Chapter XXXVIII: Section 8

Touching the will, he held that though a man is free to act,
the will itself is always determined by motives; this theory
is usually called determinism. Book II., Chapter XXI.

Although we have now a more scientific psychology than was possible in Locke’s day, nevertheless, his “Essay concerning Human Understanding” is a great monument of his genius, and one of the most interesting works in this department of literature. Its merit consists in its method, its general scope, its vast variety of topics, and the spirit of candour which pervades it. It has had a wide and remarkable influence on subsequent speculation, and on psychology, though at first it met with opposition in various quarters.

At any given time, the causes favourable to the success of a novel line of thought are various and complicated, and without at all pretending to exhaust them, I may indicate some of the conditions which conduced to the acceptance of Locke’s philosophy. A well-marked though slow transformation of thought had been proceeding in Europe for several centuries prior to Locke, which embraced in its sweep with more or less distinctness physical science, religion, ethics, and politics, while its social effects were manifested partly in the long political struggles of the different nations among themselves, and especially in the civil wars and internal conflicts of each nation within itself. This vast movement had a general tendency throughout toward greater freedom of thought, and religious and political liberty; but these results were more keenly and earnestly fought for, and sooner obtained in some of the nations than in others; in Britain the struggle for political and religious freedom was very severe but not prolonged. Hence Locke’s philosophy being in accord with the general movement of the period, and more directly in unison with the intellectual and social tendencies of England, as manifested in the Revolution of 1688, it became a great power in history.¹

¹ Soon after the publication of Locke’s Essay, opponents and
critics, as well as defenders of it appeared, and Locke
himself entered the field to defend some of his views, his
controversy with Stillingfleet is well-known; indeed, many
attacks were made upon his philosophy, but it is unnecessary
to particularise them here.

There is a correlation between the creeds of a community and its political and social organisation. The belief in the divine right and the absolute power of a king, or a caste, the prevalence of certain moral views touching the nature of marriage, or the highest ends of national life, are often necessary for the continuance of a certain order of society. When the belief is modified, the order shakes and disappears, and the ties which hold a community together then assume a somewhat different form. Anything which involves an attack upon the theories implied in the existing social order, may modify the principles or notions upon which power rests. As a struggle between two different forms of government compels each to consider its own constitution, this may issue in strengthening or in weakening the chief features of their respective beliefs. In short, anything which really stirs the social organism, afford a chance for the progress of fresh seeds of thought and belief.¹

¹ It is mainly by the thorough investigation of the subjects
indicated above, in the two preceding paragraphs, and other
cognate matters, ♦and the proper use of the sources of facts
thus obtained, that philosophers can hope that at some future
day there will be a science of sociology. “Then we shall
unravel the laws of the growth of the social organism, and
determine the conditions of its health or disease. Then,
and not till then, will it be possible to present political
science as a coherent body of doctrines, deduced from certain
axioms of universal validity, but leading to different
conclusions, according to the varying conditions of human
society. We shall be able to say what form of government is
most favourable to the happiness of a nation at any given
period of its development.... But we are still so far from
possessing anything like a science of politics, that most
of the current maxims involve conceptions which could hardly
find place in a scientific system. Fragments of the old
theories by which men endeavoured to explain the origin of
government, or to show how it might be best administered,
still perplex our discussions, and hinder the attempt to lay
a sound foundation of theory.

“The difficulty of discovering anything approaching to
an historical development of political theory is the
greater, inasmuch as theories have followed, more than
they have guided, events. Happy is the nation which has no
political philosophy, for such philosophy is generally the
offspring of a recent, or the symptom of an approaching
revolution. During the quieter hours of the eighteenth
century, Englishmen rather played with political theories
than seriously discussed them. The interest in politics
was chiefly personal. References to general principles are
introduced in rhetorical flourishes, but do not form the
basis of serious argument. In the mass of pamphlets and
speeches which fill our library shelves, it is rare to find
even the show of political philosophy. The Tory argument is
that De Foe has been put in the pillory; the Whig argument is
that the French wear wooden shoes. Walpole’s friends rail at
the Pope and the Pretender; and Bolingbroke’s friends abuse
the excise and the Hanoverian subsidies.”――Stephen’s _History
of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century_, Volume II.,
pages 130‒131.

♦ “aud” replaced with “and”

Before the close of the seventeenth century, the discoveries in physical science, wider geographical knowledge than formerly, and many other influences, had enlarged men’s conceptions of the universe. This was modifying religious ideas, while a marked tendency towards rationalism was manifesting itself in the current theology, as well as in philosophy. The movement in England appeared in various forms. Discussions and disputes touching the immortality of the soul began in the seventeenth century, increased amazingly after the Revolution, and were continued through the greater part of the eighteenth century. Locke had stated that matter might be endowed with the power of thinking. The opponents of Christianity maintained that the future existence of the soul was impossible, and many writers engaged in the discussion of this subject.

English Deism was in some degree effected by the philosophy of Locke. But the deistic creed was not essentially strong, as it was not founded on the deepest convictions, or associated with the most powerful emotions of the human breast, while its leaders lacked the glowing sympathetic feeling, and the warm aspiration, the intense earnestness, and the simple note of sincerity, which characterise the genuine apostles of mankind. The conception of the Supreme Being which the Deists presented, could not excite fervour in the heart of worshippers; yet, though Deism soon decayed and died, rationalism and scepticism have continued to spread.

Among the most eminent of the Deists who assailed the doctrines of Christianity, were John Toland, Matthew Tindal, and Anthony Collins; while on the other side may be mentioned, Samuel Clark, Bishop Berkeley, and Dr. Butler, and many other less known men. But the grounds and the methods of the attack and the defence of Christianity have undergone a transformation since the middle of the eighteenth century.

Toland published in 1696, “Christianity not Mysterious.” The aim of this work was to show that there is nothing in the New Testament contrary to reason, or above it, and, therefore, no Christian doctrine can properly be called a mystery. Adopting Locke’s definition of knowledge, he explained what was within man’s reach of knowing; and maintained that statements which contradicted reason cannot be admitted, and if above reason they cannot be understood. Reason was our only safe guide; and Christianity itself does not claim to be mysterious. Many of his explanations, however, were crude and unsatisfactory.¹

¹ Toland is the author of many pamphlets and unfinished
fragments, political, religious, and on other subjects. A
full account of his writings was given in Leland’s _View of
the Principal Deistical Writers_, 1754‒56; compare Skelton’s
_Deism Revealed_, 2 volumes, 1749; A. F. Farrar’s _Critical
History of Free Thought_.

Anthony Collins was a prominent representative of Deism, and is the author of several treatises, which were famous in their day. His “Discourse on Free Thinking” appeared in 1713, and in it he argued that all sound belief must be based on free inquiry, and seemed anxious to show that the adoption of this tenet would not necessitate the relinquishment of a belief in the supernatural. In 1724 he published his work entitled, “A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion,” containing a plausible attack on Christianity. But the most important of his works is the “Inquiry concerning Human Liberty and Necessity,” and he gives the following account of its scope:――“1. Though I deny not liberty in a certain meaning of that word, yet I contend for liberty, as it signifies a power in man to do as he wills or pleases. 2. When I affirm necessity, I contend only for moral necessity, meaning thereby that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determined by his reason and senses; and I deny man to be subject to such necessity, as in clocks, watches, and such other things, which for want of intelligence are subject to an absolute physical and mechanical necessity. 3. I have undertaken to show that the notions advanced are so far from being inconsistent with, that they are the sole foundations of morality and laws, and of awards and punishments in society; and that the notions I explode are subversive of them.” The arguments which he advanced in support of his theory were six, namely: “1. From experience; 2. From the impossibility of liberty; 3. From the imperfection of liberty, and the perfection of necessity; 4. From the consideration of the divine prescience; 5. From the nature and use of rewards and punishments; 6. From the nature of morality.” He worked out these arguments with much skill and ingenuity, and the following six objections were concisely but ably answered:――“1. That if men are necessary agents, punishments are unjust; 2. And are useless; 3. Reasoning, entreaties, blame, and praise, are useless; 4. Also the use of physical remedies is useless; 5. The reproaches of conscience are groundless; 6. The murder of Julius Cæsar could not possibly have been murder.” The treatise is characteristic throughout, and had some influence on subsequent speculation.

Mathew Tindal held a fellowship in All Souls at Oxford, and was past seventy years of age when the first volume of his work, “Christianity as Old as the Creation,” was published in 1732. Though the work was not remarkable for its method or grasp of thought, the arrangement being confused and abounding in repetitions, yet it attracted much attention. Tindal maintained that natural religion is complete and sufficient, consequently a revelation is unnecessary, so there can be no obligation to accept it. All religion must have one aim, which is to attain human perfection of character by a life in accord with human nature. In a word, his theory is this: “Whosoever so regulates his natural appetites as will conduce most to the exercise of his reason, the health of his body, and the pleasures of his senses, taken and considered altogether, since herein his happiness consists, may be certain he can never offend his Maker; who, as He governs all things according to their natures, cannot but expect His rational creatures should act according to their natures.” He stated that there is no difference between religion and morality, save that the one is acting according to the reason of things considered in themselves, the other according to the same reason of things considered as the rule of God; Christianity being only a republication of the law of nature.¹

¹ _Christianity as Old as the Creation_, pages 2, 14, _et
seq._, page 270; compare Stephen’s _History of English
Thought in the Eighteenth Century_, Volume I., pages 134‒145.

Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, may be noticed among those whose writings have influenced subsequent ethical views. He was essentially a moralist, his chief aim being to show how a rational scheme of life might be formed. A belief in God was an element of his system. “For whoever thinks that there is a just God, and pretends formally to believe that He is just and good, must suppose that there is independently such a thing as justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true. If the mere will, decree, or law of God be said absolutely to constitute right and wrong, then are these latter words of no significance at all.” Thus it seems a sound theism follows from morality, not morality from theism. Hence also religion, according to the conception which it presents of the character of God, “is capable of doing great good or harm, and atheism nothing positive in either way.”¹ Atheism indicates an unhealthy state of mind, as nothing can be more distressing “than the thought of living in a distracted universe from which many ills may be suspected, and where nothing good or lovely presents itself, nothing which can satisfy in contemplation or raise any passion, besides that of contempt, hatred, and dislike.” This tends to embitter the temper, and “to impair and ruin the very principle of virtue, namely, natural and kind affection.” In the main, he argued that whoever has a firm belief in a just and benignant God has a far stronger incentive to virtuous action than those who have no such belief; and there is thus a relation between virtue and piety, as where piety is wanting “there can neither be the same benignity, firmness, or constancy, the same good composure of the affections, or uniformity of mind.”²

¹ _Characteristics: An Inquiry concerning Virtue_, Book I.,