Chapter XXXV: Book XXV (3)

28. Intelligence of these events having been carried into the camp of the Sicilians, that Epicydes had departed from Syracuse, that the island was deserted by the Carthaginians, and almost again delivered up to the Romans; after sounding the inclinations of the besieged in conferences, they sent ambassadors to Marcellus, to treat about terms of capitulation. They had not much difficulty in coming to an agreement, that all the parts of the island which had been under the dominion of their kings should be ceded to the Romans; that the rest, with their liberty and their own laws, should be preserved to the Sicilians. They then invited to a conference the persons who had been intrusted with the management of affairs by Epicydes; to whom they said, that they were sent from the army of the Sicilians, at once to Marcellus and to them, that both those who were besieged and those who were not might share the same fortune; and that neither of them might stipulate any thing for themselves separately. They were then allowed to enter, in order to converse with their relations and friends; when, laying before them the terms which they had made with Marcellus, and holding out to them a hope of safety, they induced them to join with them in an attack upon the prefects of Epicydes, Polyclitus, Philistion, and Epicydes, surnamed Sindon. Having put them to death, they summoned the multitude to an assembly; and after complaining of the famine, at which they had been accustomed to express their dissatisfaction to each other in secret, they said, that "although they were pressed by so many calamities, they had no right to accuse Fortune, because it was at their own option how long they should continue to suffer them. That the motive which the Romans had in besieging Syracuse was affection for the Syracusans, and not hatred; for when they heard that the government was usurped by Hippocrates and Epicydes, the creatures first of Hannibal and then of Hieronymus, they took arms and began to besiege the city, in order to reduce not the city itself, but its cruel tyrants. But now that Hippocrates is slain, Epicydes shut out of Syracuse, his praefects put to death, and the Carthaginians driven from the entire possession of Sicily by sea and land, what reason can the Romans have left why they should not desire the preservation of Syracuse, in the same manner as they would if Hiero were still lining, who cultivated the friendship of Rome with unequalled fidelity? That, therefore, neither the city nor its inhabitants were in any danger, except from themselves, if they neglected an opportunity of restoring themselves to the favour of the Romans; and that no so favourable a one would ever occur as that which presented itself at the present instant, immediately upon its appearing that they were delivered from their insolent tyrants."

29. This speech was received with the most unqualified approbation of all present. It was resolved, however, that praetors should be elected before the nomination of deputies; which being done, some of the praetors themselves were sent as deputies to Marcellus, the chief of whom thus addressed him: "Neither in the first instance did we Syracusans revolt from you, but Hieronymus, whose impiety towards you was by no means so great as towards us; nor afterwards was it any Syracusan who disturbed the peace established by the death of the tyrant, but Hippocrates and Epicydes, creatures of the tyrant; while we were overpowered, on the one hand by fear, and on the other by treachery. Nor can any one say that there ever was a time when we were in possession of our liberty, when we were not also at peace with you. In the present instance, manifestly, as soon as ever we became our own masters, by the death of those persons who held Syracuse in subjection, we lost no time in coming to deliver up our arms, to surrender ourselves, our city, and our walls, and to refuse no conditions which you shall impose upon us. To you, Marcellus, the gods have given the glory of having captured the most renowned and beautiful of the Grecian cities. Every memorable exploit which we have at any time achieved by land or sea accrues to the splendour of your triumph. Would you wish that it should be known only by fame, how great a city has been captured by you, rather than that she should stand as a monument even to posterity; so that to every one who visits her by sea or land, she may point out at one time our trophies gained from the Athenians and Carthaginians, at another time those which you have gained from us; and that you should transmit Syracuse unimpaired to your family, to be kept under the protection and patronage of the race of the Marcelli? Let not the memory of Hieronymus have greater weight with you than that of Hiero. The latter was your friend for a much longer period than the former was your enemy. From the latter you have realized even benefits, while the frenzy of Hieronymus only brought ruin upon himself." At the hands of the Romans all things were obtainable and secure. There was a greater disposition to war, and more danger to be apprehended among themselves; for the deserters, thinking that they were delivered up to the Romans, induced the mercenary auxiliaries to entertain the same apprehension; and hastily seizing their arms, they first put the praetors to death, and then ran through the city to massacre the Syracusans. In their rage they slew all whom chance threw in their way, and plundered every thing which presented itself; and then, lest they should have no leaders, they elected six praetors, so that three might have the command in the Achradina, and three in the island. At length, the tumult having subsided, and the mercenary troops having ascertained, by inquiry, what had been negotiated with the Romans, it began to appear, as was really the case, that their cause and that of the deserters were different.

30. The ambassadors returned from Marcellus very opportunely. They informed them that they had been influenced by groundless suspicions, and that the Romans saw no reason why they should inflict punishment upon them. Of the three praefects of the Achradina one was a Spaniard, named Mericus. To him one of the Spanish auxiliaries was designedly sent, among those who accompanied the ambassadors. Having obtained an interview with Mericus in the absence of witnesses, he first explained to him the state in which he had left Spain, from which he had lately returned: "That there every thing was in subjection to the Roman arms; that it was in his power, by doing the Romans a service, to become the first man among his countrymen, whether he might be inclined to serve with the Romans, or to return to his country. On the other hand, if he persisted in preferring to hold out against the siege, what hope could he have, shut up as he was by sea and land?" Mericus was moved by these suggestions, and when it was resolved upon to send ambassadors to Marcellus, he sent his brother among them; who, being brought into the presence of Marcellus, apart from the rest, by means of the same Spaniard, after receiving an assurance of protection, arranged the method of carrying their object into effect, and then returned to the Achradina. Mericus then, in order to prevent any one from conceiving a suspicion of treachery, declared, that he did not like that deputies should be passing to and fro; he thought that they should neither admit nor send any; and in order that the guards might be kept more strictly, that such parts as were most exposed should be distributed among the prefects, each being made responsible for the safety of his own quarter. All approved of the distribution of the posts. The district which fell to the lot of Mericus himself extended from the fountain Arethusa to the mouth of the large harbour, of which he caused the Romans to be informed. Accordingly, Marcellus ordered a transport with armed men to be towed by a quadrireme to the Achradina during the night, and the soldiers to be landed in the vicinity of that gate which is near the fountain of Arethusa. This order having been executed at the fourth watch, and Mericus having received the soldiers when landed at the gate, according to the agreement, Marcellus assaulted the walls of the Achradina with all his forces at break of day, so that he not only engaged the attention of those who occupied the Achradina, but also bands of armed men, quitting their own posts ran to the spot from the island, in order to repel the furious attack of the Romans. During this confusion, some light ships which had been prepared beforehand, and had sailed round, landed a body of armed men at the island; these suddenly attacking the half-manned stations and the opened door of the gate at which the troops had a little before run out, got possession of the island without much opposition, abandoned as it was, in consequence of the flight and trepidation of its guards. Nor were there any who rendered less service, or showed less firmness in maintaining their posts, than the deserters; for as they did not repose much confidence even in those of their own party, they fled in the middle of the contest. When Marcellus learnt that the island was taken, one quarter of the Achradina in the hands of his troops, and that Mericus, with the men under his command, had joined them, he sounded a retreat, lest the royal treasure, the fame of which was greater than the reality, should be plundered.

31. The impetuosity of the soldiers having been checked, time and opportunity to escape were given to the deserters in the Achradina; and the Syracusans, at length delivered from their fears, threw open the gates of the Achradina, and sent deputies to Marcellus, requesting only safety for themselves and children. Having summoned a council, to which the Syracusans were invited who were among the Roman troops, having been driven from home during the disturbances, Marcellus replied, "that the services rendered by Hiero through a period of fifty years, were not more in number than the injuries committed against the Roman people in these few years by those who had had possession of Syracuse; but that most of these injuries had justly recoiled upon their authors, and that they had inflicted much more severe punishment upon themselves for the violation of treaties, than the Roman people desired. That he was indeed now besieging Syracuse for the third year, but not that the Romans might hold that state in a condition of slavery, but that the ringleaders of the deserters might not keep it in a state of thraldom and oppression. What the Syracusans could do was exemplified, either by the conduct of those Syracusans who were among the Roman troops, or that of the Spanish general, Mericus, who had delivered up the post which he was appointed to command, or, lastly, by the late but bold measure adopted by the Syracusans themselves. That the greatest possible recompence for all the evils and dangers which he had for so long a time undergone, both by sea and land, around the walls of Syracuse, was the reflection, that he had been able to take that city." The quaestor was then sent with a guard to the island, to receive and protect the royal treasure. The city was given up to be plundered by the soldiery, after guards had been placed at each of the houses of those who had been with the Roman troops. While many acts exhibited horrid examples of rage and rapacity, it is recorded that Archimedes, while intent on some figures which he had described in the dust, although the confusion was as great as could possibly exist in a captured city, in which soldiers were running up and down in search of plunder, was put to death by a soldier, who did not know who he was; that Marcellus was grieved at this event, and that pains were taken about his funeral, while his relations also for whom diligent inquiry was made, derived honour and protection from his name and memory. Such, for the most part, was the manner in which Syracuse was captured. The quantity of booty was so great, that had Carthage itself, which was carrying on a contest on equal terms, been captured, it would scarcely have afforded so much. A few days before the taking of Syracuse, Titus Otacilius passed over from Lilybaeum to Utica with eighty quinqueremes, and entering the harbour before it was light, took some transports laden with corn; then landing, he laid waste a considerable portion of the country around Utica, and brought back to his ships booty of every description. He returned to Lilybaeum, the third day after he set out, with a hundred and thirty transports laden with corn and booty. The corn he sent immediately to Syracuse; and had it not been for the very seasonable arrival of this supply, a destructive famine threatened alike the victors and the vanquished.

32. Nothing very memorable had been done in Spain for about two years, the operations of the war consisting more in laying plans than in fighting; but during the same summer in which the events above recorded took place, the Roman generals, quitting their winter quarters, united their forces; then a council was summoned; and the opinions of all accorded, that since their only object hitherto had been to prevent Hasdrubal from pursuing his march into Italy, it was now time that an effort should be made to bring the war in Spain to a termination; and they thought that the twenty thousand Celtiberians, who had been induced to take arms that winter, formed a sufficient accession to their strength. There were three armies of the enemy. Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, and Mago, who had united their forces, were about a five days' journey from the Romans. Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar, who was the old commander in Spain, was nearer to them: he was with his army near the city Anitorgis. The Roman generals were desirous that he should be overpowered first; and they hoped that they had enough and more than enough strength for the purpose. Their only source of anxiety was, lest the other Hasdrubal and Mago, terrified at his discomfiture, should protract the war by withdrawing into trackless forests and mountains. Thinking it, therefore, the wisest course to divide their forces and embrace the whole Spanish war, they arranged it so that Publius Cornelius should lead two-thirds of the Roman and allied troops against Mago and Hasdrubal, and that Cneius Cornelius, with the remaining third of the original army, and with the Celtiberians added to them, should carry on the war with the Barcine Hasdrubal. The two generals and their armies, setting out together, preceded by the Celtiberians, pitched their camp near the city Anitorgis, within sight of the enemy, the river only separating them. Here Cneius Scipio, with the forces above mentioned, halted, but Publius Scipio proceeded to the portion of the war assigned to him.

33. Hasdrubal perceiving that there were but few Roman troops in the camp, and that their whole dependence was on the Celtiberian auxiliaries; and having had experience of the perfidy of the barbarian nations in general, and particularly of all those nations among which he had served for so many years; as there was every facility of intercourse, for both camps were full of Spaniards, by secret conferences with the chiefs of the Celtiberians, he agreed with them, for a large consideration, to take their forces away. Nor did they conceive it to be any great crime; for the object was not that they should turn their arms against the Romans, while the reward which they were to receive to abstain from the war was large enough to remunerate them for their service in it. At the same time the mere rest from labour, the return to their homes, with the pleasure of seeing their friends and property, were pleasing to the generality. Accordingly, the multitude were prevailed upon as easily as their leaders. They had, moreover, nothing to fear from the Romans, in consequence of the smallness of their numbers, should they endeavour to detain them by force. It will indeed be the duty of all Roman generals to take care, and the instances here recorded should be considered as strong arguments, never to place so much confidence in foreign auxiliaries, as not to retain in their camps a preponderance of their own strength and of that force which is properly their own. The Celtiberians, suddenly taking up their standards, marched away, replying only to the Romans, who asked the cause of their departure and entreated them to stay, that they were called away by a war at home. Scipio seeing that his allies could be detained neither by prayers nor force, and that he was neither a match for his enemy without them, nor could again effect a junction with his brother, no other course which promised safety offering itself, resolved to retire as far as possible, carefully using every caution not to encounter the enemy any where on level ground. On his departing, the enemy, crossing the river, pursued him almost in his footsteps.

34. During the same period an equal terror and a greater danger pressed upon Publius Scipio. Masinissa was a young man at that time an ally of the Carthaginians, whom afterwards the friendship of the Romans rendered illustrious and powerful. He not only opposed himself with his Numidian cavalry to Scipio on his approach, but afterwards harassed him incessantly day and night, so as both to cut off his stragglers, who had gone out to a distance from the camp in search of wood and forage, and riding up to the very gates of his camp, and charging into the midst of his advanced guards, to fill every quarter with the utmost confusion. By night also alarm was frequently occasioned in the gates and rampart by his sudden attacks. Nor was there any time or place at which the Romans were exempt from fear and anxiety; and driven within their rampart, and deprived of every necessary, they suffered in a manner a regular siege; and it appeared that it would have been still straiter, if Indibilis, who it was reported was approaching with seven thousand five hundred Suessetani, should form a junction with the Carthaginians. Scipio, though a wary and provident general, overpowered by difficulties, adopted the rash measure of going to meet Indibilis by night, with the intention of fighting him wherever he should meet him. Leaving, therefore, a small force in his camp, under the command of Titus Fonteius, lieutenant-general, he set out at midnight, and meeting with the enemy, came to battle with him. The troops fought in the order of march rather than of battle. The Romans, however, had the advantage, though in an irregular fight; but the Numidian cavalry, whose observation the general supposed that he had escaped, suddenly spreading themselves round his flanks, occasioned great terror. After a new contest had been entered into with the Numidians, a third enemy came up in addition to the rest, the Carthaginian generals having come up with their rear when they were now engaged in fighting. Thus the Romans were surrounded on every side by enemies; nor could they make up their minds which they should attack first, or in what part, forming themselves into a close body, they should force their way through. The general, while fighting and encouraging his men, exposing himself wherever the strife was the hottest, was run through the right side with a lance; and when the party of the enemy, which, formed into a wedge, had charged the troops collected round the general, perceived Scipio falling lifeless from his horse, elated with joy, they ran shouting through the whole line with the news that the Roman general had fallen. These words spreading in every direction, caused the enemy to be considered as victors, and the Romans as vanquished. On the loss of the general the troops immediately began to fly from the field; but though it was not difficult to force their way through the Numidians and the other light-armed auxiliaries, yet it was scarcely possible for them to escape so large a body of cavalry, and infantry equal to horses in speed. Almost more were slain in the flight than in the battle; nor would a man have survived, had not night put a stop to the carnage, the day by this time rapidly drawing to a close.

35. After this, the Carthaginian generals, who were not slow in following up their victory, immediately after the battle, scarcely giving their soldiers necessary rest, hurry their army to Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar; confidently hoping, that after uniting their forces with his, the war might be brought to a conclusion. On their arrival, the warmest congratulations passed between the troops and their generals, who were delighted with their recent victory; for they had not only destroyed one distinguished general and all his men, but looked forward to another victory of equal magnitude as a matter of certainty. The intelligence of this great disaster had not yet reached the Romans; but there prevailed a kind of melancholy silence and mute foreboding, such as is usually found in minds which have a presentiment of impending calamity. The general himself, besides feeling that he was deserted by his allies, and that the forces of the enemy were so much augmented, was disposed from conjecture and reasoning rather to a suspicion that some defeat had been sustained, than to any favourable hopes. "For how could Hasdrubal and Mago bring up their troops without opposition, unless they had terminated their part of the war? How was it that his brother had not opposed his progress or followed on his rear? in order that if he could not prevent the armies and generals of the enemy from forming a junction, he might himself join his forces with his brother's." Disturbed with these cares, he believed that the only safe policy for the present was to retire as far as possible; and, accordingly, he marched a considerable distance thence in one night, the enemy not being aware of it, and on that account continuing quiet. At dawn, perceiving that their enemy had decamped, they sent the Numidians in advance, and began to pursue them as rapidly as possible. The Numidians overtook them before night, and charged; sometimes their rear, at other times their flanks. They then began to halt and defend themselves as well as they could; but Scipio exhorted them at once to fight so as not to expose themselves, and march at the same time, lest the infantry should overtake them.

36. But having made but little progress for a long time, in consequence of his making his troops sometimes advance and at others halt, and night now drawing on, Scipio recalled his troops from the battle, and collecting them, withdrew to a certain eminence, not very safe, indeed, particularly for dispirited troops, but higher than any of the surrounding places. There, at first, his infantry, drawn up around his baggage and cavalry, which were placed in their centre, had no difficulty in repelling the attacks of the charging Numidians; but afterwards, when three generals with three regular armies marched up in one entire body, and it was evident that his men would not be able to do much by arms in defending the position without fortifications, the general began to look about, and consider whether he could by any means throw a rampart around; but the hill was so bare, and the soil so rough, that neither could a bush be found for cutting a palisade, nor earth for making a mound, nor the requisites for making a trench or any other work; nor was the place naturally steep or abrupt enough to render the approach and ascent difficult to the enemy, as it rose on every side with a gentle acclivity. However, that they might raise up against them some semblance of a rampart, they placed around them the panniers tied to the burdens, building them up as it were to the usual height, and when there was a deficiency of panniers for raising it, they presented against the enemy a heap of baggage of every kind. The Carthaginian armies coming up, very easily marched up the eminence, but were stopped by the novel appearance of the fortification, as by something miraculous, when their leaders called out from all sides, asking "what they stopped at? and why they did not tear down and demolish that mockery, which was scarcely strong enough to impede the progress of women and children; that the enemy, who were skulking behind their baggage, were, in fact, captured and in their hands." Such were the contemptuous reproofs of their leaders. But it was not an easy task either to leap over or remove the burdens raised up against them, or to cut through the panniers, closely packed together and covered completely with baggage. When the removal of the burdens had opened a way to the troops, who were detained by them for a long time, and the same had been done in several quarters, the camp was now captured on all sides; the Romans were cut to pieces on all hands, the few by the many, the dispirited by the victorious. A great number of the men, however, having fled for refuge into the neighbouring woods, effected their escape to the camp of Publius Scipio, which Titus Fonteius commanded. Some authors relate that Cneius Scipio was slain on the eminence on the first assault of the enemy; others that he escaped with a few attendants to a castle near the camp; this, they say, was surrounded with fire, by which means the doors which they could not force were consumed; that it was thus taken, and all within, together with the general himself, put to death. Cneius Scipio was slain in the eighth year after his arrival in Spain, and on the twenty-ninth day after the death of his brother. At Rome the grief occasioned by their death was not more intense than that which was felt throughout Spain. The sorrow of the citizens, however, was partly distracted by the loss of the armies, the alienation of the province, and the public disaster, while in Spain they mourned and regretted the generals themselves, Cneius, however, the more, because he had been longer in command of them, had first engaged their affections, and first exhibited a specimen of Roman justice and forbearance.

37. When it seemed that the Roman armies were annihilated, and Spain lost, one man recovered this desperate state of affairs. There was in the army one Lucius Marcius, the son of Septimus, a Roman knight, an enterprising youth, and possessing a mind and genius far superior to the condition in which he had been born. To his high talents had been added the discipline of Cneius Scipio, under which he had been thoroughly instructed during a course of so many years in all the qualifications of a soldier. This man, having collected the troops which had been dispersed in the flight, and drafted some from the garrisons, had formed an army not to be despised, and united it with Titus Tonteius, the lieutenant-general of Publius Scipio. But so transcendent was the Roman knight in authority and honour among the troops, that when, after fortifying a camp on this side of the Iberus, it had been resolved that a general of the two armies should be elected in an assembly of the soldiers, relieving each other in the guard of the rampart, and in keeping the outposts until every one had given his vote, they unanimously conferred the supreme command upon Lucius Marcius. All the intervening time, which was but short, was occupied in fortifying their camp and collecting provisions, and the soldiers executed every order not only with vigour, but with feelings by no means depressed. But when intelligence was brought them that Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, who was coming to put the finishing stroke to the war, had crossed the Iberus and was drawing near, and when they saw the signal for battle displayed by a new commander, then calling to mind whom they had had for their leaders a little while ago, relying on what leaders and what forces they used to go out to fight, they all suddenly burst into tears and beat their heads, some raising their hands to heaven and arraigning the gods, others prostrating themselves upon the ground and invoking by name each his own former commander. Nor could their lamentations be restrained, though the centurions endeavoured to animate their companies, and though Marcius himself soothed and remonstrated with them, asking them "why they had given themselves up to womanish and unavailing lamentations rather than summon up all their courage to protect themselves and the commonwealth together, and not suffer their generals to lie unavenged?" But suddenly a shout and the sound of trumpets were heard; for by this time the enemy were near the rampart. Upon this, their grief being suddenly converted into rage, they hastily ran to arms, and, as it were, burning with fury, rushed to the gates and charged the enemy, while advancing in a careless and disorderly manner. This unexpected event instantly struck terror into the Carthaginians, who wondering whence so many enemies could have sprung up so suddenly, as the army had been almost annihilated; what could have inspired men who had been vanquished and routed with such boldness and confidence in themselves; what general could have arisen now that the two Scipios were slain; who could command the camp, and who had given the signal for battle; in consequence of these so many and so unexpected circumstances, at first, being in a state of complete uncertainty and amazement, they gave ground; but afterwards, discomfited by the violence of the charge, they turned their backs; and either there would have been a dreadful slaughter of the flying enemy, or a rash and dangerous effort on the part of the pursuers, had not Marcius promptly given the signal for retreat, and by throwing himself in the way of the front rank, and even holding some back with his own hands, repressed the infuriated troops. He then led them back to the camp, still eager for blood and slaughter. When the Carthaginians, who were at first compelled to fly with precipitation from the rampart of their enemy, saw that no one pursued them, concluding that they had stopped from fear, now on the other hand went away to their camp at an easy pace, with feelings of contempt for the enemy. There was a corresponding want of care in guarding their camp; for though the enemy were near, yet it seemed that they were but the remains of the two armies which had been cut to pieces a few days before. As in consequence of this all things were neglected in the enemy's camp, Marcius having ascertained this, addressed his mind to a measure which on the first view of it might appear rather rash than bold: it was, aggressively to assault the enemy's camp, concluding that the camp of Hasdrubal, while alone, might be carried with less difficulty than his own could be defended, if the three armies and as many generals should again unite; taking into consideration also that either if he succeeded he would retrieve their prostrate fortune, or if repulsed, still, by making the attack himself, he would rescue himself from contempt.

38. Lest, however, the suddenness of the affair, and the fear of night, should frustrate a measure which was in itself ill adapted to his condition, he thought it right that his soldiers should be addressed and exhorted; and having called an assembly, he discoursed as follows: "Soldiers, either my veneration for our late commanders, both living and dead, or our present situation, may impress on every one the belief that this command, as it is highly honourable to me, conferred by your suffrages, so is it in its nature a heavy and anxious charge. For at a time when I should be scarcely so far master of myself as to be able to find any solace for my afflicted mind, did not fear deaden the sense of sorrow, I am compelled to take upon myself alone the task of consulting for the good of you all; a task of the greatest difficulty when under the influence of grief. And not even at that critical moment, when I ought to be considering in what manner I may be enabled to keep together for my country these remains of two armies, can I divert my mind from the affliction which incessantly preys upon me. For bitter recollection is ever present, and the Scipios ever disturb me with anxious cares by day and dreams by night, frequently rousing me from my sleep, and imploring me not to suffer themselves nor their soldiers, your companions in war, who had been victorious in this country for eight years, nor the commonwealth to remain unrevenged; enjoining me also to follow their discipline and their plans; and desiring that as there was no one more obedient to their commands while they were alive than I, so after their death I would consider that conduct as best, which I might have the strongest reason for believing they would have adopted in each case. I could wish also that you, my soldiers, should not show your respect for them by lamentations and tears, as if they were dead; (for they still live and flourish in the fame of their achievements;) but that whenever the memory of those men shall occur to you, you would go into battle as though you saw them encouraging you and giving you the signal. Nor certainly could anything else than their image presenting itself yesterday to your eyes and minds, have enabled you to fight that memorable battle, in which you proved to the enemy that the Roman name had not become extinct with the Scipios; and that the energy and valour of that people, which had not been overwhelmed by the disaster at Cannae, would, doubtlessly, emerge from the severest storms of fortune. Now since you have dared so much of your own accord, I have a mind to try how much you will dare when authorized by your general: for yesterday, when I gave the signal for retreat while you were pursuing the routed enemy with precipitation, I did not wish to break your spirit, but to reserve it for greater glory and more advantageous opportunities; that you might afterwards, when prepared and armed, seize an occasion of attacking your enemy while off their guard, unarmed, and even buried in sleep. Nor do I entertain the hope of gaining an opportunity of this kind rashly, but from the actual state of things. Doubtless, if any one should ask even himself, by what means, though few in number and disheartened by defeat, you defended your camp against troops superior in number and victorious, you would give no other answer than that, as this was the very thing you were afraid of, you had kept every place secured by works and yourselves ready and equipped. And so it generally happens: men are least secure against that which fortune causes not to be feared; because you leave unguarded and exposed what you think is not necessary to be cared about. There is nothing whatever which the enemy fear less at the present time, than lest we, who were a little while ago besieged and assaulted, should aggressively assault their camp ourselves. Let us dare, then, to do that which it is incredible we should have the courage to attempt; it will be most easy from the very fact of its appearing most difficult. At the third watch of the night I will lead you thither in silence. I have ascertained by means of scouts that they have no regular succession of watches, no proper outposts. Our shout at their gates, when heard, and the first assault, will carry their camp. Then let that carnage be made among men, torpid with sleep, terrified at the unexpected tumult, and overpowered while lying defenceless in their beds, from which you were so grieved to be recalled yesterday. I know that the measure appears to you a daring one; but in difficult and almost desperate circumstances the boldest counsels are always the safest. For if when the critical moment has arrived, the opportunity of seizing which is of a fleeting nature, you delay ever so little, in vain do you seek for it afterwards when it has been neglected. One army is near us; two more are not far off. We have some hopes if we make an attack now; and you have already made trial of your own and their strength. If we postpone the time and cease to be despised in consequence of the fame of yesterday's irruption, there is danger lest all the generals and all the forces should unite. Shall we be able then to withstand three generals and three armies, whom Cneius Scipio with his army unimpaired could not withstand? As our generals have perished by dividing their forces, so the enemy may be overpowered while separated and divided. There is no other mode of maintaining the war; let us, therefore, wait for nothing but the opportunity of the ensuing night. Now depart, with the favour of the gods, and refresh yourselves, that, unfatigued and vigorous, you may burst into the enemy's camp with the same spirit with which you have defended your own." This new enterprise, proposed by their new general, they received with joy; and the more daring it was the more it pleased them. The remainder of the day was spent in getting their arms in readiness and recruiting their strength, the greater part of the night was given to rest, and at the fourth watch they were in motion.

39. At a distance of six miles beyond their nearest camp lay other forces of the Carthaginians. A deep valley, thickly planted with trees, intervened. Near about the middle of this wood a Roman cohort and some cavalry were placed in concealment with Punic craft. The communication between the two armies being thus cut off, the rest of the forces were marched in silence to the nearest body of the enemy; and as there were no outposts before the gates, and no guards on the rampart, they entered quite into the camp, as though it had been their own, no one any where opposing them. The signals were then sounded and a shout raised. Some put the enemy to the sword when half asleep; others threw fire upon the huts, which were covered in with dry straw; others blocked up the gates to intercept their escape. The enemy, who were assailed at once with fire, shouting, and the sword, were in a manner bereaved of their senses, and could neither hear each other, nor take any measures for their security. Unarmed, they fell into the midst of troops of armed men: some hastened to the gates; others, as the passes were flocked up, leaped over the rampart, and as each escaped they fled directly towards the other camp, where they were cut off by the cohort and cavalry rushing forward from their concealment, and were all slain to a man. And even had any escaped from that carnage, the Romans, after taking the nearer camp, ran over to the other with such rapidity, that no one could have arrived before them with news of the disaster. In this camp, as they were far distant from the enemy, and as some had gone off just before daylight for forage, wood, and plunder, they found every thing in a still more neglected and careless state. Their arms only were placed at the outposts, the men being unarmed, and either sitting and reclining upon the ground, or else walking up and down before the rampart and the gates. On these men, thus at their ease and unguarded, the Romans, still hot from the recent battle, and flushed with victory, commenced an attack; no effectual opposition therefore could be made to them in the gates. Within the gates, the troops having rushed together from every part of the camp at the first shout and alarm, a furious conflict arose; which would have continued for a long time, had not the bloody appearance of the Roman shields discovered to the Carthaginians the defeat of the other forces, and consequently struck them with dismay. This alarm produced a general flight; and all except those who were overtaken with the sword, rushing out precipitately wherever they could find a passage, abandoned their camp. Thus, in a night and a day, two camps of the enemy were carried, under the conduct of Lucius Marcius. Claudius, who translated the annals of Acilius out of Greek into Latin, states that as many as thirty-seven thousand men were slain, one thousand eight hundred and thirty made prisoners, and a great booty obtained; among which was a silver shield of a hundred and thirty-eight pounds' weight, with an image upon it of the Barcine Hasdrubal. Valerius Antias states, that the camp Of Mago only was captured, and seven thousand of the enemy slain; and that in the other battle, when the Romans sallied out and fought with Hasdrubal, ten thousand were slain, and four thousand three hundred captured. Piso writes, that five thousand were slain in an ambuscade when Mago incautiously pursued our troops who retired. With all, the name of the general, Marcius, is mentioned with great honour, and to his real glory they add even miracles. They say, that while he was haranguing his men a stream of fire poured from his head without his perceiving it, to the great terror of the surrounding soldiers; and that a shield, called the Marcian, with an image of Hasdrubal upon it, remained in the temple up to the time of the burning of the Capitol, a monument of his victory over the Carthaginians. After this, affairs continued for a considerable time in a tranquil state in Spain, as both parties, after giving and receiving such important defeats, hesitated to run the hazard of a general battle.

40. During these transactions in Spain, Marcellus, after the capture of Syracuse, having settled the other affairs in Sicily with so much honour and integrity as not only to add to his own renown, but also to the majesty of the Roman people, conveyed to Rome the ornaments of the city, together with the statues and pictures with which Syracuse abounded. These were certainly spoils taken from enemies, and acquired according to the laws of war; but hence was the origin of the admiration of the products of Grecian art, and to that freedom with which at present all places, both sacred and profane, are despoiled; which at last recoiled upon the Roman gods, and first upon that very temple which was so choicely adorned by Marcellus. For foreigners were in the habit of visiting the temples dedicated by Marcellus near the Capuan gate, on account of their splendid ornaments of this description, of which a very small portion can be found. Embassies from almost all the states of Sicily came to him. As their cases were different, so were also the terms granted to them. Those who had either not revolted or had returned to the alliance before the capture of Syracuse, were received and honoured as faithful allies. Those who had been induced to submit through fear after the capture of Syracuse, as vanquished, received laws from the conqueror. The Romans, however, had still remaining a war of no small magnitude at Agrigentum, headed by Epicydes and Hanno, generals in the late war, and a third new one sent by Hannibal in the room of Hippocrates, a Libyphoenician by nation, and a native of Hippo, called by his countrymen Mutines; an energetic man, and thoroughly instructed in all the arts of war under the tuition of Hannibal. To this man the Numidian auxiliaries were assigned by Epicydes and Hanno. With these he so thoroughly overran the lands of his enemies, and visited his allies with such activity, in order to retain them in their allegiance, and for the purpose of bringing them seasonable aid as each required it, that in a short time he filled all Sicily with his fame, nor was greater confidence placed in any one else by those who favoured the Carthaginian interest. Accordingly the Carthaginian and Syracusan generals, who had been hitherto compelled to keep within the walls of Agrigentum, not more at the advice of Mutines than from the confidence they reposed in him, had the courage to go out from the walls, and pitched a camp near the river Himera. When this was announced to Marcellus, he immediately advanced and sat down at a distance of about four miles from the enemy, with the intention of waiting to see what steps they took, and what they meditated. But Mutines allowed no room or time for delay or deliberation, but crossed the river, and, charging the outposts of his enemy, created the greatest terror and confusion. The next day, in an engagement which might almost be called regular, he compelled his enemy to retire within their works. Being called away by a mutiny of the Numidians, which had broken out in the camp, and in which about three hundred of them had retired to Heraclea Minoa, he set out to appease them and bring them back; and is said to have earnestly warned the generals not to engage with the enemy during his absence. Both the generals were indignant at this conduct, but particularly Hanno, who was before disturbed at his reputation. "Is it to be borne," said he, "that a mongrel African should impose restraints upon me, a Carthaginian general, commissioned by the senate and people?" Epicydes, who wished to wait, was prevailed upon by him to agree to their crossing the river and offering battle; for, said he, if they should wait for Mutines, and the battle should terminate successfully, Mutines would certainly have the credit of it.

41. But Marcellus, highly indignant that he who had repulsed Hannibal from Nola, when rendered confident by his victory at Cannae, should succumb to enemies whom he had vanquished by sea and land, ordered his soldiers immediately to take arms and raise the standards. While marshalling his army, ten Numidians rode up rapidly from the enemy's line with information that their countrymen, first induced by the same causes which brought on the mutiny, in which three hundred of their number retired to Heraclea, and secondly, because they saw their commander, just on the approach of a battle, sent out of the way by generals who wished to detract from his glory, would not take any part in the battle. This deceitful nation made good their promise in this instance. Accordingly the spirits of the Romans were increased by the intelligence, which was speedily conveyed through the lines, that the enemy were abandoned by the cavalry, which the Romans principally feared; while at the same time the enemy were dispirited, not only because they were deprived of the principal part of their strength, but further, because they were afraid lest they should themselves be attacked by their own cavalry. Accordingly, there was no great resistance made: the first shout and onset determined the business. The Numidians who stood quiet in the wings during the action, when they saw their party turning their backs, accompanied them in their flight only for a short time; but when they perceived that they were all making for Agrigentum with the most violent haste, they turned off to the neighbouring towns round about, through fear of a siege. Many thousand men were slain and captured, together with eight elephants. This was the last battle which Marcellus fought in Sicily, after which he returned victorious to Syracuse. The year was now about closing; the senate therefore decreed that Publius Cornelius, the praetor, should send a letter to Capua to the consuls, with directions that while Hannibal was at a distance, and nothing of any great importance was going on at Capua, one of them, if they thought fit, should come to Rome to elect new magistrates. On the receipt of the letter, the consuls arranged it between themselves, that Claudius should hold the election, and Fulvius remain at Capua. The consuls created by Claudius were Cneius Fulvius Centumalus, and Publius Sulpicius Galba, the son of Servius, who had never exercised any curule magistracy. After this Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, Marcus Cornelius Cethegus, Caius Sulpicius, and Caius Calpurnius Piso, were created praetors. Piso had the city jurisdiction; Sulpicius, Sicily; Cethegus, Apulia; Lentulus, Sardinia. The consuls were continued in command for a year longer.