Chapter XXI: From Salamis to Mycale (2)

Mardonius being informed that the Greeks had decamped by night, and seeing their former station unoccupied, led the Persians over the Asopus, and pursued the path which the Greeks had taken, whom he considered as flying from his arms. The Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ were the sole objects of his attack, for the Athenians, who had marched over the plain, were concealed by the hills from his view. The other Persian leaders seeing the troops moving, as if in pursuit of the Greeks, raised their standards, and followed the rout with great impetuosity, but without regularity or discipline; they hurried on with tumultuous shouts, considering the Greeks as absolutely in their power.

When Pausanias found himself thus pressed by the cavalry, he sent a horseman with the following message to the Athenians: “We are menaced, O Athenians, by a battle, the event of which will determine the freedom or slavery of Greece; and in this perplexity you, as well as ourselves, have, in the preceding night, been deserted by our allies. It is nevertheless our determination to defend ourselves to the last, and to render you such assistance as we may be able. If the enemy’s horse had attacked you, we should have thought it our duty to have marched with the Tegeatæ, who are in our rear, and still faithful to Greece, to your support. As the whole operation of the enemy seems directed against us, it becomes you to give us the relief we materially want; but if you yourselves are so circumstanced, as to be unable to advance to our assistance, at least send us a body of archers. We confess, that in this war your activity has been far the most conspicuous, and we therefore presume on your compliance with our request.”

The Athenians, without hesitation, and with determined bravery, advanced to communicate the relief which had been required. When they were already on their march, the confederate Greeks, in the service of the king, intercepted and attacked them: they were thus prevented from assisting the Lacedæmonians, a circumstance which gave them extreme uneasiness. In this situation the Spartans, to the amount of fifty thousand light-armed troops, with three thousand Tegeatæ,[37] who on no occasion were separated from them, offered a solemn sacrifice, with the resolution of encountering Mardonius.

The victims, however, were not auspicious, and in the mean time many of them were slain, and more wounded. The Persians, under the protection of their bucklers, showered their arrows upon the Spartans with prodigious effect. At this moment Pausanias, observing the entrails still unfavourable, looked earnestly towards the temple of Juno at Platæa, imploring the interposition of the goddess, and entreating her to prevent their disgrace and defeat.

Whilst he was in the act of supplicating the goddess, the Tegeatæ advanced against the barbarians: at the same moment the sacrifices became favourable, and Pausanias, at the head of his Spartans, went up boldly to the enemy. The Persians, throwing aside their bows, prepared to receive them. The engagement commenced before the barricade: when this was thrown down, a conflict took place near the temple of Ceres, which was continued with unremitted obstinacy till the fortune of the day was decided.

The barbarians, seizing their adversaries’ lances, broke them in pieces, and discovered no inferiority either in strength or courage; but their armour was inefficient, their attack without skill, and their inferiority, with respect to discipline, conspicuous. In whatever manner they rushed upon the enemy, from one to ten at a time, they were cut in pieces by the Spartans.

_Mardonius Falls and the Day is Won_

The Greeks were most severely pressed where Mardonius himself, on a white horse, at the head of a thousand chosen Persians, directed his attack. As long as he lived, the Persians, both in their attack and defence, conducted themselves well, and slew great numbers of the Spartans; but as soon as Mardonius was slain, and the band which fought near his person, and which was the flower of the army, was destroyed, all the rest turned their backs and fled. They were much oppressed and encumbered by their long dresses, besides which, being lightly armed, they had to oppose men in full and complete armour.

On this day, as the oracle had before predicted, the death of Leonidas was amply revenged upon Mardonius, and the most glorious victory which has ever been recorded, was then obtained by Pausanias. Mardonius was slain by Æmnestus, a Spartan of distinguished reputation. Æmnestus long after this Persian war, together with three hundred men, was killed in an engagement at Stenyclarus, in which he opposed the united force of the Messenians.

The Persians, routed by the Spartans at Platæa, fled in the greatest confusion towards their camp, and to the wooden entrenchment which they had constructed in the Theban territories. It seems somewhat surprising that although the battle was fought near the grove of Ceres, not a single Persian took refuge in the temple, nor was slain near it; but the greater part of them perished beyond the limits of the sacred ground. Such was the issue of the battle of Platæa.

Artabazus, the son of Pharnaces, who had from the first disapproved of the king’s leaving Mardonius behind him, and who had warmly, though unsuccessfully, endeavoured to prevent a battle, determined on the following measures. He was at the head of no small body of troops; they amounted to forty thousand men: being much averse to the conduct of Mardonius, and foreseeing what the event of an engagement must be, he prepared and commanded his men to follow him wherever he should go, and to remit or increase their speed by his example. He then drew out his army, as if to attack the enemy; but he soon met the Persians flying from them: he then immediately and precipitately fled with all his troops in disorder, not directing his course to the entrenchment or to Thebes, but towards Phocis, intending to gain the Hellespont with all possible speed.

Of those Greeks who were in the royal army, all except the Bœotians, from a preconcerted design, behaved themselves ill. The Bœotians fought the Athenians with obstinate resolution: those Thebans who were attached to the Medes made very considerable exertions, fighting with such courage, that three hundred of their first and boldest citizens fell by the swords of the Athenians. They fled at length, and pursued their way to Thebes, avoiding the route which the Persians had taken with the immense multitude of confederates, who, so far from making any exertions, had never struck a blow.

In the midst of all this tumult, intelligence was conveyed to those Greeks posted near the temple of Juno, and remote from the battle, that the event was decided, and Pausanias victorious. The Corinthians instantly, without any regularity, hurried over the hills which lay at the foot of the mountain, to arrive at the temple of Ceres. The Megarians and Phliasians, with the same intentions, posted over the plain, the more direct and obvious road. As they approached the enemy, they were observed by the Theban horse, commanded by Asopodorus, son of Timander, who, taking advantage of their want of order, rushed upon them and slew six hundred, driving the rest towards Mount Cithæron. Thus did these perish ingloriously.

The Persians, and a promiscuous multitude along with them, as soon as they arrived at the entrenchment, endeavoured to climb the turrets before the Lacedæmonians should come up with them. Having effected this, they endeavoured to defend themselves as well as they could. The Lacedæmonians soon arrived, and a severe engagement commenced.

Before the Athenians came up, the Persians not only defended themselves well, but had the advantage, as the Lacedæmonians were ignorant of the proper method of attack; but as soon as the Athenians advanced to their support, the battle was renewed with greater fierceness, and was long continued. The valour and firmness of the Athenians finally prevailed. Having made a breach they rushed into the camp: the Tegeatæ were the first Greeks that entered, and were they who plundered the tent of Mardonius, taking from thence, among other things, the manger from which his horses were fed, made entirely of brass, and very curious. This was afterwards deposited by the Tegeatæ in the temple of the Alean Minerva: the rest of the booty was carried to the spot where the common plunder was collected. As soon as their entrenchment was thrown down, the barbarians dispersed themselves different ways, without exhibiting any proof of their former bravery; they were, indeed, in a state of stupefaction and terror, from seeing their immense multitude overpowered in so short a period.

AFTER THE BATTLE

So great was the slaughter made by the Greeks, that of this army, which consisted of three hundred thousand men, not three thousand escaped, if we except the forty thousand who fled with Artabazus. The Lacedæmonians of Sparta lost ninety-one men; the Tegeatæ sixteen; the Athenians fifty-two.[38]

Of those who most distinguished themselves on the part of the barbarians, are to be reckoned the Persian infantry, the Sacian cavalry, and lastly, Mardonius himself. Of the Greeks, the Tegeatæ and Athenians were eminently conspicuous; they were, nevertheless, inferior to the Lacedæmonians. The most daring of the Spartans, was Aristodemus; the same who alone returning from Thermopylæ fell into disgrace and infamy; next to him, Posidonius, Phylocyon, and Amompharetus the Spartan, behaved the best. Nevertheless, when it was disputed in conversation what individual had on that day most distinguished himself, the Spartans who were present said, that Aristodemus, being anxious to die conspicuously, as an expiation of his former crime, in an emotion of fury had burst from his rank, and performed extraordinary exploits; but that Posidonius had no desire to lose his life, and therefore his behaviour was the more glorious: but this remark might have proceeded from envy. All those slain on this day, were highly honoured, except Aristodemus. To him, for the reason above mentioned, no respect was paid, as having voluntarily sought death.

Among the troops of the Æginetæ, assembled at Platæa, was Lampon, one of their principal citizens, and son of Pytheas. This man went to Pausanias, giving him the following most impious counsel: “Son of Cleombrotus, what you have done is beyond comparison splendid, and deserving admiration. The deity, in making you the instrument of Greece’s freedom, has placed you far above all your predecessors in glory: in concluding this business so conduct yourself that your reputation may be still increased, and that no barbarian may ever again attempt to perpetrate atrocious actions against Greece. When Leonidas was slain at Thermopylæ, Mardonius and Xerxes cut off his head, and suspended his body from a cross. Do the same with respect to Mardonius, and you will deserve the applause of Sparta and of Greece, and avenge the cause of your uncle Leonidas.” Thus spake Lampon, thinking he should please Pausanias.

“Friend of Ægina,” replied Pausanias, “I thank you for your good intentions, and commend your foresight; but what you say violates every principle of equity.[39] After elevating me, my country, and this recent victory, to the summit of fame, you again depress us to infamy, in recommending me to inflict vengeance on the dead. You say, indeed, that by such an action I shall exalt my character; but I think it is more consistent with the conduct of barbarians than of Greeks, as it is one of those things for which we reproach them. I must therefore dissent from the Æginetæ, and all those who approve their sentiments. For me, it is sufficient to merit the esteem of Sparta, by attending to the rules of honour, both in my words and actions: Leonidas, whom you wish me to avenge, has, I think, received the amplest vengeance. The deaths of this immense multitude must sufficiently have atoned for him, and for those who fell with him at Thermopylæ. I would advise you in future, having these sentiments, to avoid my presence; and I would have you think it a favour, that I do not punish you.”

Pausanias afterwards proclaimed by a herald, that no person should touch any of the booty; and he ordered the helots to collect the money into one place. They, as they dispersed themselves over the camp, found tents decorated with gold and silver, couches of the same, goblets, cups, and drinking vessels of gold, besides sacks of gold, and silver cauldrons placed on carriages. The dead bodies they stripped of bracelets, chains, and scimitars of gold; to their habits of various colours they paid no attention. Many things of value the helots secreted, and sold to the Æginetæ; others, unable to conceal, they were obliged to produce. The Æginetæ from this became exceedingly rich; for they purchased gold of the helots at the price of brass.

From the wealth thus collected, a tenth part was selected for sacred purposes. To the deity of Delphi was presented a golden tripod, resting on a three-headed snake of brass: it was placed near the altar. To the Olympian god they erected a Jupiter, ten cubits high: to the god of the isthmus, the figure of Neptune, in brass, seven cubits high. When this was done, the remainder of the plunder was divided among the army, according to their merits; it consisted of Persian concubines, gold, silver, beasts of burden, with various riches. What choice things were given to those who most distinguished themselves at Platæa, has never been mentioned, though certain presents were made them. It is certain, that a tenth part of the whole was given to Pausanias, consisting among other things of women, horses, talents, and camels.

It is further recorded, that when Xerxes fled from Greece, he left all his equipage to Mardonius: Pausanias seeing this composed of gold, silver, and cloth of the richest embroidery, gave orders to the cooks and domestics to prepare an entertainment for him, as for Mardonius. His commands were executed, and he beheld couches of gold and silver, tables of the same, and everything that was splendid and magnificent. Astonished at the spectacle, he again with a smile directed his servants to prepare a Lacedæmonian repast. When this was ready the contrast was so striking, that he laughing sent for the Grecian leaders: when they were assembled, he showed them the two entertainments. “Men of Greece,” said he, “I have called you together to bear testimony to the king of Persia’s folly, who forsook all this luxury to plunder us who live in so much poverty.” These were the words which Pausanias is said to have used to the Grecian leaders.

In succeeding times, many of the Platæans found on the field of battle, chests of gold, silver, and other riches. This thing also happened: when the flesh had fallen from the bones of the dead bodies, the Platæans, in removing them to some other spot, discovered a skull as one entire bone, without any suture. Two jaw bones also were found with their teeth, which though divided were of one entire bone, the grinders as well as the rest. The body of Mardonius was removed the day after the battle; but it is not known by whom.

The Greeks, after the division of the plunder at Platæa, proceeded to inter their dead, each nation by themselves. The Lacedæmonians sunk three trenches: in the one they deposited the bodies of their priests; in the second were interred the other Spartans; in the third, the helots. The Tegeatæ were buried by themselves, but with no distinction: the Athenians in like manner, and also the Megarians and Phliasians who were slain by the cavalry. Mounds of earth were raised over the bodies of all these people. With respect to the others shown at Platæa, they were raised by those, who being ashamed of their absence from the battle, wished to secure the esteem of posterity.

THE GREEKS ATTACK THEBES

Having buried their dead on the plain of Platæa, the Greeks, after serious deliberation, resolved to attack Thebes, and demand the persons of those who had taken part with the Medes. Of these the most distinguished were Timagenidas and Attaginus, the leaders of the faction. They determined, unless these were given up, not to leave Thebes without utterly destroying it.

On the eleventh day after the battle, they besieged the Thebans, demanding the men whom we have named. They refused to surrender them, in consequence of which their lands were laid waste and their walls attacked. This violence being continued, Timagenidas, on the twentieth day, thus addressed the Thebans: “Men of Thebes, since the Greeks are resolved not to retire from Thebes till they shall either have destroyed it, or you shall deliver us into their power, let not Bœotia on our account be farther distressed. If their demand of our persons be merely a pretence to obtain money, let us satisfy them from the wealth of the public, as not we alone but all of us have been equally and openly active on the part of the Medes; if their real object in besieging Thebes is to obtain our persons, we are ready to go ourselves, and confer with them.” The Thebans approving his advice, sent immediately a herald to Pausanias, saying they were ready to deliver up the men. As soon as this measure was determined, Attaginus fled, but his children were delivered to Pausanias, who immediately dismissed them, urging that infants could not possibly have any part in the faction of the Medes. The other Thebans who were given up, imagined they should have the liberty of pleading for themselves, and by the means of money hoped to escape. Pausanias suspecting that such a thing might happen, as soon as he got them in his power, dismissed all the forces of the allies; then removing the Thebans to Corinth, he there put them to death.

THE FLIGHT OF THE PERSIAN REMNANT

Artabazus son of Pharnaces fled from Platæa to the Thessalians. They received him with great hospitality, and entirely ignorant of what had happened, inquired after the remainder of the army. The Persian was fearful that if he disclosed the whole truth, he might draw upon him the attack of all who knew it, and consequently involve himself and army in the extremest danger. This reflection had before prevented his communication of the matter to the Phocians: and on the present occasion he thus addressed the Thessalians:

“I am hastening, as you perceive, with great expedition to Thrace, being despatched thither from our camp with this detachment, on some important business. Mardonius with his troops follows me at no great distance: show him the rights of hospitality and every suitable attention. You will finally have no occasion to repent of your kindness.”

He then proceeded through Thessaly and Macedonia, immediately to Thrace, with evident marks of being in haste. Directing his march through the midst of the country, he arrived at Byzantium, with the loss of great numbers of his men, who were either cut in pieces by the Thracians, or quite worn out by fatigue and hunger. From Byzantium, he passed over his army in transports, and thus effected his return to Asia.

CONTEMPORARY AFFAIRS IN IONIA

On the very day[40] of the battle of Platæa, a victory was gained at Mycale in Ionia. Whilst the Grecian fleet was yet at Delos, under the command of Leotychides the Lacedæmonian, ambassadors came to them from Samos. On their arrival, they sought the Grecian leaders, whom Hegesistratus (one of the ambassadors) addressed with various arguments. He urged that as soon as they should show themselves, all the Ionians would shake off their dependence, and revolt from the Persians; he told them that they might wait in vain for the prospect of a richer booty. He implored also their common deities, that being Greeks, they would deliver those who also were Greeks from servitude, and avenge them on the barbarian. He concluded by saying, that this might be easily accomplished, as the ships of the enemy were slow sailers, and by no means equal to those of the Greeks.

The Samians, with an oath, engaged to become the confederates of the Greeks. Leotychides then dismissed them all excepting Hegesistratus, who, on account of his name, he chose to take along with him. The Greeks, after remaining that day on their station, on the next sacrificed with favourable omens; Deiphonus, son of Evenius of Apollonia, in the Ionian Gulf, being their minister.

The Greeks having sacrificed favourably, set sail from Delos towards Samos. On their arrival at Calami of Samos, they drew themselves up near the temple of Juno, and prepared for a naval engagement. When the Persians heard of their approach, they moved with the residue of their fleet towards the continent, having previously permitted the Phœnicians to retire. They had determined, after a consultation, not to risk an engagement, as they did not think themselves a match for their opponents. They therefore made towards the continent, that they might be covered by their land forces at Mycale, to whom Xerxes had intrusted the defence of Ionia. These, to the amount of sixty thousand, were under the command of Tigranes the Persian, one of the handsomest and tallest of his countrymen. To these troops the commanders of the fleet resolved to retire: it was also their intention to draw their vessels on shore, and to throw up an intrenchment round them, which might equally serve as a protection to their vessels and themselves. After this resolution, they proceeded on their course, and were carried near the temple of the Eumenidæ at Mycale. Here the Persians drew their ships to land, defending them with an intrenchment formed of stones, branches of fruit trees cut down upon the spot, and pieces of timber closely fitted together. In this position they were ready to sustain a blockade, and with hopes of victory, being prepared for either event.

When the Greeks received intelligence that the barbarians were retired to the continent, they considered them as escaped out of their hands. They were exceedingly exasperated, and in great perplexity whether they should return or proceed towards the Hellespont. Their ultimate determination was to follow the enemy towards the continent. Getting therefore all things ready for an engagement by sea, and providing themselves with scaling ladders, and such other things as were necessary, they sailed to Mycale. When they approached the enemy’s station, they perceived no one advancing to meet them; but beheld the ships drawn on shore, secured within an intrenchment, and a considerable body of infantry ranged along the coast. Leotychides upon this advanced before all the rest in his ship, and coming as near the shore as he could, thus addressed the Ionians by a herald:

“Men of Ionia, all you who hear me, listen to what I say, for the Persians will understand nothing of what I tell you. When the engagement shall commence, remember first of all our common liberties; in the next place take notice, our watch-word is Hebe. Let those who hear me, inform all who do not.”

The motive of this conduct was the same with that of Themistocles at Artemisium. These expressions, if not intelligible to the barbarians, might make the desired impression on the Ionians; or if explained to the former, might render the fidelity of the latter suspected.

When Leotychides had done this, the Greeks approached the shore, disembarked, and prepared for battle. The Persians observing this, and knowing the purport of the enemy’s address to the Ionians, took their arms from the Samians, suspecting them of a secret attachment to the Greeks. The Samians had purchased the freedom of five hundred Athenians, and sent them back with provisions to their country, who having been left in Attica, had been taken prisoners by the Persians, and brought away in the barbarian fleet. The circumstance of their thus releasing five hundred of the enemies of Xerxes, made them greatly suspected. To the Milesians, under pretence of their knowledge of the country, the Persians confided the guard of the paths to the heights of Mycale: their real motive was to remove them to a distance. By these steps the Persians endeavoured to guard against those Ionians, who might wish, if they had the opportunity, to effect a revolt. They next heaped their bucklers upon each other, to make a temporary rampart.

THE BATTLE OF MYCALE

The Greeks being drawn up, advanced to attack the barbarians: as they were proceeding, a herald’s wand was discovered on the beach, and a rumour circulated through the ranks, that the Greeks had obtained a victory over the forces of Mardonius and Bœotia.[41] On the same day that their enemies were slaughtered at Platæa, and were about to be defeated at Mycale, the rumour of the former victory being circulated to this distance, rendered the Greeks more bold, and animated them against every danger. It appears farther worthy of observation, that both battles took place near the temple of the Eleusinian Ceres. The battle of Platæa, as we have before remarked, was in the vicinity of the temple of Ceres; the one at Mycale was in a similar situation.

The Athenians, who with those that accompanied them, constituted one-half of the army, advanced by the coast, and along the plain: the Lacedæmonians and their auxiliaries made their way by the more woody and mountainous places.

Whilst the Lacedæmonians were making a circuit, the Athenians in the other wing were already engaged. The Persians, as long as their entrenchment remained uninjured, defended themselves well, and without any inferiority; but when the Athenians, with those who supported them, increased their exertions, mutually exhorting one another, that they and not the Lacedæmonians might have the glory of the day, the face of things was changed; the rampart was thrown down, and a sensible advantage was obtained over the Persians. They sustained the shock for a considerable time, but finally gave way, and retreated behind their entrenchments. The Athenians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Trœzenians, rushed in with them; for this part of the army was composed of these different nations.

When the wall was carried, the barbarians gave no testimony of their former prowess, but, except the Persians, indiscriminately fled. These last, though few in number, vigorously resisted the Greeks, who poured in upon them in crowds. Artayntes and Ithamitres, the commanders of the fleet, saved themselves by flight: but Mardontes, and Tigranes the general of the land-forces, were slain. Whilst the Persians still refused to give ground, the Lacedæmonians and their party arrived, and put all who survived to the sword. Upon this occasion many of the Greeks were slain, and among a number of the Sicyonians, Perilaus their leader. The Samians, who were in the Persian army, and from whom their weapons had been taken, no sooner saw victory incline to the side of the Greeks, than they assisted them with all their power. The other Ionians seeing this, revolted also, and turned their arms against the barbarians. The Milesians had been ordered, the better to provide for the safety of the Persians, to guard the paths to the heights, so that in case of accident the barbarians, under their guidance, might take refuge on the summits of Mycale; with this view, as well as to remove them to a distance, and thus guard against their perfidy, the Milesians had been so disposed; but they acted in direct contradiction to their orders. Those who fled, they introduced directly into the midst of their enemies, and finally were active beyond all the rest in putting them to the sword. In this manner did Ionia a second time revolt from the Persian power.

AFTER MYCALE

In this battle the Athenians most distinguished themselves, and next to the Athenians, they who obtained the greatest reputation were the Corinthians, Trœzenians, and Sicyonians. The greater number of the barbarians being slain, either in the battle or in the pursuit, the Greeks burned their ships, and totally destroyed their wall: the plunder they collected upon the shore, among which was a considerable quantity of money. Having done this, they sailed from the coast. When they came to Samos, they deliberated on the propriety of removing the Ionians to some other place, wishing to place them in some part of Greece where their authority was secure; but they determined to abandon Ionia to the barbarians. They were well aware both of the impossibility of defending the Ionians on every emergency, and of the danger which these would incur from the Persians, if they did not. The Peloponnesian magistrates were of opinion, that those nations who had embraced the cause of the Medes should be expelled, and their lands given to the Ionians. The Athenians would not consent that the Ionians should be transported from their country, nor would they allow the Peloponnesians to decide on the destruction of Athenian colonies. Seeing them tenacious of this opinion, the Peloponnesians no longer opposed them. Afterwards the people of Samos, Chios, Lesbos, and the other islands who had assisted with their arms in the present exigence, were received into the general confederacy, having by an oath, promised constant and inviolable fidelity. This ceremony performed, they sailed towards the Hellespont, meaning to destroy the bridge, which they expected to find in its original state.

The barbarians who saved themselves by flight, came to the heights of Mycale, and thence escaped in no great numbers to Sardis. During the retreat, Masistes, son of Darius, who had been present at the late unfortunate engagement, severely reproached Artayntes the commander-in-chief: among other things, he said, that in the execution of his duty he had behaved more like a woman than a man, and had materially injured the interests of his master. To say that a man is more dastardly than a woman is with the Persians the most infamous of all reproaches. Artayntes, after bearing the insult for some time, became at length so exasperated, that he drew his scimitar, intending to kill Masistes. He was prevented by Xenagoras, son of Praxilaus, a native of Halicarnassus, who happening to be behind Artayntes, seized him by the middle, and threw him to the ground: at the same time the guards of Masistes came up. Xenagoras by this action not only obtained the favour of Masistes, but so much obliged Xerxes, by thus preserving his brother, that he was honoured with the government of all Cilicia. Nothing further of consequence occurred on their way to Sardis, where they found the king, who after his retreat from Athens, and his ill success at sea, had there resided.

The Greeks, sailing from Mycale towards the Hellespont, were obliged by contrary winds to put in at Lectum: thence they proceeded to Abydos. Here they found the bridge, which they imagined was entire, and which was the principal object of their voyage, effectually broken down. They on this held a consultation; Leotychides, and the Lacedæmonians with him, were for returning to Greece; the Athenians, with their leader Xanthippus, advised them to continue where they were, and make an attempt on the Chersonesus. The Peloponnesians returned; but the Athenians, passing from Abydos to the Chersonesus, laid siege to Sestus. To this place, as by far the strongest in all that district, great numbers had retired from the neighbouring towns, as soon as it was known that the Greeks were in the Hellespont: among others was Œobazus of Cardia, a Persian who had previously collected here all that remained of the bridge. The town itself was possessed by the native Æolians, but they had with them a great number of Persians and other allies. The governor of this place, under Xerxes, was Artayctes, a Persian, of a cruel and profligate character.

Whilst they were prosecuting the siege, the autumn arrived. The Athenians, unable to make themselves masters of the place, and uneasy at being engaged in an expedition so far from their country, entreated their leaders to conduct them home. They refused to do this, till they should either succeed in their enterprise, or be recalled by the people of Athens, so intent were they on the business before them.

The besieged, under Artayctes, were reduced to such extremity of wretchedness, that they were obliged to boil for food the cords of which their beds were composed. When these also were consumed, Artayctes, Œobazus, and some other Persians, fled, under cover of the night, escaping by an avenue behind the town, which happened not to be blockaded by the enemy.

When the morning came, the people of the Chersonesus made signals to the Athenians from the turrets, and opened to them the gates. The greater part commenced a pursuit of the Persians, the remainder took possession of the town. Œobazus fled into Thrace; but he was here seized by the Absinthians, and sacrificed, according to their rites, to their god Plistorus: his followers were put to death in some other manner. Artayctes and his adherents, who fled the last, were overtaken near the waters of Ægos, where, after a vigorous defence, part were slain, and part taken prisoners. The Greeks put them all in chains, Artayctes and his son with the rest, and carried them to Sestus. Conducting him therefore to the shore where the bridge of Xerxes had been constructed, they there crucified him; though some say this was done upon an eminence near the city of Madytus. The son was stoned in his father’s presence.

The Athenians, after the above transactions, returned to Greece, carrying with them, besides vast quantities of money, the fragments of the bridge, to be suspended in their temples.[b]

A REVIEW OF RESULTS

The disproportion between the immense host assembled by Xerxes, and the little which he accomplished, naturally provokes both contempt for Persian force and an admiration for the comparative handful of men by whom they were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the point which attentive contemplation of the facts will justify. The Persian mode of making war (which we may liken to that of the modern Turks, now that the period of their energetic fanaticism has passed away) was in a high degree disorderly and inefficient: the men indeed, individually taken, especially the native Persians, were not deficient in the qualities of soldiers, but their arms and their organisation were wretched--and their leaders yet worse. On the other hand, the Greeks, equal, if not superior, in individual bravery, were incomparably superior in soldier-like order as well as in arms: but here too the leadership was defective, and the disunion a constant source of peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his treatise on the malignity of Herodotus, insist on acknowledging nothing but magnanimity and heroism in the proceedings of the Greeks throughout these critical years, are forced to deal very harshly with the inestimable witness on whom our knowledge of the facts depends, and who intimates plainly that, in spite of the devoted courage displayed, not less by the vanquished at Thermopylæ than by the victors at Salamis, Greece owed her salvation chiefly to the imbecility, cowardice, and credulous rashness of Xerxes. Had he indeed possessed either the personal energy of Cyrus or the judgment of Artemisia, it may be doubted whether any excellence of management, or any intimacy of union, could have preserved the Greeks against so great a superiority of force; but it is certain that all their courage as soldiers in line would have been unavailing for that purpose, without a higher degree of generalship, and a more hearty spirit of co-operation, than that which they actually manifested.

A GLANCE FORWARD

One hundred and fifty years after this eventful period, we shall see the tables turned, and the united forces of Greece under Alexander of Macedon becoming invaders of Persia. We shall find that in Persia no improvement has taken place during this long interval, that the scheme of defence under Darius Codomannus labours under the same defects as that of attack under Xerxes, that there is the same blind and exclusive confidence in pitched battles with superior numbers, that the advice of Mentor the Rhodian, and of Charidemus, is despised like that of Demaratus and Artemisia, that Darius Codomannus, essentially of the same stamp as Xerxes, is hurried into the battle of Issus by the same ruinous temerity as that which threw away the Persian fleet at Salamis, and that the Persian native infantry (not the cavalry) even appear to have lost that individual gallantry which they displayed so conspicuously at Platæa. But on the Grecian side, the improvement in every way is very great: the orderly courage of the soldier has been sustained and even augmented, while the generalship and power of military combination has reached a point unexampled in the previous history of mankind. Military science may be esteemed a sort of creation during this interval, and will be found to go through various stages: Demosthenes and Brasidas, the Cyreian army and Xenophon, Agesilaus, Iphicrates, Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon, Alexander: for the Macedonian princes are borrowers of Greek tactics, though extending and applying them with a personal energy peculiar to themselves, and with advantages of position such as no Athenian or Spartan ever enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasion of Xerxes and that of Alexander we contrast the progressive spirit of Greece, serving as herald and stimulus to the like spirit in Europe, with the stationary mind of Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid individual, but never appropriating to itself new social ideas or powers, either for war or for peace.

It is out of the invasion of Xerxes that those new powers of combination, political as well as military, which lighten up Grecian history during the next two centuries, take their rise. They are brought into agency through the altered position and character of the Athenians--improvers, to a certain extent, of military operations on land, but the great creators of marine tactics and manœuvring in Greece, and the earliest of all Greeks who showed themselves capable of organising and directing the joint action of numerous allies and dependents, thus uniting the two distinctive qualities of the Homeric Agamemnon--ability in command, with vigour in execution.

In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted against Persia under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy any ostensible rank above that of an ordinary member: the post of second dignity in the line at Platæa had indeed been adjudged to her, but only after a contending claim from Tegea. But without any difference in ostensible rank, she was in the eye and feeling of Greece no longer the same power as before. She had suffered more, and at sea had certainly done more, than all the other allies put together: even on land at Platæa, her hoplites had manifested a combination of bravery, discipline, and efficiency against the formidable Persian cavalry superior even to the Spartans: nor had any Athenian officer committed so perilous an act of disobedience as the Spartan Amompharetus. After the victory of Mycale, when the Peloponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the Athenian forces did not shrink from prolonged service for the important object of clearing the Hellespont, thus standing forth as the willing and forward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides these exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals gifted with any talents for command, whom this momentous conquest had thrown up, were both of them Athenians: first, Themistocles; next, Aristides. From the beginning to the end of the struggle, Athens had displayed an unreserved Panhellenic patriotism, which had been most ungenerously requited by the Peloponnesians; who had kept within their isthmian walls, and betrayed Attica twice to hostile ravage; the first time, perhaps, unavoidably, but the second time a culpable neglect, in postponing their outward march against Mardonius. And the Peloponnesians could not but feel, that while they had left Attica unprotected, they owed their own salvation at Salamis altogether to the dexterity of Themistocles and the imposing Athenian naval force.

Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained little or no mischief by the invasion, while the Athenians had lost for the time even their city and country, with a large proportion of their movable property irrecoverably destroyed, we might naturally expect to find the former, if not lending their grateful and active aid to repair the damage in Attica, at least cordially welcoming the restoration of the ruined city by its former inhabitants. Instead of this, we find the same selfishness again prevalent among them; ill-will and mistrust for the future, aggravated by an admiration which they could not help feeling, overlays all their gratitude and sympathy.[g]

FOOTNOTES

[33] A man of the name of Cyrsilus had ten months before met a similar fate for having advised the people to stay in their city and receive Xerxes. The Athenian women in like manner stoned his wife. During the French Revolution the women of Paris, better distinguished by the name of _Poissardes_, in every particular imitated this brutality, and whoever differed with them in opinion were exposed to the danger of the _Lanterne_.[c]

[34] The fate of Athens has been various. It was first burned by Xerxes; the following year by Mardonius; it was a third time destroyed in the Peloponnesian War; it received a Roman garrison to protect it against Philip son of Demetrius, but was not long afterwards ravaged and defaced by Sulla; in the reign of Arcadius and Honorius it was torn in pieces by Alaric, king of the Goths.[c]

[35] Plutarch relates some particulars previous to this event, which are worth transcribing:

Whilst Greece found itself brought to a most delicate crisis, some Athenian citizens of the noblest families of the place, seeing themselves ruined by the war, and considering that with their effects they had also lost their credit and their influence, held some secret meetings, and determined to destroy the popular government of Athens; in which project if they failed, they resolved to ruin the state, and surrender Greece to the barbarians. This conspiracy had already made some progress, when it was discovered to Aristides. He at first was greatly alarmed, from the juncture at which it happened; but as he knew not the precise number of conspirators, he thought it expedient not to neglect an affair of so great importance, and yet not to investigate it too minutely, in order to give those concerned opportunity to repent. He satisfied himself with arresting eight of the conspirators; of these, two as the most guilty were immediately proceeded against, but they contrived to escape. The rest he dismissed, that they might show their repentance by their valour, telling them, that a battle should be the great tribunal to determine their sincere and good intentions to their country.[c]

[36] Let it be remembered, to the honour of Greece, that on this occasion the Greeks, whose number only amounted to one hundred and ten thousand, were opposed by fifty thousand of their treacherous countrymen.[c]

[37]

Of the Spartans there were 5,000
Seven helots to each Spartan 35,000
Lacedæmonians 5,000
A light-armed soldier to each Lacedæmonian 5,000
Tegeatæ 1,500
Light-armed Tegeatæ 1,500
------
Total 53,000[c]

[38] The Greeks, according to Plutarch, lost in all 1360 men: all those who were slain of the Athenians were of one particular tribe. Plutarch is much incensed at Herodotus for his account of this battle; but the authority of our historian seems entitled to most credit.[c] [Bury, however, thinks he gave the Athenians too large a share in the victory.]

[39] Pausanias altered materially afterwards. He aspired to the supreme power, became magnificent and luxurious, fierce and vindictive.[e]

[40] [Bury declares it to have been a few days later.]

[41] It is unnecessary to remark, that the superstition of Herodotus is in this passage conspicuous. Diodorus Siculus is most sagacious, when he says that Leotychides, and those who were with him, knew nothing of the victory of Platæa; but that they contrived this stratagem to animate their troops. Polyænus relates the same in his _Stratagemata_.[e] “These things which happen by divine interposition,” says Herodotus, “are made known by various means.”

(From a Greek Statuette now in the British Museum)]