Chapter D: Possible Questions Regarding H-Bombs and International Control1

_The answers to many of the questions which follow are obvious. The
answer to other questions are less obvious. Each question has been
selected to suggest and to illustrate the kind of problem which may be
involved, whether easy or difficult of solution. It should be
emphasized that the original United States proposals and the existing
United Nations plan foresee and carefully take into account the
possibility of an H-bomb, as evidenced by the language they contain.
The same is true of the McMahon Act for domestic control of atomic
energy within the United States._

Footnote 1:

All material in this appendix, except those paragraphs headed
“Author’s Comments,” has been prepared by the staff of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy.

1. IS THE HYDROGEN BOMB A MORE OR LESS IMPORTANT WEAPON THAN THE ATOMIC BOMB? MIGHT HYDROGEN BOMBS PROVE TO BE DECISIVE IN WAR, OR HAS THEIR SIGNIFICANCE BEEN EXAGGERATED?

Dr. Harold Urey, a Nobel Prize winner in [chemistry], has suggested that the H-bomb would be militarily decisive; Dr. Hans Bethe, [and other noted physicists, have] indicated that the step from A-bombs to H-bombs is as great as the original step from conventional to atomic explosives. However, Dr. Robert F. Bacher, a former AEC Commissioner, states that—

while it [the H-bomb] is a terrible weapon, its military effectiveness
seems to have been grossly overrated in the minds of laymen.

Some of the questions which may bear upon this difference of opinion are as follows:

(1) _Shock effect._—To what extent do H-bombs excel A-bombs in permitting a highly destructive attack to be compressed in time?

(2) _Comparative numbers._—What quantity of A-bombs are required to do the same job as a given number of H-bombs?

(3) _Neutron economy._—How much fissionable material for A-bombs is sacrificed by using the neutrons available in reactors for making H-bomb materials?

(4) _Deliverability._—Under various combat conditions, is the delivery of H-bombs cheaper and surer than delivery of an “equivalent” number of A-bombs?

(5) _Aiming accuracy._—How superior is a weapon which need strike only within a number of miles in order to destroy its target over one which must strike within 1 or 2 miles?

(6) _Psychology._—As compared with the A-bomb, to what extent might the H-bomb impair an enemy’s will to resist and accelerate recognition of defeat?

(7) _Tactical employment._—What is the relative value of A-bombs and H-bombs in tactical situations—when used against troops in the field, guerrilla fighters, forces preparing for amphibious invasion, a fleet, a string of air strips or submarine bases, atomic facilities, underground installations, etc.?

(8) _Definition of “military effectiveness.”_—Would the use of H-bombs to destroy large urban centers containing no armaments plants have no “military effectiveness,” or would such destruction aid the attacker and therefore represent “militarily effective” use of the weapon? Is it possible to distinguish, in an era of total war, between “military” and “nonmilitary” targets?

AUTHOR’S COMMENT

The answer to (1) becomes obvious in light of the answers to (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6), all of which must be considered together. We know that a standard H-bomb would be the equal to ten nominal A-bombs in its power to destroy by blast and to as many as thirty A-bombs in its incendiary effects. In terms of total area, the H-bomb can destroy by blast an area of more than 300 square miles, as compared with an area of only ten square miles for the nominal A-bomb, and more than 1,200 square miles by fire and burns, as compared with only four square miles for the early A-bomb model. As for neutron economy, we have seen that this vast increase in power could be achieved at a cost in fissionable A-bomb material possibly as low as one twelfth, and no higher, at the most, than the plutonium required (according to Professor Oliphant’s estimate) for just one A-bomb. It thus becomes obvious that such a weapon not only is much cheaper, in terms of destruction and cost of materials, than the conventional A-bomb, but is much more easily and safely delivered, since it would still be highly effective as a blasting weapon if exploded more than five miles from its target, while as an incendiary it would still be highly effective as far as fifteen miles away. Hence there can be no question that H-bombs vastly excel A-bombs in permitting a highly destructive attack to be compressed in time, and that its psychological effect in impairing an enemy’s will to resist is also incalculably greater.

Its vastly greater range of destructiveness, its economy of material, and its surer delivery also make the H-bomb vastly superior to the A-bomb as a tactical weapon. Neither the H-bomb nor the A-bomb appears to be practical for use against guerrilla fighters, except possibly as a threat.

As already discussed at length in Chapter III, there could be no possible justification, on moral as well as military grounds, for using the H-bomb as a strategic weapon to destroy large urban centers, especially those containing no armaments plants, except in retaliation for such use against us or our allies.

2. IF THE H-BOMB IS DEEMED TO BE DECISIVE OR FAR MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE A-BOMB, SHOULD INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF HYDROGEN WEAPONS TAKE PRIORITY OVER CONTROL OF ORDINARY ATOMIC WEAPONS? SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PROPOSE A SEPARATE PLAN EXCLUSIVELY DESIGNED TO REGULATE H-BOMBS?

The official United Nations proposals for international control of atomic energy apparently involve the assumption that A-bombs are so unique technically and so menacing as to set them apart from conventional weapons and to justify separate consideration in the United Nations and a separate regulatory system. If the step from A-bombs to H-bombs is considered to be as great as the step from conventional weapons to A-bombs, does it follow that hydrogen warfare should become the subject of a separate control proposal and should receive separate consideration in the United Nations?

Are the technical facts of atomic and hydrogen weapons so intimately related that both must be controlled if either is to be controlled? Are the political facts such that the two problems must be regarded inseparably?

AUTHOR’S COMMENT

Since the H-bomb requires the A-bomb as a trigger, it becomes obvious that the two problems are inseparable.

3. IS THE EXISTING UNITED NATIONS PLAN TECHNICALLY ADEQUATE TO CONTROL H-BOMBS?

The United Nations plan has been couched in such a manner that an international agency would possess discretionary authority in defining and controlling materials and processes that may be employed to manufacture nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

For instance, the _Second Report_ of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission defines “atomic energy” as including “all forms of energy released in the course of, or as a result of, nuclear fission _or of other nuclear transformation_.” “Source material” is taken to mean “any material containing one or more key substances in such concentration as the international agency may by regulation determine.” “Key substance” is defined to mean “uranium, thorium _and any other element from which nuclear fuel can be produced, as may be determined by the international agency_.” (p. 71). Similarly, the report defines “nuclear fuel” as “plutonium, U-233, U-235, uranium enriched in U-235, material containing the foregoing, _and any other material which the international agency determines to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy through nuclear chain reaction of the material_.” (p. 71.) The _report_ likewise observes that: “Dangerous activities or facilities are those which are of _military significance_ in the production of atomic weapons. The word “dangerous” is used in the sense of _potentially dangerous to world security_.” (p. 70). [Italics supplied throughout.]

Does such breadth of phraseology mean that manufacturing processes and source materials needed in the production of H-bombs could be properly controlled, through the existing UN plan?

Since nearly 2 years of work were required to formulate the UN plan, can this plan be regarded as adequate for hydrogen weapons so long as the control measures for the atomic energy industry are not explicitly elaborated with the same detail as the arrangements evolved for controlling U-235 and plutonium?

It may also be pointed out that the existing UN plan contains no provision for physically protecting informants who advise the international agency of violations. Might potential informants keep silent for fear of being punished by their national governments? Is this factor important if the existing UN plan were subjected to the added strain of controlling hydrogen weapons as well as atomic weapons?

What safeguards would assure that the employees of an international control agency would be faithful and loyal to the objectives of the agency and that they would not work purely in the interests of some national government—perhaps a national government other than that of their own country?

AUTHOR’S COMMENT

The language makes it obvious that the United Nations plan “foresees and carefully takes into account the possibility of an H-bomb.” In view of Russia’s attitude, however, and to leave no room for future quibbling, the present plan should be explicitly elaborated to include hydrogen weapons. On the other hand, since Russia will have none of the plan, such elaboration would at best be purely academic.

As for protecting informants, certainly no plan could contemplate that citizens would act as spies against their own country, even if they find that their country is violating an international agreement. The plan is designed so that such violations could be detected by the official employees of the international control agency. Obviously, such official employees stationed in any country should not be nationals of that country and should be protected by diplomatic immunity. Each country, in selecting its representatives to the control agency, would naturally subject them to a most careful screening as to their character and loyalty, and would use all necessary checks to make certain that they are faithful and loyal to the objectives of the agency.

4. IS CONTROL OVER FISSIONABLE MATERIALS SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT THE PRODUCTION OF HYDROGEN BOMBS? IF SO, IS THE EXISTING UN PLAN ADEQUATE TO THIS TASK?

The technical facts suggest that H-bombs may be regulated in at least two ways: (1) Control over the fissionable material usable as a “trigger” and (2) control over deuterium and tritium.

Perhaps control over _all_ fissionable material would give effective control over hydrogen weapons. However, by way of specific example, the introduction to volume VI of the Scientific Information Transmitted to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946-October 14, 1946 (see State Department Publication 2661, pp. 151–152), comments as follows:

It is difficult to define the amount of activity in the illicit
production of atomic weapons which is significant. The illicit
construction of a single atomic bomb by means of a decade of
successful evasion would not provide an overwhelming advantage, if it
can be assumed that it would take another decade to produce a second
bomb. But the secret production of one bomb per year would create a
definite danger, and the secret production of five or more per year
would be disastrous. This report assumes arbitrarily that the minimum
unit of noncompliance is the secret production of one atomic bomb per
year or a total of five bombs over any period of time. [This example
is chosen because UN documents published later omit concrete
illustrations, although the stress which these documents place upon
international ownership, operation, and management clearly reflects a
determination to reduce to the rock-bottom minimum any illicit mining
or production.]

Considering that five illicit A-bombs might, under certain circumstances, lead to five illicit H-bombs, what margin of inefficiency—if any—in controlling source and fissionable material is permissible? Is absolute protection against illegal diversion of source and fissionable material technically possible? Does the existing UN plan provide absolute or near-absolute protection? Can greater technical protection be secured than under the present UN plan?

AUTHOR’S COMMENT

It can be stated unequivocally that, in the absence of complete mutual faith and goodwill on the part of all concerned, neither the existing UN plan nor any other technical plan that can be devised will provide absolute or near-absolute protection. No plan could be devised that would provide assurance against the diversion of enough material in any one year to make at least one atomic bomb. In five years this would mean the secret production of five hydrogen bombs.

5. MUST H-BOMB CONTROLS RELATE TO DEUTERIUM AND TRITIUM AS WELL AS TO FISSIONABLE MATERIAL? IF THEY MUST, CAN THE PRESENT UN PLAN FULLY PROVIDE FOR THESE CONTROLS OR DOES IT REQUIRE REVISION OR CHANGES IN EMPHASIS?

Should control over both fissionable material and deuterium and tritium call for the same emphasis and consideration which the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission has already given to control of U-235 and plutonium? Would surveillance of deuterium and tritium manufacture furnish better insurance against illicit H-bomb construction than surveillance of U-235 and plutonium, or is the reverse more apt to be true? Are added safeguards necessary to regulate deuterium and tritium? Or is the UN plan, as now constituted, sufficiently flexible and comprehensive to take care of light-element control?

AUTHOR’S COMMENT

Since H-bombs require either U-235 or plutonium, as well as deuterium and tritium, and since absolute or near-absolute control of U-235 or plutonium is not possible, it becomes obvious that H-bomb controls must relate to both deuterium and tritium as well as to fissionable material. Since the UN plan does not mention them by name, added safeguards are necessary to regulate deuterium and tritium. No safeguards, however, could be devised even in this respect to provide absolute or near-absolute protection.

6. IS IT TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE TO DETECT THE MANUFACTURE OF HEAVY WATER AND DEUTERIUM THROUGH INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION? WOULD AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FLATLY PROHIBITING PRODUCTION IN QUANTITY BE DESIRABLE?

The manufacture of heavy water and the separation of deuterium are relatively simple processes. They may be carried out in small plants which can exist in a variety of locales.

The _Second Report_ of the UN Commission comments as follows:

The international agency shall have the authority to require periodic
reports from nations regarding the production, shipment, location, and
use of specialized equipment and supplies directly related to the
production and use of atomic energy, such as mass spectrometers,
diffusion barriers, gas centrifuges, electromagnetic isotope
separation units, very pure graphite in large amounts, heavy water,
and beryllium or beryllium compounds in large amounts. In addition,
the agency shall have authority to require reports as specified of
certain distinctive facilities and construction projects having
features of size and design, or construction or operation, which, in
combination with their location and/or production or consumption of
heat or electricity, are peculiarly comparable to those of known
atomic facilities of dangerous character (p. 54).

Would inspectors possessing freedom of movement be able to locate deuterium and heavy water plants? Would aerial surveys and aerial photographs of industrial areas help detect processes which produce hydrogen as a byproduct and which might therefore be concerned with the manufacture of heavy water or deuterium? Should quantity production of deuterium be prohibited even though it is used in certain types of peacetime reactors such as the Canadian reactor at Chalk River, the French reactor at Chatillon, Swedish reactors under construction, and a research reactor at the Argonne National Laboratory? Is it possible on technical grounds to enforce such a prohibition?

AUTHOR’S COMMENT

It would not be desirable to prohibit production of heavy water and deuterium in quantity since heavy water is the best moderator of neutrons in the large-scale production of atomic power for industrial uses. Furthermore, such a prohibition could never be enforced, since, as stated, the manufacture of heavy water and the separation of deuterium are relatively simple processes that “may be carried out in small plants which can exist in a variety of locales.” What makes it even more difficult, if not impossible, to detect any violation of such a prohibition is the fact that the raw material for heavy water or deuterium is just plain water.

7. SHOULD THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT UN PLAN RELATING TO INSPECTION, SURVEYS, AND EXPLORATIONS BE MODIFIED TO CONTROL HEAVY WATER AND DEUTERIUM PRODUCTION?

The United Nations plan assumes that the production of fissionable material cannot be regulated without strict supervision over the mining of source materials such as uranium and thorium:

Without the control of raw materials, any other controls that might be
applied in the various processes of atomic energy production would be
inadequate because of the uncertainty as to whether or not the
international agency has knowledge of the disposition of _all_ raw
material. (_Second Report_, p. 30.)

Whereas uranium and thorium are needed to produce U-235, [U-233] and plutonium, the production of deuterium is not subject to such limitation of source materials. Only water, the existence of power, and comparatively simple plants are needed for the manufacture of heavy water and deuterium. In view of these facts, can the existing United Nations plan cope with the problem of regulating deuterium production?

In commenting upon spot aerial surveys, for example, the _Second Report_ recommends that “the [international] agency shall conduct spot aerial surveys in each period of 2 years over areas not exceeding 5 percent of the territory under the control of each nation or areas not to exceed 2,000 square miles, whichever is the larger. (These area limitations apply to spot aerial surveys only)” (p. 68). If aerial surveys were to be used not only in controlling raw materials but also to help in spotting deuterium and heavy water plants, must they be carried out more frequently than is provided in the existing plan?

The _Second Report_ also indicates that a UN inspectorate should be compelled to secure permission, through a warrant procedure, before inspecting “private and restricted property not open to visitation by the population in the locality, and in the case of certain ground surveys and aerial surveys which are additional to others which the agency may conduct without warrant or other special authorization” (p. 60). Do the technical facts surrounding heavy water and deuterium production suggest that such a restriction on an international agency’s authority would have to be modified?

AUTHOR’S COMMENT

See comment on question 6.

8. WHAT SAFEGUARDS ARE NECESSARY TO PREVENT CLANDESTINE PRODUCTION OF TRITIUM? WOULD AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FLATLY PROHIBITING PRODUCTION IN QUANTITY BE DESIRABLE?

U-235 and plutonium may be used either in weapons or as fuels for peacetime reactors. Here is the reason most frequently cited for requiring that international control include not only inspection but also such further guaranties as United Nations ownership, operation, and management of “dangerous” plants. The potentiality, both for good and evil, that characterizes fissionables does not appear to characterize tritium, which has no known peacetime uses except as a laboratory research tool. Is it therefore possible that the reason for requiring inspection plus other guaranties as regards U-235 and plutonium does not apply to tritium and that inspection alone would answer?

If quantity production of tritium were altogether forbidden—as having no peacetime purpose—the mere act of preparing lithium (the tritium raw material) for irradiation and the mere act of inserting it in a nuclear reactor might be considered a violation. Would such action be impossible to conceal from managers and inspectors stationed at each reactor permitted under the control agreement? Would an illegal reactor itself be impossible to conceal from inspectors enjoying freedom of movement?

A few private commentators have argued that the UN plan fundamentally errs in assuming industrial power to be around the corner. They estimate that this goal is actually a decade or two away and that meanwhile the control problem would be simplified if all high-powered reactors were dismantled. Does the role of reactor-produced tritium in H-bomb production strengthen such an argument?

The UN plan distinguishes between atomic facilities which are sufficiently “dangerous” to require UN management and facilities which may be operated by national governments and merely require international inspection. Since all reactors produce neutrons and hence might be useful in some degree—however small—in manufacturing tritium, is it now necessary to regard certain reactors formerly considered to be “non-dangerous” as now being in the “dangerous” category?

Are there other methods, apart from reactors, for producing tritium? If so, how can they be controlled? Would the right of the international control agency to own, operate, and manage “dangerous” plants and to own and regulate both fissionable materials and “fusionable materials” meet such a situation?

AUTHOR’S COMMENT

The most efficient and rapid method for producing tritium is by inserting lithium metal into a large nuclear reactor, thus exposing it to irradiation by neutrons, which transmute the lithium into tritium and helium. Tritium could also be produced in a similar manner in the smaller nuclear reactors used for research purposes, and though these smaller reactors would produce it at a considerably slower rate, the fact that the amounts of tritium required may be rather small would inevitably shift these reactors from the “non-dangerous” to the “dangerous” category. Such small reactors are essential for research, and their prohibition would strike a vital blow at the progress of science. Furthermore, they could be much more easily hidden than large reactors. This fact, therefore, weakens, rather than strengthens the argument for the dismantling of all high-powered reactors, as such dismantling would not prevent the production of tritium.

There are other, though less efficient, methods for producing tritium, however, that do not require any reactors at all. A good neutron source can be provided by exposing beryllium to radium, radon, or polonium. These neutrons could then be used to bombard lithium and convert it into tritium. Nor is lithium necessary, for at least four other elements, including deuterium, helium 3, boron, and nitrogen, can be transmuted by neutrons from the beryllium into tritium. What is more, even neutrons are not absolutely essential, since deuterons (nuclei of deuterium) and beryllium could be made to yield tritium by bombarding them with other deuterons. The latter method, however, would require the use of giant cyclotrons and would be very slow.

All this would indicate that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to provide safeguards against the clandestine production of tritium.

9. SHOULD A WORLD-WIDE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY COVER CONCENTRATED LITHIUM DEPOSITS?

A key feature of the United Nations plan is the provision for a world-wide geological survey of uranium and thorium—the raw materials potentially usable in A-bombs. This survey is considered necessary in order to permit tracing of materials as they progress from the mines through various processing phases and finally enter a nuclear reactor. Does the same kind of logic apply to lithium—raw material for tritium? How formidable is the technical problem of locating and controlling deposits of lithium?

Pegmatite minerals constitute a principal source of lithium ores, which are currently produced as a byproduct of the nonmetallic mineral industry. Commercial deposits of lithium are known to exist in the Black Hills of North Dakota; northern New Mexico; Saskatchewan, Canada; and southwest Africa. Production of ores rose to about 900 tons of lithium oxide in 1944 and is now about 200 tons. So long as requirements do not exceed byproduct production, supply does not appear to present a problem. If requirements exceed byproduct supply, the cost of the excess might be high. Lithium is now used commercially in glass, as a compound in welding fluxes, in storage batteries, in fluorescent light tubes, and as an alloying element.

Are the quantities of lithium ore required on an order of magnitude that makes control feasible?

AUTHOR’S COMMENT

Such a world-wide geological survey would be futile, as only a few hundred pounds of lithium would be necessary to produce enough tritium for a relatively large H-bomb stockpile, and such amounts could be hidden right now from available stocks.

10. DO THE TECHNICAL FACTS OF THE H-BOMB MEAN THAT NOW, MORE THAN EVER, THE UNITED NATIONS PLAN IS THE CORRECT APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL CONTROL?

Various critics of the UN plan have denied that management control over “dangerous” plants is essential to protect against violations. High-power reactors are among the plants to be classified as “dangerous” under the UN plan, and these same reactors are the ones which might produce not merely plutonium but tritium in quantity. Likewise, an international agency would possess authority to check the design of any isotope separation unit and to assume the right of construction and operation if these fall into the “dangerous” category. Deuterium may be obtained through isotopic separation. Do such facts as these refute the critics and demonstrate that managerial and material control by the United Nations, over and above inspection, is more than ever necessary in order to prevent diversion of nuclear fuel or illegal irradiation of lithium?

AUTHOR’S COMMENT

In the light of the technical facts about the H-bomb, the argument as to whether managerial control over “dangerous” plants is essential to protect against violations becomes wholly academic. We have seen that even managerial control would not offer either absolute or near-absolute protection. No plan that does not offer at least near-absolute protection against the clandestine production of even one H-bomb per year could be trusted when a nation’s very existence may be at stake.

11. HOW DOES THE H-BOMB AFFECT THE PROBLEM OF “STAGES”?

The United Nations plan would take effect by “stages”—one stage to include, among other projects, a world-wide geological survey, another stage, to involve, among other projects, the taking over of atomic installations, and still another to bring about the disposition of fissionable materials.

At what point in some such progression would national stockpiles of deuterium and tritium be placed under control? When this point was reached, would they be destroyed or be held in storage under United Nations auspices? If a nation pretended to make known its entire stockpile of tritium and deuterium while actually it kept hidden a substantial portion, how would the international agency discover such a violation?

AUTHORS COMMENT

See comment on questions 12 and 13.

12. HOW DOES THE H-BOMB BEAR UPON THE PROBLEM OF DISPOSITION OF EXISTING STOCKS OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL?

When a control plan takes effect, what should be done with supplies of U-235 and plutonium in excess of a quantity immediately usable for peacetime purposes? This problem has received relatively little consideration in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. If excess stocks were destroyed, a valuable future source of energy and storehouse of neutrons would be lost. On the other hand, if the stocks were kept in existence under UN guard, seizure by an aggressor state might rapidly permit it to attack with atomic bombs—and innocent countries might have relatively little warning.

Such seizures might quickly lead, under certain circumstances, to the construction of “triggers” for H-bombs. Does this fact tip the balance in favor of destroying excess U-235 and plutonium? Or are these substances still too valuable and too difficult to replace to justify destruction? Is there a third alternative—possibly involving partial destruction or the use of “denaturants” or the construction of many power reactors, regardless of cost factors—to keep excess stocks of fissionables contaminated with fission products?

AUTHORS COMMENT

The problem of the disposition of existing stocks of fissionable materials was given little consideration because it was too hot to handle. From the very beginning Russia insisted that all atomic bombs be destroyed, and she left no doubt that she meant the destruction of the fissionable materials with which bombs could be quickly assembled. Even before the H-bomb, such destruction might have meant suicide to nations that complied, since they would have been at the complete mercy of noncomplying nations. The advent of the H-bomb makes all talk of such destruction, wholly apart from the waste of a priceless, irreplaceable natural resource, completely unrealistic, as any such act would be tantamount to abdication, a prelude to a super-Munich by the free nations. Denaturing, which makes fissionable materials temporarily useless for bombs, is also out of the question, since it would take a long time to reconcentrate them, giving nations with a hidden stock of nondenatured material a tremendous advantage that might well mean the difference between survival and annihilation for a nation that acted in good faith. All this also applies to the destruction of stocks of deuterium and tritium.

13. HOW DOES THE H-BOMB BEAR UPON “QUOTAS”?

The United Nations plan envisages that reactors and other atomic facilities will be distributed among the nations according to “quotas” and a “strategic balance”—whereby no one nation, by seizing the plants within or near its borders, could gain an undue military advantage over innocent nations. This “quota” feature has been criticized as unnecessary and as likely to hinder individual countries in developing the peacetime uses of atomic energy to the maximum extent.

Does the fact that reactor fuels, if seized by an aggressor, might make available H-bomb “triggers” tend to render all the more desirable the “quota” idea? How long a time would an aggressor require to make enough deuterium and tritium for H-bombs in seized plants? Could a world control authority, by requiring that certain design features be incorporated in the plants under its control, extend this time period? What should be done with plants in existence at the time a control agreement takes effect and well suited to H-bomb production but poorly suited to peacetime uses? How should such plants, if they were not dismantled, figure in “quota” allotments?

AUTHOR’S COMMENT

From its very inception the quota system was totally impossible of realization. Today it is likely to prove a snare and a delusion, giving a false sense of security, since it could not guarantee against the clandestine production of at least one H-bomb a year. The plutonium for the trigger could be produced in hidden small reactors, while the deuterium and tritium could be produced in other small plants that could be equally hidden. As we have seen, tritium production does not even require a nuclear reactor.

Like the “quota system,” the system of “stages” has also become completely out of date, since it was predicated on the control system taking effect before Russia developed her own atomic bombs or had built her own nuclear reactors. Today there is no longer any logical reason for any stages, since any delay would make effective control more difficult. Even today, if an international agency were to take over stockpiles, it could never be certain that considerable amounts had not been hidden away. In other words, even if the UN plan were to be adopted today, it would not give security against a surprise atomic attack, which is the very purpose of the plan.

14. HOW DOES THE H-BOMB BEAR UPON RESEARCH TO BE PERFORMED BY THE UNITED NATIONS CONTROL AGENCY?

Under the United Nations plan, individual nations would be forbidden to engage in atomic weapons research, but such research would be performed by the world control agency itself, as a means of keeping it at the forefront of knowledge in this field and thereby enabling it to detect violations which might otherwise pass unnoticed through ignorance. Is research upon H-bombs so dangerous that not even the world control agency should be allowed to undertake it?

AUTHOR’S COMMENT

If an international agency is ever established, it is obvious that it would have to carry on research on H-bombs for the same reason that would make it vital for it to carry on research on A-bombs—“to keep at the forefront of knowledge” so that it would be in a position to “detect violations.” This would become all the more imperative just because the H-bomb is so much more dangerous.

15. SHOULD TECHNICAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE H-BOMB BE TRANSMITTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS AS A BASIS FOR A DISCUSSION OF HYDROGEN CONTROL?

In 1946 the United States transmitted six volumes of technical information on atomic energy to the United Nations. This was one important means of providing members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission with sufficient basic data to discuss international control.

No similar body of material on hydrogen bombs has been transmitted to the United Nations. Can the Commission now discuss the control of hydrogen warfare without further official information on its technical aspects? If such information is to be provided, who should be the provider, the United States or the Soviet Union, or both?

AUTHOR’S COMMENT

All the information so far has come from the United States. In fact, the Smyth Report, the six volumes of technical information submitted to the UN, the testimony by scientists at the Congressional hearings on the McMahon Act, and much declassified information have been of invaluable aid to Russia in developing her own atomic bomb. It is about time that this one-way flow of information came to a stop. Not a trickle has so far come out of Russia—not even an official acknowledgment that she has exploded her first A-bomb—and until she shows her willingness to co-operate fully, we must stop playing Santa Claus.

16. SHOULD A NEW PANEL OF EXPERTS ANALOGOUS TO THE ACHESON-LILIENTHAL BOARD BE APPOINTED TO STUDY THE H-BOMB IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL CONTROL?

It is now more than 4 years since the Acheson-Lilienthal Board made its recommendations on international control. Their findings have since been largely incorporated into the UN plan.

Do the events of the last 4 years make it desirable, for technical reasons, to rethink the control problem? Are the technical data of hydrogen bombs such, as to demand a recasting and change of emphasis in the existing UN plan? Have the prospects of large-scale peacetime applications of atomic energy sufficiently changed that a different orientation in control measures is desirable?

If re-examination of the control question is indicated, should this inquiry be undertaken in the first instance by a group of qualified Americans? Or should the United States suggest that an internationally constituted board initially take on this assignment?

Considering the strong Soviet opposition to the UN plan, is it useful to consider the problem of control? Is the Soviet attitude at all likely to change in the foreseeable future? Would a rethinking of the control problem contribute to a solution unless Soviet representatives participated? Would the appointment of a new “Acheson-Lilienthal Board” raise false hopes?

AUTHOR’S COMMENT

As indicated in Chapter IV and in the preceding comments, the UN plan for the international control of atomic energy is wholly out of date, and the sooner we realize it, the better for us and for the world. It was at best a noble ideal, which did not have the slightest chance of realization from the very start. A re-examination of the entire problem, even before the advent of the H-bomb, had been long overdue. Today it is all the more imperative. Since such a re-examination requires, or at least implies, the withdrawal of the plan, originally sponsored by this country, it should be done by an international board, preferably at the suggestion of some nation other than the United States.

The new board, in considering the whole problem anew, should avoid our original error of regarding control of atomic weapons as a problem wholly separate from that of other weapons of mass destruction. It should recognize the facts of life and not aim at bringing the millennium overnight. It should not seek absolute security, since the facts show it to be unattainable. Rather should it accept as a wise maxim that even partial security is better than none.

If the board set for itself certain limited objectives, they would have a much better chance of universal acceptance than if its aims were too high, as they were in the original United States plan, now the plan of the majority of United Nations. Its first limited objective should be a general agreement to outlaw the use of all weapons of mass destruction against civilian populations. This would mean outlawing the use not only of A- and H-bombs against large urban centers of population, but also of all other conventional weapons for the mass killing of noncombatants.

A second limited objective should be the outlawing of radiological warfare in all forms, which should include the use of the rigged H-bomb as well as the use of A-bombs in a manner that takes advantage of their radioactive effects. This would mean the prohibition of the explosion of A- or H-bombs from a low altitude, or their explosion underwater in a harbor.

These limited objectives would still permit nations to manufacture atomic weapons and to use them as tactical weapons against military personnel, while they would eliminate their use as strategic weapons against large urban centers. The very possession of atomic weapons by both sides, however, may in itself prevent their use even tactically. In fact, there would still be the hope that they would serve as effective deterrents against war itself.

The advantage of such a plan of limited objectives is the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that even Russia would not dare to turn it down and thus stand before the world as preventing the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons against civilian populations. And once we reached agreement with Russia on one set of limited objectives, the door may possibly have been opened for further agreement on other limited objectives.

Peace, step by step, appears to be the only alternative to possible catastrophe. One limited objective after another must become our major policy.

A NOTE ON THE TYPE IN WHICH THIS BOOK IS SET

_The text of this book is set in Caledonia, a Linotype face designed by W. A. Dwiggins. This type belongs to the family of printing types called “modern face” by printers—a term used to mark the change in style of type-letters that occurred about 1800. Caledonia borders on the general design of Scotch Modern, but is more freely drawn than that letter._

_The book was composed, printed, and bound by Kingsport Press, Inc., Kingsport, Tennessee._

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_Also by_ WILLIAM L. LAURENCE

DAWN OVER ZERO

[_1946_, _1947_]

_This is a Borzoi Book, published in New York by Alfred A. Knopf_

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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

Page Changed from Changed to

56 Valuing their liberty more their Valuing their liberty more than
lives, the American their lives, the American

122 Einstein’s formula, E = mc₂, Einstein’s formula, E = mc²,
revealed that matter revealed that matter

● Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained. ● Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.