to be believed as revealed truth, to the exclusion of all other interpretations.

The foregoing may be elucidated by the examples given above. When Holy Writ describes in figurative language and Oriental, demonstrative style, how God created the heaven and earth, the sun and moon, the sea and its contents, it means to teach us religious truths: that God is the First Cause of everything, and hence that the sun and moon, for instance, are not uncreated deities, as the Egyptian believed them to be. The narrative need not be taken in a literal sense, as if God immediately formed everything in the exact condition as it now appears to us; it may be interpreted in the sense that God let the present condition of things gradually grow out of the forces and materials and plan of nature He created, the result of a lengthy evolution. When our Lord tells us in the gospel that His Father in heaven feeds the birds of the air and clothes the grass of the field, we know that this is to be understood as a mediate action of God, which He exercises through the instinct of animals and through natural forces which He created for the purpose. Now when former ages, reading the narrative of Genesis, generally understood an immediate creation of the world, because the knowledge of nature at the time did not admit of any other interpretation, it is by no means necessary to conclude from it that every other interpretation must be rejected as against the Bible, or that the Church herself has prescribed this literal interpretation as the only correct one. As is known, _St. Augustine_, the greatest Father of the Church, had another very liberal explanation of the Genesis narrative, and the Church has never censured him. (He taught that the whole world had been created at one time, and that the six days of the Mosaic narrative were the logical divisions of an account of the various orders of creatures.) And now the interpretations vary greatly. The passages in Scripture, in which, according to popular modes of expression, the sun is said to rise and set and revolve about the earth, the latter standing in the centre of the world—these, too, were interpreted literally in the days of the Fathers: there was no cause for interpreting them otherwise; but it was only due to defective knowledge of nature at the time. These temporary errors remained till corrected by research in the field of the natural sciences: had the discoveries been made sooner, the errors, too, would have disappeared sooner.

The Church knows, and the holy Fathers knew, that it is not the purpose of Holy Writ to teach profane sciences, but to instruct in faith and morals; if it speaks of other matters, it is but occasionally, and then in the idiom of common life, which is not the same as the scientific language of the specialist. Indeed, the Bible does not intend to give scientific instruction in such matters, nor could it have done so at a time when men were not ripe for such enlightenment.

Thus _St. Augustine_ insists that the Spirit of God who spoke
through the authors of Scripture did not intend to instruct men in
matters which do not serve for salvation, and hence he objects to
the Scriptures being taken literally in regard to such matters,
because the Bible adapts itself to man’s manner of speech: a
distinction is to be made between letter and sense (“Multi multum
disputant de iis rebus, quae majore prudentia nostri auctores
omiserunt, ad beatam vitam non profuturas discentibus ... Breviter
dicendum est, ... Spiritum Dei, qui per ipsos loquebatur, noluisse
ita docere homines nulli saluti profuturas,” De Gen. ad lit., II,
9, n. 20. Cf. De Gen. contra Manich. 1, 5, n. 3; 11, n. 17). He
further cautions Bible students against putting their own
interpretation upon obscure passages and then claiming it to be
dogma, because one may easily go astray and thus make the
Scriptures appear ridiculous. “In rebus obscuris atque a nostris
oculis remotissimis, si qua inde scripta etiam divina legerimus,
quae possint salva fide, qua imbuimur, alias atque alias parere
sententias, in nullam earum nos praecipiti affirmatione
proiciamus, ut si forte, diligentius discussa veritas eam recte
labefactaverit, corruamus, non pro sententia divinarum
scripturarum sed pro nosctra ita dimicantes, ut eam velimus
scripturarum esse, quae nostra est” (De genesi ad lit. I, 18 n.
37). “Plerumque accidit, ut aliquid de terra, de coelo, de ceteris
mundi huius elementis ... etiam non christianus ita noverit, ut
certissima ratione et experientia teneat. Turpe est autem nimis et
perniciosum ac maxime cavendum, ut christianus de his rebus quasi
secundum christianas literas loquentem ita delirare quilibet
infidelis audiat, ut, quemadmodum dicitur, toto coelo errare
conspiciens, risum tenere vix possit” (Ibid. I, 19 n. 39). Cf.
also I, 21. _St. Thomas of Aquin_ also expresses himself in this
sense: “Multum autem nocet, talia, quae ad pietatis doctrinam non
spectant, vel asserere vel negare, quasi pertinentia ad sacram
doctrinam ... Unde mihi videtur tutius esse, ut haec, quae
philosophi communius senserunt et nostrae fidei non repugnant,
neque sic esse asserenda ut dogmata fidei, licet aliquando sub
nomine philosophorum introducantur, neque sic esse neganda tamquam
fidei contraria, ne sapientibus huius mundi contemnendi doctrinam
fidei occasio praebeatur” (Opusc. X. ad Jo. Vercel. Proem.).

The doctrine of the _Church_ concurs with this, as laid down in
numerous documents, many of them quoting the above-mentioned words
of _St. Augustine_. It also insists that the interpretation of the
Fathers be only taken as a standard of the Church’s explanation of
the meaning of Scripture when they are unanimous on the meaning of
a passage relating to faith and morals; but not to other things
(cf. Encycl. Providentissimus, Denz. 10 ed., n. 1947, 1944; Conc.
Trid., sess. IV., Conc. Vat. sess. III., c. 2, Denz. nn. 786,
1788).

Now if one simply opens Holy Scripture, takes up some passage at random, explains it in its most literal sense, and then insists that this is the evident meaning, and goes on to assert with the same insistence that this is the interpretation of the Church, and a part of the faith of Catholics in regard to the natural sciences, then of course it is very easy to make out contradictions between faith and science: but such efforts cannot claim to be scientific. It is not necessary to know theology and the principles of Catholic exegesis; but it is not proper that those who are ignorant of these matters pass judgment on them, not even in the name of objective research.

Hence we may easily see what we should think of a writer who
asserts that the examination of the Christian-Catholic idea of the
world leads to the following results: “The Books of Moses,
inspired by divine revelation, are the golden key to the
understanding of the whole history of creation. Other Scriptural
passages of the Old and New Testaments, the writings of the
Fathers, etc., are to be considered as supplementary to these.
According to these authorities the earth is a flat disc,
surrounded by the sea. Above it arches the firmament of heaven,
with its great lights for day and night. Below it are purgatory
and hell. All this is not the gradual outgrowth of lengthy
evolution, but was created by God out of nothing in a few days,
about six thousand years ago, of which four thousand are reckoned
before Christ and two thousand after Christ. Although modern
science has long since established that the Biblical narrative is
of no worth, nothing but an imperfect reproduction of older myths,
the Catholic Church continues to teach it literally to this very
day, spreading it broadcast by thousands and thousands of
catechisms, and insisting on it being learned as a part of
religious instruction in all schools, and to be accepted as the
revealed truth” (_L. Wahrmund_, Katholische Weltanschauung und
freie Wissenschaft, 1908, p. 14. The scientific value of this work
has been considered by _L. Fonck_, Katholische Weltansch).

“Clericalism,” we are told, “stands on a rigidly fixed view of the
world, corresponding in part to the childhood of mankind, to the
dawning of civilization.... Philosophy, built upon the results of
progress, since it is unceasingly forcing its way ahead, cannot
remain in accord with the notions belonging to a remote past,
partly to Babylonian and Egyptian civilization, partly to the
thought of nomadic times.” It is then pointed out how this view of
the world on which clericalism, that is, the Catholic Church, is
based, has already been overthrown in many instances. “The
geocentric position, the doctrine of our earth being the centre
and man the ultimate aim of the universe, must needs be abandoned
by the world of scientists, in view of the new system of
Copernicus; the doctrine also of the earth being a disc must be
abandoned in consequence of the voyage of Columbus, and subsequent
discoveries, which make it certain that the earth is a globe”
(Prof. _K. Menger_, Die Eroberung der Universitaeten. Neue Freie
Presse, Nov. 24, 1907). It is surprising what little knowledge
suffices to warrant writing about theological matters in the name
of “objective research.”

These passages, in regard to their scientific contents and manner,
recall vividly an American work that appeared some time ago, and
reached many editions. It is entitled, “A History of the Conflict
Between Religion and Science,” by _J. W. Draper_. The book was
answered by a competent authority, _De Smedt_, S. J., “L’Eglise et
la Science,” 1877.

It seems _Draper’s_ arguments have since become a pattern for
many. He, too, maintains that Holy Writ has always been declared
by the Church and the Fathers to be a source of profane science.
This, he states, is true especially of _St. Augustine_. We read:
“The book of Genesis ... also in a philosophical point of view
became the grand authority of Patristic science. Astronomy,
geology, geography, anthropology, chronology, and indeed all the
various departments of human knowledge, were made to conform to
it.... The doctrines of _St. Augustine_ have had the effect of
thus placing theology in antagonism with science....” “No one did
more than this Father to bring science and religion into
antagonism; it was mainly he who diverted the Bible from its true
office—a guide to purity of life—and placed it in the perilous
position of being the arbiter of human knowledge....” “What, then,
is that sacred, that revealed science, declared by the Fathers to
be the sum of all knowledge?... As to the earth, it affirmed that
it is a flat surface, over which the sky is spread like a dome. In
this the sun and moon and stars move, so that they may give light
by day and by night to man.... Above the sky or firmament is
heaven; in the dark and fiery space beneath the earth is hell....”
(pp. 57-63).

By reading again what we said above, especially the urgent
admonitions of _St. Augustine_ not to look upon the Scriptures as
a text-book of profane science, one will be able to appreciate the
scientific quality of the book in question.

The fancy of this writer has distorted Christianity and the Church
into a monster that has nothing more important to do than to tread
down and crush science and civilization. A few examples will
suffice to show how he proves the _contradictions between faith
and science_. The Christian religion teaches that man is subject
to death as a penalty for original sin: prior to that sin death
had no power over Adam and Eve. It is claimed that this is a
contradiction of science. But how? Long before Adam, thousands of
animals and plants had died, the author asserts. “The doctrine
declared to be orthodox by ecclesiastical authority is overthrown
by the unquestionable discoveries of modern science. Long before a
human being had appeared on earth millions of individuals, nay,
more, thousands of species and even genera had died” (p. 57). The
author has completely missed the point. The matter in question is
not the death of animals and plants, but the death of man. The
infallibility of the Pope is refuted by the fact that he failed to
foresee the result of the war between France and Germany.
“Notwithstanding his infallibility, which implies omniscience, His
Holiness did not foresee the issue of the Franco-Prussian war” (p.
352, also p. 362).

How high his historical statements are to be rated is shown by the
assertion that _Cyril of Alexandria_ had much to do with the
introduction of the worship of the Virgin Mary (p. 55); that
auricular confession was introduced by the Fourth Lateran Council
in 1215 (p. 208). He asks when the idea originated that the
Pentateuch was written by Moses under divine inspiration, and he
finds that “not until after the second century [of the Christian
era] was there any such extravagant demand on human credulity” (p.
220). It would seem incredible that any one could write such
stuff.

The author says in his preface: “I had also devoted much attention
to the experimental investigation of natural phenomena, and had
published many well-known memoirs on such subjects. And perhaps no
one can give himself to these pursuits, and spend a large part of
his life in the public teaching of science, without partaking of
that love of impartiality and truth which philosophy incites”
(VIII-IX). We do not care to argue with the author about his
experience in experimental research, nor about his love for the
truth, but he himself has shown superabundantly that they have not
sufficed to keep him clear from scientific shallowness and the
grossest blunders. Nevertheless, it seems that his scientific
ability obtained for him in the consideration of many the weight
of an authority. _Haeckel_, in his “Weltraetsel,” refers
repeatedly to the book, and recommends “its truthful statements
and excellent discussion” to his readers (Weltraetsel, 17. Kap.,
Wissenschaft u. Christentum).

Such is the fashion in which contradictions between faith and
science, and the Church’s hostility towards scientific research,
are proved.

The result is that we must distinguish clearly between dogmas of faith and private opinions or interpretations. Of course it may frequently happen, and has happened, that the Christian savant is too timorous, and looks askance at the discoveries of science, and even thinks he ought to resist them, because he is afraid that religious truth might be opposed by them. Nor can it be said that this timidity is altogether without excuse, for there was hardly one scientific discovery of the nineteenth century that was not immediately grasped and exploited by eager enemies of the Christian religion. Too often has science been made the menial of infidelity, and the assertion has been untiringly repeated that science and faith cannot agree. No wonder, then, that timid souls become suspicious, that they are prone to resist the whole theory of evolution in a lump, instead of trying to distinguish between what is of scientific value in it, and what is misused for the purpose of denying creation.

Nevertheless, such narrow-mindedness is strongly to be censured. It has often caused the reproach, that Catholics lack the freedom to admit scientific discoveries. They forget the wise admonition of the prince of mediæval theologians, that it were advisable, in regard to scientific views which have nothing to do with religion, neither to set them down as truths of faith, nor either to reject them as contrary to faith lest occasion be given to think contemptuously of the faith. As long as men are and men think, narrow-mindedness will never be lacking. Hence if the believing scientist wants to know whether he is running counter to faith in any particular, he has to ascertain from theological text-books what the Church declares to belong to faith, what explanation of Holy Scripture is unconditionally binding, and not what is the individual opinion of theologians, much less what some pious nurse is telling the little ones.

This is the first rule concerning the relation between faith and science: it states what the scientist is _not_ tied down to.

2. Science Retains its Method of Research.

But when and how may the scientist be restricted? Here we come to the second point: the directions which faith may give to the profane sciences are in themselves not of a positive but of a _negative kind_; revelation and Church cannot tell the scientist what he is to assert or defend in the field of the profane sciences, but only what propositions he must _avoid_. Thus every science is left free to pursue its own method of research. It is not difficult to understand this.

Faith draws from divine revelation; profane sciences, as such, do not draw from divine revelation, but only from experience and reason. Philosophy would cease to be philosophy and become theology did it demonstrate the immortality of the soul by revelation. The anthropologist would cease to be an anthropologist and become a theologian if he would attempt to prove the common origin of mankind by Holy Scripture.

In other words, the profane sciences are distinguished from faith and theology by their formal object, by the end they have in view, by the scientific method with which they handle their subject. Theology, of course, uses revelation extensively; and in this it differs from the other sciences. Hence faith cannot command the anthropologist to defend also in profane science the common origin of the human race from Adam and Eve, because it is held to be a revealed truth. He must say: I believe as a Christian that this is true, established by divine revelation, and no science will ever prove the contrary; but whether I can positively defend this fact as resulting from anthropology, depends on my ability to corroborate it by the methods of this science, that is by the testimony of profane history. And just as little could the historian be required to obtain historical results of which he cannot produce the evidence according to his method.

Therefore faith can only tell the profane scientist that he must not assert anything which is held by faith to be erroneous; that it is false to say there is nothing but force and matter, that the human soul ends in death, or that the various families of the human race have not a common origin. As soon as the scientist knows by faith that a thing is false, he is bound to refrain from asserting it: bound in the first place by the duty to believe, but also by the principles of his own science, which is to find not error, but truth, which forbids to assert what has been proved to be erroneous. Perhaps his own means will not enable him to prove the truth independently of revelation; then from the standpoint of his science he must say, _Non liquet._

The position of the Catholic Church agrees with these principles.
She knows, and emphasizes that science has its own method, and
hence a natural right and freedom to proceed in its own field
according to its method. The Church rejects but one kind of
freedom, viz., the freedom to propound a doctrine proved by faith
to be erroneous. “The Church by no means forbids these disciplines
to use in their own field their own principles and method,”
declares the Vatican Council. “But, while acknowledging this
lawful freedom, the Church takes care to prevent them from taking
up errors in opposition to divine teaching, or from creating
confusion by transgressing their limits and invading the realm of
faith” (Vat. sess. III, ch. 4. Cf. also the letter of _Pius IX_.,
“Gravissimas,” of Dec. 11, 1862, to the Archbishop of Munich,
Denz. n. 1666, _seq._)

These few remarks show the lack of intelligence in the charge that “Catholic philosophy starts from dogmas and revelation,” or that the Church would dictate to scientists everything they should teach; that, according to its principles it could claim the right “to impose upon a physicist of _Zeppelin’s_ era the task of proving the Ascension of Christ or the Assumption of Mary by aërostatic rules.” This is simply gross ignorance or misrepresentation.

3. Restraint Only in the Province of Revelation.

In what matters may faith and the Church be a guide to research in this negative sense? In all fields, or only some? Evidently only in their own sphere. But to the sphere of faith belongs only what is contained in divine revelation, viz., the truths of _religion and morality_, as laid down in Scripture and tradition, the truths of God and His work of salvation, of man and his way to his eternal destiny, of the means of grace, and of the Church. Whatever lies outside of that sphere does not belong to the province of faith. This is true also of the teaching authority of the Church. The purpose of the Church is to guard faithfully the treasure of divine revelation and to transmit it in an authoritative manner to mankind: hence her authority in teaching is confined to what is contained in revelation, and what is necessary for an efficient custody and transmission of it to mankind. Hence she may declare certain truths as revealed, she may reject opposing errors, she may condemn books offensive to faith, she may approve or reject systems of ethics. But she cannot set up wholly new religious truths or revelations. _Depositum custodi_—this is the purpose of the Church. Still less are matters of an entirely profane nature subject to the teaching authority of the Church. Profane sciences can therefore receive direction from faith only in those matters which at the same time belong to the province of faith.

What follows from this? It follows that _almost all the profane sciences are incapable of being instructed or restricted by faith_, because their province lies outside that of faith, and does not come in touch with it: they are left to themselves to correct their errors. When the astronomer in his observatory watches the movements of the planets, and bases thereon his mathematical calculations, when the physicist or chemist in his laboratory observes the laws of nature or makes new discoveries, when the pathologist studies the symptoms of diseases in organisms, no warning voice interrupts their work of study. Of course when they deny the creation, the possibility of miracles, then they conflict with faith; but then they have ceased to be naturalists, they have become philosophers. When the botanist or zoölogist in his laboratory is studying plants and animals and collecting his specimens, when the palæontologist is excavating and examining his fossils, they enjoy perfect freedom: all this has nothing directly to do with faith. And there is no warning sign set up for the geographer or geologist when settling the orographical or hydrographical conditions of countries or measuring geological strata; no danger signal disturbs the linguist in establishing the grammar of unknown languages, nor the archæologist or the historian, when they discover new documents or decipher inscriptions. Nor does anybody interrupt the mathematician in his calculations.

What unnecessary worry, then, for the representatives of mathematics, geology, palæontology, and chemistry to write burning protests against the fetters of dogma in the interest of their scientific activity! And it is superfluous worry for professors of the technical arts to get excited by imagining that electricity and steam must be treated according to ecclesiastical precepts. Nor is there need of emphasizing the statement that there cannot be a Catholic chemistry, geography, or mathematics—it is self-evident.

Hence almost the entire province of the profane sciences, which are the pride of our age and occupy the foremost position in our universities, with their laboratories, institutes and observatories and meteorological stations, are free and perfectly undisturbed by faith. If accordingly any one should be of the opinion that the Christian-minded scientist were hindered in his scientific research, he would have to consider him an unhampered investigator at least in this vast field.

Most in touch with faith comes _philosophy_. Not in the vast field of logic, of empirical psychology, in questions concerning the essence of bodies and their forces, in matters of mere history of philosophy; but in questions of views of the world and life, in metaphysics and ethics, it does. These, the highest questions, bearing on the direction and pursuit of human life, matters that most occupy the human mind, are at the same time subjects of revelation; God Himself has deigned to teach the truth in these matters, to make them safe for all time against the error of the mind of man. Here philosophers encounter danger-signals. They hear, what their reason even tells them, that it is erroneous to think there is no world of spirits, no God above nature, no immortality, no life hereafter, no providence. Nor could one say that philosophy is the loser by being kept from error which endangers human life. Nowhere are errors so apt to occur as in questions which are outside the sphere of immediate experience; nowhere are self-deceptions more common than there, where disposition and character continually influence the mind.

A modern representative of philosophy, _E. Adickes_, writes as
follows: “In the course of this history (of metaphysics) there
have been given long since all the principal answers that are at
all possible to all metaphysical questions. The building up of
metaphysical systems can and will proceed, nevertheless, and their
multiplicity will remain.... Of course, progress will not be
gained thereby: results will not gain in certainty, contradictions
and mysteries do not diminish.”

“If the greatest of the ancient Greek natural scientists,
physicians, and geographers should rise again they would be amazed
at the progress made in their sciences; like beginners they would
sit at the feet of teachers of our day, they would lack the most
elementary ideas; they would first have to learn what every
grammar-school boy knows, and much of what they once considered
achievements would be disclosed to them as deception or mere
hypothesis. On the other hand a _Plato_, an _Aristotle_, a _Zeno_
or _Epicurus_, might readily take part in our discussions about
God and the soul, about virtue and immortality. And they could
safely use their old weapons, the keenness of which has suffered
but little from the rust of time and the attacks of opponents.
They would be astonished at the little progress made, so that now,
after two thousand years, the same answers are given to the same
questions.” (Charakter und Weltanschauung, 1905, p. 24).

A science which must make such a confession has no reason to
reject with haughty self-confidence the intimations of a divine
revelation.

The _science of history_ again has not the duty of praising everything that has happened within the Catholic Church or else to repress it; no, only the truth is desired. But it must not start out with the assumption that God’s influence in the world, a divine revelation, miracles, and a supernatural guidance of the Church, are impossible; nor must it attempt to construe history according to that assumption. Hence it must not undertake to explain the religion of the Jewish nation, or the origin of Christianity, by unconditionally ignoring everything supernatural, and attempting to eliminate it by prejudiced research and by means of natural factors, whether they be called Babylonic myths or Greek philosophy or anything else; it must not impugn the credibility of the Gospel, claiming that reports of miracles must be false; it must not write the history of the Church and deliberately ignore its supernatural character, as if it were the violent struggle of a federation of priests for universal rule. Assured results undoubtedly are arrived at in history less frequently than in other sciences; it offers full play to suppositions, hypotheses, constructive fancy, the influence of ideas inculcated by education and personal views of the world, especially when summing up facts. Hence here more than anywhere else must moral character and unselfish love of the truth stand higher than the desire for freedom.

The _history of religion_ and _anthropology_ must be forbidden to assume that the human mind is but a product of animal evolution, that therefore religion and morality, family and state life, reason and language, and the entire intellectual and social life have necessarily evolved from the first stages of animal life. If we add that _jurisprudence_ in its highest principles comes in touch with faith, and that it also must not dispute the divine right of the Church, we have mentioned the most important sciences and instances in which the investigator must take faith into consideration.

We now understand in what sense we may rightly speak of a “_Christian philosophy and science_” or of a “_Catholic science of history_.” Surely not in this sense that philosophy and history have to draw their results from Holy Scripture or from the dogmatical decisions of the Church; nor in the sense that they have to make positive defence for everything that the Church finds it necessary to prescribe. The sense is merely this: they guide themselves by faith, as we said above, by refraining from propositions and presumptions proved by faith to be false. In a large measure this is also the meaning of the often-misrepresented term, _Catholic University_. In the reverse sense we may speak of a liberal science. It is that science which in the field of philosophy and religion guides itself by the principles of liberalism and the principle of liberal freedom and the rejection of faith. But to speak of a Catholic, Protestant, Liberal chemistry or mathematics, has no sense at all, because these disciplines, like most other profane sciences, have no direct connection with Catholicism, Protestantism, or Liberalism.

That we have stated correctly the _attitude of the Catholic
Church_ is evidenced by more than one official document. In the
decree of the Holy Office of July 3, 1907, the so-called Syllabus
of _Pius X._, the following (5.) proposition is condemned:
“Inasmuch as the treasure of faith contains only revealed truths,
it does not behoove the Church under any consideration to pass
judgment on the assertions made by human sciences.” Similarly was
the proposition (14), likewise condemned in the Syllabus of _Pius
IX._: “Philosophy must be pursued without any regard to
supernatural revelation.”

These condemnations stirred up anger: “Now,” it was said, “the
Church wants to subject the whole of human knowledge to her
judgment: this is unbearable insolence.” But what follows from
these condemnations? The opposite truth asserted in them is this:
the Church in one respect must pass judgment on the assertions
made by human science, namely, in so far as they come in conflict
with the doctrines of faith. The only freedom rejected by the
Council is the freedom to contradict revealed truth: it must not
be held “that human science may be pursued with freedom, that its
assertions can be considered true and must not be rejected by the
Church even if they contradict a revealed doctrine.” (sess. III,
ch. 4, can. 2). The Church does not want to judge on matters of
profane science; but she claims the right, due to her as guardian
appointed for the preservation of the pure faith, to raise her
warning voice when, for instance, natural science transgresses its
limits and trespasses on the province of religion by denying the
creation of the world. It is but self-defence against an attack
upon her inviolable domain. But she does not claim the authority
to sit in judgment upon the results of astro-physics, upon the
atom-hypothesis, or its opposite; or on the acceptance of a theory
about ions or earthquakes.

Another question may be touched upon: Is the _Catholic historian_ free to proceed steadily in the search after historic truth, even where he discovers facts which do not reflect honour on his Church? And where it is a question of uncertain, private revelation, of doubtfulness of relics and other sacred objects exposed for public worship, may he proceed undisturbed with his critical research, or is he restrained by ecclesiastical authority?

Should the Catholic meet with dark passages in the history of his Church, then every well-meaning observer will demand that he display in the treatment of such matters a pious forbearance for his Church. His respect for her will dictate this. Unsparing criticism and hunting for blemishes and shadows must be excluded. But he cannot on this account be bound to pass by the unpleasant facts he may meet in his researches, or to cloak or deny them against his better knowledge. He knows that the divinity of his Church shows itself to best advantage just because, notwithstanding many weaknesses and faults, past and present, she passes unvanquished and imperishable through all storms,—a token of the supernatural origin of her strength and power of endurance.

It was this very thought that moved _Leo XIII._ to open the Vatican Archives for freest research to friend and enemy,—the clearest proof that could possibly be given that the Church does not fear historical truth. In his letter of admonition, of August 18, 1883, urging the fostering of historiography, the same Pope gives the following rules for the Catholic scientist: “The first law of history is that it must not say anything false; the second, that it must not be afraid of saying the truth, lest a suspicion of partiality and unfairness arise.” An excellent example of the application of these rules is found in _L. v. Pastor’s_ “History of the Popes,” especially in what he says about _Alexander VI._ and _Leo X._

In his historical investigation of private revelations, such as those of _St. Gertrude_, _St. Mechtild_, _Bl. Juliana of Liège_, or of relics and objects of veneration, the historian is likewise not restricted by Church-direction. Having merely the task of preserving the treasure of the faith received from Christ and the Apostles, the Church in her function as Teacher never vouches for the divine origin of new, private revelations, nor for the accuracy of pious traditions of another kind. True, she decides authoritatively whether private revelations contain anything against faith and morals, but she decides nothing more. If she accepts such revelations or traditions as genuine, she claims for the facts in question only that human faith which corresponds to their historical proof.

This is clearly stated by the recent encyclical _Pascendi_: “In
judging of pious traditions, the following must be kept in mind:
the Church employs such prudence in treating of these matters that
she does not allow such traditions to be written about except with
great precaution and only after making the declarations required
by _Urban VIII._; and even then, after this has been properly
done, the Church by no means asserts the truth of the private
revelation or of the tradition, but merely permits them to be
believed, provided there be sufficient human reasons. It was in
this sense that the Sacred Congregation of Rites declared
thirty-one years ago: ‘These apparitions are neither approved nor
condemned by the Holy See; it merely permits them to be believed
in a natural way, provided the tradition on which they rest be
corroborated by credible testimonies and documents.’ Whoever
follows this maxim is safe. The veneration of such things is
always conditional, it is only relative, and on the condition that
the tradition be true. In so far only is the veneration absolute
as it relates to the Saint to whom the veneration is paid. The
same applies to the veneration of relics.” (_Benedict XIV._ says
of private revelations: “Praedictis revelationibus etsi
_approbatis_, non debere nec posse a nobis adhiberi assensum fidei
catholicae, sed tantum fidei humanae juxta regulas prudentiae,
juxta quas praedictae revelationes sunt probabiles et pie
credibiles.” De Serv. Dei beatificatione, III, c. ult. n. 15).

Hence the historian is free to investigate such traditions
critically, provided, of course, that he does not violate the
reverence due to sacred things.

4. Infallible and Non-Infallible Teachings.

Now to consider a last point. Does it not rest entirely with the pleasure of ecclesiastical authority, as would seem from what has been said above, to suppress at any time the results, or at least the hypotheses, of scientific research by pointing to putative truths of faith presumed to be in opposition? Then, of course, the scientist would be at the mercy of a zealous ecclesiastical authority. Or will it perhaps be said that this authority is infallible in its every decision? Think of _Galileo_, of the interdict against the Copernican view of the world, and you will be able fully to appreciate the danger alluded to!

We shall later on return to the famous case of _Galileo_. For the present we only call attention to a distinction which must not be overlooked, the distinction between infallible teachings and those that are not infallible.(3)

According to Catholic teaching, the universal teaching body of the Church, when declaring unanimously to be an object of faith something relating to faith and morals, is endowed with _infallibility_, and also when in its daily practice of the faith it unanimously professes a doctrine to be a truth of faith. This infallibility is also possessed by the Pope alone when, acting in his capacity as Supreme Teacher of the Church in matters of faith and morals, he intends to give a permanent decision for the whole Church (ex cathedra).

Besides these infallible teachings there are also _non-infallible_ teachings, and they are the more frequent. Such are, first of all, the ordinary doctrinal utterances of the Pope himself in his regular supervision of the teaching of doctrine: these instructions and declarations are of a lower kind than those peremptory ones that are pronounced ex cathedra: he is infallible only in the utterance of these ultimate, supreme decisions, the chief bulwark, as it were, erected against the floods of error. Decisions ex cathedra are very rare. Encyclical letters, too, are, as a rule, not infallible. It is self-evident that the theological opinions and statements of the Pope as a private person, not as Supreme Head of the Church, do not belong here at all. They have no official character and are in no way binding.

Among decisions that are not infallible are further included, in various degrees, the doctrinal utterances of Bishops, of particular synods, and especially those of the Roman Congregations. The latter are bodies of Cardinals, delegated by the Head of the Church, as highest Papal boards, to co-operate with him in the various offices of administration. Of these, the Congregation of the Holy Office and that of the Index may also render decisions on doctrinal questions. Although the Congregations act by virtue of their delegation from the Pope, and publish their decrees with his consent, the decisions are not decisions of the Pope himself, but remain decisions of the Cardinals. Much less can the infallibility of the Pope pass over to them: it is his personal prerogative, the aid of the Holy Ghost is promised to him, and protects his judgments under certain conditions against error.

But the Catholic owes submission also to the non-infallible teachings; and not only an outer submission, a reverent silence, that offends not either verbally or in writing against the decision rendered, but he owes also his inner assent. But it cannot be that unconditional inner assent which he owes to the infallible decision, for this he holds to be irrevocably certain; nor is his assent to non-infallible decisions a real act of faith. He is not given any unconditional guarantee of the truth. An error is, of course, most unlikely, but not absolutely impossible. Hence the faithful Catholic should always be ready to accept such decisions in as far as they are warranted by recognized truth. This applies to all kinds of doctrinal teaching, but of course in different ways, corresponding to the degree of authority,—for instance, Papal decisions are of higher authority than those of the Congregations,—yet it applies also to the doctrinal decisions of the Congregations, because they are the ordinary teaching organs of the Church.

When the Congregation of the Index, 1857, had forbidden the works
of _Guenther_ and many thought they could evade the decision,
_Pius IX._ wrote, June 15, to the Archbishop of Cologne: “The
decree is so far-reaching that nobody may think himself free not
to hold what we have confirmed.” Similar was what the Pope had
written to the Archbishop of Mecheln after the condemnation of the
ontological errors of _Ubagh_. The Motu proprio of _Pius X._ of
November 8, 1907, speaks similarly of the obligation of submission
to the decisions of the Papal Biblical Commission relating to
doctrines, and to the decrees of Congregations when approved by
the Pope. (Cf. also the Syllabus of Pius IX., sent. 22.)

Theologians agree that this requisite internal assent is not the
same as irrevocable assent. This was also declared by _Pius IX._
in his letter to the Archbishop of Munich-Freising, saying that
this inner submission is by no means faith; and no theologian will
ascribe infallibility to a mere congregational decree. (See on
this point: _e.g._ _Grisar_, Galileistudien, 1882, 171 _seq._ Cr.
_Pesch_, Theol. Zeitfragen, Erste Folge, 1900, III. _Egger_,
Streiflichter ueber die freiere Bibelforschung, 1889.)

It would be erroneous to think that only in recent times, after
the embarrassment caused by the regrettable _Galileo_ decision the
subtle distinction had been invented that congregational decisions
are not binding on Catholics with absolute force. This was taught
by theologians long before the _Galileo_ case caused any
excitement. In this sense the celebrated writer on Moral Theology,
_Lacroix_, said: “The declarations of none of these Congregations
are infallible.... No infallibility is promised to the
Congregation in so far as it is viewed as separate from the Pope”
(Theologia Moralis, 1729, I, n. 215). _Raccioli_, soon after the
_Galileo_ trial, wrote: “The Holy Congregation of Cardinals as
separate from the Pope cannot give to any proposition the proper
authority of faith.” And he adds: “There being extant no decision
of the Pope, or of a Council directed and confirmed by him, the
proposition of the sun moving and the earth standing still cannot
on the strength of a congregational decree be considered a truth
that must be believed” (Almagestum novum, 1651, I, 52).

The obligation to give interior assent also to an authority not infallible, cannot seem strange if this authority offers a guarantee for the truth commensurate to the assent demanded. We certainly ask of a child to receive the instruction from his parent and teacher with internal assent, so far as the latter does not run counter to its instinct for the truth, else the education of the child and the needful influence over its intellectual life would be impossible. Upon the Church has been bestowed by her divine Founder the task of guiding the faithful authoritatively in the educational matters committed to the Church, and not only in their youth but throughout their lives. This guidance in religion and morality would be impossible if the faithful could constantly deny their internal assent to the instruction of the Church, which is given generally in a form that is not infallible. The full power of the Church to teach with authority implies a corresponding duty of the faithful to assent to her teachings as far as this is possible. Does not the scientific specialist think himself obliged to accept a proposition on the strength of a certain authority, even if the latter’s infallibility is not established? He reads in his scientific periodical and finds in it the report of special researches made by a colleague. He cannot examine them over again, yet he accepts them because of the reliability of his colleague, in which he sees the guarantee of truth. Likewise, only more so, does the Catholic owe it to his sense of truth to impose upon himself an assent even where the representatives of the teaching authority of the Church are not endowed in their decision with the gift of infallibility. For he knows that even in such teachings the Church is commonly under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, who will seldom tolerate error. He is promised to the teaching Church for the safe guidance of the faithful; these declarations are, however, the ordinary doctrinal utterances of that ecclesiastical office. And the Holy Ghost cannot permit that the teaching authority should by a wrong decision forfeit the confidence it enjoys.

Moreover, this authority ranks very high even when looked at from a purely human standpoint. Those who are invested with it are mostly men of great learning, competent to give such doctrinal decisions by virtue of their experience and position, and learned advisers are at their side. They are guided by the tradition and wisdom of a universal Church, which measures its history by thousands of years: the decisions, too, are for the most part but the application or repetition of previous doctrinal utterances. Besides, there is the hesitating caution which advances to a decision only after long deliberations, and in undemonstrated matters usually refrains from decision; a caution which has increased still more in recent times, since so many subtle questions have arisen on the boundaries of science and faith. It is also known that many inquisitive eyes are constantly turned on Rome, and a single wrong decision might entail most disagreeable consequences for friend and foe. The pressure must be very great before a much-disputed question is taken up at all.

Of course it is by no means impossible that difficulties may pile up in such a way that an error may really be made. History knows of such a case. But the very fact that the one case of _Galileo_ is always quoted, and, therefore, that in the long history of the Congregations this is considered to be almost the only case of importance, is a proof how carefully the Congregations proceed, and that supernatural aid is granted them. An institution which in the course of its long existence had to reply to innumerable questions and against which only one wrong decision of importance can be pointed out, must necessarily be an exemplary institution. An institution so free from human error must surely be guided by the Holy Ghost. Compare with this the many cases in which science has had to correct itself, had to abandon its long-championed propositions as untenable.

Thus, in a given case, the decision is not difficult for the Catholic. On one side stand the representatives of a science which has erred, very often, incomparably more frequently than the ecclesiastical teaching authority, and which lacks the special aid of God. On the other side is the ecclesiastical authority, which has almost never erred, and which enjoys special divine aid; moreover, it examines into its questions with greater caution and care, because it has more to lose. In addition it is almost invariably able to point to a large number, and frequently the majority, of savants who indorse its decisions, because these mostly concern disputed questions not yet scientifically determined. Hence the Catholic will find no difficulty in presuming that the decision is in accord with the truth; the more so because, as a rule, he himself is unable to examine scientifically both sides of the question.

Should any one, nevertheless, be clearly convinced, by substantial and valid reasons, that there has been prejudgment, then he would not be any longer obliged to give it his interior assent: truth before all else. It would be easy, too, by presenting reliable information to an authoritative quarter, to secure the triumph of the truth. However, in this case a man must be ever on his guard against the tendency to overrate his own arguments. In excitement he easily thinks himself to be certainly in the right, but when considering the matter quietly before God and his conscience, he will rarely come to the conclusion that it would be wise to set his judgment above the decision. In the case of _Galileo_ the decision of the Congregation was by no means opposed by a clear conviction of the truth of the opposite.