Chapter VIII: Appendix: The Hydrogen Bomb and International Control

_In the fall of 1949 Senator McMahon directed the staff of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy to study the hydrogen bomb in relation to international control of atomic energy. The material in the following pages, with the exception of the comments in Appendix D, was prepared by the staff at the chairman’s request to assist the joint committee in considering the problem._

_It is my belief that this valuable material, until now unavailable in such excellent summary form, will also assist Americans in general in considering this vital problem. Readers of this volume should find it helpful in arriving at conclusions of their own, particularly in the light of the facts and discussion presented in Chapters III and IV. I further believe that a careful perusal of the following material will lend strong support to my view that the international control of atomic weapons, as envisaged in the majority plan of the United Nations,—the only plan that may give assurance against a surprise atomic attack—had become wholly impractical even before the entry of the H-bomb into the picture, and that the imminent development of the H-bomb has made it so unworkable that any further plan to revive it would be futile._

_This material makes it clear (a) that Russia never had any intention of reaching any agreement on international control and had set out to sabotage any plan from the very beginning; and (b) that no plan, no matter how foolproof, could hope to succeed in the absence of complete mutual trust and confidence. Events in Korea, I am convinced, have driven the last nail into the coffin of the UN control plan._

A
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC
WEAPONS

May 1945: Secretary of War Stimson appoints interim Committee to study
problem of atomic energy.

August 6, 1945: Hiroshima.

October 3, 1945: President’s message to Congress outlines necessity
for international control of atomic energy and proposes
conversations with Canada and United Kingdom.

November 15, 1945: Three-nation agreed declaration on atomic energy
(Truman-Attlee-King declaration). Calls for United Nations
Commission to make proposals for international control plan.
Proposals should provide safeguards “by way of _inspection and
other means_.” (Wherever used in the following pages, italics are
supplied.)

December 27, 1945: U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister communiqué on
results of Moscow Conference. Proposes that Canada, China, and
France join with Big Three in sponsoring resolution calling for
United Nations Atomic Energy Commission with terms of reference
stipulated in Truman-Attlee-King declaration.

January 24, 1946: General Assembly resolution establishing United
Nations Commission on Atomic Energy. Composed of members of
Security Council plus Canada.

March 28, 1946: Acheson-Lilienthal report. Urges that mines and
“dangerous” atomic-energy facilities be put under _international
ownership_ and _management_ of Atomic Development Authority.
Additional safeguards in the form of _inspection_. Nations to
operate “safe” plants under ADA license. Plants to be distributed
among nations in keeping with _strategic balance_. Control plan to
be implemented by stages.

June 14, 1946: Baruch proposals to United Nations. Closely follow
Acheson-Lilienthal recommendations. Ask “condign punishment,” for
violations, and request agreement that UN Charter _veto_ clause
not apply to sanctions for stipulated violations of atomic-energy
treaty.

June 19, 1946: Soviet Union counterproposals. Demand prohibition of
atomic weapons and destruction of existing stockpiles _before_
international control plan is negotiated. Soviet proposals provide
no safeguards against evasion.

December 31, 1946: First Report of UNAEC. Incorporates essential
features of Baruch proposals into statement of principles for plan
for international control of atomic energy. Adopted 10 to 0, with
U.S.S.R. and Poland abstaining.

June 11, 1947: U.S.S.R. control proposals. Soviets assent to _periodic
inspection_, but this would apply only to _declared_ plants.

August 11, 1947: Soviets consent in principle to concept of _quotas_.

September 11, 1947: Second Report of UNAEC. Outlines powers,
functions, and limitations thereon of any international agency in
implementing effective control plan.

May 17, 1948: Third Report of UNAEC. Reports impasse because Soviets
refuse to accept majority plan and persist in refusing to put
forward effective proposals of their own. Concludes that further
work in UNAEC is fruitless until Soviet cooperation in broader
fields of policy is secured. Recommends that Commission’s work be
suspended until sponsoring powers find that basis for agreement
exists.

September 25, 1948: Soviets modify position by asking that conventions
for prohibition of atomic weapons and for international control go
into effect simultaneously.

November 4, 1948: By vote of 40 to 6, UN General Assembly endorses
majority control plan. Calls upon UNAEC to continue work and
requests that sponsoring powers consult to explore possible basis
of agreement.

August 9, 1949: First meeting of sponsoring powers of UNAEC.

September 23, 1949: President Truman’s announcement of Soviet atomic
explosion.

October 25, 1949: Canada, China, France, United Kingdom, United States
statement reveals Soviet attitude still prevents agreement.

November 23, 1949: General Assembly resolution calls upon sponsoring
powers to continue consultations.

November 23, 1949: Soviets reverse position on quotas, abandoning
previous assent in principle.

January 19, 1950: U.S.S.R. walks out of sponsoring powers
consultations over China recognition issue.

January 31, 1950: President Truman announces that United States will
proceed with development of hydrogen bomb.

B
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
PROPOSALS AND NEGOTIATIONS

_Early steps looking toward international control_

Even before the test explosion at Alamogordo, N. Mex., had ushered in the atomic age, the United States Government was studying methods of making atomic energy a socially constructive force.

In May 1945 an Interim Committee appointed by Secretary of War Stimson commenced investigating the problem. The Committee recognized “that the means of producing the atomic bomb would not forever remain the exclusive property of the United States....” Therefore, “Secretary of War Stimson was one of the first to recommend a policy of international supervision and control of the entire field of atomic energy....”

When on August 6, 1945, President Truman made the first public statement on the atomic bomb, he made clear that “under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge the technical process of production or all the military application, pending further examination of possible methods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of sudden destruction.” He assured the American people that he would “make further recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic power can become a powerful and forceful influence toward the maintenance of world peace.”

The President’s recommendations were transmitted to the Congress on October 3, 1945. He spoke of the necessity for “international arrangements looking, if possible, to the renunciation of the use and development of the atomic bomb, and directing ... atomic energy ... toward peaceful and humanitarian ends.” So great a challenge could not await the full development of the United Nations. The President, therefore, proposed initiating discussions “first with our associates in this discovery, Great Britain and Canada, and then with other nations....”

_The Truman-Attlee-King declaration_

In the three nations agreed declaration of November 15, 1945—frequently called the Truman-Attlee-King declaration—was recorded the concerted objectives of the three nations that had developed the atomic bomb.

According to the declaration, any international arrangements should have a dual goal: Preventing the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes, and promoting its use for peaceful and humanitarian ends. To reach these objectives, the signatory nations proposed a United Nations Commission empowered to make recommendations to the parent body. It was asked that the Commission make specific proposals “for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect states against the hazards of violations and evasions.” It was further suggested that the Commission’s work “proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.”

Contained in the agreed declaration was the genesis of the basic feature of the control proposals subsequently advanced by the United States, and accepted by a large majority of the United Nations: safeguards through inspection and _other means_. It was recognized even at this early date that “effective, reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards” against evasion represented the minimum prerequisite of a satisfactory international arrangement.

At the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in December 1945, the Truman-Attlee-King proposals received the Soviet Union’s endorsement. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to invite Canada, China, and France to join with them in sponsoring a resolution calling for a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Such a Commission would consist of the 11 members of the Security Council plus Canada when that state was not sitting on the Council. It is noteworthy that the Commission’s proposed terms of reference were exactly those suggested by the Truman-Attlee-King declaration.

In its first substantive resolution, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the recommendations of the Moscow Conference and established the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy on January 24, 1946.

_The Acheson-Lilienthal report_

In order to inquire into the nature of the “effective, reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards” called for in the Truman-Attlee-King declaration, Secretary of State Byrnes in January 1946 appointed a Committee headed by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The Committee in turn enlisted the aid of a Board of Consultants under the chairmanship of David Lilienthal.

The findings of the two groups were made public on March 28, 1946, in the Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, commonly called the Acheson-Lilienthal report. It was advanced “not as a final plan but as a place to begin, a foundation on which to build.”

The report concluded that no security against atomic attack could be found in an agreement that merely “outlawed” these weapons. Nor was it considered feasible to control atomic energy “only by a system which relies on inspection and similar police-like methods.” Instead, inspection must be supplemented by _international ownership and management_ of raw materials and key installations. “Dangerous” operations—those of potential military consequence—would be carried out by an Atomic Development Authority, an international agency under the United Nations. Only “safe” activities—those of no military importance—would be conducted by the individual nations, under licenses from the Atomic Development Authority. Any plan finally agreed upon would be implemented by _stages_ with the United States progressively transferring its fund of theoretical and technological knowledge to an international authority as safeguards were put into effect.

The report amplified the Truman-Attlee-King proposals in two important respects.

First, it stated that international ownership—not specifically mentioned in the earlier declaration—was a necessary adjunct of international inspection. Second, it advanced the concept of “strategic balance” or “quotas.” The Report held that an acceptable plan must be “such that if it fails or the whole international situation collapses, any nations such as the United States will still be in a relatively secure position, compared to any other nation.” To help attain this end, it was proposed that the Atomic Development Authority’s stock piles and plants be well distributed geographically.

_The Baruch proposals to the United Nations_

Less than 3 months after the publication of the Acheson-Lilienthal report, the United States Government gave the world its proposals for the international control of atomic energy. On June 14, 1946, Bernard Baruch presented them to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission “as a basis for beginning our discussion.”

Mr. Baruch stated that:

When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the
renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put
into effective operation and condign punishments set up for violations
of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international
crimes, we propose that:

1. manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;

2. existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the
treaty; and

3. the Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the
know-how for the production of atomic energy.

The methods suggested for achieving international control were the following:

The United States proposes the creation of an International Atomic
Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the
development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material
and including—

1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities
potentially dangerous to world security.

2. Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.

3. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.

4. Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative
character intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic
knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend, and therefore to
detect—misuse of atomic energy. To be effective, the Authority must
itself be the world’s leader in the field of atomic knowledge and
development and thus supplement its legal authority with the great
power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge.

These proposals represented a broadening—rather than essential modification—of the Acheson-Lilienthal recommendations. The additional features concerned (1) _condign punishment_, and (2) the so-called power of veto of the United Nations Charter.

Whereas the Acheson-Lilienthal report had not dealt with the subject of sanctions, Mr. Baruch held that a realistic agreement must provide for penalties “of as severe a nature as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their execution as possible....” Such “condign punishment” would be meted out if _previously stipulated_ violations of a control plan occurred.

This problem, Mr. Baruch stated, was intimately related with the veto provisions of the United Nations Charter. Under the Charter, sanctions can be invoked only with the concurrence of the five permanent members of the Security Council, i.e., China, France, United Kingdom, United States, and the Soviet Union. Mr. Baruch maintained, however, that “there must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes.... The bomb does not wait on debate.” He pointed out that the United States was “concerned here with the veto power only as it affects this particular problem.”

A United States memorandum of July 12, 1946, stressed that “Voluntary relinquishment of the veto on questions relating to a specific weapon previously outlawed by unanimous agreement because of its uniquely destructive character, in no wise involves any compromise of the principle of unanimity of action as applied to general problems or to particular situations not foreseeable and therefore not susceptible of advance unanimous agreement.”

_The first Soviet proposals—Gromyko’s statement of June 19, 1946_

A week after the American plans were put forward, the Soviet Union announced its own proposals. They were marked chiefly by Soviet insistence that the United States agree to stop the production of atomic weapons and destroy existing bombs _before_ international control arrangements were negotiated.

Although they called for “an international convention for outlawing weapons based on the use of atomic energy,” the Soviet proposals did not provide “effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.” They proposed that the “rule of unanimity” in the Security Council apply to atomic-energy matters. Hence if one of the permanent members of the Security Council or a friend violated a control scheme, the other members of the United Nations would have no legal means, under the Charter, of invoking sanctions against it.

Throughout 1946 the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission continued its investigations of the control problem. On December 31, 1946, the Commission issued its _First Report_. It revealed that the essential features of the Baruch proposals had won the support of all the members of the Commission except the Soviet Union and Poland.

_The Soviet Proposals of June 11, 1947_

A year after it suggested a convention for “outlawing” atomic weapons, the Soviet Union came forward with a set of control proposals.

A chief point of interest in the plan was the fact that the Soviets now assented to “_periodic_ inspection of facilities for mining and production of atomic materials” by an international inspectorate. In answer to a United Kingdom inquiry, however, the Russians stated that “normally, inspectors will visit only _declared_ plants”—with this supplemented by special investigations when there were “grounds for suspicion” of violation of the convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons. The power of the Control Commission would be further limited to making recommendations to governments and to the Security Council. On other matters that separated the Soviet Union from the majority position—such as international ownership and management, and the veto question—there was no change in the Russian position.

The subsequent half-year brought one sign of a further modification of the U.S.S.R. stand. On August 11, 1947, Mr. Gromyko seemingly brought the Soviets closer to the majority position by agreeing that “the idea of quotas deserves attention and serious consideration by the Atomic Energy Commission....”

_The Second and Third Reports of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission—September 11, 1947, and May 17, 1948_

The _Second Report_ of the Atomic Energy Commission spelled out in detail the precise powers and functions and the limitations thereon of any international agency in implementing an effective control plan. When the _Report_ was approved by the General Assembly by a vote of 40 to 6, the plan developed in the UNAEC became a world plan—to which only the Soviet Union and her satellites took exception.

By the spring of 1948 the UNAEC became convinced that the Soviet Union’s refusal to accept any plan that met the technical requirements of controlling atomic energy was symptomatic of broader differences which made further negotiations on the Commission level fruitless.

The _Third Report_ stated that “the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure the agreement of the Soviet Union to even those elements of effective control from the technical point of view, let alone their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field....”

It appeared to the Commission that the atomic deadlock was but one manifestation of the more widespread dispute between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. In view of this, the Commission majority recommended that negotiations in the Commission be suspended until the permanent members of the UNAEC found that “there exists a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic energy....”

The following were regarded as the basic considerations which, even on a technical level, made the U.S.S.R. position untenable:

I. The powers provided for the International Control Commission by the
Soviet Union proposals, confined as they are to _periodic inspection_
and _special investigations_, are insufficient to guarantee against
the diversion of dangerous materials from known atomic facilities, and
do not provide the means to detect secret activities.

II. Except by recommendations to the Security Council of the United
Nations, the International Control Commission has no powers to enforce
either its own decisions or the terms of the convention or conventions
on control.

III. The Soviet Union Government insists that the convention
establishing a system of control, even so limited as that contained in
the Soviet Union proposals, can be concluded only _after_ a convention
providing for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the destruction of
existing atomic weapons has been “signed, ratified, and put into
effect.” [Italics in original.]

The Commission’s work had come to a standstill.

_Atomic energy negotiations since 1948_

Meeting in Paris in the fall of 1948 the General Assembly, by a vote of 40 to 6, approved the general findings and recommendations of the FIRST REPORT and the specific proposals of part II of the SECOND REPORT “as constituting the necessary basis for the establishing of an effective system of international control of atomic energy.” However, it called upon the UNAEC to continue its work and to study such subjects as it deemed “practicable and useful,” and asked that the permanent members of the Commission “consult in order to determine if there exists a basis for agreement....” The permanent members were requested to transmit the results of their consultations to the General Assembly.

In the meanwhile, the Soviet Union had served notice of what appeared to be a significant change in its position. In a draft resolution dated September 25, 1948, the Soviets proposed—

To elaborate draft conventions for the banning of atomic weapons and
conventions for the establishment of international effective control
over atomic energy, taking into account that the convention for the
banning of atomic weapons and the convention for the establishment of
international control over atomic energy must be signed and
implemented and entered into force _simultaneously_.

It was the last word of this resolution that marked a change in the U.S.S.R. stand. Previously, the Soviets had demanded that atomic weapons production be prohibited and stock piles be destroyed _before_ a control plan was discussed.

Nonetheless, the new Soviet proposal gave no indication that the Soviets would accede to what the majority regard as an _effective_ control plan. Furthermore, the proposal for simultaneous prohibition and control was considered to be physically impossible to implement. “The development of atomic energy is the world’s newest industry, and already is one of the most complicated. It would not be reasonable to assume that any effective system of control could be introduced and enforced overnight. Control and prohibition must, therefore, go into effect over a period of time and by a series of stages.”

The record of negotiations from the fall of 1948 to the present is largely one of inaction.

On September 23, 1949, President Truman announced that an atomic explosion had occurred in the Soviet Union. One month later, the sponsoring powers of the UNAEC revealed that the consultations between them “had not yet succeeded in bringing about agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the other five powers.”

Despite this, the General Assembly, on November 23, 1949, asked that the permanent members of the Commission continue their consultations and keep the Commission and the General Assembly informed of their work. On the same day, Vishinsky revealed that the Soviets no longer entertained favorably the principle of quotas.

On January 19, 1950, consultations came to an end when the Soviet Union withdrew from the discussions over the question of recognition of the Chinese Government.