Chapter VIII: Book I: Sidenote: Introduction. The importance and magnitude of the subject (5)

+81.+ When news of this dreadful affair reached the Carthaginians, they were powerless indeed to do anything, but they were filled with horror; and in a transport of agony despatched messengers to Hamilcar and the second general Hanno, entreating them to rally to their aid and avenge the unhappy victims; and at the same time they sent heralds to the authors of this crime to negotiate for the recovery of the dead bodies. But the latter sternly refused; and warned the messengers to send neither herald nor ambassador to them again; for the same punishment which had just befallen Gesco awaited all who came. And for the future they passed a resolution, which they encouraged each other to observe, to put every Carthaginian whom they caught to death with torture; and that whenever they captured one of their auxiliaries they would cut off his hands and send him back to Carthage. And this resolution they exactly and persistently carried out. Such horrors justify the remark that it is not only the bodies of men, and the ulcers and imposthumes which are bred in them, that grow to a fatal and completely incurable state of inflammation, but their souls also most of all. For as in the case of ulcers, sometimes medical treatment on the one hand only serves to irritate them and make them spread more rapidly, while if, on the other hand, the medical treatment is stopped, having nothing to check their natural destructiveness, they gradually destroy the substance on which they feed; just so at times it happens that similar plague spots and gangrenes fasten upon men’s souls; and when this is so, no wild beast can be more wicked or more cruel than a man. To men in such a frame of mind if you show indulgence or kindness, they regard it as a cover for trickery and sinister designs, and only become more suspicious and more inflamed against the authors of it; while if you retaliate, their passions are aroused to a kind of dreadful rivalry, and then there is no crime too monstrous or too cruel for them to commit. The upshot with these men was, that their feelings became so brutalised that they lost the instincts of humanity: which we must ascribe in the first place, and to the greatest extent, to uncivilised habits and a wretchedly bad early training; but many other things contributed to this result, and among them we must reckon as most important the acts of violence and rapacity committed by their leaders, sins which at that time were prevalent among the whole mercenary body, but especially so with their leaders.

[Sidenote: Quarrels of Hanno and Hamilcar.]

[Sidenote: Revolt of Hippo Zarytus and Utica.]

+82.+ Alarmed by the recklessness displayed by the enemy, Hamilcar summoned Hanno to join him, being convinced that a consolidation of the two armies would give him the best chance of putting an end to the whole war. Such of the enemy as he took in the field he put to execution on the spot, while those who were made prisoners and brought to him he threw to the elephants to be trampled to death; for he now made up his mind that the only possibility of finishing the war was to entirely destroy the enemy. But just as the Carthaginians were beginning to entertain brighter hopes in regard to the war, a reverse as complete as it was unexpected brought their fortunes to the lowest ebb. For these two generals, when they had joined forces, quarrelled so bitterly with each other, that they not only omitted to take advantage of chances against the enemy, but by their mutual animosity gave the enemy many opportunities against themselves. Finding this to be the case, the Carthaginian government sent out instructions that one of the generals was to retire, the other to remain, and that the army itself was to decide which of them it should be. This was one cause of the reverse in the fortunes of Carthage at this time. Another, which was almost contemporaneous, was this. Their chief hope of furnishing the army with provisions and other necessaries rested upon the supplies that were being brought from a place to which they give the name of Emporiae: but as these supplies were on their way, they were overtaken by a storm at sea and entirely destroyed. This was all the more fatal because Sardinia was lost to them at the time, as we have seen, and that island had always been of the greatest service to them in difficulties of this sort. But the worst blow of all was the revolt of the cities of Hippo Zarytus and Utica, the only cities in all Libya that had been faithful to them, not only in the present war, but also at the time of the invasion of Agathocles, as well as that of the Romans. To both these latter they had offered a gallant resistance; and, in short, had never at any time adopted any policy hostile to Carthage. But now they were not satisfied with simply revolting to the Libyans, without any reason to allege for their conduct. With all the bitterness of turncoats, they suddenly paraded an ostentatious friendship and fidelity to them, and gave practical expression to implacable rage and hatred towards the Carthaginians. They killed every man of the force which had come from Carthage to their aid, as well as its commander, and threw the bodies from the wall. They surrendered their town to the Libyans, while they even refused the request of the Carthaginians to be allowed to bury the corpses of their unfortunate soldiers. Mathōs and Spendius were so elated by these events that they were emboldened to attempt Carthage itself. But Barcas had now got Hannibal as his coadjutor, who had been sent by the citizens to the army in the place of Hanno,—recalled in accordance with the sentence of the army, which the government had left to their discretion in reference to the disputes that arose between the two generals. Accompanied, therefore, by this Hannibal and by Narávas, Hamilcar scoured the country to intercept the supplies of Mathōs and Spendius, receiving his most efficient support in this, as in other things, from the Numidian Narávas.

[Sidenote: Friendly disposition of Rome.]

[Sidenote: Hiero of Syracuse.]

+83.+ Such being the position of their forces in the field, the Carthaginians, finding themselves hemmed in on every side, were compelled to have recourse to the help of the free states in alliance with them.[145] Now Hiero, of Syracuse, had during this war been all along exceedingly anxious to do everything which the Carthaginians asked him; and at this point of it was more forward to do so than ever, from a conviction that it was for his interest, with a view alike to his own sovereignty and to his friendship with Rome, that Carthage should not perish, and so leave the superior power to work its own will without resistance. And his reasoning was entirely sound and prudent. It is never right to permit such a state of things; nor to help any one to build up so preponderating a power as to make resistance to it impossible, however just the cause. Not that the Romans themselves had failed to observe the obligations of the treaty, or were showing any failure of friendly dispositions; though at first a question had arisen between the two powers, from the following circumstance. At the beginning of the war, certain persons sailing from Italy with provisions for the mutineers, the Carthaginians captured them and forced them to land in their own harbour; and presently had as many as five hundred such persons in their prisons. This caused considerable annoyance at Rome: but, after sending ambassadors to Carthage and recovering possession of the men by diplomatic means, the Romans were so much gratified that, by way of returning the favour, they restored the prisoners made in the Sicilian war whom they still retained; and from that time forth responded cheerfully and generously to all requests made to them. They allowed their merchants to export to Carthage whatever from time to time was wanted, and prohibited those who were exporting to the mutineers. When, subsequently, the mercenaries in Sardinia, having revolted from Carthage, invited their interference on the island, they did not respond to the invitation; nor when the people of Utica offered them their submission did they accept it, but kept strictly to the engagements contained in the treaty.

[Sidenote: B.C. 238. Hamilcar, with assistance from Sicily, surrounds Mathōs and Spendius.]

+84.+ The assistance thus obtained from these allies encouraged the Carthaginians to maintain their resistance: while Mathōs and Spendius found themselves quite as much in the position of besieged as in that of besiegers; for Hamilcar’s force reduced them to such distress for provisions that they were at last compelled to raise the siege. However, after a short interval, they managed to muster the most effective of the mercenaries and Libyans, to the number in all of fifty thousand, among whom, besides others, was Zarzas the Libyan, with his division, and commenced once more to watch and follow on the flank of Hamilcar’s march. Their method was to keep away from the level country, for fear of the elephants and the cavalry of Narávas; but to seize in advance of him all points of vantage, whether it were rising ground or narrow pass. In these operations they showed themselves quite a match for their opponents in the fury of their assault and the gallantry of their attempts; but their ignorance of military tactics frequently placed them at a disadvantage. It was, in fact, a real and practical illustration of the difference between scientific and unscientific warfare: between the art of a general and the mechanical movements of a soldier. Like a good draught-player, by isolating and surrounding them, he destroyed large numbers in detail without coming to a general engagement at all; and in movements of more importance he cut off many without resistance by enticing them into ambushes; while he threw others into utter dismay by suddenly appearing where they least expected him, sometimes by day and sometimes by night: and all whom he took alive he threw to the elephants. Finally, he managed unexpectedly to beleaguer them on ground highly unfavourable to them and convenient for his own force; and reduced them to such a pitch of distress that, neither venturing to risk an engagement nor being able to run away, because they were entirely surrounded by a trench and stockade, they were at last compelled by starvation to feed on each other: a fitting retribution at the hands of Providence for their violation of all laws human and divine in their conduct to their enemies. To sally forth to an engagement they did not dare, for certain defeat stared them in the face, and they knew what vengeance awaited them if they were taken; and as to making terms, it never occurred to them to mention it, they were conscious that they had gone too far for that. They still hoped for the arrival of relief from Tunes, of which their officers assured them, and accordingly shrank from no suffering however terrible.

[Sidenote: Spendius and Autaritus fall into the hands of Hamilcar.]

+85.+ But when they had used up for food the captives in this horrible manner, and then the bodies of their slaves, and still no one came to their relief from Tunes, their sufferings became too dreadful to bear; and the common soldiers broke out into open threats of violence against their officers. Thereupon Autaritus, Zarzas, and Spendius decided to put themselves into the hands of the enemy and to hold a parley with Hamilcar, and try to make terms. They accordingly sent a herald and obtained permission for the despatch of an embassy. It consisted of ten ambassadors, who, on their arrival at the Carthaginian camp, concluded an agreement with Hamilcar on these terms: “The Carthaginians may select any ten men they choose from the enemy, and allow the rest to depart with one tunic a-piece.” No sooner had these terms been agreed to, than Hamilcar said at once that he selected, according to the terms of the agreement, the ten ambassadors themselves. The Carthaginians thus got possession of Autaritus, Spendius, and the other most conspicuous officers. The Libyans saw that their officers were arrested, and not knowing the terms of the treaty, believed that some perfidy was being practised against them, and accordingly flew to seize their arms. Hamilcar thereupon surrounded them with his elephants and his entire force, and destroyed them to a man. This slaughter, by which more than forty thousand perished, took place near a place called the Saw, so named from its shape resembling that tool.

[Sidenote: Siege of Mathōs in Tunes.]

[Sidenote: Defeat and death of Hannibal.]

+86.+ This achievement of Hamilcar revived the hopes of the Carthaginians who had been in absolute despair: while he, in conjunction with Narávas and Hannibal, employed himself in traversing the country and visiting the cities. His victory secured the submission of the Libyans; and when they had come in, and the greater number of the towns had been reduced to obedience, he and his colleagues advanced to attack Tunes, and commenced besieging Mathōs. Hannibal pitched his camp on the side of the town nearest to Carthage, and Hamilcar on the opposite side. When this was done they brought the captives taken from the army of Spendius and crucified them in the sight of the enemy. But observing that Hannibal was conducting his command with negligence and over-confidence, Mathōs assaulted the ramparts, killed many of the Carthaginians, and drove the entire army from the camp. All the baggage fell into the hands of the enemy, and Hannibal himself was made a prisoner. They at once took him up to the cross on which Spendius was hanging, and after the infliction of exquisite tortures, took down the latter’s body and fastened Hannibal, still living, to his cross; and then slaughtered thirty Carthaginians of the highest rank round the corpse of Spendius. It seemed as though Fortune designed a competition in cruelty, giving either side alternately the opportunity of outdoing the other in mutual vengeance. Owing to the distance of the two camps from each other it was late before Barcas discovered the attack made from the town; nor, when he had discovered it, could he even then go to the rescue with the necessary speed, because the intervening country was rugged and difficult. He therefore broke up his camp, and leaving Tunes marched down the bank of the river Macaras, and pitched his camp close to its mouth and to the sea.

[Sidenote: By a final effort the Carthaginians raise a reinforcement for Hamilcar.]

[Sidenote: Mathōs beaten and captured.]

+87.+ This unexpected reverse reduced the Carthaginians once more to a melancholy state of despair. But though their recent elation of spirit was followed so closely by this depression, they did not fail to do what they could for their own preservation. They selected thirty members of the Senate; with them they associated Hanno, who had some time ago been recalled; and, arming all that were left of military age in the city, despatched them to Barcas, with the feeling that they were now making their supreme effort. They strictly charged the members of the Senate to use every effort to reconcile the two generals Hamilcar and Hanno, and to make them forget their old quarrel and act harmoniously, in view of the imminence of the danger. Accordingly, after the employment of many various arguments, they induced the generals to meet; and Hanno and Barcas were compelled to give in and yield to their representations. The result was that they ever afterwards co-operated with each other so cordially, that Mathōs found himself continually worsted in the numerous skirmishes which took place round the town called Leptis, as well as certain other towns; and at last became eager to bring the matter to the decision of a general engagement, a desire in which the Carthaginians also shared in an equal degree. Both sides therefore having determined upon this course: they summoned all their allies to join them in confronting the peril, and collected the garrisons stationed in the various towns, conscious that they were about to stake their all on the hazard. All being ready on either side for the conflict, they gave each other battle by mutual consent, both sides being drawn up in full military array. When victory declared itself on the side of the Carthaginians, the larger number of the Libyans perished on the field; and the rest, having escaped to a certain town, surrendered shortly afterwards; while Mathōs himself was taken prisoner by his enemies.

[Sidenote: Reduction of Hippo and Utica, B.C. 238.]

+88.+ Most places in Libya submitted to Carthage after this battle. But the towns of Hippo and Utica still held out, feeling that they had no reasonable grounds for obtaining terms, because their original acts of hostility left them no place for mercy or pardon. So true is it that even in such outbreaks, however criminal in themselves, it is of inestimable advantage to be moderate, and to refrain from wanton acts which commit their perpetrator beyond all power of forgiveness. Nor did their attitude of defiance help these cities. Hanno invested one and Barcas the other, and quickly reduced them to accept whatever terms the Carthaginians might determine.

[Sidenote: B.C. 241-238.]

The war with the Libyans had indeed reduced Carthage to dreadful danger; but its termination enabled her not only to re-establish her authority over Libya, but also to inflict condign punishment upon the authors of the revolt. For the last act in the drama was performed by the young men conducting a triumphal procession through the town, and finally inflicting every kind of torture upon Mathōs. For three years and about four months did the mercenaries maintain a war against the Carthaginians which far surpassed any that I ever heard of for cruelty and inhumanity.

[Sidenote: The Romans interfere in Sardinia.]

And about the same time the Romans took in hand a naval expedition to Sardinia upon the request of the mercenaries who had deserted from that island and come to Italy; and when the Carthaginians expressed indignation at this, on the ground that the lordship over Sardinia more properly belonged to them, and were preparing to take measures against those who caused the revolt of the island, the Romans voted to declare war against them, on the pretence that they were making warlike preparations, not against Sardinia, but against themselves. The Carthaginians, however, having just had an almost miraculous escape from annihilation in the recent war, were in every respect disabled from renewing their quarrel with the Romans. They therefore yielded to the necessities of the hour, and not only abandoned Sardinia, but paid the Romans twelve hundred talents into the bargain, that they might not be obliged to undertake the war for the present.