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Chapter XXXVIII: Book XXVI (3)

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30. After the provinces had been exchanged, the Sicilians, on being introduced into the senate, discoursed largely on the constant fidelity of king Hiero to the Roman people, converting it into a public merit. They said, "that the tyrants, Hieronymus, and, after him, Hippocrates and Epicydes, had been objects of detestation to them, both on other accounts and especially on account of then deserting the Romans to take part with Hannibal. For this cause Hieronymus was put to death by the principal young men among them, almost with the public concurrence, and a conspiracy was formed to murder Epicydes and Hippocrates, by seventy of the most distinguished of their youth; but being left without support in consequence of the delay of Marcellus, who neglected to bring up his troops to Syracuse at the time agreed upon, they were all, on an indictment that was made, put to death by the tyrants. That Marcellus, by the cruelty exercised in the sacking of Leontini, had given occasion to the tyranny of Hippocrates and Epicydes. From that time the leading men among the Syracusans never ceased going over to Marcellus, and promising him that they would deliver the city to him whenever he pleased; but that he, in the first instance, was disposed rather to take it by force, and afterwards, finding it impossible to effect his object by sea or land, after trying every means, he preferred having Syracuse delivered to him by Sosis, a brazier, and Mericus, a Spaniard, to receiving it from the principal men of Syracuse, who had so often offered it to him voluntarily to no purpose; doubtless in order that he might with a fairer pretext butcher and plunder the most ancient allies of the Roman people. If it had not been Hieronymus who revolted to Hannibal, but the people and senate of Syracuse; if the body of the Syracusan people, and not their tyrants, Hippocrates and Epicydes, who held them in thraldom, had closed the gates against Marcellus; if they had carried on war with the Roman people with the animosity of Carthaginians, what more could Marcellus have done in hostility than he did, without levelling Syracuse with the ground? Nothing indeed was left at Syracuse except the walls and gutted houses of her city, the temples of her gods broken open and plundered; her very gods and their ornaments having been carried away. From many their possessions also were taken away, so that they were unable to support themselves and their families, even from the naked soil, the only remains of their plundered property. They entreated the conscript fathers, that they would order, if not all, at least such of their property as could be found and identified, to be restored to the owners." After they had made these complaints, Laevinus ordered them to withdraw from the senate-house, that the senate might deliberate on their requests, when Marcellus exclaimed, "Nay, rather let them stay here, that I may reply to their charges in their presence, since we conduct your wars for you, conscript fathers, on the condition of having as our accusers those whom we have conquered with our arms. Of the two cities which have been captured this year, let Capua arraign Fulvius, and Syracuse Marcellus."

31. The deputies having been brought back into the senate-house, the consul said: "I am not so unmindful of the dignity of the Roman people and of the office I fill as consul, conscript fathers, as to make a defence against charges brought by Greeks, had the inquiry related only to my own delinquency. But it is not so much what I have done, as what they deserved to suffer, which comes into dispute. For if they were not our enemies, there was no difference between sacking Syracuse then, and when Hiero was alive. But if, on the other hand, they have renounced their connexion with us, attacked our ambassadors sword in hand, shut us out of their city and walls, and defended themselves against us with an army of Carthaginians, who can feel indignant that they should suffer the hostilities they have offered? I turned away from the leading men of the Syracusans, when they were desirous of delivering up the city to me, and esteemed Sosis and Mericus as more proper persons for so important an affair. Now you are not the meanest of the Syracusans, who reproach others with the meanness of their condition. But who is there among you, who has promised that he would open the gates to me, and receive my armed troops within the city? You hate and execrate those who did so; and not even here can you abstain from speaking with insult of them; so far is it from being the case that you would yourselves have done any thing of the kind. The very meanness of the condition of those persons, conscript fathers, with which these men reproach them, forms the strongest proof that I did not turn away from any man who was willing to render a service to our state. Before I began the siege of Syracuse I attempted a peace, at one time by sending ambassadors, at another time by going to confer with them; and after that they refrained not from laying violent hands on my ambassadors, nor would give me an answer when I held an interview with their chief men at their gates, then, at length, after suffering many hardships by sea and land, I took Syracuse by force of arms. Of what befell them after their city was captured they would complain with more justice to Hannibal, the Carthaginians, and those who were vanquished with them, than to the senate of the victorious people. If, conscript fathers, I had intended to conceal the fact that I had despoiled Syracuse, I should never have decorated the city of Rome with her spoils. As to what things I either took from individuals or bestowed upon them, as conqueror, I feel assured that I have acted agreeably to the laws of war, and the deserts of each. That you should confirm what I have done, conscript fathers, certainly concerns the commonwealth more than myself, since I have discharged my duty faithfully; but it is the duty of the state to take care, lest, by rescinding my acts, they should render other commanders for the time to come less zealous. And since, conscript fathers, you have heard both what the Sicilians and I had to say, in the presence of each other, we will go out of the senate-house together, in order that in my absence the senate may deliberate more freely." Accordingly, the Sicilians having been dismissed, he himself also went away to the Capitol to levy soldiers.

32. The other consul then proposed to the fathers the consideration of the requests of the Sicilians, when a long debate took place. A great part of the senate acquiesced in an opinion which originated with Titus Manlius Torquatus, "that the war ought to have been carried on against the tyrants, the enemies both of the Syracusans and the Roman people; that the city ought to have been recovered, not captured; and, when recovered, should have been firmly established under its ancient laws and liberty, and not distressed by war, when worn out with a wretched state of bondage. That in the contest between the tyrants and the Roman general, that most beautiful and celebrated city, formerly the granary and treasury of the Roman people, which was held up as the reward of the victor, had been destroyed; a city by whose munificence and bounty the commonwealth had been assisted and adorned on many occasions, and lastly, during this very Punic war. Should king Hiero, that most faithful friend of the Roman empire, rise from the shades, with what face could either Syracuse or Rome be shown to him, when, after beholding his half-demolished and plundered native city, he should see, on entering Rome, the spoils of his country in the vestibule, as it were, of the city, and almost in the very gates?" Although these and other similar things were said, to throw odium upon the consul and excite compassion for the Sicilians, yet the fathers, out of regard for Marcellus, passed a milder decree, to the effect, "that what Marcellus had done while prosecuting the war, and when victorious, should be confirmed. That for the time to come, the senate would look to the affairs of Syracuse, and would give it in charge to the consul Laevinus, to consult the interest of that state, so far as it could be done without detriment to the commonwealth." Two senators having been sent to the Capitol to request the consul to return to the senate-house, and the Sicilians having been called in, the decree of the senate was read. The deputies were addressed in terms of kindness, and dismissed, when they threw themselves at the knees of the consul, Marcellus, beseeching him to pardon them for what they had said for the purpose of exciting compassion, and procuring relief from their calamities, and to receive themselves and the city of Syracuse under his protection and patronage; after which, the consul addressed them kindly and dismissed them.

33. An audience of the senate was then granted to the Campanians. Their speech was more calculated to excite compassion, but their case less favourable, for neither could they deny that they deserved the punishment they had suffered, nor were there any tyrants to whom they could transfer their guilt. But they trusted that sufficient atonement had been made by the death of so many of their senators by poison and the hands of the executioner. They said, "that a few only of their nobles remained, being such as were not induced by the consciousness of their demerit to adopt any desperate measure respecting themselves, and had not been condemned to death through the resentment of their conquerors. That these implored the restoration of their liberty, and some portion of their goods for themselves and families, being citizens of Rome, and most of them connected with the Romans by affinity and now too near relationship, in consequence of intermarriages which had taken place for a long period." After this they were removed from the senate-house, when for a short time doubts were entertained whether it would be right or not to send for Quintus Fulvius from Capua, (for Claudius, the proconsul, died after the capture of that place,) that the question might be canvassed in the presence of the general who had been concerned, as was done in the affair between Marcellus and the Sicilians. But afterwards, when they saw in the senate Marcus Atilius, and Caius Fulvius, the brother of Flaccus, his lieutenant-generals, and Quintus Minucius, and Lucius Veturius Philo, who were also his lieutenant-generals, who had been present at every transaction; and being unwilling that Fulvius should be recalled from Capua, or the Campanians put off, Marcus Atilius Regulus, who possessed the greatest weight of any of those present who had been at Capua, being asked his opinion, thus spoke: "I believe I assisted at the council held by the consuls after the capture of Capua, when inquiry was made whether any of the Campanians had deserved well of our state; and it was found that two women had done so; Vestia Oppia, a native of Atella and an inhabitant of Capua, and Faucula Cluvia, formerly a common woman. The former had daily offered sacrifice for the safety and success of the Roman people, and the latter had clandestinely supplied the starving prisoners with food. The sentiments of all the rest of the Campanians towards us had been the same," he said, "as those of the Carthaginians; and those who had been decapitated by Fulvius, were the most conspicuous in rank, but not in guilt. I do not see," said he, "how the senate can decide respecting the Campanians who are Roman citizens, without an order of the people. And the course adopted by our ancestors, in the case of the Satricani when they had revolted, was, that Marcus Antistius, the plebeian tribune, should first propose and the commons make an order, that the senate should have the power of pronouncing judgment upon the Satricani. I therefore give it as my opinion, that application should be made to the plebeian tribunes, that one or more of them should propose to the people a bill, by which we may be empowered to determine in the case of the Campanians." Lucius Atilius, plebeian tribune, proposed to the people, on the recommendation of the senate, a bill to the following effect: "Concerning all the Campanians, Atellanians, Calatinians, and Sabatinians, who have surrendered themselves to the proconsul Fulvius, and have placed themselves under the authority and dominion of the Roman people; also concerning what things they have surrendered, together with their persons, both lands and city, divine or human, together with their utensils and whatsoever else they have surrendered; concerning these things, Roman citizens, I ask you what it is your pleasure should be done." The commons thus ordered: "Whatsoever the senate on oath, or the majority of those present, may determine, that we will and order."

34. The senate having taken the matter into their consideration in conformity with this order of the people, first restored to Oppia and Cluvia their goods and liberty; directing, that if they wished to solicit any other rewards from the senate, they should come to Rome. Separate decrees were passed respecting each of the Campanian families, all of which it is not worth while to enumerate. The goods of some were to be confiscated; themselves, their children, and their wives were to be sold, excepting such of their daughters as had married before they came into the power of the Roman people. Others were ordered to be thrown into chains, and their cases to be considered at a future time. They made the amount of income the ground on which they decided, whether the goods of the rest of the Campanians should be confiscated or not. They voted, that all the cattle taken except the horses, all the slaves except adult males, and every thing which did not belong to the soil, should be restored to the owners. They ordered that all the Campanians, Atellanians, Calatinians, and Sabatinians, except such as were themselves, or whose parents were, among the enemy, should be free, with a proviso, that none of them should become a Roman citizen or a Latin confederate; and that none of those who had been at Capua while the gates were shut should remain in the city or territory of Capua after a certain day. That a place should be assigned to them to inhabit beyond the Tiber, but not contiguous to it. That those who had neither been in Capua nor in any Campanian city which had revolted from the Romans during the war, should inhabit a place on this side the river Liris towards Rome; and that those who had come over to the Romans before Hannibal arrived at Capua, should be removed to a place on this side the Vulturnus, with a proviso, that none of them should have either land or house within fifteen miles of the sea. That such of them as were removed to a place beyond the Tiber, should neither themselves nor their posterity acquire or possess any property any where, except in the Veientian, Sutrian, or Nepetian territories; and, except on condition, that no one should possess a greater extent of land than fifty acres. That the goods of all the senators, and such as had been magistrates at Capua, Calatia, and Atella, should be sold at Capua; but that the free persons who were decreed to be exposed to sale, should be sent to Rome and sold there. As to the images and brazen statues, which were said to have been taken from the enemy, whether sacred or profane, they referred them to the college of pontiffs. They sent the Campanians away, considerably more grieved than they were when they came, in consequence of these decrees; and now they no longer complained of the severity of Quintus Fulvius towards them, but of the malignity of the gods and their own accursed fortune.

35. After the Sicilians and Campanians were dismissed, a levy was made; and after the troops had been enlisted for the army, they then began to consider about making up the number of rowers; but as there was neither a sufficient supply of men for that purpose, nor any money at that time in the treasury by which they might be purchased or paid, the consuls issued an edict, that private persons should furnish rowers in proportion to their income and rank, as had been done before, with pay and provisions for thirty days. So great was the murmuring and indignation of the people, on account of this edict, that a leader, rather than matter, was wanting for an insurrection. It was said, that "the consuls, after having ruined the Sicilians and Campanians, had undertaken to destroy and lacerate the Roman commons; that, drained as they had been for so many years by taxes, they had nothing left but wasted and naked lands. That the enemy had burned their houses, and the state had taken away their slaves, who were the cultivators of their lands, at one time by purchasing them at a low rate for soldiers, at another by commanding a supply of rowers. If any one had any silver or brass it was taken away from him, for the payment of rowers or for annual taxes. That no force could compel and no command oblige them to give what they had not got. That they might sell their goods and then vent their cruelty on their persons, which were all that remained to them. That they had nothing even left from which they could be redeemed." These complaints were uttered not in secret, but publicly in the forum, and before the eyes of the consuls themselves, by an immense crowd which surrounded them; nor could the consuls appease them now by coercing nor by soothing them. Upon this they said that three days should be allowed them to consider of the matter; which interval the consuls employed in examining and planning. The following day they assembled the senate to consider of raising a supply of rowers; and after arguing at great length that the people's refusal was fair, they brought their discourse to this point, that whether it were just or unjust, this burden must be borne by private individuals. For from what source could they procure rowers, when there was no money in the treasury? and how, without fleets, could Sicily be kept in subjection, or Philip be prevented from entering Italy, or the shores of Italy be protected?

36. In this perplexing state of affairs, when all deliberation was at a stand, and a kind of torpor had seized on men's minds, Laevinus, the consul, observed, that "as the magistrates were more honoured than the senators, and the senators than the people, so also ought they to be the first in taking upon themselves every thing that was burdensome and arduous. If you would enjoin any duty on an inferior, and would first submit yourself and those belonging to you to the obligation, you will find everybody else more ready to obey; nor is an expense thought heavy, when the people see every one of their principal men taking upon himself more than his proportion of it. Are we then desirous that the Roman people should have and equip a fleet? that private individuals should without repugnance furnish rowers? Let us first execute the command ourselves. Let us, senators, bring into the treasury to-morrow all our gold, silver, and coined brass, each reserving rings for himself, his wife, and children, and a bulla for his son; and he who has a wife or daughters, an ounce weight of gold for each. Let those who have sat in a curule chair have the ornaments of a horse, and a pound weight of silver, that they may have a salt-cellar and a dish for the service of the gods. Let the rest of us, senators, reserve for each father of a family, a pound weight only of silver and five thousand coined _asses_. All the rest of our gold, silver, and coined brass, let us immediately carry to the triumviri for banking affairs, no decree of the senate having been previously made; that our voluntary contributions, and our emulation in assisting the state, may excite the minds, first, of the equestrian order to emulate us, and after them of the rest of the community. This is the only course which we, your consuls, after much conversation on the subject, have been able to discover. Adopt it, then, and may the gods prosper the measure. If the state is preserved, she can easily secure the property of her individual members, but by betraying the public interests you would in vain preserve your own." This proposition was received with such entire approbation, that thanks were spontaneously returned to the consuls. The senate was then adjourned, when every one of the members brought his gold, silver, and brass into the treasury, with such emulation excited, that they were desirous that their names should appear among the first on the public tables; so that neither the triumviri were sufficient for receiving nor the notaries for entering them. The unanimity displayed by the senate was imitated by the equestrian order, and that of the equestrian order by the commons. Thus, without any edict, or coercion of the magistrates, the state neither wanted rowers to make up the numbers, nor money to pay them; and after every thing had been got in readiness for the war, the consuls set out for their provinces.

37. Nor was there ever any period of the war, when both the Carthaginians and the Romans, plunged alike in vicissitudes, were in a state of more anxious suspense between hope and fear. For on the side of the Romans, with respect to their provinces, their failure in Spain on the one hand, and their successes in Sicily on the other, had blended joy and sorrow; and in Italy, the loss of Tarentum was an injury and a source of grief to them, while the unexpected preservation of the citadel with the garrison was matter of joy to them. The sudden terror and panic occasioned by the siege and attack of Rome, was turned into joy by the capture of Capua, a few days after. Their affairs beyond sea also were equalized by a kind of compensation. Philip had become their enemy at a juncture somewhat unseasonable; but then the Aetolians, and Attalus, king of Asia, were added to their allies; fortune now, in a manner, promising to the Romans the empire of the east. The Carthaginians also set the loss of Capua against the capture of Tarentum; and as they considered it as glorious to them to have reached the walls of Rome without opposition, so they were chagrined at the failure of their attempt, and they felt ashamed that they had been held in such contempt, that while they lay under the walls of Rome, a Roman army was marched out for Spain at an opposite gate. With regard also to Spain itself, the greater the reason was to hope that the war there was terminated, and that the Romans were driven from the country, after the destruction of two such renowned generals and their armies, so much the greater was the indignation felt, that the victory had been rendered void and fruitless by Lucius Marcius, a general irregularly appointed. Thus fortune balancing events against each other, all was suspense and uncertainty on both sides, their hopes and their fears being as strong as though they were now first commencing the war.

38. What grieved Hannibal more than any thing was the fact, that Capua having been more perseveringly besieged by the Romans than defended by him, had turned from him the regard of many of the states of Italy, and it was not only impossible for him to retain possession of all these by means of garrisons, unless he could make up his mind to tear his army into a number of small portions, which at that time was most inexpedient, but he could not, by withdrawing the garrisons, leave the fidelity of his allies open to the influence of hope, or subject to that of fear. His disposition, which was strongly inclined to avarice and cruelty, induced him to plunder the places he could not keep possession of, that they might be left for the enemy in a state of desolation. This resolution was equally horrid in principle and in its issue, for not only were the affections of those who suffered such harsh treatment alienated from him, but also of the other states, for the warning affected a greater number than did the calamity. Nor did the Roman consul fail to sound the inclinations of the cities, whenever any prospect of success presented itself. Dasius and Blasius were the principal men in Salapia, Dasius was the friend of Hannibal, Blasius, as far as he could do it with safety, promoted the Roman interest, and, by means of secret messengers, had given Marcellus hopes of having the place betrayed to him, but the business could not be accomplished without the assistance of Dasius. After much and long hesitation and even then more for the want of a better plan than from any hope of success, he addressed himself to Dasius; but he, being both adverse to the measure and also hostile to his rival in the government, discovered the affair to Hannibal. Both parties were summoned, and while Hannibal was transacting some business on his tribunal, intending presently to take cognizance of the case of Blasius, and the accuser and the accused were standing apart from the crowd, which was put back, Blasius solicited Dasius on the subject of surrendering the city; when he exclaimed, as if the case were now clearly proved, that he was being treated with about the betrayal of the city, even before the eyes of Hannibal. The more audacious the proceeding was, the less probable did it appear to Hannibal and those who were present. They considered that the charge was undoubtedly a matter of rivalry and animosity, and that it had been brought because it was of such a nature that, not admitting of being proved by witnesses, it could the more easily be fabricated. Accordingly the parties were dismissed. But Blasius, notwithstanding, desisted not from his bold undertaking, till by continually harping upon the same subject, and proving how conducive such a measure would be to themselves and their country, he carried his point that the Punic garrison, consisting of five hundred Numidians, and Salapia, should be delivered up to Marcellus. Nor could it be betrayed without much bloodshed, consisting of the bravest of the cavalry in the whole Punic army. Accordingly, though the event was unexpected, and their horses were of no use to them in the city, yet hastily taking arms, during the confusion, they endeavoured to force their way out; and not being able to escape, they fell fighting to the last, not more than fifty of them falling into the hands of the enemy alive. The loss of this body of cavalry was considerably more detrimental to Hannibal than that of Salapia, for the Carthaginian was never afterwards superior in cavalry, in which he had before been most effective.

39. During this time the scarcity of provisions in the citadel of Tarentum was almost intolerable; the Roman garrison there, and Marcus Livius, the praefect of the garrison and the citadel, placing all their dependence in the supplies sent from Sicily; that these might safely pass along the coast of Italy, a fleet of about twenty ships was stationed at Rhegium. Decius Quinctius, a man of obscure birth, but who had acquired great renown as a soldier, on account of many acts of bravery, had charge of the fleet and the convoys. At first he had five ships, the largest of which were two triremes, given to him by Marcellus, but afterwards, in consequence of his spirited conduct on many occasions, three quinqueremes were added to his number, at last, by exacting from the allied states of Rhegium, Velia, and Paestum, the ships they were bound to furnish according to treaty, he made up a fleet of twenty ships, as was before stated. This fleet setting out from Rhegium, was met at Sacriportus, about fifteen miles from the city by Democrates, with an equal number of Tarentine ships. It happened that the Roman was then coming with his sails up, not expecting an approaching contest, but in the neighbourhood of Croto and Sybaris, he had supplied his ships with rowers, and had his fleet excellently equipped and armed for the size of his vessels, and it also happened, that just at the time when the enemy were in sight, the wind completely fell, so that there was sufficient time to furl their sails, and get their rowers and soldiers in readiness for the approaching action. Rarely elsewhere have regular fleets engaged with so much spirit, for they fought for what was of greater importance than the fleets themselves. The Tarentines, in order that, having recovered their city from the Romans after the lapse of almost a century, they might also rescue their citadel, hoping also to cut off the supplies of their enemy, if by a naval battle they could deprive them of the dominion of the sea. The Romans, that, by keeping possession of the citadel, they might prove that Tarentum was lost not by the strength and valour of their enemies, but by treachery and stealth. Accordingly, the signal having been given on both sides, they charged each other with the beaks of their ships, and neither did they draw back their own, nor allow the ships of the enemy with which they were engaged to separate from them, having thrown then grappling irons, and thus the battle was carried on in such close quarters, that they fought not only with missile weapons, but in a manner foot to foot even with their swords. The prows joined together remained stationary, while the sterns were moved round by the force of their adversaries' oars. The ships were crowded together in so small a compass, that scarcely one weapon fell into the sea without taking effect. They pressed front against front like lines of troops engaging on land, and the combatants could pass from one ship to another. But the contest between two ships which had engaged each other in the van, was remarkable above the rest. In the Roman ship was Quinctius himself, in the Tarentine, Nico, surnamed Perco, who hated, and was hated by, the Romans, not only on public grounds, but also personally, for he belonged to that faction which had betrayed Tarentum to Hannibal. This man transfixed Quinctius with a spear while off his guard, and engaged at once in fighting and encouraging his men, and he immediately fell headlong with his arms over the prow. The victorious Tarentine promptly boarded the ship, which was all in confusion from the loss of the commander, and when he had driven the enemy back, and the Tarentines had got possession of the prow, the Romans, who had formed themselves into a compact body, with difficulty defending the stern, suddenly another trireme of the enemy appeared at the stern. Thus the Roman ship, enclosed between the two, was captured. Upon this a panic spread among the rest, seeing the commander's ship captured, and flying in every direction, some were sunk in the deep and some rowed hastily to land, where, shortly after, they became a prey to the Thurians and Metapontines. Of the storeships which followed, laden with provisions, a very few fell into the hands of the enemy; the rest, shifting their sails from one side to another with the changing winds, escaped into the open sea. An affair took place at Tarentum at this time, which was attended with widely different success; for a party of four thousand men had gone out to forage, and while they were dispersed, and roaming through the country, Livius, the commander of the citadel and the Roman garrison, who was anxious to seize every opportunity of striking a blow, sent out of the citadel Caius Persius, an active officer, with two thousand soldiers, who attacked them suddenly when widely dispersed and straggling about the fields; and after slaying them for a long time on all hands, drove the few that remained of so many into the city, to which they fled in alarm and confusion, and where they rushed in at the doors of the gates, which were half-opened that the city might not be taken in the same attack. In this manner affairs were equally balanced at Tarentum, the Romans being victorious by land, and the Tarentines by sea. Both parties were equally disappointed in their hope of receiving provisions after they were within sight.

40. While these events were occurring, the consul, Laevinus, after a great part of the year had elapsed, having arrived in Sicily, where he had been expected by both the old and new allies, considered it his first and principal duty to adjust the affairs of Syracuse, which were still in a state of disorder, the peace being but recent. He then marched his legions to Agrigentum, the seat of the remaining part of the war, which was occupied by a strong garrison of Carthaginians; and here fortune favoured his attempt. Hanno was commander-in-chief of the Carthaginians, but their whole reliance was placed upon Mutines and the Numidians. Mutines, scouring the whole of Sicily, employed himself in carrying off spoil from the allies of the Romans; nor could he by force or stratagem be cut off from Agrigentum, or prevented from sallying from it whenever he pleased. The renown which he gained by this conduct, as it began now to eclipse the fame of the commander-in-chief, was at last converted into a source of jealousy; so that even now his successes were not as acceptable as they ought to have been, on account of the person who gained them. For these reasons Hanno at last gave his commission to his own son, concluding that by taking away his command he should also deprive him of the influence he possessed with the Numidians. But the result was very different; for their former attachment to him was increased by the envy incurred by him. Nor did he brook the affront put upon him by this injurious treatment, but immediately sent secret messengers to Laevinus, to treat about delivering up Agrigentum. After an agreement had been entered into by means of these persons, and the mode of carrying it into execution concerted, the Numidians seized on a gate which leads towards the sea, having driven the guards from it, or put them to the sword, and then received into the city a party of Romans sent for that purpose; and when these troops were now marching into the heart of the city and the forum with a great noise, Hanno, concluding that it was nothing more than a disturbance and secession of the Numidians, such as had happened before, advanced to quell the mutiny; but observing at a distance that the numbers were greater than those of the Numidians, and hearing the Roman shout, which was far from being new to him, he betook himself to flight before he came within reach of their weapons. Passing out of the town at a gate in the opposite quarter, and taking Epicydes to accompany him, he reached the sea with a few attendants; and having very seasonably met with a small vessel, they abandoned to the enemy Sicily, for which they had contended for so many years, and crossed over into Africa. The remaining multitude of Carthaginians and Sicilians fled with headlong haste, but as every passage by which they could escape was blockaded up, they were cut to pieces near the gates. On gaining possession of the town, Laevinus scourged and beheaded those who took the lead in the affairs of Agrigentum. The rest, together with the booty, he sold. All the money he sent to Rome. Accounts of the sufferings of the Agrigentines spreading through all Sicily, all the states suddenly turned to the Romans. In a short time twenty towns were betrayed to them, and six taken by storm. As many as forty put themselves under their protection, by voluntary surrender. The consul having rewarded and punished the leading men of these states, according to their several deserts, and compelled the Sicilians, now that they had at length laid aside arms, to turn their attention to the cultivation of their lands, in order that the island might by its produce not only maintain its inhabitants, but, as it had frequently done on many former occasions, add to the supplies of Rome and Italy, he returned into Italy, taking with him a disorderly multitude from Agathyrna. These were as many as four thousand men, made up of a mixed assemblage of every description of persons, exiles, bankrupts, the greater part of them felons, who had supported themselves by rapine and robbery, both when they lived in their native towns, under the restraint of the laws, and also after that a coincidence in their fortunes, brought about by causes different in each case, had congregated them at Agathyrna. These men Laevinus thought it hardly safe to leave in the island, when an unwonted tranquillity was growing up, as the materials of fresh disturbances; and besides, they were likely to be useful to the Rhegians, who were in want of a band of men habituated to robbery, for the purpose of committing depredations upon the Bruttian territory. Thus, so far as related to Sicily, the war was this year terminated.

41. In Spain, in the beginning of spring, Publius Scipio, having launched his ships, and summoned the auxiliary troops of his allies to Tarraco by an edict, ordered his fleet and transports to proceed thence to the mouth of the Iberus. He also ordered his legions to quit their winter quarters, and meet at the same place; and then set out from Tarraco, with five thousand of the allies, to join the army. On his arrival at the camp he considered it right to harangue his soldiers, particularly the old ones who had survived such dreadful disasters; and therefore, calling an assembly, he thus addressed them: "Never was there a new commander before myself who could, with justice and good reason, give thanks to his soldiers before he had availed himself of their services. Fortune laid me under obligations to you before I set eyes on my province or your camp; first, on account of the respect you have shown to my father and uncle, both in their lifetime and since their death; and secondly, because by your valour you have recovered and preserved entire, for the Roman people, and me their successor, the possession of the province which had been lost in consequence of so dreadful a calamity. But since, now, by the favour of the gods, our purpose and endeavour is not that we may remain in Spain ourselves, but that the Carthaginians may not; and not to stand on the bank of the Iberus, and hinder the enemy from crossing that river, but cross it first ourselves, and carry the war to the other side, I fear lest to some among you the enterprise should appear too important and daring, considering your late misfortunes, which are fresh in your recollection, and my years. There is no person from whose mind the memory of the defeats sustained in Spain could be obliterated with more difficulty than from mine; inasmuch as there my father and uncle were both slain within the space of thirty days, so that one death after another was accumulated on my family. But as the orphanhood and desolation of my own family depresses my mind, so both the good fortune and valour of our nation forbid me to despair of the safety of the state. It has happened to us by a kind of fatality, that in all important wars we have been victorious, after having been defeated. I pass over those wars of ancient date with Porsena, the Gauls, and Samnites. I will begin with the Punic wars. How many fleets, generals, and armies were lost in the former war? Why should I mention what has occurred in this present war? I have either been myself present at all the defeats sustained, or have felt more than any other those from which I was absent. What else are the Trebia, the Trasimenus, and Cannae, but monuments of Roman armies and consuls slain? Add to these the defection of Italy, of the greater part of Sicily and Sardinia, and the last terror and panic, the Carthaginian camp pitched between the Anio and the walls of Rome, and the victorious Hannibal seen almost in our gates. Amid this general ruin, the courage of the Roman people alone stood unabated and unshaken. When every thing lay prostrate on the ground, it was this that raised and supported the state. You, first of all, my soldiers, under the conduct and auspices of my father, opposed Hasdrubal on his way to the Alps and Italy, after the defeat of Cannae, who, had he formed a junction with his brother, the Roman name would now have been extinct. These successes formed a counterpoise to those defeats. Now, by the favour of the gods, every thing in Italy and Sicily is going on prosperously and successfully, every day affording matter of fresh joy, and presenting things in a better light. In Sicily, Syracuse and Agrigentum have been captured, the enemy entirely expelled the island, and the province placed again under the dominion of the Romans. In Italy, Arpi has been recovered and Capua taken. Hannibal has been driven into the remotest corner of Bruttium, having fled thither all the way from Rome, in the utmost confusion; and now he asks the gods no greater boon than that he might be allowed to retire in safety, and quit the territory of his enemy. What then, my soldiers, could be more preposterous than that you, who here supported the tottering fortune of the Roman people, together with my parents, (for they may be equally associated in the honour of that epithet,) when calamities crowded one upon another in quick succession, and even the gods themselves, in a manner, took part with Hannibal, should now sink in spirits when every thing is going on happily and prosperously? Even with regard to the events which have recently occurred, I could wish that they had passed with as little grief to me as to you. At the present time the immortal gods who preside over the destinies of the Roman empire, who inspired all the centuries to order the command to be given to me, those same gods, I say, by auguries and auspices, and even by nightly visions, portend entire success and joy. My own mind also, which has hitherto been to me the truest prophet, presages that Spain will be ours; that the whole Carthaginian name will in a short time be banished from this land, and will fill both sea and land with ignominious flight. What my mind presages spontaneously, is also supported by sound reasoning. Their allies, annoyed by them, are by ambassadors imploring our protection; their three generals, having differed so far as almost to have abandoned each other, have divided their army into three parts, which they have drawn off into regions as remote as possible from each other. The same fortune now threatens them which lately afflicted us; for they are both deserted by their allies, as formerly we were by the Celtiberians, and they have divided their forces, which occasioned the ruin of my father and uncle. Neither will their intestine differences allow them to unite, nor will they be able to cope with us singly. Only do you, my soldiers, favour the name of the Scipios, favour the offspring of your generals, a scion springing up from the trunks which have been cut down. Come then, veterans, lead your new commander and your new army across the Iberus, lead us across into a country which you have often traversed, with many a deed of valour. I will soon bring it to pass that, as you now trace in me a likeness to my father and uncle in my features, countenance, and figure, I will so restore a copy of their genius, honour, and courage, to you, that every man of you shall say that his commander, Scipio, has either returned to life, or has been born again."

42. Having animated his troops with this harangue, and leaving Marcus Silanus with three thousand infantry and three hundred horse, for the protection of that district, he crossed the Iberus with all the rest of his troops, consisting of twenty-five thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred horse. Though certain persons there endeavoured to persuade him that, as the Carthaginian armies had retired from each other into three such distant quarters, he should attack the nearest of them; yet concluding that if he did so there was danger lest he should cause them to concentrate all their forces, and he alone should not be a match for so many, he determined for the present to make an attack upon New Carthage, a city not only possessing great wealth of its own, but also full of every kind of military store belonging to the enemy; there were their arms, their money, and the hostages from every part of Spain. It was, besides, conveniently situated, not only for a passage into Africa, but also near a port sufficiently capacious for a fleet of any magnitude, and, for aught I know, the only one on the coast of Spain which is washed by our sea. No one but Caius Laelius knew whither he was going. He was sent round with the fleet, and ordered so to regulate the sailing of his ships, that the army might come in view and the fleet enter the harbour at the same time. Both the fleet and army arrived at the same time at New Carthage, on the seventh day after leaving the Iberus. The camp was pitched over against that part of the city which looks to the north. A rampart was thrown up as a defence on the rear of it, for the front was secured by the nature of the ground. Now the situation of New Carthage is as follows: at about the middle of the coast of Spain is a bay facing for the most part the south-west, about two thousand five hundred paces in depth, and a little more in breadth. In the mouth of this bay is a small island forming a barrier towards the sea, and protecting the harbour from every wind except the south-west. From the bottom of the bay there runs out a peninsula, which forms the eminence on which the city is built; which is washed in the east and south by the sea, and on the west is enclosed by a lake which extends a little way also towards the north, of variable depth according as the sea overflows or ebbs. An isthmus of about two hundred paces broad connects the city with the continent, on which, though it would have been a work of so little labour, the Roman general did not raise a rampart; whether his object was to make a display of his confidence to the enemy from motives of pride, or that he might have free regress when frequently advancing to the walls of the city.

43. Having completed the other requisite works, he drew up his ships in the harbour, that he might exhibit to the enemy the appearance of a blockade by sea also; he then went round the fleet, and having warned the commanders of the ships to be particularly careful in keeping the night-watches, because an enemy, when besieged, usually tried every effort and in every quarter at first, he returned into his camp; and in order to explain to his soldiers the reason why he had adopted the plan of commencing the war with the siege of a city, in preference to any other, and also by exhortations to inspire them with hopes of making themselves masters of it, he summoned them to an assembly, and thus addressed them: "Soldiers, if any one among you suppose that you have been brought here to attack a single city, that man takes a more exact account of your present labour than of its profitable result from it. For you will in truth attack the walls of a single city, but in that single city you will have made yourselves masters of all Spain. Here are the hostages of all her most distinguished kings and states; and as soon as you shall have gained possession of these, they will immediately deliver into your hands every thing which is now subject to the Carthaginians. Here is the whole of the enemy's treasure, without which they cannot carry on the war, as they are keeping mercenary troops, and which will be most serviceable to us in conciliating the affections of the barbarians. Here are their engines, their arms, their tackle, and every requisite in war; which will at once supply you, and leave the enemy destitute. Besides, we shall gain possession of a city, not only of the greatest beauty and wealth, but also most convenient as having an excellent harbour, by means of which we may be supplied with every requisite for carrying on the war both by sea and land. Great as are the advantages we shall thus gain, we shall deprive our enemies of much greater. This is their citadel, their granary, their treasury, their magazine, their receptacle for every thing. Hence there is a direct passage into Africa; this is the only station for a fleet between the Pyrenees and Gades; this gives to Africa the command of all Spain. But as I perceive you are arrayed and marshalled, let us pass on to the assault of New Carthage, with our whole strength, and with undaunted courage." Upon this, they all with, one accord cried out that it should be done; and he led them to Carthage, and ordered that the assault should be made both by sea and land.

44. On the other side, Mago, the Carthaginian general, perceiving that a siege was being prepared for both by sea and land, himself also disposed his forces thus: he placed two thousand of the townsmen to oppose the enemy, on the side facing the Roman camp; he occupied the citadel with five hundred soldiers, and stationed five hundred on a rising ground, facing the east; the rest of his troops he ordered, intent on every thing that occurred, to hasten with assistance wherever the shout, or any sudden emergency, might call them. Then, throwing open the gate, he sent out those he had drawn up in the street leading to the camp of the enemy. The Romans, according to the direction of their general, retired a little, in order that they might be nearer to the reserved troops which were to be sent to their assistance during the engagement. At first they stood with pretty equal force, but afterwards the reserved troops, sent from time to time from the camp, not only obliged the enemy to turn their backs, but followed them up so close when flying in disorder, that had not a retreat been sounded, they seemed as though they would have rushed into the city together with the fugitives. The consternation in the field was not greater than in every part of the city; many of the outposts were abandoned in panic and flight; and the walls were deserted, as they leaped down each in the part nearest him. Scipio, who had gone out to an eminence called Mercury's hill, perceiving that the walls were abandoned by their defenders in many parts, ordered all his men to be called out of his camp and advance to take the city, and orders them to bring the scaling-ladders. The general himself, covered by the shields of three stout young men, (for now an immense number of missiles of every description were let fly from the walls,) came up to the city, cheered them on, and gave the requisite orders; and, what was of the utmost importance in exciting the courage of his men, he appeared among them a witness and spectator of the valour or cowardice of each. Accordingly, they rushed forward, amidst wounds and weapons; nor could the walls, or the armed troops which stood upon them, repel them from eagerly mounting them. At the same time an attack was commenced by the fleet upon that part of the city which was washed by the sea. But here the alarm occasioned was greater than the force which could be employed; for while they were bringing the boats to shore, and hastily landing the ladders and the men, each man pressing forward to gain the land the shortest way, they hindered one another by their very haste and eagerness.

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The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26Chapter XXXVIII: Book XXVI (3)

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