Chapter V: Book I: Sidenote: Introduction. The importance and magnitude of the subject (2)

+21.+ Meanwhile, however, those who were charged with the shipbuilding were busied with the construction of the vessels; while others collected crews and were engaged in teaching them to row on dry land: which they contrived to do in the following manner. They made the men sit on rower’s benches on dry land, in the same order as they would sit on the benches in actual vessels: in the midst of them they stationed the Celeustes, and trained them to get back and draw in their hands all together in time, and then to swing forward and throw them out again, and to begin and cease these movements at the word of the Celeustes. By the time these preparations were completed the ships were built. They therefore launched them, and, after a brief preliminary practice of real sea-rowing, started on their coasting voyage along the shore of Italy, in accordance with the Consul’s order. For Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who had been appointed by the Roman people a few days before to command the fleet, after giving the ship captains orders that as soon as they had fitted out the fleet they should sail to the Straits, had put to sea himself with seventeen ships and sailed in advance to Messene; for he was very eager to secure all pressing necessaries for the naval force. While there some negotiation was suggested to him for the surrender of the town of Lipara. Snatching at the prospect somewhat too eagerly, he sailed with the above-mentioned ships and anchored off the town. But having been informed in Panormus of what had taken place, the Carthaginian general Hannibal despatched Boōdes, a member of the Senate, with a squadron of twenty ships. He accomplished the voyage at night and shut up Gnaeus and his men within the harbour. When day dawned the crews made for the shore and ran away, while Gnaeus, in utter dismay, and not knowing in the least what to do, eventually surrendered to the enemy. The Carthaginians having thus possessed themselves of the ships as well as the commander of their enemies, started to rejoin Hannibal. Yet a few days afterwards, though the disaster of Gnaeus was so signal and recent, Hannibal himself was within an ace of falling into the same glaring mistake. For having been informed that the Roman fleet in its voyage along the coast of Italy was close at hand, he conceived a wish to get a clear view of the enemy’s number and disposition. He accordingly set sail with fifty ships, and just as he was rounding the “Italian Headland” he fell in with the enemy, who were sailing in good order and disposition. He lost most of his ships, and with the rest effected his own escape in a manner beyond hope or expectation.

[Sidenote: The “corvi” or “crows” for boarding.]

+22.+ When the Romans had neared the coasts of Sicily and learnt the disaster which had befallen Gnaeus, their first step was to send for Gaius Duilius, who was in command of the land forces. Until he should come they stayed where they were; but at the same time, hearing that the enemy’s fleet was no great way off, they busied themselves with preparations for a sea-fight. Now their ships were badly fitted out and not easy to manage, and so some one suggested to them as likely to serve their turn in a fight the construction of what were afterwards called “crows.” Their mechanism was this. A round pole was placed in the prow, about twenty-four feet high, and with a diameter of four palms. The pole itself had a pulley on the top, and a gangway made with cross planks nailed together, four feet wide and thirty-six feet long, was made to swing round it. Now the hole in the gangway was oval shaped, and went round the pole twelve feet from one end of the gangway, which had also a wooden railing running down each side of it to the height of a man’s knee. At the extremity of this gangway was fastened an iron spike like a miller’s pestle, sharpened at its lower end and fitted with a ring at its upper end. The whole thing looked like the machines for braising corn. To this ring the rope was fastened with which, when the ships collided, they hauled up the “crows,” by means of the pulley at the top of the pole, and dropped them down upon the deck of the enemy’s ship, sometimes over the prow, sometimes swinging them round when the ships collided broadsides. And as soon as the “crows” were fixed in the planks of the decks and grappled the ships together, if the ships were alongside of each other, the men leaped on board anywhere along the side, but if they were prow to prow, they used the “crow” itself for boarding, and advanced over it two abreast. The first two protected their front by holding up before them their shields, while those who came after them secured their sides by placing the rims of their shields upon the top of the railing. Such were the preparations which they made; and having completed them they watched an opportunity of engaging at sea.

[Sidenote: Victory of Duilius at Mylae, B.C. 260.]

+23.+ As for Gaius Duilius, he no sooner heard of the disaster which had befallen the commander of the navy than handing over his legions to the military Tribunes he transferred himself to the fleet. There he learnt that the enemy was plundering the territory of Mylae, and at once sailed to attack him with the whole fleet. No sooner did the Carthaginians sight him than with joy and alacrity they put to sea with a hundred and thirty sail, feeling supreme contempt for the Roman ignorance of seamanship. Accordingly they all sailed with their prows directed straight at their enemy: they did not think the engagement worth even the trouble of ranging their ships in any order, but advanced as though to seize a booty exposed for their acceptance. Their commander was that same Hannibal who had withdrawn his forces from Agrigentum by a secret night movement, and he was on board a galley with seven banks of oars which had once belonged to King Pyrrhus. When they neared the enemy, and saw the “crows” raised aloft on the prows of the several ships, the Carthaginians were for a time in a state of perplexity; for they were quite strangers to such contrivances as these engines. Feeling, however, a complete contempt for their opponents, those on board the ships that were in the van of the squadron charged without flinching. But as soon as they came to close quarters their ships were invariably tightly grappled by these machines; the enemy boarded by means of the “crows,” and engaged them on their decks; and in the end some of the Carthaginians were cut down, while others surrendered in bewildered terror at the battle in which they found themselves engaged, which eventually became exactly like a land fight. The result was that they lost the first thirty ships engaged, crews and all. Among them was captured the commander’s ship also, though Hannibal himself by an unexpected piece of luck and an act of great daring effected his escape in the ship’s boat. The rest of the Carthaginian squadron were sailing up with the view of charging; but as they were coming near they saw what had happened to the ships which were sailing in the front, and accordingly sheered off and avoided the blows of the engines. Yet trusting to their speed, they managed by a manœuvre to sail round and charge the enemy, some on their broadside and others on their stern, expecting by that method to avoid danger. But the engines swung round to meet them in every direction, and dropped down upon them so infallibly, that no ships could come to close quarters without being grappled. Eventually the Carthaginians turned and fled, bewildered at the novelty of the occurrence, and with a loss of fifty ships.

[Sidenote: Further operations in Sicily.]

[Sidenote: Hamilcar.]

[Sidenote: Segesta and Macella.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal in Sardinia.]

+24.+ Having in this unlooked-for manner made good their maritime hopes the Romans were doubly encouraged in their enthusiasm for the war. For the present they put in upon the coast of Sicily, raised the siege of Segesta when it was reduced to the last extremity, and on their way back from Segesta carried the town Macella by assault. But Hamilcar, the commander of the Carthaginian land forces happened, after the naval battle, to be informed as he lay encamped near Panormus that the allies were engaged in a dispute with the Romans about the post of honour in the battles: and ascertaining that the allies were encamped by themselves between Paropus and Himeraean Thermae, he made a sudden attack in force as they were in the act of moving camp and killed almost four thousand of them. After this action Hannibal sailed across to Carthage with such ships as he had left; and thence before very long crossed to Sardinia, with a reinforcement of ships, and accompanied by some of those whose reputation as naval commanders stood high. But before very long he was blockaded in a certain harbour by the Romans, and lost a large number of ships; and was thereupon summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified. This came about because the first thing the Romans did upon getting a navy was to try to become masters of Sardinia.

[Sidenote: B.C. 259.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 258. Coss. A. Atilius Calatinus, C. Sulpicius, Paterculus.]

[Sidenote: Hippana and Myttistratum.]

[Sidenote: Camarina.]

During the next year the Roman legions in Sicily did nothing worthy of mention. In the next, after the arrival of the new Consuls, Aulus Atilius and Gaius Sulpicius, they started to attack Panormus because the Carthaginian forces were wintering there. The Consuls advanced close up to the city with their whole force, and drew up in order of battle. But the enemy refusing to come out to meet them, they marched away and attacked the town of Hippana. This they carried by assault: but though they also took Myttistratum it was only after it had stood a lengthened siege owing to the strength of its situation. It was at this time, too, that they recovered Camarina, which had revolted a short time previously. They threw up works against it, and captured it after making a breach in its walls. They treated Henna, and sundry other strong places which had been in the hands of the Carthaginians, in the same way; and when they had finished these operations they undertook to lay siege to Lipara.

[Sidenote: Fighting off Tyndaris.]

[Sidenote: Coss. C. Atilius Regulus, Cn. Cornelius, Blasio II. B.C. 257.]

+25.+ Next year Gaius Atilius, the Consul, happened to be at anchor off Tyndaris, when he observed the Carthaginian fleet sailing by in a straggling manner. He passed the word to the crews of his own ships to follow the advanced squadron, and started himself before the rest with ten ships of equal sailing powers. When the Carthaginians became aware that while some of the enemy were still embarking, others were already putting out to sea, and that the advanced squadron were considerably ahead of the rest, they stood round and went to meet them. They succeeded in surrounding and destroying all of them except the Consul’s ship, and that they all but captured with its crew. This last, however, by the perfection of its rowers and its consequent speed, effected a desperate escape. Meanwhile the remaining ships of the Romans were sailing up and gradually drawing close together. Having got into line, they charged the enemy, took ten ships with their crews, and sunk eight. The rest of the Carthaginian ships retired to the Liparean Islands.

[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 257-256.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 256. Coss. L. Manlius, Vulso Longus, M. Atilius Regulus II. (Suff.).]

The result of this battle was that both sides concluded that they were now fairly matched, and accordingly made more systematic efforts to secure a naval force, and to dispute the supremacy at sea. While these things were going on, the land forces effected nothing worth recording; but wasted all their time in such petty operations as chance threw in their way. Therefore, after making the preparations I have mentioned for the approaching summer, the Romans, with three hundred and thirty decked ships of war, touched at Messene; thence put to sea, keeping Sicily on their right; and after doubling the headland Pachynus passed on to Ecnomus, because the land force was also in that district. The Carthaginians on their part put to sea again with three hundred and fifty decked ships, touched at Lilybaeum, and thence dropped anchor at Heracleia Minoa.

[Sidenote: Preparations for the Battle of Ecnomus.]

[Sidenote: Roman forces. 330 ships, with average of 420 men (300 rowers + 120 marines) = 138,600 men.]

[Sidenote: Carthaginian numbers, 150,000 men.]

+26.+ Now it was the purpose of the Romans to sail across to Libya and transfer the war there, in order that the Carthaginians might find the danger affecting themselves and their own country rather than Sicily. But the Carthaginians were determined to prevent this. They knew that Libya was easily invaded, and that the invaders if they once effected a landing would meet with little resistance from the inhabitants; and they therefore made up their minds not to allow it, and were eager rather to bring the matter to a decisive issue by a battle at sea. The one side was determined to cross, the other to prevent their crossing; and their enthusiastic rivalry gave promise of a desperate struggle. The preparations of the Romans were made to suit either contingency, an engagement at sea or a disembarkation on the enemy’s soil. Accordingly they picked out the best hands from the land army and divided the whole force which they meant to take on board into four divisions. Each division had alternative titles; the first was called the “First Legion” or the “First Squadron,”—and so on with the others. The fourth had a third title besides. They were called “Triarii,” on the analogy of land armies. The total number of men thus making up the naval force amounted to nearly one hundred and forty thousand, reckoning each ship as carrying three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty soldiers. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, made their preparations almost exclusively with a view to a naval engagement. Their numbers, if we reckon by the number of their ships, were over one hundred and fifty thousand men. The mere recital of these figures must, I should imagine, strike any one with astonishment at the magnitude of the struggle, and the vast resources of the contending states. An actual view of them itself could hardly be more impressive than the bare statement of the number of men and ships.

[Sidenote: The Roman order at Ecnomus.]

Now the Romans had two facts to consider: First, that circumstances compelled them to face the open sea; and, secondly, that their enemies had the advantage of fast sailing vessels. They therefore took every precaution for keeping their line unbroken and difficult to attack. They had only two ships with six banks of oars, those, namely, on which the Consuls Marcus Atilius and Lucius Manlius respectively were sailing. These they stationed side by side in front and in a line with each other. Behind each of these they stationed ships one behind the other in single file—the first squadron behind the one, and the second squadron behind the other. These were so arranged that, as each ship came to its place, the two files diverged farther and farther from each other; the vessels being also stationed one behind the other with their prows inclining outwards. Having thus arranged the first and second squadrons in single file so as to form a wedge, they stationed the third division in a single line at its base; so that the whole finally presented the appearance of a triangle. Behind this base they stationed the horse-transports, attaching them by towing-ropes to the ships of the third squadron. And to the rear of them they placed the fourth squadron, called the Triarii, in a single line, so extended as to overlap the line in front of them at both extremities. When these dispositions were complete the general appearance was that of a beak or wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact and strong; while the whole was easy to work and serviceable, and at the same time difficult to break up.

[Sidenote: The disposition of the Carthaginian fleet.]

[Sidenote: ch. 19.]

[Sidenote: ch. 25.]

[Sidenote: The battle.]

+27.+ Meanwhile the Carthaginian commanders had briefly addressed their men. They pointed out to them that victory in this battle would ensure the war in the future being confined to the question of the possession of Sicily; while if they were beaten they would have hereafter to fight for their native land and for all that they held dear. With these words they passed the word to embark. The order was obeyed with universal enthusiasm, for what had been said brought home to them the issues at stake; and they put to sea in the full fervour of excited gallantry, which might well have struck terror into all who saw it. When their commanders saw the arrangement of the enemies’ ships they adapted their own to match it. Three-fourths of their force they posted in a single line, extending their right wing towards the open sea with a view of outflanking their opponents, and placing their ships with prows facing the enemy; while the other fourth part was posted to form a left wing of the whole, the vessels being at right angles to the others and close to the shore. The two Carthaginian commanders were Hanno and Hamilcar. The former was the general who had been defeated in the engagement at Agrigentum. He now commanded the right wing, supported by beaked vessels for charging, and the fastest sailing quinqueremes for outflanking, the enemy. The latter, who had been in the engagement off Tyndaris, had charge of the left wing. This officer, occupying the central position of the entire line, on this occasion employed a stratagem which I will now describe. The battle began by the Romans charging the centre of the Carthaginians, because they observed that it was weakened by their great extension. The ships in the Carthaginian centre, in accordance with their orders, at once turned and fled with a view of breaking up the Roman close order. They began to retire with all speed, and the Romans pursued them with exultation. The consequence was that, while the first and second Roman squadrons were pressing the flying enemy, the third and fourth “legions” had become detached and were left behind,—the former because they had to tow the horse-transports, and the “Triarii” because they kept their station with them and helped them to form a reserve. But when the Carthaginians thought that they had drawn the first and second squadron a sufficient distance from the main body a signal was hoisted on board Hamilcar’s ship, and they all simultaneously swung their ships round and engaged their pursuers. The contest was a severe one. The Carthaginians had a great superiority in the rapidity with which they manœuvred their ships. They darted out from their line and rowed round the enemy: they approached them with ease, and retired with despatch. But the Romans, no less than the Carthaginians, had their reasons for entertaining hopes of victory: for when the vessels got locked together the contest became one of sheer strength: their engines, the “crows,” grappled all that once came to close quarters: and, finally, both the Consuls were present in person and were witnesses of their behaviour in battle.

+28.+ This was the state of affairs on the centre. But meanwhile Hanno with the right wing, which had held aloof when the first encounter took place, crossing the open sea, charged the ships of the Triarii and caused them great difficulty and embarrassment: while those of the Carthaginians who had been posted near the land manœuvred into line, and getting their ships straight, charged the men who were towing the horse-transports. These latter let go the towing-ropes, grappled with the enemy, and kept up a desperate struggle.

[Sidenote: Three separate battles.]

[Sidenote: First with Hamilcar’s squadron.]

[Sidenote: Second squadron under Regulus.]

So that the engagement was in three separate divisions, or rather there were three sea-fights going on at wide intervals from each other. Now in these three engagements the opposing parties were in each case fairly matched, thanks to the original disposition of the ships, and therefore the victory was in each case closely contested. However the result in the several cases was very much what was to be expected where forces were so equal. The first to engage were the first to separate: for Hamilcar’s division at last were overpowered and fled. But while Lucius was engaged in securing his prizes, Marcus observing the struggle in which the Triarii and horse-transports were involved, went with all speed to their assistance, taking with him all the ships of the second squadron which were undamaged. As soon as he had reached and engaged Hanno’s division, the Triarii quickly picked up courage, though they were then getting much the worst of it, and returned with renewed spirits to the fight. It was now the turn for the Carthaginians to be in difficulties. They were charged in front and on the rear, and found to their surprise that they were being surrounded by the relieving squadron. They at once gave way and retreated in the direction of the open sea.

[Sidenote: Third squadron relieved by Regulus and Manlius.]

While this was going on, Lucius, who was sailing back to rejoin his colleague, observed that the third squadron had got wedged in by the Carthaginians close in shore. Accordingly he and Marcus, who had by this time secured the safety of the transports and Triarii, started together to relieve their imperilled comrades, who were now sustaining something very like a blockade. And the fact is that they would long before this have been utterly destroyed had not the Carthaginians been afraid of the “crows,” and confined themselves to surrounding and penning them in close to land, without attempting to charge for fear of being caught by the grappling-irons. The Consuls came up rapidly, and surrounding the Carthaginians captured fifty of their ships with their crews, while some few of them managed to slip away and escape by keeping close to the shore.

[Sidenote: General result.]

Such was the result of the separate engagements. But the general upshot of the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. Twenty-four of their vessels were destroyed; over thirty of the Carthaginians. Not a single Roman ship was captured with its crew; sixty-four of the Carthaginians were so taken.

[Sidenote: Siege of Aspis. (Clupea.)]

+29.+ After the battle the Romans took in a fresh supply of victual, repaired and refitted the ships they had captured, bestowed upon the crews the attention which they had deserved by their victory, and then put to sea with a view of continuing their voyage to Libya. Their leading ships made the shore just under the headland called the Hermaeum, which is the extreme point on the east of the Gulf of Carthage, and runs out into the open sea in the direction of Sicily. There they waited for the rest of the ships to come up, and having got the entire fleet together coasted along until they came to the city called Aspis. Here they disembarked, beached their ships, dug a trench, and constructed a stockade round them; and on the inhabitants of the city refusing to submit without compulsion, they set to work to besiege the town. Presently those of the Carthaginians who had survived the sea-fight came to land also; and feeling sure that the enemy, in the flush of their victory, intended to sail straight against Carthage itself, they began by keeping a chain of advanced guards at outlying points to protect the capital with their military and naval forces. But when they ascertained that the Romans had disembarked without resistance and were engaged in besieging Aspis, they gave up the idea of watching for the descent of the fleet; but concentrated their forces, and devoted themselves to the protection of the capital and its environs.

[Sidenote: Aspis taken.]

[Sidenote: M. Atilius Regulus remains in Africa, winter of B.C. 256-255.]

Meanwhile the Romans had taken Aspis, had placed in it a garrison to hold it and its territory, and had besides sent home to Rome to announce the events which had taken place and to ask for instructions as to the future,—what they were to do, and what arrangements they were to make. Having done this they made active preparations for a general advance and set about plundering the country. They met with no opposition in this: they destroyed numerous dwelling houses of remarkably fine construction, possessed themselves of a great number of cattle; and captured more than twenty thousand slaves whom they took to their ships. In the midst of these proceedings the messengers arrived from Rome with orders that one Consul was to remain with an adequate force, the other was to bring the fleet to Rome. Accordingly Marcus was left behind with forty ships, fifteen thousand infantry, and five hundred cavalry; while Lucius put the crowd of captives on board, and having embarked his men, sailed along the coast of Sicily without encountering any danger, and reached Rome.

+30.+ The Carthaginians now saw that their enemies contemplated a lengthened occupation of the country. They therefore proceeded first of all to elect two of their own citizens, Hasdrubal son of Hanno, and Bostarus, to the office of general; and next sent to Heracleia a pressing summons to Hamilcar. He obeyed immediately, and arrived at Carthage with five hundred cavalry and five thousand infantry. He was forthwith appointed general in conjunction with the other two, and entered into consultation with Hasdrubal and his colleague as to the measures necessary to be taken in the present crisis. They decided to defend the country and not to allow it to be devastated without resistance.

[Sidenote: B.C. 256-255. The operations of Regulus in Libya.]

[Sidenote: Defeat of the Carthaginians near Adys.]

A few days afterwards Marcus sallied forth on one of his marauding expeditions. Such towns as were unwalled he carried by assault and plundered, and such as were walled he besieged. Among others he came to the considerable town of Adys, and having placed his troops round it was beginning with all speed to raise siege works. The Carthaginians were both eager to relieve the town and determined to dispute the possession of the open country. They therefore led out their army; but their operations were not skilfully conducted. They indeed seized and encamped upon a piece of rising ground which commanded the enemy; but it was unsuitable to themselves. Their best hopes rested on their cavalry and their elephants, and yet they abandoned the level plain and cooped themselves up in a position at once steep and difficult of access. The enemy, as might have been expected, were not slow to take advantage of this mistake. The Roman commanders were skilful enough to understand that the best and most formidable part of the forces opposed to them was rendered useless by the nature of the ground. They did not therefore wait for them to come down to the plain and offer battle, but choosing the time which suited themselves, began at daybreak a forward movement on both sides of the hill. In the battle which followed the Carthaginians could not use their cavalry or elephants at all; but their mercenary troops made a really gallant and spirited sally. They even forced the first division of the Romans to give way and fly: but they advanced too far, and were surrounded and routed by the division which was advancing from the other direction. This was immediately followed by the whole force being dislodged from their encampment. The elephants and cavalry as soon as they gained level ground made good their retreat without loss; but the infantry were pursued by the Romans. The latter however soon desisted from the pursuit. They presently returned, dismantled the enemy’s entrenchment, and destroyed the stockade; and from thenceforth overran the whole country-side and sacked the towns without opposition.

[Sidenote: Tunes.]

Among others they seized the town called Tunes. This place had many natural advantages for expeditions such as those in which they were engaged, and was so situated as to form a convenient base of operations against the capital and its immediate neighbourhood. They accordingly fixed their headquarters in it.

[Sidenote: Distress at Carthage, which is heightened by an inroad of Numidians.]

[Sidenote: Spring of B.C. 255. Regulus proposes harsh terms.]

[Sidenote: The terms rejected.]

+31.+ The Carthaginians were now indeed in evil case. It was not long since they had sustained a disaster at sea: and now they had met with one on land, not from any failure of courage on the part of their soldiers, but from the incompetency of their commanders. Simultaneously with these misfortunes, they were suffering from an inroad of the Numidians, who were doing even more damage to the country than the Romans. The terror which they inspired drove the country folk to flock for safety into the city; and the city itself had to face a serious famine as well as a panic, the former from the numbers that crowded into it, the latter from the hourly expectation of a siege. But Regulus had different views. The double defeat sustained by the Carthaginians, by land as well as by sea, convinced him that the capture of Carthage was a question of a very short time; and he was in a state of great anxiety lest his successor in the Consulship should arrive from Rome in time to rob him of the glory of the achievement. He therefore invited the Carthaginians to make terms. They were only too glad of the proposal, and sent their leading citizens to meet him. The meeting took place: but the commissioners could not bring their minds to entertain his proposals; they were so severe that it was almost more than they could bear to listen to them at all. Regulus regarded himself as practically master of the city, and considered that they ought to regard any concession on his part as a matter of favour and pure grace. The Carthaginians on the other hand concluded that nothing worse could be imposed on them if they suffered capture than was now enjoined. They therefore returned home without accepting the offers of Regulus, and extremely exasperated by his unreasonable harshness. When the Carthaginian Senate heard the conditions offered by the Roman general, though they had almost relinquished every hope of safety, they came to the gallant and noble resolution that they would brave anything, that they would try every possible means and endure every extremity, rather than submit to terms so dishonourable and so unworthy of their past history.

[Sidenote: Arrival of the Spartan Xanthippus in Carthage.]

+32.+ Now it happened that just about this time one of their recruiting agents, who had some time before been despatched to Greece, arrived home. He brought a large number of men with him, and among them a certain Lacedaemonian named Xanthippus, a man trained in the Spartan discipline, and of large experience in war. When this man was informed of their defeat, and of how it had taken place, and when he had reviewed the military resources still left to the Carthaginians, and the number of their cavalry and elephants, he did not take long to come to a decided conclusion. He expressed his opinion to his friends that the Carthaginians had owed their defeat, not to the superiority of the Romans, but to the unskilfulness of their own commanders. The dangerous state of their affairs caused the words of Xanthippus to get abroad quickly among the people and to reach the ears of the generals; and the men in authority determined to summon and question him. He appeared, and laid his views before the magistrates; in which he showed to what they owed their present disasters, and that if they would take his advice and keep to the flat parts of the country alike in marching, encamping, and giving battle, they would be able with perfect ease to secure safety for themselves and to defeat their opponents in the field. The generals accepted the suggestion, resolved to follow his advice, and there and then put their forces at his command. Among the multitude the observation of Xanthippus was passed from mouth to mouth, and gave rise, as was to be expected, to a good deal of popular rumour and sanguine talk. This was confirmed when he had once handled the troops. The way in which he got them into order when he had led them outside the town; the skill with which he manœuvred the separate detachments, and passed the word of command down the ranks in due conformity to the rules of tactics, at once impressed every one with the contrast to the blundering of their former generals. The multitude expressed their approbation by loud cheers, and were for engaging the enemy without delay, convinced that no harm could happen to them as long as Xanthippus was their leader. The generals took advantage of this circumstance, and of the extraordinary recovery which they saw had taken place in the spirits of the people. They addressed them some exhortations befitting the occasion, and after a few days’ delay got their forces on foot and started. Their army consisted of twelve thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and nearly a hundred elephants.

[Sidenote: The new strategy of the Carthaginians.]

[Sidenote: The dispositions for the battle.]

+33.+ The Romans at once noticed a change. They saw that the Carthaginians chose level country for their line of march, and flat places for their encampments. This novelty puzzled and rather alarmed them, yet their prevailing feeling was an eager desire to come to close quarters with the enemy. They therefore advanced to a position about ten stades from them and employed the first day in pitching a camp there. Next day, while the chief officers of the Carthaginians were discussing in a council of war what dispositions were called for, and what line of strategy they were to adopt, the common soldiers, in their eagerness for the engagement, collected in groups, shouted out the name of Xanthippus, and showed that their opinion was in favour of an immediate forward movement. Influenced by the evident enthusiasm and eagerness of the army, and by the appeals of Xanthippus that they should not let the opportunity slip, the generals gave orders to the men to get ready, and resigned to Xanthippus the entire direction of affairs, with full authority to act as he thought most advantageous. He at once acted upon this authority. He ordered out the elephants, and placed them in a single line in front of the whole army. The heavy phalanx of the Carthaginians he stationed at a moderate interval in the rear of these. He divided the mercenaries into three corps. One he stationed on the right wing; while the other two, which consisted of the most active, he placed with the cavalry on both wings. When the Romans saw that the enemy were drawn up to offer them battle they readily advanced to accept it. They were however alarmed at the elephants, and made special arrangements with a view to resist their charge. They stationed the velites in the van, and behind them the legionaries, many maniples deep, while they divided the cavalry between the two wings. Their line of battle was thus less extended than usual, but deeper. And though they had thereby made a sufficient provision against the elephants, yet being far out-numbered in cavalry, their provision in that part of the field was altogether inadequate. At length both sides had made their dispositions according to their respective plans of operation, and had placed their several men in the posts assigned to them: and now they were standing drawn up in order, and were each of them watching for the right moment for beginning the attack.

[Sidenote: The battle.]

[Sidenote: The Romans are beaten and annihilated.]

[Sidenote: Regulus made prisoner.]

+34.+ No sooner had Xanthippus given the order to the men on the elephants to advance and disperse the lines in front of them, and to his cavalry to outflank both wings and charge the enemy, than the Roman army—clashing their shields and spears together after their usual custom, and simultaneously raising their battle-cry—charged the enemy. The Roman cavalry being far out-numbered by the Carthaginians were soon in full retreat on both wings. But the fortune of the several divisions of the infantry was various. Those stationed on the left wing—partly because they could avoid the elephants and partly because they thought contemptuously of the mercenaries—charged the right wing of the Carthaginians, succeeded in driving them from their ground, and pursued them as far as their entrenchment. Those stationed in front of the elephants were less fortunate. The maniples in front were thrown into utter confusion by the crushing weight of the animals: knocked down and trampled upon by them they perished in heaps upon the field; yet owing to its great depth the main body remained for a time unbroken. But it was not for long. The maniples on the rear found themselves outflanked by the cavalry, and were forced to face round and resist them: those on the other hand who forced their way to the front through the elephants, and had now those beasts on their rear, found themselves confronted by the phalanx of Carthaginians, which had not yet been in action and was still in close unbroken order, and so were cut to pieces. This was followed by a general rout. Most of the Romans were trampled to death by the enormous weight of the elephants; the rest were shot down in their ranks by the numerous cavalry: and there were only a very few who attempted to save themselves by flight. But the flatness of the country was unfavourable to escape in this manner. Some of the fugitives were destroyed by the elephants and cavalry; while only those who fled with the general Regulus, amounting perhaps to five hundred, were after a short pursuit made prisoners with him to a man.

On the Carthaginian side there fell about eight hundred of the mercenaries, those namely who had been stationed opposite the left wing of the Romans. On the part of the Romans about two thousand survived. These were those whom I have already described as having chased the Carthaginian right wing to their entrenchment, and who were thus not involved in the general engagement. The rest were entirely destroyed with the exception of those who fled with Regulus. The surviving maniples escaped with considerable difficulty to the town of Aspis. The Carthaginians stripped the dead, and taking with them the Roman general and the rest of their prisoners, returned to the capital in a high state of exultation at the turn their affairs had now taken.

[Sidenote: Eurip. fr.]

+35.+ This event conveys many useful lessons to a thoughtful observer. Above all, the disaster of Regulus gives the clearest possible warning that no one should feel too confident of the favours of Fortune, especially in the hour of success. Here we see one, who a short time before refused all pity or consideration to the fallen, brought incontinently to beg them for his own life. Again, we are taught the truth of that saying of Euripides—

One wise man’s skill is worth a world in arms.

For it was one man, one brain, that defeated the numbers which were believed to be invincible and able to accomplish anything; and restored to confidence a whole city that was unmistakably and utterly ruined, and the spirits of its army which had sunk to the lowest depths of despair. I record these things in the hope of benefiting my readers. There are two roads to reformation for mankind—one through misfortunes of their own, the other through those of others: the former is the most unmistakable, the latter the less painful. One should never therefore voluntarily choose the former, for it makes reformation a matter of great difficulty and danger; but we should always look out for the latter, for thereby we can without hurt to ourselves gain a clear view of the best course to pursue. It is this which forces us to consider that the knowledge gained from the study of true history is the best of all educations for practical life. For it is history, and history alone, which, without involving us in actual danger, will mature our judgment and prepare us to take right views, whatever may be the crisis or the posture of affairs.

[Sidenote: Xanthippus quits Carthage.]

+36.+ To return to our narrative. Having obtained this complete success the Carthaginians indulged in every sign of exultation. Thanksgivings were poured out to God, and joyful congratulations interchanged among themselves. But Xanthippus, by whose means such a happy change had been brought about and such an impulse been given to the fortunes of Carthage, did not remain there long, but took ship for home again. In this he showed his wisdom and discernment. For it is the nature of extraordinary and conspicuous achievements to exasperate jealousies and envenom slander; against which a native may perhaps stand with the support of kinsfolk and friends, but a foreigner when exposed to one or the other of them is inevitably overpowered before long and put in danger. There is however another account sometimes given of the departure of Xanthippus, which I will endeavour at a more suitable opportunity to set forth.

[Sidenote: The Romans prepare a fleet to relieve their beaten army.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 255. Coss. Ser. Fulvius Paetinus Nobilior, M. Aemilius Paullus.]

Upon this unlooked-for catastrophe in the Libyan campaign, the Roman government at once set to work to fit out a fleet to take off the men who were still surviving there; while the Carthaginians followed up their success by sitting down before Aspis, and besieging it, being anxious to get the survivors of the battle into their hands. But failing to capture the place, owing to the gallantry and determined courage of these men, they eventually raised the siege. When they heard that the Romans were preparing their fleet, and were intending to sail once more against Libya, they set about shipbuilding also, partly repairing old vessels and partly constructing new. Before very long they had manned and launched two hundred ships, and were on the watch for the coming of their enemies. By the beginning of the summer the Romans had launched three hundred and fifty vessels. They put them under the command of the Consuls Marcus Aemilius and Servius Fulvius, and despatched them. This fleet coasted along Sicily; made for Libya; and having fallen in with the Carthaginian squadron off Hermaeum, at once charged and easily turned them to flight; captured a hundred and fourteen with their crews, and having taken on board their men who had maintained themselves in Libya, started from Aspis on their return voyage to Sicily.

[Sidenote: The fleet is lost in a storm.]

[Sidenote: Between June 28 and July 26.]

+37.+ The passage was effected in safety, and the coast of Camarina was reached: but there they experienced so terrible a storm, and suffered so dreadfully, as almost to beggar description. The disaster was indeed extreme: for out of their three hundred and sixty-four vessels eighty only remained. The rest were either swamped or driven by the surf upon the rocks and headlands, where they went to pieces and filled all the seaboard with corpses and wreckage. No greater catastrophe is to be found in all history as befalling a fleet at one time. And for this Fortune was not so much to blame as the commanders themselves. They had been warned again and again by the pilots not to steer along the southern coast of Sicily facing the Libyan sea, because it was exposed and yielded no safe anchorage; and because, of the two dangerous constellations, one had not yet set and the other was on the point of rising (for their voyage fell between the rising of Orion and that of the Dog Star). Yet they attended to none of these warnings; but, intoxicated by their recent success, were anxious to capture certain cities as they coasted along, and in pursuance of this idea thoughtlessly exposed themselves to the full fury of the open sea. As far as these particular men were concerned, the disaster which they brought upon themselves in the pursuit of trivial advantages convinced them of the folly of their conduct. But it is a peculiarity of the Roman people as a whole to treat everything as a question of main strength; to consider that they must of course accomplish whatever they have proposed to themselves; and that nothing is impossible that they have once determined upon. The result of such self-confidence is that in many things they do succeed, while in some few they conspicuously fail, and especially at sea. On land it is against men only and their works that they have to direct their efforts: and as the forces against which they exert their strength do not differ intrinsically from their own, as a general rule they succeed; while their failures are exceptional and rare. But to contend with the sea and sky is to fight against a force immeasurably superior to their own: and when they trust to an exertion of sheer strength in such a contest the disasters which they meet with are signal. This is what they experienced on the present occasion: they have often experienced it since; and will continue to do so, as long as they maintain their headstrong and foolhardy notion that any season of the year admits of sailing as well as marching.

[Sidenote: The Carthaginians renew operations in Sicily.]

+38.+ When the Carthaginians heard of the destruction which had befallen the Roman fleet, they made up their minds that as their late victory had made them a match for their enemy on land, so now the Roman catastrophe had made them a match for him at sea. Accordingly they devoted themselves with still greater eagerness than before to their naval and military preparations. And first, they lost no time in despatching Hasdrubal to Sicily, and with him not only the soldiers that they had already collected, but those also whom they had recalled from Heracleia; and along with them they sent also a hundred and forty elephants. And next, after despatching him, they began fitting out two hundred ships and making all other preparations necessary for a naval expedition. Hasdrubal reached Lilybaeum safely, and immediately set to work to train his elephants and drill his men, and showed his intention of striking a blow for the possession of the open country.

[Sidenote: B.C. 254. Coss. Gn. Cornelius Scipio Asina II., Aulus Atilius, Calatinus II.]

The Roman government, when they heard of this from the survivors of the wreck on their arrival home, felt it to be a grievous misfortune; but being absolutely resolved not to give in, they determined once more to put two hundred and twenty vessels on the stocks and build afresh. These were finished in three months, an almost incredibly short time, and the new Consuls Aulus Atilius and Gnaeus Cornelius fitted out the fleet and put to sea. As they passed through the straits they took up from Messene those of the vessels which had been saved from the wreck; and having thus arrived with three hundred ships off Panormus, which is the strongest town of all the Carthaginian province in Sicily, they began to besiege it. They threw up works in two distinct places, and after other necessary preparations brought up their battering rams. The tower next the sea was destroyed with ease, and the soldiers forced their way in through the breach: and so what is called the New Town was carried by assault; while what is called the Old Town being placed by this event in imminent danger, its inhabitants made haste to surrender it. Having thus made themselves masters of the place, the army sailed back to Rome, leaving a garrison in the town.

[Sidenote: B.C. 253. Coss. Gn. Servilius Caepio, G. Sempronius Blaesus.]

+39.+ But next summer the new Consuls Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Sempronius put again to sea with their full strength, and after touching at Sicily started thence for Libya. There, as they coasted along the shore, they made a great number of descents upon the country without accomplishing anything of importance in any of them. At length they came to the island of the Lotophagi called Mēnix, which is not far from the Lesser Syrtis. There, from ignorance of the waters, they ran upon some shallows; the tide receded, their ships went aground, and they were in extreme peril. However, after a while the tide unexpectedly flowed back again, and by dint of throwing overboard all their heavy goods they just managed to float the ships. After this their return voyage was more like a flight than anything else. When they reached Sicily and had made the promontory of Lilybaeum they cast anchor at Panormus. Thence they weighed anchor for Rome, and rashly ventured upon the open sea-line as the shortest; but while on their voyage they once more encountered so terrible a storm that they lost more than a hundred and fifty ships.

[Sidenote: B.C. 252.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 251. Coss. Lucius Caecilius Metellus, G. Furius Pacilus.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 252-251.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 250.]

The Romans after this misfortune, though they are eminently persistent in carrying out their undertakings, yet owing to the severity and frequency of their disasters, now yielded to the force of circumstances and refrained from constructing another fleet. All the hopes still left to them they rested upon their land forces: and, accordingly, they despatched the Consuls Lucius Caecilius and Gaius Furius with their legions to Sicily; but they only manned sixty ships to carry provisions for the legions. The fortunes of the Carthaginians had in their turn considerably improved owing to the catastrophes I have described. They now commanded the sea without let or hindrance, since the Romans had abandoned it; while in their land forces their hopes were high. Nor was it unreasonable that it should be so. The account of the battle of Libya had reached the ears of the Romans: they had heard that the elephants had broken their ranks and had killed the large part of those that fell: and they were in such terror of them, that though during two years running after that time they had on many occasions, in the territory either of Lilybaeum or Selinus, found themselves in order of battle within five or six stades of the enemy, they never plucked up courage to begin an attack, or in fact to come down upon level ground at all, all because of their fear of an elephant charge. And in these two seasons all they did was to reduce Therma and Lipara by siege, keeping close all the while to mountainous districts and such as were difficult to cross. The timidity and want of confidence thus displayed by their land forces induced the Roman government to change their minds and once more to attempt success at sea. Accordingly, in the second consulship of Caius Atilius and Lucius Manlius, we find them ordering fifty ships to be built, enrolling sailors and energetically collecting a naval armament.

[Sidenote: B.C. 251.]

[Sidenote: Skirmishing at Panormus.]