Chapter XXXIX: Part 3: , Section 2

² _Ibid._, Section 3.

He contended strongly for the existence of disinterested affection in man, and used the term “moral sense” to express his doctrine. He indicated the rise of this moral sense, and argued that it has a foundation in nature. “There is in reality no rational creature whatsoever who knows not that when he voluntarily offends or does harm to anyone, he cannot fail to create an apprehension and fear of like harm, and consequently a resentment and animosity in everyone that observes him. So that the offender must be conscious of being liable to such treatment from everyone, as if he had in some degree offended all ... of this the wickedest creature living must have a sense. So that if there be any farther meaning in this sense of right and wrong, if in reality there be any sense of this kind which an absolutely wicked creature has not, it must consist in a real antipathy or aversion to injustice or wrong, and in a real affection towards equity and right for its own sake, and on account of its natural beauty and worth.

“It is impossible to suppose a mere sensible creature, originally so ill-conditioned and unnatural, as that from the moment he comes to be tried by sensible objects, he should have no good passion towards his kind, no foundation either of piety, love, kindness, or social affection. It is fully as impossible to conceive that a rational creature coming first to be tried by rational objects, and receiving into his mind the images or representations of justice, generosity, gratitude, or other virtue, should have no liking of these, or dislike of their contraries, but be found absolutely indifferent towards whatsoever is presented to him of this sort. A soul, indeed, may as well be without a sense, as without admiration in the things of which it has any knowledge.... Sense of right and wrong, therefore, being as natural to us as natural affection itself, and being a first principle in our constitution, there is no speculative idea or belief which is capable immediately or directly to exclude or destroy it.”¹ From these passages and from others of a similar import, it may be observed that several of Shaftesbury’s ethical views were transferred into Scottish philosophy. His influence is also notable on Kant’s doctrine of the relation between Morality and Religion.

¹ _Inquiry concerning Virtue_, Part II., Section 3; Part III.,