Chapter C: The Atomic Impasse

Regarded in fundamental terms, the deadlock in international control negotiations reflects diametrically opposed notions of the responsibilities of individual nations in a world of atomic energy.

All nations except the Soviet Union and her satellites “put world security first, and are prepared to accept innovations in traditional concepts of international cooperation, national sovereignty, and economic organization where these are necessary for security. The government of the U.S.S.R. puts its sovereignty first and is unwilling to accept measures which may impinge upon or interfere with its rigid exercise of unimpeded state sovereignty.”

This basic variance in the objectives of the Soviet Union and the other members of the United Nations is mirrored in the majority and minority control proposals.

The specific differences in the two plans may be summarized as follows:

INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION

_United Nations._—Complete and continuing inspection by international
personnel, including aerial and ground surveys, and inspection of
atomic facilities.

_Soviet Union._—Periodic inspection of declared plants. Special
investigations when there exist “grounds for suspicion”—not that
the control agreement has been violated—but that the convention
outlawing atomic weapons has been violated. (This could mean that
only if a nation were subjected to surprise atomic attack would
the necessary “grounds for suspicion” enter into existence.)

INTERNATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

_United Nations._—International ownership or management of dangerous
facilities and international ownership of source materials and
their fissionable derivatives—in order to prevent diversion of
such material from existing plants.

_Soviet Union._—Complete opposition to international ownership or
management provisions.

STRATEGIC BALANCE (QUOTAS)

_United Nations._—National quotas to be incorporated into
international control treaty.

_Soviet Union._—Sees in quotas an instrument for “American
domination.”

SANCTIONS

_United Nations._—No veto to protect those who violate stipulated
provisions of international agreement.

_Soviet Union._—All decisions require unanimous consent of permanent
members of Security Council.

The permanent members of the UNAEC have summarized the differences between the Soviet plan and the world plan in the following fashion:

“The Soviet Union proposes that nations should continue to own explosive atomic materials.

“The other five Powers feel that under such conditions there would be
no effective protection against the sudden use of these materials
as atomic weapons.

“The Soviet Union proposes that nations continue, as at present, to own, operate, and manage facilities making or using dangerous quantities of such materials.

“The other five Powers believe that, under such conditions, it would
be impossible to detect or prevent the diversion of such materials
for use in atomic weapons.

“The Soviet Union proposes a system of control depending on periodic inspection of facilities the existence of which the national government concerned reports to the international agency, supplemented by special investigations on suspicion of treaty violations.

“The other five Powers believe that periodic inspection would not
prevent the diversion of dangerous materials and that the special
investigations envisaged would be wholly insufficient to prevent
clandestine activities.”