Chapter III: , Sections 1, 7

Hobbes manifested a fair knowledge of the operation of those principles which subsequent psychologists have termed the laws of association and mental modifications and ideas. He points out and distinguishes various ways in which ideas and thoughts are associated, though he does not use the term association of ideas, but uses the expressions, trains of imaginations, and trains of thoughts. But I can only afford space for a few of his illustrations:――

“When a man thinks on anything, his next thought after is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently.... All fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in the sense: and those motions that immediately succeed one another in the sense, continue also together after sense; inasmuch as the former coming again to take place and be predominant, the latter follows, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner as water upon a plain table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger.” Again, “The cause of the coherence or consequence of one conception to another, is their first coherence at that time when they are produced by sense; as, for example, from St. Andrew the mind runs to St. Peter, because their names are read together; from St. Peter to a stone, for the same cause; from stone to foundation, because we see them together; and for the same cause, from foundation to church, and from church to people, and from people to tumult: and according to this example, the mind may run almost from anything to anything. But as in the sense the conception of cause and effect may succeed one another, so may they after sense in the imagination: and for the most part they do so.” He stated and illustrated other ways in which the train of thoughts is regulated.

Of reminiscence he says: “Beginning with the appetite to recover something lost, proceeding from the present backwards, from thought of the place where we miss it, to the thought of the place whence we came last; and from the thought of that to the thought of a place before, till we have in our mind some place wherein we had the thing we miss: and this is called reminiscence.” Further, “The remembrance of succession of one thing to another, that is, of what was antecedent, and what consequent, and what concomitant, is called an experiment, whether the same be made by us voluntarily, as when a man puts anything into the fire, to see what effect the fire will produce upon it, or not made by us, as when we remember a fair morning after a red evening. To have had many experiments is what we call experience, which is nothing but remembrance of what antecedents have been followed by what consequents.”¹

¹ _Leviathan_, Part I., Chapter III.; _Human Nature_, Chapter
IV., Sections 2, 5, 6.

On the side of feeling, emotion, and will, Hobbes’s psychology is of less value. His description of the passions, feelings, and emotions, though on some points clear and accurate, is, as a whole, imperfect and lacking in consistency. His theory of the will was this: “In deliberation, the last appetite, as also the last fear, is called will, namely, the last appetite, will to do, or will to omit. It is all one, therefore, to say will and last will. Will, therefore, is the last appetite in deliberating.... Appetite, fear, hope, and the rest of the passions, are not called voluntary, for they proceed not from, but are the will; and the will is not voluntary, for a man can no more say he will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite repetition of the word will, which is absurd and insignificant. Forasmuch as will to do is appetite, and will to omit fear, the cause of appetite and fear is the cause also of our will.” With Hobbes, will and appetite are the same thing, till deliberation is brought into operation; so that the action of appetite is necessitated, “and, therefore, such a liberty as is free from necessity is not to be found either in the will of men or beasts.” But he admits the relation of will and belief.¹

¹ _Human Nature_, Chapter XII., Sections 2, 5, 6; _Leviathan_,