Chapter II: Freedom Of Teaching And The State (1)

Close bonds of mutual dependence and solidarity interlink all created beings, especially men. Insufficient in himself, both physically and mentally, man finds in uniting with others everything he needs; thus do individuals and families join forces, generations join hands; what the fathers have earned is inherited and increased by new generations. Human life is essentially social life and co-operation—in the indefinite form social life within the great human society, in the definite form social life within the two great bodies, Church and state. Within both bodies human benefits are to be attained and protected against danger by common exertion—within the Church the spiritual benefits of eternal character, within the state the temporal benefits.

Hence both bodies, or societies, will have to take a position in relation to science and its doctrine. Indeed, in civilized nations there is hardly a public activity of mightier influence upon life than science. The contemplation of this position shall now be our task.

Science, as we have above set forth, addresses itself to mankind—a fallible science addressing itself to men easily deceived; therefore, an unrestricted freedom in teaching is ethically inadmissible. Hence it follows, as a matter of course, that the authorities of state and Church, who must guard the common benefits, have the duty of keeping the freedom in scientific teaching within its proper bounds, so far as this lies in their power. Hitherto we have left these social authorities out of consideration; the position taken was the general ethical one.

The case might be supposed that the Church had provided few restrictions of this kind, and the state none at all; nevertheless, an absolute freedom in teaching would still present a condition dangerous to the community at large, contrary to the demands of morality; we should then have an unrestricted freedom in teaching, permitted by law, but ethically inadmissible.

The distinction is important. Quite often freedom in teaching is spoken of as permitted by the state, as if it was identical with ethical permission. If freedom in teaching is permitted by the state, this evidently means only that the state permits teaching without interference on its part; it says, I do not stand in the way, I let things proceed. But this does not mean that it is right and proper. The burden of personal responsibility rests upon him who avails himself of a freedom which, though not hindered by the state, is in conflict with what is right. The state tolerates many things—it does not interfere against unkindness, nor against extravagance, nor deceit; nevertheless everybody is morally responsible for such doings.

If, then, we take up the question, what position social authority should take toward scientific teaching, whether it be in the higher schools, or outside of them, we are considering chiefly the state. It is the state that enters most into consideration when freedom in teaching nowadays is discussed; the state may interfere most effectively in the management of schools and universities, for these are state institutions in most countries.

Universities as State Institutions.

They were not always state institutions. The universities of the Middle Ages were autonomous corporations, which constituted themselves, made their own statutes, had their own courts, but enjoyed at the same time legal rights. Conditions gradually changed after the Reformation. The power of princes began more and more to interfere in the management of the universities, until in the seventeenth century, and still more in the eighteenth, the universities became state institutions, subject to the reigning sovereign, the professors his salaried officials, and text-books, subject and form of instruction were prescribed by the minute, paternal directions of the sovereign, and with the mania for regulating that was a feature of the eighteenth century. The nineteenth century brought more liberty; it was demanded by the enlarged scope of universities, which no longer were only the training schools for the learned professions, but became the home of research, needing freedom of movement.

Nevertheless, universities are in many countries still state institutions. They are founded by the state, are given organization and laws by the state; the teachers are appointed and given their commissions by the state. They are state officials, though less under government supervision than other state officials. At the same time these universities are possessed of a certain measure of autonomy, a remainder of olden times. They elect their academic authorities, which have some autonomy and disciplinary jurisdiction. Likewise the separate faculties have their powers; they confer degrees, administer their benefices, and exert considerable influence in filling vacant chairs.

The state then considers it its duty to grant freedom in teaching. “Science and its teaching are free,” says the law in some countries. No doubt a loosely drawn sentence; at any rate, it means that science should be granted the _proper_ freedom. And this freedom it must have. We have become more sensitive of unjustified paternal government than were the people of the eighteenth century.

The Object of the State.

What kind of a freedom in teaching, then, should be granted by the state? Unlimited freedom? This is, at any rate, not a necessary conclusion. The state must also grant freedom to the father for the education of his children, to the landowner for the culture of his fields, to the artist in the production of his works; but that freedom would not be understood to be an unlimited one, having no regard to the interests of society, but merely as the exclusion of unwarranted interference. Hence if the state, for reasons of the commonwealth, were to restrict freedom of teaching, the restraint could not be considered unjust. The purpose of the state must not suffer injury; to attain this purpose the state has the right to demand, and must demand, all that is necessary to the purpose in view, even though it entails a restriction of somebody’s freedom. Now for a definition of this purpose of the state.

Like any other society, the state seeks to attain a definite object, so much the more because the state is necessary to man, who otherwise would have to forego the things most needed in life; and but for the public co-operation of the many these could be attained not at all, or at least not sufficiently. To provide these things is the object of the state, viz., the public welfare of the citizens; it is to bring about public conditions which will enable the citizens to attain their temporal welfare. To this end the state must protect the rights of its subjects, and must protect and promote the public goods of economic life, but especially the spiritual benefits of morals and religion. The state, through its legislative, judicial, and executive functions, is to _direct_ effectively the community to this end; therefore it is incumbent upon the state to care for the preservation and promotion of both material and spiritual benefits, for the protection of private rights, and for the conditions necessary to its own existence, even against the arbitrary will of its subjects.

Protection for the Spiritual Foundations of Life.

From this the conclusion naturally follows, that the state must not grant freedom to propound in public, by speech or writing, theories that will _endanger the religious and moral goods of its citizens and the foundation of the state_.

We claim that the state neglects a solemn duty if it permits without hindrance—we will not say, the ridicule and disparagement of religion and morals: the less so, as freedom to ridicule and to slander has nothing to do with freedom in teaching—but the public promulgation of theories which are either irreligious, or against morals, or against the state. Even though they be done in scientific form, injuries to the common weal remain injuries, and they do not change into something else by being committed in scientific form. The state must seek to prevent such injuries by strictly enforced penalties and by the selection of conscientious teachers. The enforcement of the principle may not be possible under circumstances, legislatures may lack insight or good will, or the complexion of the state may not admit of it for the time being, or permanently. Then we would simply see a regrettable condition, a government incapable of ridding itself of the morbid matter which is poisoning its marrow. But if there is good will and energy, one thing may always be done to check injurious influences, and that is the awakening and employment of forces of opposition.

The University of Halle is said to have been the first one to
enjoy modern freedom in teaching. What, at that time, however, was
meant by freedom in teaching, is shown by the words of _Chr.
Thomasius_ in 1694: “Thank God that He has prompted His Anointed
(the prince) not to introduce here the yoke under which many are
now and then languishing, but gracefully to grant our teachers the
freedom of doctrines _that are not against God and the state_.”
One hundred and fifty years later Minister _Eichhorn_ advised the
University of Koenigsberg that in natural sciences neither the
individual freedom in teaching nor of research are limited, that
the case is different, however, with philosophy as applied to
life, with history, theology, and the science of laws. “The first
requisite there,” he said, “is a proper bent of mind, which,
however, can find its basis and its lasting support only in
religion. With the proper bent of mind there will be no desire to
teach doctrines which attack the roots of the very life of one’s
own country.”

Now, what considerations make it plain that the duty of the state is as stated? Two: consideration for its subjects, and consideration for the state itself. The state must protect the highest _possessions of its citizens_. For that reason men are by nature itself prompted to found states, so as to protect better their common goods, by the strong hand of an authority, against foes from within and without, and to enable them to bequeath those goods inviolate to their sons and grandsons. Hence they must demand of state-power not to tolerate conditions which would greatly jeopardize those goods, and certainly not to allow attacks thereon by its own educational organs. The highest spiritual benefits of civilization, and at the same time the necessary foundations of a well-ordered life, are, first of all, morality and religion; not morality alone, but also religion, do not forget this. Man’s first duty is the duty of worshipping God, of recognizing and worshipping his Creator, the ultimate end of all things. A profound truth was stated by _Aristotle_, when, coupling the duties to God with those to parents, he said that those merit punishment who question the duty of worshipping the gods and of loving one’s parents. Hence the first thing to be preserved to the nations is religion; it is in many ways their most precious possession, too. Not only do all nations possess religion, not excepting the most uncivilized; but there is no power that influences life and stirs the heart more than religion. Consider the religious wars of history; while they were surely deplorable, they demonstrate what religion is to man. Even in individuals who to all appearance are irreligious, religion never fully dies out; it appears there in false forms, or is their great puzzle, maybe the incubus of their lives, giving them no rest. Only in conjunction with firm religious principle can morality stand fast. Nowadays they work for ethics without religion, for education and school without God. Theoreticians in their four walls, removed from all real life, are busily working out systems of this sort. This new ethics has not yet stood the test of life, or, if it did, it has succeeded in gaining for its adherents only those who are at odds with religion and morals. These theories must first be otherwise attested before they may replace the old, well-tried religious foundations.

The noted and justly esteemed pedagogue, _Fr. W. Foerster_,
writes: “On the part of free-thinkers vigorous complaint has been
made that my book so decidedly confesses the unparalleled
pedagogic strength of the Christian religion. The author therefore
repeats emphatically that this confession has not grown out of an
arbitrary metaphysical mood, but directly out of his
moral-pedagogic studies. For over ten years of a long period of
instructing the youth in ethics, he has been engaged exclusively
in studying psychologically the problem of character-forming, and
the result of his studies is his conviction that all attempts at
educating youth without religion are absolutely futile. And, in
the judgment of the author, the only reason why the notion that
religion is superfluous in education is prevalent in such large
circles of modern pedagogues, is, that they have no extensive
practical experience in character-training, nor made thorough and
concentrated studies.” “The fact is, that all education in which
religion to all outward appearance is dispensed with, is still
deeply influenced by the after-effect of religious sanction and
religious earnestness. What education without religion really
means will become more clearly known in the coming generation.”

The state is zealous in protecting the property of its citizens, to which end a powerful police apparatus is constantly at work. If the state deems it its duty to interfere in this matter, must it not consider it a still higher duty to protect religion and morals, for the very reason that they are the property of its citizens, and even their most precious? _Pro aris et focis_, for home and altar, was what was fought for by the old Romans. Is it possible that a pagan government was more sterling and high-minded than the Christian state of the present? If it is to be the bearer of civilization, it ought to consider that man liveth not by bread alone. The only true mental civilization is the one which does not hamper but helps man in attaining his eternal goal.

Modern state power is being urged from all sides to take measures against the corruption of morals by the novel and the shop window, and not to look on apathetically when the consuming fire is spreading all about, in the name of art. Are the dangers to the spiritual health of society any less if reformers, in the name of science, shake at the foundations of matrimony, advocate polygamy, teach atheism? Because a so-called reformer has lost the fundamental truths of our moral-religious order, must all the rest submit to an attack upon the sacred possessions of themselves and their descendants?

That the rights of the teacher are not unrestricted was set forth
by an American paper (“Science,” No. 321) in its comment upon the
removal of certain professors: “There are barriers set to them on
the one hand by the rights of the students, and by the rights of
the college where he teaches, on the other. The college must
preserve its reputation and its good name, the student must be
protected against palpable errors and waste of time.... If a
professor of sociology should attack the institution of matrimony,
and propound the gospel of polygamy and of free love, then neither
the right to teach his views nor his honesty of purpose would save
him from dismissal. This is of course a very extreme case, not
likely to happen.”

Is it so very extreme? Certainly not in regard to teaching by
books. Listen: “From the foregoing it is self-evident that
polygyny based upon the rivalry of men for women (analogous to the
animal kingdom) presents the natural sexual practice of mankind.
Whether there is to be preferred a simultaneous or a successive
polygyny, or a combination of both, would depend on varying
conditions. The ethical type of the sexual condition, viz., in
general the desirable biological type, is the one that would best
suit a polygyny based upon a selection of man.” It is taught
further: “The monogamic principle of marriage in general is only
conditionally favorable to civilization, whereas it is destructive
of it constitutionally, hence in need of reform.” “Our
contemporaneous sexual reform wave has not yet assumed the
position of this knowledge; on the contrary, notwithstanding its
revolutionary aspect in some particulars, it is still under the
ban of the traditional ideal of marriage”; continence before
marriage is an “absurd” proposition!

This new system of morals, fit for the barnyard, but for women the
lowest degradation, is now to become the ideal of men, nay, even
of women: “True motherly pride, true womanly dignity, are
incompatible with the exclusiveness of the monogamic property
principle. If our movement for sexual reform is to elevate us
instead of plunging us into the mire, then this view must become
part and parcel of our women.” “The picture of the motherly woman,
of the woman with the pride of sexual modesty, instead of with the
exciting desire of possession ... this picture must become the
ideal of men, and sink down to the bottom of their soul and into
the fibres of their nervous system; it must animate their fancy
and awaken their sensual passions.”(20) We stand right in the
midst of the world of beasts!

This perilous moral teaching is allowed also in public lectures.
On November 14, 1908, the “Allgemeine Rundschau” wrote: “Imagine a
spacious concert-hall, brightly illuminated, every one of the many
seats occupied, the boxes filled to the last place, the aisles
crowded, by a most variegated audience: men and women, young
maidens, youths with downy beard; gentlemen of high rank with
their ladies, faces upon which are written a life of vast
experience side by side with childish faces whose innocence is
betrayed by their looks, and on the platform a university
professor and physician, holding forth about the most intimate
relations of sexual life: the unfitness of celibacy, the Catholic
morals of matrimony, prostitution and prostitutes, the causes of
adultery, ‘sterile marriage,’ onanism, and many kinds of
perversities. The man is, moreover, speaking in a fashion that
makes one forget the admonishments of conscience.”

The city council of Lausanne, in its meeting of February 10, 1907,
prohibited _Forel’s_ lecture as an attack upon decency and public
morals, making reference in its resolution to _Forel’s_ ideas as
laid down in his book. In protest, _Forel_ made a public
statement, saying among other things: “If the council desires to
be logical it would have to prohibit also the sale of my book.” We
have no objection to make to his conclusion.

We stated that religion is man’s first duty. This applies not only to the individual, but also—and this is forgotten too often—to the state. Man, by his nature, and hence in all forms of his life, including his citizenship, is obliged to have religion. He remains in all conditions the creature which is dependent upon God. And does not the state, too, owe special duties of gratitude to God? It owes its origin to God: the impulse to found states has been put into the human nature by its Creator; the state owes to God the foundation of its authority: in a thousand difficulties the state is thrown upon His help. Therefore a public divine service is found with all peoples. Does the state comply with this duty by silently supporting a public atheism when it might do otherwise? by even becoming its patron, when, posing as science, it ascends to the lecturing desk to teach adolescing youth?

Of course, free-thought is of a different opinion, especially the one of to-day. Its principle is: the state need not trouble itself about God and Religion, that is the private matter of each individual. In the eyes of free-thought the state is an imaginary being, hovering over the heads of its citizens; though they may be religious, the state itself should have no Religion. What absurdity! It is nothing short of nonsense to demand of the members of a state, the overwhelming majority of whom hold Religion to be true and necessary, that as a political community they are to act as if their Religion were false and worthless, as if to deny and to destroy it were quite proper. What else is the state but an organized aggregation of its citizens? To make of religious citizens, a state without Religion is just as absurd as a Catholic state composed wholly and entirely of Protestant citizens. This leads us to a further consideration. The state must protect its own foundations. Just as it must defend its existence against enemies from without, it must protect itself against those enemies from within, who, whether realizing the consequences or not, are by their actions actually shaking its foundations. These foundations consist of proper views on social and political principles, on morals and Religion. If the state does not intend to abolish itself, it must not permit doctrines to be disseminated which imperil these foundations and, consequently, the peaceful continuance of the state. In fact, no state power in its senses would permit a teacher, who directly attacks the validity of the state order, to continue; it would retire every professor of law who would dare to teach that regicide is permissible, or who would with the oratory of a Tolstoy preach the unnaturalness of a state possessing coercive power.

As a rule, open advocates of _Socialism_ are kept out of
college-chairs. And rightly so. So long as the adherents of
Socialism see in the state but the product of the egotism of the
ruling classes, and an institute for subjugating the masses, and
in the obtainment of political power the means of doing away with
this state of affairs, so long will it be impossible for the state
to trust the education of the future citizen to a Socialist, nor
can the latter, as an honest man, accept a position of trust from
the state, much less bind himself by the oath of office to
co-operate in the work of the state. Prof. _C. Bornhak_ makes the
following comment: “The decisive point is not freedom in teaching,
but the circumstance that the Socialist professor takes advantage
of the respect connected with a state office, or of his position
at a state institution, to undermine the state. A state that would
stand for this would deserve nothing better than its abolition.”

And _Paulsen_ similarly writes: “A state that would allow in the
lecture rooms of its colleges Socialistic views to be taught as
the results of science ... such a state will be looked for in
vain.”

Hence it is certain the state cannot grant a freedom in teaching that would jeopardize the foundation of its existence. It must consequently recognize no freedom which, in lectures and publications, will seriously injure public morality and religion. Morality and religion are, first of all, the indispensable conditions for the continuance of the state.

_Aristotle_ says the first duty of the state is to care for
religion. _Plato_ proposes heavy penalty for those who deny the
existence of the gods; a well-ordered state, he claims, must care
first of all for the fostering of religion. _Plutarch_ calls
religion the bond of every society and the foundation of the law.
_Cicero_ declares that there can be neither loyalty nor justice
without regard for God. _Valerius Maximus_ could say of Rome: “It
has ever been the principle of our city to give preference to
religion before any other matter, even before the highest and most
glorious benefits.” _Washington_, in his speech to Congress in
1789, declared religion and morality to be the most indispensable
support of the commonweal. He stated that it would be in vain for
one, who tries to wreck these two fundamental pillars of the
social structure, to boast of his patriotism.

Without religion there can be no firm resistance by conscience against man’s lower nature, no social virtues and sacrifices, there can only be egotism, the foe of all social order. No secure state-life can be built upon the principles that formed the basis of the French Revolution. So we see, generally and instinctively, the endeavour to prevent as much as possible anti-religious doctrines from being expounded directly to the broad masses of the people. This of itself is tantamount to the acknowledgment of their danger to the state. Yet, millions have tasted the fruit of an atheistic science, and the poison shows its effect; they have shaken off the yoke of religion; in its place dissatisfaction and bitterness are filling their breast, and fists are clenched against the existing order.

_Bebel_ said in a speech in the German Reichstag, on September 16,
1878: “Gentlemen, you attack our views in respect to religion,
because they are atheistic and materialistic. I acknowledge them
to be so.... I firmly believe Socialism will ultimately lead to
atheism. But these atheistic doctrines, that now are causing so
much pain and trouble for you, by whom were they scientifically
and philosophically demonstrated? Was it by Socialists? Men like
_Edgar_ and _Bruno_, _Bauer_, _Feuerbach_, _David Strauss_, _Ernst
Renan_, were they Socialists? They were men of science.... What is
allowed to the one—why should it be forbidden to the other?”

The notorious anarchist _Vaillant_ said: “I have demonstrated to
the physicians at Hotel-Dieu that my deed is the inexorable
consequence of my philosophy, and of the philosophy of _Buechner_,
_Darwin_, and _Herbert Spencer_.”

The youthful criminal _Emil Herny_ read at his trial a memorandum
wherein he said among other things: “I am an anarchist since 1891.
Up to this time I was wont to esteem and even to idolize my
country, the family, the state, and property.... Socialism is not
able to change the present order. It upholds the principle of
authority which, all affirmations of so-called free-thinkers
notwithstanding, is an obsolete remnant of the belief in a higher
power. I however was a materialist, atheist. My scientific
researches taught me gradually the work of natural forces. I
conceived that science had done away with the hypothesis of ‘God,’
which it needs no longer, hence that also the
religious-authoritative doctrine of morals, built upon it, as upon
a false foundation, had to disappear.”

What political wisdom would it be to honor as science any doctrine that becomes a social danger the moment it is taken seriously; what logic to denounce those as dangerous who are putting into practice a science that is hailed as the bearer of civilization!

One may object: How is the state to determine whether scientific doctrines are warranted or not warranted? The state has the conviction that in its political offices it has no organs for the cognition of scientific truth, for this reason it leaves science to self-regulation. Only the scientist, it is said, is able to revise the scientist.

Nothing but scholarly conceit can engender such ideas. Then any one would have the right to pin upon himself the badge of the scientist and become thereby completely immune. Thus, the bearers of practical political wisdom are declared incompetent to recognize the chief foundation of their state-structure; to realize, what daily experience and the experience of centuries teaches, that disbelief in God, even if sailing under false colors, undermines authority, that communism and upheaval of moral conceptions are tantamount to social danger. They are directed to depend for their information in such matters upon the latest ideas of impractical scientists. The fact is, the matters at issue have, with hardly an exception, long been decided. And where the Christian faith is concerned, the Church and the Christian centuries tell us clearly enough, what has hitherto been understood by Christianity. If the objection here advanced were true, then the state would not have a right to decide in the matter of exhibiting immoral pictures in show windows, without having argued the matter previously with representatives of art. The state would not be allowed to pronounce a death sentence because some scientists denounce capital punishment: the state would have to expunge “guilt,” “expiation,” and “liberty” from its penal code, because many recent scientists, by rejecting the freedom of choice, have removed the dividing line between crime and insanity, between punishment and correction.

Protection for Christianity.

Hitherto we have, in respect to religion, considered chiefly the rational truths, which are the foundations of every religion and also common to non-Christian creeds; the existence of a supermundane God and of a life after death are the most important of them. The revealed Christian religion contains, beside these truths, some others, which supplement them and surround them like a living garland, viz., original sin, redemption, resurrection, the divinity of Christ, grace and the Sacraments, the existence of a Church with its God-given rights, indissolubility of matrimony, etc. Should state-power protect the Christian and Catholic religion by warding off attacks against it, though such attacks are made in scientific form? This, too, in a state in which perhaps other confessions are enjoying the freedom of worship?

It would seem superfluous to propose this question specifically.
If, according to the gist of our argument, religion is to be
protected, what other religion can be meant than the Christian
religion? That is the religion of our nations; none other is.
While the stated distinction may have more of an academic than a
practical interest, the discussion of this question will not be
idle, if only for the reason that it will shed even more light
upon our previous statements. Besides, there are manifest efforts
to dislodge Christianity from the life of our people, and with it
all true religion, under the pretext of opposing church-doctrines
and dogmatism. The war against Christianity has not since the days
of a _Celsus_ been waged as it is to-day.

We premise a principle of a general nature. Of conflicting religions and views of the world, only one can be true; this is clear to every one who still believes in truth. It is equally clear that this one truth only can have the right to come forward and to enlist support in public life as a spiritual power; error has no right to prevail against truth. Hence it will not do to say simply: There are also the convictions of minorities in the state; some claim that none of the existing religions is the right one, others have dropped all belief in God; in our times we wish to concede to any conviction the right to enter into competition with others, provided mockery and abuse are barred. These remarks are quite true, in the sense that neither the individual nor the state may directly interfere with conscience or prescribe opinions: leaving entirely aside the question whether any one really could have a serious conviction of atheism. The foregoing is true also in the sense that public avowal of opinion must not be hindered by individuals. To interpret this to mean that the state must grant freedom to any expression of doctrine would be a grave misconception of the social influence which false ideas are liable to exercise. Does the state grant this freedom to any kind of medical practice, whether exercised skilfully or awkwardly, conscientiously or unscrupulously?

Moral-religious error may in public life expect only _tolerance_—just as many other evils must be tolerated, because their prevention would cause greater evils to arise. This is the reason why the state may, and often must, grant freedom of worship even to false creeds, because its denial would give rise to greater harm to the public weal (_St. Thomas_, 2, 2 q. 10, 11). Freedom of teaching, likewise, must not be granted in the sense of acknowledging that false doctrines and truth have equal rights; this would amount to an assassination of truth. Freedom can be conceded to error for the one reason only, that by not granting it there would be engendered greater evils. Consequently, if a state-power, or the organs of its legislative part, are convinced that the Christian religion is the only true one, they cannot possibly concede to contrary doctrines the right to pose as the truth and thus deceive minds; they may be granted the same freedom in teaching only because restrictive laws can either not be enforced at all, or not without creating a disorder that would give rise to greater evils. Hence the lesser evil must be carefully ascertained.

With this general principle in mind, it is easily seen that a freedom large enough to include an open attack on the fundamental, rational, truths of religion and morals—this having been our subject hitherto—could be conceded only if disbelief and atheism had gained so much power as to make impossible its prohibition. In this case, however, the state should be conscious of the fact that it allows the undermining of its foundations. If, in another state, religious feeling were at so low an ebb, that the freedom of the Christian truth could not be obtained in any other way than by granting full freedom for everything, then even such unlimited freedom would be a good thing to be striven for; of itself a deplorable condition and contrary to God’s intentions, but good as the lesser evil.

But let us return to the revealed religion. In the eyes of those who are convinced that the Christian religion, namely, the Catholic religion, is the only true religion, the ideal condition would be to have the entire population united in its faithful confession; then matters would simplify themselves in our case. But this ideal hardly exists anywhere. True, in many countries the population is almost wholly Christian; but the denominations are mixed, and many have separated at heart from Christianity. What standards, then, should rule in this case?

Looking at it specially, the demand of ethical reason is no doubt this: Nations and governments whose past was Christian, whose institutions and civilization are still Christian, and an overwhelming majority of whose members still think and believe in a Christian way, would fail in their gravest duties if they would expose or permit the Christian religion to remain unprotected against the attacks and the attempts at destruction by a false science, or by conceding to the adversaries of Christianity equal rights or even preference. The Christian religion will not be destroyed; but whole nations may lose it, and its loss will in great measure be the fault of those in whose hands their fate was laid. Here might be applied _Napoleon’s_ well-known saying: “The weakness of the highest authority is the greatest misfortune of the nations.”

It remains an anomaly that a state, the members of which for the most part are Christians, should treat this religion with indifference, and tolerate that its tenets and traditions be represented as fairy-tales and fables, its moral law as a danger to civilization, and perhaps its divine Founder as a victim of religious frenzy. If the state is the expression and the _representative of its subjects_, then such disharmony between public and private life is unnatural. Moreover, the Christian religion is held by the majority of its citizens to be the most precious legacy of their forefathers; they must demand from the state _protection for their greatest good_. And this may be claimed with even greater right by provinces where the population almost unanimously clings to the creed of their ancestors; at the colleges in these parts the faithful people will be entitled to protection more than elsewhere against dangers to its inherited religion. It would be unnatural in this case to apply the thoughtless principle of dealing uniformly with all provinces of the state. The state is not a heap of uniform pebbles, but an organism composed of different parts, each desiring to retain its own peculiar life.

Do not say this presumption does not admit of application to our
conditions, the majority of the people of this age being long
since estranged from Christianity. It is true, if we turn our eye
only to the more conspicuous classes of society, the classes that
control the newspapers and mould public opinion, this view might
be admitted as to some countries. But if we look at the masses,
those not infected by half-education, then this opinion is true no
longer. And there are many who at heart are not so distant from
faith as it would seem. In public life they pose as free-thinkers,
but their domestic life bears frequently a Christian character.
And often they approach more and more the faith, the older they
grow. This is known to be the fact even of scientists. Instances
are men like _Ampère_, _Foucault_, _Flourens_, _Hermite_, _Bion_,
_Biran_, _Fechner_, _Lotze_, _Romanes_, _Littré_, and others.
_Plato_ claimed that no one who in his youth disputed the
existence of the gods retained this view to his old age.
“Christianity,” observes _Savigny_ rightly, “is not only to be
acknowledged as a rule of life, it has actually transformed the
world, so that all our thoughts are ruled and penetrated by it, no
matter how foreign, even hostile, to Christianity they may
appear.”

It is a sign how deeply Christian religion has sunk its roots into the heart, that it remains _the_ religion even for those who have turned away from it. To be sure, for our nations Christianity is _the_ religion. For them the religion of a _Confucius_ or _Zoroaster_ does not enter into consideration; nor any of the products of modern religious foundations, which would replace Christianity with substitutions of all kinds of religious essences; they are on a level with the attempts at reconstructing sexual ethics: both are regrettable delusions. “Improvement” of Christian morality is tantamount to abandoning all morals, and desertion from the Christian religion, amongst our people, has always been apostasy from all religion. The Christian religion is so true, that no one can renounce it inwardly and then find peace in a self-made one. And all efforts aimed at displacing Christianity lead only to an abandonment of all religion.

Look at the number of people from whom slander and insinuation have torn their old religion to be replaced by another—a freer, higher religion; their moral decadence soon bears testimony of the religious consecration which has been given to them. Woe unto those authorities who, while able to oppose, are indifferent, and who lend a hand in causing Christian thought to withdraw more and more from our mental atmosphere, to be replaced by another spirit, a spirit that will gradually control the decision of the judge, the practice of the physician, the instruction of the teacher, and thus more and more enter into the life of the people.

It is not assured to those nations of Europe, whose public life is
feeding to-day upon the remnants of their Christian past, that
they will not relapse into a state of moral and religious
barbarity. “Maybe civilized mankind, or our nation at least, is
really losing its hold more and more upon definite moral
standards,” so complains a modern pedagogue; “possibly the
emancipation of sensuality will increase without end, perhaps we
have passed forever the stage of true humanity and of a live
idealism, and we shall henceforth glide downward.... These are no
mere, feverish dreams; there is good reason for facing these
possibilities with a determined eye, and no accidental or
philosophical optimism can ignore them” (_Münch_).

“It is quite possible,” we are told by another, “that much will go
down in our old Europe during the next centuries; and the downfall
will not be restricted by any means to Church and Christianity,
and in the crises that will come Europe will hardly get the needed
support from an æsthetic heathendom, from the Monists’ Union, or
from the evidences of science” (_Troeltsch_).

If it does not come to it, it will not be the merit of authorities
who let the vessel of state drift rudderless toward the rocks of
dechristianization.

They do not realize that they greatly endanger thereby also the foundations of the state. _The foundations of our governments rest upon Christianity._ The Christian faith created the state, created matrimony, family, and the education of the youth; created the social virtues of loyalty and of obedience. What we have of religion is Christian, what we have of the religious support of morality is equally Christian; “Christianity, Christian faith, Christian formation of life penetrates all vital utterances of the Occidental world like an all-pervading element” (_Paulsen_).

It is one of the first principles of political prudence not to shake the foundations upon which the state rests. States and nations are not ephemeral beings, existing from one day to the other, they are historical structures measuring their lives by centuries; past generations join hands with present generations, deeds and customs of the fathers live on in their sons.

States must remain on the historical tracks on which they have travelled to success, at least until the new track has stood the test of reliability. So far anti-Christian philosophy has terribly shaken governments; it has not yet proved itself a state-conserving principle.

It is a sad condition to see the guardians of states, devoid of historical appreciation, allow their people to tear themselves away from the soil wherein reposed the roots from which they drew life and strength. Sad, too, that complaints are made of college-professors who abuse freedom in teaching by constructing an unproved contradiction between knowledge and faith, by misrepresenting Christian tenets, by lowering the prestige of the Church, by distorting her historical picture. It would be regrettable for a Christian state, if the complaint were justified that for the most part our colleges have become places where religion is ignored; where the name of Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of mankind, is no longer mentioned; where the name of God never occurs in history, in natural and political science; where religion is considered the most unessential factor of mental life, a factor that has nothing to offer, that can answer no question—a treatment which, by the force of suggestion, must lead young men to think that religion is of no account. It is a banishment which in its effect is little different from an attack upon religion.

Sadder still would it be if the following view were to prevail at
our colleges: “A right of the student to see protected and not
destroyed any views and convictions, including those of a
religious nature, which he may bring to the university from his
home surroundings, from his preliminary education, as it is
asserted time and again in the frequent complaints about the
dechristianizing of youth at the universities—does not exist and
cannot exist, because it would be in contradiction to the very
essence of the university and its tasks” (_Jodl_).

Is not this the ethical principle of the bird of prey? Is it not
allowed to guard the defenceless chick against the hawk? Christian
people send their sons to the university, and demand that the
education of the parental home be spared, that the inexperience of
youth be not misused. The state must demand that the
religious-moral education which it furthers in its public schools
be not destroyed by the higher schools. Yet, all these rights must
be silenced the moment the vision of the absolute freedom of
teaching makes its appearance, since to refrain from
dechristianizing the youth would be contrary to his tasks.

If such abuse in the management of the power of knowledge, within and without colleges, is not counteracted by all possible means, then none need be surprised when a science free from religion and Christianity is followed by an elementary school free from religion, when in public and preparatory schools the free-thinking teacher is telling the pupils that there is no creation but only evolution, and that the gospels and biblical history are poetical stories such as the Nibelungenlied and the Iliad and Odyssey.

We cannot be astonished to find the following rules advocated for
the instruction in public schools: “Religious instruction in
schools should not differ from the instruction in other subjects,
namely, one of full freedom, bound only by recognized documents
and personalities of religious literature and religious science.
The school must teach that which is, it must present the tenets of
all times and all nations in so far as this is possible within its
modest compass.... But if the pupil should ask, What really is?
What position should the teacher assume toward this question? In
my opinion, he should speak in plain terms. He should say: There
are people who believe all that is taught by the different systems
of religion.... The child may further ask of the teacher whether
he himself believes. No teacher who claims the confidence of the
children should shirk the answer. He may confess his faith or
disbelief, without need of worry. It cannot hurt his prestige in
the eyes of the child, because, if for no other reason, either way
he will find himself in an equally large and good company”
(_Tews_).

But we hear much more radical utterances. For instance, the
official organ of teachers in a Catholic country urges defection
from the Church in the following words: “How long will
Social-Democracy, now so formidable, remain inactive against
clerical arrogance? How much longer will it shirk a duty that is
clear to the dullest eye? If the millions of our Social-Democrats,
including the women and children, would break away from Rome, the
priestcraft in Austria is as good as defeated. A grave
responsibility rests upon the Social-Democratic leaders. Should
they miss the moment to act, they will be judged by history!”
(Deutsch-oesterreichische Lehrerzeitung, June 1, 1909).

Another organ of teachers declares Christianity to be nothing else
but _victorious heresy_, for which Christ had to lay down His life
the same as _Giordano_, _Hus_, and countless others. “The subject
of religion as taught in the preparatory schools is for the most
part taken from ages whose customs and morals are—happily—no
longer ours.” We see radicalism rampant in large circles of public
school teachers, demanding noisily, excitedly, and, of course, in
the name of modern science and enlightenment, the abolition of the
divine service, of prayer, and religious instruction in school,
giving as reason that, “as to matters of mental freedom no
difference should be made between a university and a village
school.” That our people will “carelessly waste their Christian
patrimony, this is the great danger.”

Our argument is not that only Catholics should be professors, nor even to limit the teaching office to Christians. But one thing must be demanded of the college-teacher, that he possess the pedagogic qualifications to render him competent of educating the hope of the Christian people. As a rule this demands a religious, Christian disposition. One thing the state must absolutely demand of the teacher, that he have appreciation for the foundations of the Christian state; he who has no understanding for the historical forms of the life of a nation, who even regards them with hostility, should remain away from this vocation.

In the United States the Jesuit Order has five free universities, founded and directed by the Order. Their professors are not all Catholics; there are professors of other creeds, even Jews. All work in harmony to the common end of the university.

Men who sincerely and conscientiously strive for the interests of
science will everywhere show not only consideration, but even
understanding and respect, for what is true in the ideas of
others. “I gaze,” so writes Prof. _Smolka_, “upon the likenesses
of my venerable Protestant masters, under whom I studied at
Göttingen. Thirty-seven years have passed since I went to them, in
full confidence to find in their school the leaders who would be
free from the influence of the Catholic view of the world. To
their profound knowledge I owe, first of all, the emancipation
from the prejudices I was raised in, from the views of an
atmosphere devoted to Indifferentism in which I had passed my
youth. Prof. _Waitz_ opened my eyes to the grandeur of the
Catholic Church in the course of the centuries, in the repeated
prostration of the Papacy and its ever-following rise to
unsuspected heights, a fact unparalleled in the history of human
institutions. Prof. _Lotze_ rebuked me at the very beginning of my
studies at Göttingen for a slighting remark about scholastic
philosophy: later he imbued me with profound respect for it and
for the wealth of problems it embraces. These scientists,
Protestants without exception and in exclusively Protestant
surroundings, inoculated me with sincere love for scientific
truth, regardless of the consequences it would lead to. They also
introduced the youthful mind to the tried methods of scientific
research, indicating the boundaries where the domain of research
ends and the right of dogma, or arbitrary rule of subjective
imagination, begins.”

Restriction of Right.

We need no further proof that the state is justified in restricting the freedom of teaching, whenever demanded by the business of the state as described above. Restriction of this kind can be considered unjustified only by a state theory of liberalism, which holds that the object of the state consists in merely protecting individual liberty, no matter if this liberty should lead to the gravest injuries so long as it does not affect the freedom of others; a theory which changes the state community from an integral organism into a conglomeration of autonomous individuals. _Lasalle_ scornfully termed this theory the “nightwatchman idea” of the state. The state has the right and the duty to exert a necessary influence upon the pursuit of science, especially at the universities. Against it the pleading of _autonomy of the college_ and its teacher will not hold. They have a certain autonomy, that was even greater in former times. An important part of it is the right to propose appointments for vacant chairs. It must be admitted that this method of appointment is proper; it vouches for the scientific fitness of the appointee, and will prove a protection against the exercise of undue political influence and ministerial absolutism, provided that this method is impartially exercised. But an autonomy that disputes the right of the state to protect its interests, where free science conflicts with it, that would demand, as has been asserted, that “no infringement of the freedom in teaching must be deduced from the official position as teacher,”—such autonomy would be a palpable misconception of the dependency of the college-teacher and of the social service of science. The rules that apply to other, non-judicial, officers should apply to teachers appointed by the state, and offences in their office, or conduct injurious to the purpose and the dignity of their office, should be treated similarly as in the case of other public servants. Nor should members of the legislature be forbidden to defend the rightful interests of their constituents in regard to schools. They are elected by the people for this purpose, and the people have a claim on the schools, which are supported by their taxes and to which some of their greatest interests are attached.

It has been demanded to concede to college-teachers the
independence and immunity of judges. This, however, would be
overlooking the vast difference between professors and judges. The
judge has to render legal decisions in concrete cases, according
to existing laws; in order to lessen the danger of his being
guided by outside considerations he is given a large measure of
independence. But what questions has the college-professor to
decide? Mathematical or physical questions? There his
incorruptibility is not in such danger that he must be made
independent of government. Religious and moral questions,
questions of views of the world? These he is not compelled to
decide. Neither state nor people have appointed him to question,
time and again, the fundamental foundations of human life, and to
render decisions which nobody requested.

It is not clear why science, pleading its independence, should oppose justified restrictions. As a matter of fact _this independence does not exist anywhere_. Numerous are the considerations, often unwarranted, it is actually tied to, yea, often tied to by its own hands. He who is familiar with scientific doings, especially academic doings, knows numbers of such ties—there is the professional opinion in scientific circles; woe unto him who in his scientific works dares to confess a supernatural view of the world!—ties of the predominance of certain leaders or schools, without or against whose favor it is difficult to attain recognition, approval, or position; the ties of parties and cliques in an academic career; the tie, too, of that insinuating power of the state that confers much-desired decorations and titles.

“Where is this freedom of science?” asks a modern academic
teacher. “Some will say science and its teaching are free in our
country. True, it is so written on paper. But those charged with
keeping this principle inviolate are human. For instance the
monists have the chief voice in appointments to zoölogical chairs.
They will propose only scientists who are not opponents to the
monistic faith. Far be it from me to assume any _mala fides_. They
simply believe that only their faith is the proper one to promote
science. But I ask again, where is the freedom of science?”
(_Dahl_).