Chapter XLIII: Appendix: to VOL. I (11)

In the town of Hereford the meetings were also disturbed from time to time, chiefly by boys, who threw among those that were met, not only stones, and excrements, but burning squibs; and used all manner of insolency and mischief they could think of, against these harmless people, either by breaking the glass windows, or the forms and seats. One of the leaders of this turbulent company, was the son of one Abraham Seward, who about this time was elected mayor; but when complaints were made to him of the outrageous actions of the said wicked crew, he pretended to be ignorant of his son’s doings, and for all that threatened those that came to him, with the execution of the law upon them, if they did not leave off to keep meetings. And as it was well known that the chief master of the town-school was displeased at the extravagant insolency of some of his scholars, so it was reported also, that he was forbidden to correct them for it; and that the college priests had set them on, and said they would hear them out in what they did; for some of those brutish boys were choristers. Two friends went to the justices, Robert Simons and Thomas Simons, to acquaint them with the excessive abuses they met with. But the justices not at all regarding their complaint, the said Robert endeavoured to draw some confession of a meeting from one of them, intending, as he himself said, immediately to have fined him, if he had confessed; but he was wary. Now since the insolency of the boys was thus encouraged by authority, it was no wonder it continued there a whole year. At length eight men were taken from the meeting, by the aforesaid mayor, Abraham Seward, and carried to the town-hall; and in their passage along, he said, they should never meet there more. To which a friend, going with him, said, ‘We are a people gathered by the power of the Lord; and therefore the power of man cannot scatter us.’ Being come to the town-hall, the oaths of allegiance and supremacy were tendered to them, on which they said, ‘We are Christians, therefore cannot break the command of Christ, which forbids to swear at all; but to render just and lawful allegiance to the king, we do not deny, nor refuse.’ And they persisting in their refusal to swear, were committed to prison. The next day after, one Walter Rogers, a prebend, walking by the meeting-house, and observing how it was broken, said to some, that they were very good boys, and had done their work better than he thought they had.

At one of the quarter-sessions in Nottingham, one John Sayton appeared, who, being fined twenty pounds for suffering a conventicle at his house, in the parish of Blyth, came to appeal for justice. The witness produced against him, said, ‘I was there on that day, and there were several people met, but were all silent, and no words spoken amongst them; but I did not see John Sayton there.’ And that the said John Sayton was above sixty miles from home the same day, for which he was fined twenty pounds, was made appear in open court by substantial evidence. Then the counsel for the appellant said, in the first place, forasmuch as there was neither preaching, praying, nor reading, as their own witness doth testify, therefore it was no conventicle. Secondly, being they cannot prove he was there, therefore how can it be judged, that he did either wittingly or willingly consent to that meeting, if they could make it a conventicle? To this the informer’s counsel objected, that although there was neither preaching, praying, nor reading, yet it was evident enough that they met under a pretence of religious exercise; and seeing there were more than five, and not of John Sayton’s family, therefore it must needs be a conventicle. And as to the second, seeing they cannot prove he was there, we must leave it to the consciences of the jury, whether he did willingly consent to that meeting or no. After the counsel had spoken on both sides, Peniston Whaley, one of the justices, who sat in the chair as judge of the court, stood up, and said to the jury, ‘Although there was no visible exercise that can be proved, yet the Quakers say, they worship God in spirit and truth; and we know their manner is to sit sighing and groaning,’ &c. The jury returning, and being asked by the court, ‘Do you find it for the king, or for the appellant,’ answered, ‘For the appellant.’ This so displeased the said justice Whaley, that he bid them go forth again. But one of the jurymen saying, they were agreed, and they had considered the thing very well, he thereupon fell into such a rage, that he said, ‘You deserve all to be hanged; for you are as ill as highwaymen.’ Perhaps he himself was either an informer, or a special friend to such, and therefore was sorry that the jury deprived him of the booty, or a share of it.

There was now great persecution in all parts of England, neither did it go better in the principality of Wales. Nine persons being taken prisoners, and brought this summer to the assizes held for the county of Merioneth, in the town Bala, upon an indictment for not resorting to their parish churches, the oaths of allegiance and supremacy were tendered to them, Kemick Eyton, and Thomas Walcot being judges; and upon their refusal of taking these oaths, the said judges declared it as their opinion in open court, that in case the prisoners would refuse the oaths the second time, they should be prosecuted as traitors, the men to be hanged and quartered, and the women to be burnt. But this threat could not make them afraid; for at the next assizes the oaths being tendered them again, they continued in refusing, though they solemnly acknowledged allegiance to the king as supreme magistrate; and thereupon were remanded to close imprisonment, where Edward Rees, one of them, being above sixty years of age, and not able to hear the cold, died about the height of the frost, not having been allowed the use of fire.

Sometime before, it happened within the corporation of Pool, in Montgomeryshire, that the justice, David Maurice, coming into a house where a small number of people were peaceably met, and all silent, required them to depart. Hereupon Thomas Lloyd, one of the company, began to speak a few words, by way of defining true religion, and what true worship was; and what he said was so reasonable, that the said justice approved of it as sound, and according to the doctrine of the church of England; yet notwithstanding he fined the said Thomas Lloyd in twenty pounds for preaching.

This year died in prison John Sage, being about eighty years of age, after having been in prison at Ivelchester in Somersetshire, almost ten years, for not paying of tithes. And it appeared that since the restoration of king Charles, above two hundred of the people called Quakers, died in prisons in England, where they had been confined because of their religion. I could relate abundance of occurrences this year, if I had a mind to extend my work, but I study brevity; yet cannot omit to mention, that in this year, in the island of Barbadoes, in the West Indies, a law was made to prevent negroes coming into the meetings of the Quakers, which was of this tenor:

‘Whereas of late, many negroes have been suffered to remain at
the meetings of the Quakers, as hearers of their doctrine, and
taught in their principles, whereby the safety of the island
may be much hazarded: be it enacted, that if at any time after
publication hereof, any negro, or negroes, be found with the
people called Quakers, at any of their meetings, as hearers of
their preaching, he or they shall be forfeited, one half to such
as shall seize, or sue for him or them, if belonging to any
of the Quakers, and the other moiety to the public use of the
island; provided that if he or they be seized, such as seize,
shall bring their actions upon this statute, within three months,
against the owner of the negro, or negroes: wherein the defendant
having ten days summons, shall appear, plead, and come to trial
at the first court after summons, or judgment to be given by
nihil dicit, and execution immediately to issue. And if such
negro, or negroes, do not belong to any of the persons present
at the same meeting, any person or persons may bring an action
upon this statute, against any of the persons present at the said
meeting, at the election of the informer, and so recover ten
pounds for every negro, or negroes, present at the said meeting
as aforesaid, to be divided as aforesaid, and in such actions
proceedings to be as aforesaid. And no person whatsoever, shall
keep any school, to instruct any child in any learning, unless
within one month after the publication hereof, he first take the
oaths of allegiance and supremacy, before some justice of peace
of the parish where the party lives, and have a certificate
thereof, or have a special license from the governor, on pain
of three months imprisonment, and forfeiture of 300 lbs. of
Muscovado sugar, the one moiety to the informer, and the other
to the public use of the island, to be recovered as aforesaid.
And no person whatsoever, who is not an inhabitant and resident
of this island, and hath been so for twelve months together,
shall hereafter publicly discourse, or preach at the meeting of
the Quakers, on pain of six months imprisonment, and forfeiture
of 1000 lbs. Muscovado sugar, the one moiety to such as sue for
it, the other to the public use of the island, to be recovered
as aforesaid: provided that all actions upon this statute, be
brought within six months after the offence.

‘Read, and passed the council the 21st of April, 1676,
and consented to by his excellency [the governor] the
same day.

EDWARD STEED, _Deputy-secretary_.’

Although in the beginning of this statute, the instructing of the negroes in the doctrine of the Quakers, is represented as a thing whereby the safety of the island might be much hazarded, yet the sequel shows that this was not the matter, but that it was endeavoured to deprive the Quakers of their due liberty. What was the issue hereof I am unacquainted with.

This year Robert Barclay wrote a letter to the heer Adrian Paets, with whom he had some discourse when the said heer returned from Spain, where he had been ambassador for the States of the United Provinces. This Paets having a strange opinion of the doctrine of the Quakers, had a good while ago wrote a letter[41] to Christian Hartzoeker, at Rotterdam, about their doctrine; and having afterwards discoursed with Barclay concerning the inward and immediate revelation of the Spirit of God, this induced Barclay to write a letter on the said subject in Latin, to the aforementioned heer, wherein he made a more large reply to his arguments, than he had done by word of mouth. This letter being sent over from Scotland to Holland, was delivered by Benjamin Furly at Rotterdam, to the said heer Paets, with a desire that he might be pleased to return an answer to it, which he promised he would. But he continuing deficient in the case, Furly at last published the said letter in print, but without mentioning the name of him to whom it was written, only his character, viz. _Cuidam legato_.[42]

[41] To be found in the book called _Præstantium ac eruditorum
virorum Epistolæ Ecclesiastique & Theologicæ_. Amstelodami _apud_
Franciscum Halman. 1704.

[42] To a certain ambassador.

In this letter was set down first the objection of the heer Paets, to wit, that since the being and substance of the Christian religion consisted in the knowledge of, and faith concerning, the birth, life, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ Jesus, he considered the substance of the Christian religion as contingent truth; which contingent truth was matter of fact. And matter of fact could not be known but by the relation of another, or by the perception of the outward senses; because there are naturally in our souls no ideas of contingent truths, such as are concerning necessary truths, viz. that God is, and that the whole is greater than the part. And since it might without absurdity be said, that God cannot make a contingent truth to become a necessary truth; neither can God reveal contingent truths or matters of fact, but as contingent truths are revealed; and matters of fact not being revealed but by the outward senses, the conclusion drawn from thence is, that men are not obliged to believe God producing any revelation in the soul concerning matter of fact, whether of a thing done, or to be done, unless there be added some miracles obvious to the outward senses, by which the soul may be ascertained that that revelation cometh from God. All these arguments Barclay answered very circumstantially, premising first, that it was falsely supposed that the essence of the Christian religion consisted in the historical faith and knowledge of the birth, life, death, resurrection and ascension of Christ. That faith and historical knowledge is indeed a part of the Christian religion, but not such an essential part as that without which the Christian religion cannot consist; but an integral part, which goes to the completing of the Christian religion, as the hands or feet of a man are the integral parts of a man, without which nevertheless a man may exist, but not an entire and complete man. Yet he agrees, that the historical knowledge of Christ is commonly manifested to us by the holy Scriptures as the means; but nevertheless he asserts, that God could without such an outward mean manifest the said historical knowledge to our minds: and also, that a contingent truth may be known by a supernatural knowledge. And he saith, that when God doth make known unto men any matter of fact by divine immediate revelation, he then speaks as to the ear of the heart of the inward man. And, that as when any natural idea is excited in us, we clearly know it; so also when a supernatural idea is raised, we clearly know that whereof it is the idea. He also holds forth, what properly is the inward supernatural sense in man; and then he distinguisheth between contingent and necessary truths, and shows how a divine revelation may be known to be such, saying that natural and spiritual senses are distinguishable by their objects, and demonstrating how godly men may know they are in the favour of God, and how the wicked feel the wrath of God as fire. He also relates after what manner the spiritual senses distinguish the good and the evil; and he confesseth there is in all men, as well the godly as the ungodly, some sort of idea of God, as of a most perfect being: but he asserts, that the supernatural idea of God differeth much from the natural; and that in all men there is a supernatural idea of God. He also shows, wherein the motions of the mind differ from those of the body; and that there are ideas as well of supernatural, as of natural things. And showing from whence the errors of false likenesses of reason proceed, he says, that the natural reason cannot perceive supernatural things. He also asserts, that the revelations to the prophets were by inward inspirations in their minds; and that they were most certainly persuaded that they were divinely inspired, even without any outward miracle; and that it is by the inspiration of the same divine Spirit, by which the prophets prophesied, that we do believe their words and writings to be divine, concerning contingent truths, as well past as to come. Moreover he inquires, whether faith comes by outward hearing, and he shows how the outward senses may be deceived; nay, that often they are vitiated both by outward casualties and natural infirmities, whereunto the godly are no less subject than the wicked.

All this is treated at large by Barclay, as may be seen in the said letter, and several years after, when the heer Paets was at London, being one of the commissioners for the Dutch East India company, Barclay spoke with him again, and so represented the matter, that he readily yielded that he had been mistaken in his notion of the Quakers; for he found they could make a reasonable plea for the foundation of their religion. And thereupon R. Barclay translated the said letter into English as follows:

‘_My Friend_,

‘Albeit I judge I did fully answer to all thy arguments in that
conference we had, concerning the necessity and possibility of
inward immediate revelation, and of the certainty of true faith
from thence proceeding; nevertheless, because after we had made
an end, and were parting, thou wouldest needs remit to my further
consideration the strength of thy argument, as that in which
thou supposedst the very hinge of the question to lie: that I
might satisfy thy desire, and that the truth might more appear,
I did further consider of it, but the more I weighed it, I found
it the weaker. And therefore that thou thyself mayest make the
truer judgment of it, I thought meet to send thee my further
considerations thereon; (which I had done ere now, had not I,
both at London and elsewhere, been diverted by other necessary
occasions,) wherein I doubt not, but thou wilt perceive a full
and distinct answer to thy argument. But if thou canst not as
yet yield to the truth, or thinkest mine answer in any part to
be defective, so that there yet remains with thee any matter
of doubt or scruple; I do earnestly desire thee, that as I for
thy sake, and out of love to the truth, have not been wanting to
examine thy argument, and to transmit to thee my considerations
thereon; so thou mayest give thyself the trouble to write and
send me what thou hast further to say: which my friend, N. N. who
delivers thee this will, at what time thou shalt appoint, receive
from thee, and transmit to me thy letter; that at last the truth
may appear where it is.

‘And that the whole matter may the more clearly be understood, it
will be fit in the first place, to propose thy argument, whereby
thou opposest the immediate revelation of God in the saints:
thence concluding thou hast fully overturned the foundation of
the people called Quakers. Which argument of thine is;

‘That since, (as thou judgest,) the being and substance of the
Christian religion consisteth in the knowledge of, and faith
concerning, the birth, life, death, resurrection, and ascension
of Christ Jesus, thou considerest the substance of the Christian
religion as a contingent truth; which contingent truth is matter
of fact. Whence thou reasonest, that:

Matter of fact cannot be known but by the relation of another,
or by perception of the outward senses; because there are
naturally in our souls no ideas of contingent truths, such as
are concerning necessary truths: to wit, that God is; and that
the whole is greater than the part.--And since it may without
absurdity be said, that

God cannot make a contingent truth to become a necessary truth;
neither can God reveal contingent truths or matters of fact,
but as contingent truths are revealed: but matters of fact
are not revealed but by the outward senses.--From whence thou
concludest, that

Men are not even obliged to believe God producing any revelation
in the soul concerning matter of fact, whether of a thing done,
or to be done, unless there be added some miracles obvious to
the outward senses, by which the soul may be ascertained, that
that revelation cometh from God.

‘All this thou endeavourest also to prove from the Scripture,
Rom. x. where the apostle saith, “Faith cometh by hearing:” and
because the apostle speaketh afterwards of those who were sent
in the plural number; thence thou concludest that to be spoken
of outward preaching by the ministry of men: and since the
apostle uses a question, saying, “How shall they believe unless
they hear,” thou gatherest from the induction and connexion
of the text, that the apostle treats only of outward hearing;
thence concluding, that without outward hearing, faith cannot
be produced: and therefore, that there can be no immediate
revelation by the simple operation of the Spirit in the mind,
unless there be somewhat proposed to the outward senses.

‘Before I proceed to a direct answer to this argument, some
things are necessary to be premised:

‘First then; That it is falsely supposed, that the essence of
the Christian religion consists in the historical faith and
knowledge of the birth, death, life, resurrection, and ascension
of Jesus Christ. That faith and historical knowledge is indeed a
part of the Christian religion; but not such an essential part,
as that without which the Christian religion cannot consist: but
an integral part, which goes to the completing of the Christian
religion; as the hands or feet of a man are integral parts of
a man, without which nevertheless a man may exist, but not an
entire and complete man.

‘Secondly, If by immediate revelation be understood such a
revelation of God, as begets in our souls an historical faith
and knowledge of the birth of Christ in the flesh, without
the means of the holy Scripture, we do not contend for such a
revelation, as commonly given, or to be expected by us, or any
other Christians. For albeit many other evangelical truths be
manifested to us by the immediate manifestation of God, not
using the Scripture as the means; yet the historical knowledge
of Christ is not commonly manifested to us, nor to any others,
but by the holy Scripture, as the means, and that by way of a
material object: even as when we see the person of Peter or Paul
to our visive faculty immediately, yet not without the medium
of that person concurring as a material object to produce that
sight; while the light of the sun concurs, as the formal object
of that visit or sight. So that when we livingly and spiritually
know the history of the birth of Christ in the flesh; the inward
revelation or illumination of God, which is like the sun’s light,
proceeding from the divine sun, doth shine into the eye of the
mind, and by its influence moves the mind to assent unto the
historical truth of Christ’s birth, life, &c. in the reading or
hearing the Scripture, or meditating therein.

‘Thirdly, Nevertheless we do firmly assert, that God can most
easily, clearly, and certainly, manifest to our minds the
historical truths of Christ’s birth, &c. when it so pleaseth
him, even without the Scripture, or any other outward means. And
because this argument seems to be formed against the possibility
of such a revelation, therefore I shall proceed to discuss it:
but first thou mayest mind, that the prophets who foretold
Christ’s coming in the flesh, and being to be born of a virgin,
and afterwards to suffer death, did know these truths of fact by
the inward inspiration of God, without outward means: for which
see 1 Pet. i. 10, 11. Now that which hath been may be.

‘Fourthly, This argument doth at most conclude, that we cannot
know naturally any truth of fact, but by the relation of another
without, us, or by the preception of the outward senses; because
there are naturally in our minds no ideas concerning contingent
truths, (and every truth of fact is a contingent truth,) as
there are of necessary truths. This then proveth, that we cannot
naturally know any contingent truth, but by the relation of
another, or perception of the outward senses: but that hindreth
not, but we may know a contingent truth by a supernatural
knowledge, God supplying the place of an outward relator; who is
so true, that he may, and ought to be believed, since God is the
fountain of truth.

‘Fifthly, When God doth make known unto men any matter of fact
by divine immediate revelation or inspiration, God speaking as
to the ear of the heart of the inward man, or as by his finger
writing therein, two things are to be considered in such an
immediate revelation.

[Greek: Τὸ: To][43] _Materiale_, The matter of fact, or thing
revealed, which is contingent.

[43] _The_ in Greek. Latin lacks a definite
article.--_Transcriber._

[Greek: Τὸ: To][44] _Formale_, The form or mode, how the
revelation is made: which form is an inward, divine, and
supernatural revelation, which is the voice or speech of God,
inwardly speaking to the ear of the inward man or mind of man,
or a divine writing supernaturally imprinted therein. Now as
to the material part, or the thing and matter revealed, this is
indeed a contingent truth, and of itself is not manifest to the
mind; but because of the form, that is, because of the divine
mode, and supernatural inward operation, the matter is known to
be true. For that divine and supernatural inward operation, which
the mind doth feel and perceive in itself, is the voice of God
speaking unto man, which by its nature and specific property is
as clearly distinguished and understood to be the voice of God,
as the voice of Peter or James is known to be the voice of such
men. For every being as a being is knowable, and that by its own
specific nature, or property proceeding from its nature; and
hath its proper idea, by which it is distinguishable from every
other thing, if so be its idea be stirred up in us, and clearly
proposed to us.

[44] _The_ in Greek. Latin lacks a definite
article.--_Transcriber._

‘Sixthly: Now as some beings are natural, some supernatural,
so some ideas are natural, some supernatural: and as when any
natural idea is excited in us, we clearly know it; so also when a
supernatural idea is raised, we clearly know that, whereof it is
the idea. But the voice of God speaking to the mind of man, is a
supernatural being, and stirreth up in us a supernatural idea, by
which we clearly know that inward voice to be the voice of God,
and not the voice or operation of another, or of any evil spirit,
or angel, because none of these have a supernatural idea, as the
voice of God, and his divine operation hath: for it is full of
vigour, virtue, and divine glory, as saith the psalmist, who had
often experience of it; and we also in our measures are witnesses
thereof, for the voice of God is known to be his by its divine
virtue.

‘Seventhly: The senses are either outward or inward: and the
inward senses are either natural or supernatural; we have an
example of the inward natural sense in being angered or pacified,
in love and hatred; or when we perceive and discern any natural
truth, such as the natural maxims, to wit, that the whole is
greater than the part, &c. or when we deduce any conclusion by
the strength of natural reason, that perception also in a larger
sense, may be called an inward sense. But an example of an inward
supernatural sense is, when the heart or soul of a pious man,
feels in itself divine motions, influences, and operations,
which sometimes are as the voice or speech of God, sometimes
as a most pleasant and glorious illustration or visible object
to the inward eye, sometimes as a most sweet savour or taste,
sometimes as an heavenly and divine warmness, or, so to speak,
melting of the soul in the love of God. Moreover, this divine and
supernatural operation in the mind of man, is a true and most
glorious miracle; which when it is perceived by the inward and
supernatural sense divinely raised up in the mind of man, doth so
evidently and clearly persuade the understanding to assent to the
thing revealed, that there is no need of an outward miracle: for
this assent is not because of the thing itself, but because of
the revelation proposing it, which is the voice of God. For when
the voice of God is heard in the soul, the soul doth as certainly
conclude the truth of that voice, as the truth of God’s being,
from whom it proceeds.

‘These things being thus premised, I now proceed to a direct
answer. For what is said, that God cannot make a contingent truth
to become a necessary truth, I agree; but when any contingent
truth is manifest to us by the immediate revelation of God,
there is in it two things to be considered, to wit, the thing
revealed, which is contingent; and the revelation itself:
which upon the supposition, that it is a divine revelation,
is no contingent truth, but a most necessary truth. And this
all mankind will say, that this proposition, every divine
revelation is necessarily true, is as clear and evident, as that
proposition, that every whole is greater than its part.

‘But thou wilt say; how knowest thou that a divine revelation is
a divine revelation? I answer, how knowest thou that a whole is a
whole, and a part is a part? thou wilt say, by the natural idea
excited in me of a whole, and of a part. I answer again; even so
a divine revelation is known to be such by a supernatural idea of
divine revelation stirred up in us, and that by a divine motion,
or supernatural operation. But it is no wonder that men, who have
no experience of supernatural ideas, or at least do not heed
them, do deny them; which is, as if a man naturally blind denied
light or colours; or a deaf man sounds, because they experience
them not. Therefore, we cannot dissemble, that we feel a fervent
zeal even divinely kindled in us against such an absurd opinion,
as affirms, that God cannot ascertain us of his will in any
contingent truth, but by proposing it to the outward senses. This
opinion does in a manner turn men into brutes, as if man were not
to believe his God, unless he propose what is to be believed to
the outward senses, which the beasts have common with us; yea, it
derogates from God’s power, and imputes weakness to him, as if
he could not do that, which not only both good and evil angels
can do, but which the meanest creatures can do, and the most
insensible. As for instance: the heat of the fire, the coldness
of the air and water worketh upon us; yea, if a pin prick us, we
feel it, and that by the outward sense; because the objects are
outward and carnal: but since God is a most pure and glorious
Spirit, when he operateth in the innermost parts of our minds by
his will; shall not he and his will be clearly felt according to
his nature, that is, by a spiritual and supernatural sense? For
as the nature of God is, so is the nature of his will, to wit,
purely spiritual, and therefore requireth a spiritual sense to
discern it; which spiritual sense, when it is raised up in us by
a divine operation, doth as clearly and certainly know the voice
or revelation of the will of God, concerning any thing which God
is pleased to reveal, however contingent, as the outward sense
knows and perceives the outward object. And it is no less absurd,
to require of God, who is a most pure Spirit, to manifest his
will to men by the outward senses, else not to be credited; as to
require us to see sounds, and hear lights and colours. For as the
objects of the outward senses are not to be confounded, but every
object is to have its proper sense; so must we judge of inward
and spiritual objects, which have their proper sense, whereby
they are to be perceived. And tell me, how God doth manifest his
will concerning matters of fact, when he sends his angels to men,
since angels, (as is commonly received,) have not outward senses,
or at least not so gross ones, as ours are? Yea, when men die,
and appear before the tribunal of God, whether unto eternal life
or death, how can they know this, having laid down their bodies,
and therewith their outward senses? And nevertheless this truth
of God is a truth of fact, as is the historical truth of Christ’s
birth in the flesh. And which is yet more near: how do good and
holy men even in this life most certainly know, that they are
in the favour and grace of God? no outward revelation doth make
this known unto them; but the Spirit, as saith the apostle,
beareth witness with our spirits, that we are the children of
God. For the mere testimony of a human conscience, without inward
testimony of the holy Spirit, cannot beget in us a firm and
immoveable testimony of our sonship, because the heart of man is
deceitful; and if the testimony thereof were true, at most it is
but a human testimony, which begetteth in us only a human faith:
but that faith, by which holy men believe they are the sons of
God, is a divine faith, which leans upon a divine testimony of
the holy Spirit, witnessing in them that they are the sons of
God. Moreover, when a good man feels in himself that undeclarable
joy of the holy Spirit, concerning which the holy Scripture
speaks, and which is the common privilege of the saints, how or
whence feels he this joy? Truly, this argument concludes no less
against this heavenly spiritual joy, which is begotten in the
souls of the saints by the holy Spirit, than it does against the
immediate revelation of God: for there is no natural idea of this
spiritual joy, else mere natural men, yea, such as are profane
and ungodly, would feel it as much as the godly: but because it
is a supernatural thing, therefore it can have no true idea but
what is supernatural. Moreover, whence is it that profane men
feel sometimes in themselves the wrath of God as fire, when all
things, as to the outward, go as prosperously with them as with
the godly, and oftentimes more prosperously? For there is no
natural idea in men of this inward wrath of God. There is also an
inward grief oftentimes raised up in wicked men from the sense of
this wrath of God, which very much vexeth and tormenteth their
minds; and nevertheless this grief hath no natural idea in us:
for oftentimes wicked men feel not this sorrow; for God sometimes
is, as it were, silent, while the wicked sin, as in Psalm 1.

‘All which things do most clearly demonstrate, that there are
in men supernatural ideas of supernatural beings; which ideas
are nevertheless not perceived by us, unless they be stirred
up by some supernatural operation of God, which raiseth up in
us supernatural and spiritual senses, which by their nature
are as distinguishable from the natural senses, whether inward
or outward, as the natural senses are distinguished one from
another by their specific difference. Of which spiritual senses
the Scripture speaks frequently, as Heb. v. and xiv. where is
spoken of the spiritual senses in general, by which the spiritual
man hath the discerning of good and evil: which good is of a
spiritual nature, and conduceth to feed in us a spiritual and
divine life; and the evil is of that kind, by which the spiritual
life is in us hurt; to wit, sins, whether carnal or spiritual;
all which cannot be discerned but by such who have spiritual
senses stirred up in them, as saith the apostle. In other
places the Scripture also speaketh of these spiritual senses
in particular; as of the spiritual seeing, Psalm xxxiv. 9. Of
the spiritual hearing, Psalm lxxxv. 9. Of spiritual tasting,
Psalm xxxiv. 8. Of spiritual smelling, Cant. i. 3. Of spiritual
touching, Acts xvii. 8, and in many other places of Scripture
we read of those spiritual senses in particular. Yea, it is the
promise of the gospel, that the glory of God shall be seen of
holy men, such as are clean of heart, even in this life: Isaiah
xxxiii. 17. Mat. v. 8. Which were fulfilled in the primitive
Christians, see John i. 14. 1 John i. 2, 3, 4. 2 Cor. iii. 18,
and chap. iv. 6. But what is this vision of God and divine glory,
which the souls of the saints enjoy in this life, which is only
as the earnest or first-fruits of that more abundant glorious
vision in the life to come, concerning which the Scripture so
much declareth, which is the highest happiness of the immortal
soul.

‘For this argument seemeth to do no less injury to the saints,
than to rob them of this most glorious treasure both in this
life, and that to come. For there is in us no natural idea of
this divine glory, as there is not of God himself which is any
ways proportionable unto so great happiness, which the Scripture
so much declareth of, by which the godly are rewarded partly in
this life, and plenarily in that which is to come. We confess
indeed, there is in all men, as well the godly as ungodly,
some sort of idea of God, as of a most perfect being; and that
therefore this proposition, there existeth a most perfect being,
doth as clearly appear to human understanding, as that the whole
is greater than the part: and therefore this proposition, that
a most perfect being existeth, ought to be numbered among the
principles, that of themselves are manifest. But this idea of God
is as manifest to ungodly, as to godly men; yea, it is clearly
perceived by the devil, as by the most holy angels: for all the
devils know that God is; but yet how blind is the devil, and all
wicked men, as to the vision of God, which is the chief reward of
the saints.

‘There is then either no such vision of God, neither in this
life, nor in that to come; or there is a supernatural idea of
God in us, by which we are made capable of this vision; which
supernatural idea of God differeth much from that natural idea of
God, which Cartesius and his followers so much talk of, (albeit
others long before Cartesius did observe this natural idea of
God, and spoke of it.) But the happiness of the saints consists
not in contemplating this natural idea of God, else the wicked
would be as happy as the godly; yea, the very devil as the most
holy angel: since, as is said, both the devil and most wicked men
do as clearly perceive this natural idea of God, as the most holy
men or angels.

‘If the Scripture then be true, there is in men a supernatural
idea of God, which altogether differs from this natural idea: I
say, in all men; because all men are capable of salvation, and
consequently of enjoying this Divine vision. Now this capacity
consisteth herein, that they have such a supernatural idea in
themselves: for if there were no such idea in them, it were
impossible they should so know God. For whatsoever is clearly
and distinctly known, is known by its proper idea; neither can
it other-ways be clearly and distinctly known: for the ideas of
all things are divinely planted in our souls; for they are not
begotten in us by outward objects, or outward causes, as the
better philosophy teacheth, but only are by these outward things
excited or stirred up. And this is true not only in supernatural
ideas of God, and things divine, and in natural ideas of the
natural principles of human understanding, and conclusions thence
deduced by the strength of human reason: but even in the ideas
of outward objects, which are perceived by the outward senses;
as that noble Christian philosopher Bœtius hath well observed;
to which also the Cartesian philosophy agreeth. For when I see
any outward object, whether it be a man, or horse, or bird, the
outward object does not treat in my eye, nor yet in my mind the
idea of those things; for the outward object does nothing but
imprint in our sensible organs a corporeal motion. Now there
is nothing in a corporeal motion that can form in us the ideas
of those things; for all ideas are of a spiritual nature: now
nothing that is corporeal can produce that which is spiritual,
because the less excellent cannot produce the more excellent,
else the effect would exceed its cause: which is against all
sound reason, that it should bring forth what were of a higher
and more excellent kind. Therefore all ideas, whether of natural
or spiritual things, are divinely implanted in our minds; which
nevertheless do not always appear, but sometimes appear, and
sometimes are as it were hid in us, and sometimes are stirred
up in us by causes outward or inward, and again do as it were
sleep and shun our observation, and seem not to be otherways
distinguished by our minds, but as thoughts and perceptions of
the mind from the mind itself; that is, as the mode from the
subject, or as a bodily motion from the body, whereof it is the
motion: for as is the relation of a bodily motion to a body,
so is the relation of a thought or perception of the mind to
the mind. In this nevertheless they differ, that the mind can
move itself, and operate in itself: which a body cannot do: but
as a body can be moved by another, so also can the mind after
this manner be moved by another, and that both by outward and
inward causes, but chiefly by God himself, in whose hand all
souls and creatures are. But of these things there is enough
said at present; and I hope, I have not thus far impertinently
philosophised.

‘As there are then natural ideas concerning the things of the
natural world; as for instance, ideas of light and colours,
ideas of voice and sound, ideas of savouring and smelling, ideas
of tasting and feeling, as of heat and cold, of grief and joy;
it follows also, that there are ideas of supernatural things,
concerning the divine and supernatural things of the divine and
supernatural world; as ideas of those things above-mentioned
in the spiritual world. And as the natural ideas are stirred
up in us by outward and natural bodies, so those divine and
supernatural ideas are stirred up in us by a certain principle,
which is a body in naturals, in relation to the spiritual world,
and therefore may be called a divine body; not as if it were
a part of God, who is a most pure spirit; but the organ, or
instrument of God, by which he worketh in us, and stirreth up in
us these ideas of divine things. This is that flesh and blood of
Christ, by which the saints are nourished; which is a mystery to
all unregenerated and mere natural men, never to be reached by
them, while they remain in that state.

‘Now if there be such supernatural ideas, there are also senses,
or perceptive faculties by which those ideas are perceived; for
those are two relatives that suppose and infer one another:
but in wicked men those senses or faculties do as it were
sleep, as the visive faculty of a blind man; but in the godly
they are stirred up. Now by these divine and spiritual senses,
which are distinct and distinguishable from all the natural
faculties of the soul, whether of imagination, or natural reason,
spiritual minded men do behold the glory and beauty of God, in
respect whereof, and for which, all the glory of this world is
despicable to them; yea, even as dross and dung. And they also
hear God inwardly speaking in their souls, words truly divine
and heavenly, full of virtue and divine life; and the savour and
taste of divine things, and do, as it were, handle them with the
hands of their souls. And those heavenly enjoyments do as really
differ in their nature from all false similitudes, and fictitious
appearances of them, which either the mind of man by its own
strength can imitate, or any evil spirit to deceive man can
counterfeit; as a true man differs from the dead image of a man,
or true bread, honey, wine, or milk, doth from the mere picture
of those things. And albeit either the imagination of man, or
subtilty of the devil, may counterfeit false likenesses of these
enjoyments, by which men may be deceived; and no doubt many are
deceived; that doth not hinder, but that those divine enjoyments
are clearly perceived in such, in whom the divine and spiritual
senses are truly opened, and the true supernatural ideas of those
things truly raised up.

‘And if there be at any time a mistake, the divine illumination
is not the cause of that mistake, but some evil disposition
of the mind; as happeneth in those things relating to natural
reason. For there are many false appearances of reason, which
differ as much from true reason, as those false and pretended
revelations, and diabolical inspirations from such as are truly
divine. Now, how many men who would be esteemed philosophers,
are miserably deceived by those false likenesses of reason,
judging their false reasons to be the true similitudes of things
and solid ratiocinations; which nevertheless moveth no man of
sound reason, to reject sound and solid reason, as doubtful and
uncertain? For even sound natural reason is an excellent gift of
God, and very useful to mankind, when used in its proper place:
but let none think to comprehend by their natural reason things
that are of a divine and supernatural kind. And as we use to
do, when any one is deceived by false appearances of reason, we
endeavour to reduce them to contemplate the first natural ideas
of natural things, and to meditate therein, which is as a test or
touchstone, by which all the appearances and likenesses of reason
are to be examined; if they contradict them, to be rejected; so
also when any one is deceived by his own imagination, or the
cunning of satan, thinking any evil inspiration of the devil to
be a true divine revelation, he that is so deceived, is to be
reduced to the natural ideas of things, (if so be that pretended
revelation doth contradict them, for no true divine revelation
can contradict the true natural ideas,) or to the supernatural
ideas of divine things, which are most simple, clear, and obvious
to the minds of men, if they will turn their minds to the divine
seed in them; or at least those ideas are readily and easily
stirred up. For as in natural ideas, so in supernatural, some are
more easily raised than others: for there is a certain order both
of natural and supernatural ideas, whereby they are gradually
excited: nor is there any mortal man, in whose mind at some
time or other there is not stirred up some idea that is truly
supernatural and divine, and who hath not felt in himself both
the wrath and judgment of God for his sins; and also some tender
and gentle taste of God’s love and goodness, by which wicked
men are invited to repentance. Now that which is thought to be
a divine revelation, and is felt to contradict any divine and
supernatural idea, which is clearly perceived in the soul, it is
a manifest token that it is not a divine revelation, but either a
false imagination, or the wicked suggestion of some evil spirit.

‘But to proceed: if we will hear the Scripture, (as all
Christians ought,) it testifies to us, that God hath declared
his mind and will even concerning contingent truths to come, in
the prophets; as that of the first to the Hebrews doth evidently
declare: “God, who at sundry times, and in divers manners spoke
to our fathers in the prophets.” Yea, let us hear the prophets
themselves; Hosea, chap. i. saith plainly, “That the word of the
Lord was made in him,” as it is in the Hebrew. Habakuk also says,
As he was standing on his watch, to see what Jehovah would speak
in him. And it is so manifest that the most heavenly revelations
are by inward illustrations, and inspirations in the very minds
of the prophets, that it is strange how any that believe in the
Scripture should doubt of it. And if it happened at any time,
such revelations were made in the natural imaginations of the
prophets, or any of their inward natural senses, then it may be
confessed, they could not be infallibly certain they came from
God; unless they also felt God in the divine and supernatural
senses, by which they did most nearly approach to him, from these
superior and most inward senses, working upon the lower and less
noble faculties of the mind. But whichever way the prophets were
certain, that they were inspired of God, even when they foretold
contingent truths to come, it is without doubt, they were most
certainly persuaded, that they were divinely inspired, and that
frequently without any outward miracle. For John the Baptist did
no miracle; and many prophesied, where there appeared no miracle:
as in the Scriptures may be often observed. And we also by the
inspiration of the same Divine spirit, by which the prophets
prophesied, do believe their words and writings to be divine,
concerning contingent truths, as well past as to come; else that
faith, by which we believe the Scripture, would not be divine,
but merely human. And thence we need no outward miracles to move
us to believe the Scriptures; and therefore much less were they
necessary to the prophets who wrote them. For we see in many
places of the prophets, where they declare prophesies as revealed
to them of God, there is not a word mentioned of any outward
miracle, as that by which alone they were certain of it.

‘Moreover, the falseness of this argument doth appear, in that
the Scripture doth declare many contingent truths to have been
revealed to the prophets in dreams. Now as natural and wicked men
do not see what they dream by a real perception of the outward
senses, but by inward ideas which are presented to the mind, and
perceived by it, so it is also in divine revelations of this
nature. Of which we have a clear example in Joseph, the husband
of the blessed Virgin, who, when he observed his wife with
child, was told in a dream, that she had conceived by the Holy
Ghost: now I would know, to which of Joseph’s outward senses was
this revealed? or what miracle had he to induce him to believe?
which could neither be proved, so as to make an infallible
application to Mary, by the testimony of the Scripture; and which
being against the order of nature, did choke his reason. The
Scripture mentions no miracle in this matter; and yet no doubt
Joseph had highly sinned had he not believed this revelation,
and notwithstanding, rejected his wife as an adultress. But if
thou sayest, that according to thy hypothesis there must have
been a miracle; that is only to beg the question: and how false
this hypothesis is, the apostle shows clearly, 1 Cor. ii. 14.
the natural or animal man knoweth not, receiveth not, the things
of God. Now divine revelations are of this nature; if either
chiefly or only those things were to be judged by the outward
senses, it would contradict the apostle. For natural men, yea,
the most wicked, have the use of the outward senses as true and
exact as the most godly. And whereas the apostle adds, “For
they are spiritually discerned,” it puts the matter out of all
question: for thence it abundantly appears, that this discerning
is not by the outward senses according to the following verse;
for the apostle saith, “The spiritual man judgeth all things:”
this then must be done by some senses or properties peculiar to
the spiritual man, and in which he excels the natural man, which
is not in the outward senses, as we all do know. Therefore the
perception of “spiritual things cannot be by the outward senses,
either as the chief or only means,” as is falsely contended for.