Chapter III: Front Matter (3)

M^r Gerry. A popular election in this case is radically vicious. The ignorance of the people would put it in the power of some one set of men dispersed through the Union & acting in Concert to delude them into any appointment. He observed that such a Society of men existed in the Order of the Cincinnati. They are respectable, united, and influential. They will in fact elect the chief Magistrate in every instance, if the election be referred to the people. His respect for the characters composing this Society could not blind him to the danger & impropriety of throwing such a power into their hands.

M^r Dickinson. As far as he could judge from the discussions which had taken place during his attendance, insuperable objections lay ag^{st} an election of the Executive by the Nat^l Legislature; as also by the Legislatures or Executives of the States. He had long leaned towards an election by the people which he regarded as the best & purest source. Objections he was aware lay ag^{st} this mode, but not so great he thought as ag^{st} the other modes. The greatest difficulty in the opinion of the House seemed to arise from the partiality of the States to their respective Citizens. But might not this very partiality be turned to a useful purpose. Let the people of each State chuse its best Citizen. The people will know the most eminent characters of their own States, and the people of different States will feel an emulation in selecting those of which they will have the greatest reason to be proud. Out of the thirteen names thus selected, an Executive Magistrate may be chosen either by the Nat^l Legislature, or by Electors appointed by it.

On a Question which was moved for postponing M^r Pinkney's motion, in order to make way for some such proposition as had been hinted by M^r Williamson & others, it passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay.
V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On M^r Pinkney's motion that no person shall serve in the Executive more than 6 years in 12. years, it passed in the negative.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.
V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On a motion that the members of the Committee be furnished with copies of the proceedings it was so determined; S. Carolina alone being in the negative.

It was then moved that the members of the House might take copies of the Resolutions which had been agreed to; which passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Con. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay.
Mary^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Gerry & M^r Butler moved to refer the resolution relating to the Executive (except the clause making it consist of a single person) to the Co[~m]ittee of detail.

M^r Wilson hoped that so important a branch of the System w^d not be committed untill a general principle sh^d be fixed by a vote of the House.

M^r Langdon. was for the commitment--Adj^d.

THURSDAY JULY. 26. IN CONVENTION.[12]

[12] "The affairs of the federal government are, I believe, in
the utmost confusion: The convention is an expedient that
will produce a decisive effect. It will either recover us
from our present embarrassments or complete our ruin; for I
do suspect that if what they recommend sho^d be rejected
this wo^d be the case. But I trust that the presence of
Gen^l Washington will have great weight in the body itself
so as to overawe & keep under the demon of party, & that the
signature of his name to whatever act shall be the result of
their deliberations will secure its passage thro' the
union."--Monroe to Jefferson, July 27, 1787 (_Writings of
Monroe_, i., 173).

Col. Mason. In every stage of the Question relative to the Executive, the difficulty of the subject and the diversity of the opinions concerning it have appeared. Nor have any of the modes of constituting that department been satisfactory. 1. It has been proposed that the election should be made by the people at large; that is that an act which ought to be performed by those who know most of Eminent characters, & qualifications, should be performed by those who know least. 2. that the election should be made by the Legislatures of the States. 3. by the Executives of the States. Ag^{st} these modes also strong objections have been urged. 4. It has been proposed that the election should be made by Electors chosen by the people for that purpose. This was at first agreed to: But on further consideration has been rejected. 5. Since which, the mode of M^r Williamson, requiring each freeholder to vote for several candidates has been proposed. This seemed like many other propositions, to carry a plausible face, but on closer inspection is liable to fatal objections. A popular election in any form, as M^r Gerry has observed, would throw the appointment into the hands of the Cincinnati, a Society for the members of which he had a great respect, but which he never wished to have a preponderating influence in the Gov^t. 6. Another expedient was proposed by M^r Dickinson, which is liable to so palpable & material an inconvenience that he had little doubt of its being by this time rejected by himself. It would exclude every man who happened not to be popular within his own State; tho' the causes of his local unpopularity might be of such a nature as to recommend him to the States at large. 7. Among other expedients, a lottery has been introduced. But as the tickets do not appear to be in much demand, it will probably, not be carried on, and nothing therefore need be said on that subject. After reviewing all these various modes, he was led to conclude, that an election by the Nat^l Legislature as originally proposed, was the best. If it was liable to objections, it was liable to fewer than any other. He conceived at the same time that a second election ought to be absolutely prohibited. Having for his primary object for the pole-star of his political conduct, the preservation of the rights of the people, he held it as an essential point, as the very palladium of civil liberty, that the Great officers of State, and particularly the Executive should at fixed periods return to that mass from which they were at first taken, in order that they may feel & respect those rights & interests, Which are again to be personally valuable to them. He concluded with moving that the constitution of the Executive as reported by the Com^e of the whole be reinstated, viz. "that the Executive be appointed for seven years, & be ineligible a 2^d time."

M^r Davie seconded the motion.

Doc^r Franklin. It seems to have been imagined by some that the returning to the mass of the people was degrading the magistrate. This he thought was contrary to republican principles. In free Governments the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors & sovereigns. For the former therefore to return among the latter was not to _degrade_ but to _promote_ them. And it would be imposing an unreasonable burden on them, to keep them always in a State of servitude, and not allow them to become again one of the Masters.

Question on Col. Masons motion as above; which passed in the affirmative

N. H. ay. Mass^{ts} not on floor. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no.
Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Gov^r Morris was now ag^{st} the whole paragraph. In answer to Col. Mason's position that a periodical return of the great officers of the State into the mass of the people, was the palladium of Civil liberty he w^d observe that on the same principle the Judiciary ought to be periodically degraded; certain it was that the Legislature ought on every principle, yet no one had proposed, or conceived that the members of it should not be re-eligible. In answer to Doc^r Franklin, that a return into the mass of the people would be a promotion, instead of a degradation, he had no doubt that our Executive like most others would have too much patriotism to shrink from the burthen of his office, and too much modesty not to be willing to decline the promotion.

On the question on the whole resolution as amended in the words following--"that a National Executive be instituted--to consist of a single person--to be chosen by the Nat^l legislature--for the term of seven years--to be ineligible a 2^d time--with power to carry into execution the nat^l laws--to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for--to be removable on impeachment & conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty--to receive a fixt compensation for the devotion of his time to the public service, to be paid out of the Nat^l treasury"--it passed in the affirmative

N. H. ay. Mass. not on floor. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del.
no. M^d no. V^a div^d. M^r Blair & Col. Mason ay. Gen^l
Washington & M^r Madison no. M^r Randolph happened to be out of
the House. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Mason moved "that the Co[~m]ittee of detail be instructed to receive a clause requiring certain qualifications of landed property & citizenship of the U. States, in members of the Legislature, and disqualifying persons having unsettled Acc^{ts} with or being indebted to the U. S., from being members of the Nat^l Legislature."--He observed that persons of the latter descriptions had frequently got into the State Legislatures, in order to promote laws that might shelter their delinquencies; and that this evil had crept into Cong^s if Report was to be regarded.

M^r Pinckney seconded the motion.

Mr. Gov^r Morris. If qualifications are proper, he w^d prefer them in the electors rather than the elected. As to debtors of the U. S. they are but few. As to persons having unsettled accounts he believed them to be pretty many. He thought however that such a discrimination would be both odious & useless, and in many instances, unjust & cruel. The delay of settlem^t had been more the fault of the Public than of the individuals. What will be done with those patriotic Citizens who have lent money, or services or property to their Country, without having been yet able to obtain a liquidation of their claims? Are they to be excluded?

M^r Ghorum was for leaving to the Legislature the providing ag^{st} such abuses as had been mentioned.

Col. Mason mentioned the parliamentary qualifications adopted in the Reign of Queen Anne, which he said had met with universal approbation.

M^r Madison had witnessed the zeal of men having acc^{ts} with the public, to get into the Legislatures for sinister purposes. He thought however that if any precaution were taken for excluding them, the one proposed by Col. Mason ought to be new modelled. It might be well to limit the exclusion to persons who had rec^d money from the public, and had not accounted for it.

M^r Gov^r Morris. It was a precept of great antiquity as well as of high authority that we should not be righteous overmuch. He thought we ought to be equally on our guard ag^{st} being wise overmuch. The proposed regulation would enable the Govern^t to exclude particular persons from office as long as they pleased. He mentioned the case of the Co[~m]ander in Chief's presenting his account for secret services, which he said was so moderate that every one was astonished at it; and so simple that no doubt could arise on it. Yet had the Auditor been disposed to delay the settlement, how easily he might have effected it, & how cruel w^d it be in such a case to keep a distinguished & meritorious Citizen under a temporary disability & disfranchisement. He mentioned this case merely to illustrate the objectionable nature of the proposition. He was opposed to such minutious regulations in a Constitution. The parliamentary qualifications quoted by Col. Mason, had been disregarded in practice; and was but a scheme of the landed ag^{st} the monied interest.

M^r Pinckney & Gen^l Pinckney moved to insert by way of amendm^t the words Judiciary & Executive so as to extend the qualifications to those departments which was agreed to nem con.

M^r Gerry thought the inconveniency of excluding a few worthy individuals who might be public debtors or have unsettled acc^{ts} ought not to be put in the scale ag^{st} the public advantages of the regulation, and that the motion did not go far enough.

M^r King observed that there might be great danger in requiring landed property as a qualification since it would exclude the monied interest, whose aids may be essential in particular emergencies to the public safety.

M^r Dickinson, was ag^{st} any recital of qualifications in the Constitution. It was impossible to make a compleat one, and a partial one w^d by implication tie up the hands of the Legislature from supplying the omissions. The best defence lay in the freeholders who were to elect the Legislature. Whilst this Source should remain pure, the Public interest would be safe. If it ever should be corrupt, no little expedients would repel the danger. He doubted the policy of interweaving into a Republican constitution a veneration for wealth. He had always understood that a veneration for poverty & virtue, were the objects of republican encouragement. It seemed improper that any man of merit should be subjected to disabilities in a Republic where merit was understood to form the great title to public trust, honors & rewards.

M^r Gerry if property be one object of Government, provisions to secure it cannot be improper.

M^r Madison moved to strike out the word _landed_, before the word "qualifications." If the proposition s^d be agreed to he wished the Committee to be at liberty to report the best criterion they could devise. Landed possessions were no certain evidence of real wealth. Many enjoyed them to a great extent who were more in debt than they were worth. The unjust Laws of the States had proceeded more from this class of men, than any others. It had often happened that men who had acquired landed property on credit, got into the Legislatures with a view of promoting an unjust protection ag^{st} their Creditors. In the next place, if a small quantity of land should be made the standard, it would be no security; if a large one, it would exclude the proper representatives of those classes of Citizens who were not landholders. It was politic as well as just that the interests & rights of every class should be duly represented & understood in the public Councils. It was a provision every where established that the Country should be divided into districts & representatives taken from each, in order that the Legislative Assembly might equally understand & sympathize with the rights of the people in every part of the Community. It was not less proper that every class of Citizens should have an opportunity of making their rights be felt & understood in the public Councils. The three principal classes into which our citizens were divisible, were the landed the commercial, & the manufacturing. The 2^d & 3^d class, bear as yet a small proportion to the first. The proportion however will daily increase. We see in the populous Countries in Europe now, what we shall be hereafter. These classes understand much less of each others interests & affairs, than men of the same class inhabiting different districts. It is particularly requisite therefore that the interests of one or two of them should not be left entirely to the care, or impartiality of the third. This must be the case if landed qualifications should be required; few of the mercantile, & scarcely any of the manufacturing class chusing whilst they continue in business to turn any part of their Stock into landed property. For these reasons he wished if it were possible that some other criterion than the mere possession of land should be devised. He concurred with M^r Gov^r Morris in thinking that qualifications in the Electors would be much more effectual than in the elected. The former would discriminate between real & ostensible property in the latter; But he was aware of the difficulty of forming any uniform standard that would suit the different circumstances & opinions prevailing in the different States.

M^r Gov^r Morris 2^{ded} the motion.

On the Question for striking out "landed"

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d no.
V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On Question on 1^{st} part of Col. Masons proposition as to "qualification of property & citizenship," as so amended

N. H. ay. Mas^{ts} ay. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

"The 2^d part, for disqualifying debtors, and persons having unsettled accounts," being under consideration

M^r Carrol moved to strike out "having unsettled accounts"

M^r Ghorum seconded the motion; observing that it would put the commercial & manufacturing part of the people on a worse footing than others as they would be most likely to have dealings with the public.

M^r L. Martin, if these words should be struck out, and the remaining words concerning debtors retained, it will be the interest of the latter class to keep their accounts unsettled as long as possible.

M^r Wilson was for striking them out. They put too much power in the hands of the Auditors, who might combine with rivals in delaying settlements in order to prolong the disqualifications of particular men. We should consider that we are providing a Constitution for future generations, and not merely for the peculiar circumstances of the moment. The time has been, and will again be, when the public safety may depend on the voluntary aids of individuals which will necessarily open acc^{ts} with the public, and when such acc^{ts} will be a characteristic of patriotism. Besides a partial enumeration of cases will disable the Legislature from disqualifying odious & dangerous characters.

M^r Langdon[13] was for striking out the whole clause for the reasons given by M^r Wilson. So many exclusions he thought too would render the system unacceptable to the people.

[13] "M^r Langdon is a man of considerable fortune, possesses a
liberal mind, and a good plain understanding--about 40 years
old."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 325.

M^r Gerry. If the argum^{ts} used today were to prevail, we might have a Legislature composed of Public debtors, pensioners, placemen & contractors. He thought the proposed qualifications would be pleasing to the people. They will be considered as a security ag^{st} unnecessary or undue burdens being imposed on them. He moved to add "pensioners" to the disqualified characters which was negatived.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Con. no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no.
Mary^d ay. V^a no. N. C. divided. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

M^r Gov^r Morris. The last clause, relating to public debtors will exclude every importing merchant. Revenue will be drawn it is foreseen as much as possible, from trade. Duties of course will be bonded, and the Merch^{ts} will remain debtors to the public. He repeated that it had not been so much the fault of individuals as of the public that transactions between them had not been more generally liquidated & adjusted. At all events to draw from our short & scanty experience rules that are to operate through succeeding ages, does not savour much of real wisdom.

On question for striking out, "persons having unsettled accounts with the U. States."

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay.
V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

M^r Elseworth was for disagreeing to the remainder of the clause disqualifying Public debtors; and for leaving to the wisdom of the Legislature and the virtue of the Citizens, the task of providing ag^{st} such evils. Is the smallest as well as the largest debtor to be excluded? Then every arrear of taxes will disqualify. Besides how is it to be known to the people when they elect who are or are not public debtors. The exclusion of pensioners & placemen in Engl^d is founded on a consideration not existing here. As persons of that sort are dependent on the Crown, they tend to increase its influence.

M^r Pinkney s^d he was at first a friend to the proposition, for the sake of the clause relating to qualifications of property; but he disliked the exclusion of public debtors; it went too far. It w^d exclude persons who had purchased confiscated property or should purchase Western territory of the public, and might be some obstacle to the sale of the latter.

On the question for agreeing to the clause disqualifying public debtors

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.
V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

Col. Mason, observed that it would be proper, as he thought, that some provision should be made in the Constitution ag^{st} choosing for the Seat of the Gen^l Gov^t the City or place at which the Seat of any State Gov^t might be fixt. There were 2 objections ag^{st} having them at the same place, which without mentioning others, required some precaution on the subject. The 1^{st} was that it tended to produce disputes concerning jurisdiction. The 2^d & principal one was that the intermixture of the two Legislatures tended to give a provincial tincture to y^e Nat^l deliberations. He moved that the Com^e be instructed to receive a clause to prevent the seat of the Nat^l Gov^t being in the same City or town with the Seat of the Gov^t of any State longer than untill the necessary public buildings could be erected.

M^r Alex. Martin 2^{ded} the motion.

M^r Gov^r Morris did not dislike the idea, but was apprehensive that such a clause might make enemies of Philad^a & N. York which had expectations of becoming the Seat of the Gen^l Gov^t.

M^r Langdon approved the idea also: but suggested the case of a State moving its seat of Gov^t to the nat^l Seat after the erection of the Public buildings.

M^r Ghorum. The precaution may be evaded by the Nat^l Legisl^{re} by delaying to erect the Public buildings.

M^r Gerry conceived it to be the gen^l sense of America, that neither the Seat of a State Gov^t nor any large commercial City should be the seat of the Gen^l Gov^t.

M^r Williamson liked the idea, but knowing how much the passions of men were agitated by this matter, was apprehensive of turning them ag^{st} the System. He apprehended also that an evasion, might be practised in the way hinted by M^r Ghorum.

M^r Pinkney thought the Seat of a State Gov^t ought to be avoided; but that a large town or its vicinity would be proper for the Seat of the Gen^l Gov^t.

Col. Mason did not mean to press the motion at this time, nor to excite any hostile passions ag^{st} the system. He was content to withdraw the motion for the present.

M^r Butler was for fixing by the Constitution the place, & a central one, for the seat of the Nat^l Gov^t.

The proceedings since Monday last were referred unanimously to the Com^e of detail, and the Convention then unanimously adjourned till Monday, Aug^{st} 6. that the Com^e of detail might have time to prepare & report the Constitution. The whole proceedings as referred are as follow[14]:

[14] Madison's note says: "here copy them from the Journal p.
207." In the _Journal_ they are given as having been
"collected from the proceedings of the convention, as they
are spread over the journal from June 19^{th} to July
26^{th}."--_Journal of Federal Convention_, 207. The dates
show when the resolutions were agreed to, and are correct.

June 20. I. RESOLVED, That the Government of the United States
ought to consist of a supreme legislative, judiciary,
and executive.

June 21. II. RESOLVED, That the legislature consist of two
branches.

III. RESOLVED, That the members of the first branch of
the legislature ought to be elected by the people of the
several states, for the term of two years; to be paid
June 22. out of the publick treasury; to receive an adequate
compensation for their services; to be of the age of
June 23. twenty-five years at least; to be ineligible and
incapable of holding any office under the authority of
the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to
the functions of the first branch) during the term of
service of the first branch.

June 25. IV. RESOLVED, That the members of the second branch of
the legislature of the United States ought to be chosen
by the individual legislatures; to be of the age of
June 26. thirty years at least; to hold their offices for six
years, one third to go out biennally; to receive a
compensation for the devotion of their time to the
publick service; to be ineligible to and incapable of
holding any office, under the authority of the United
States (except those peculiarly belonging to the
functions of the second branch) during the term for
which they are elected, and for one year thereafter.

V. RESOLVED, That each branch ought to possess the right
of originating acts.

VI. RESOLVED, That the national legislature ought to
Postponed 27. possess the legislative rights vested in Congress by the
July 16. confederation; and moreover, to legislate in all cases
for the general interests of the union, and also in
July 17. those to which the states are separately incompetent, or
in which the harmony of the United States may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.

VII. RESOLVED, That the legislative acts of the United
States, made by virtue and in pursuance of the articles
of union, and all treaties made and ratified under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law
of the respective states, as far as those acts or
treaties shall relate to the said states, or their
July 17 citizens and inhabitants; and that the judiciaries of
the several states shall be bound thereby in their
decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the
individual States to the contrary, notwithstanding.

July 16. VIII. RESOLVED, That in the original formation of the
legislature of the United States, the first branch
thereof shall consist of sixty-five members; of which
number

New Hampshire shall send three,
Massachusetts eight,
Rhode Island one,
Connecticut five,
New York six,
New Jersey four,
Pennsylvania eight,
Delaware one,
Maryland six,
Virginia ten,
North Carolina five,
South Carolina five,
Georgia three.

But as the present situation of the states may probably
alter in the number of their inhabitants, the
legislature of the United States shall be authorized,
from time to time, to apportion the number of
representatives; and in case any of the states shall
hereafter be divided, or enlarged by addition of
territory, or any two or more states united, or any new
states created within the limits of the United States,
the legislature of the United States shall possess
authority to regulate the number of representatives, in
any of the foregoing cases, upon the principle of their
number of inhabitants according to the provisions
hereafter mentioned, namely--Provided always, that
representation ought to be proportioned to direct
taxation. And in order to ascertain the alteration in
the direct taxation, which may be required from time to
time by the changes in the relative circumstances of the
states--

IX. RESOLVED, That a census be taken within six years
from the first meeting of the legislature of the United
States, and once within the term of every ten years
afterwards, of all the inhabitants of the United States,
in the manner and according to the ratio recommended by
Congress in their resolution of April 18, 1783; and that
the legislature of the United States shall proportion
the direct taxation accordingly.

X. RESOLVED, That all bills for raising or appropriating
money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of
the government of the United States, shall originate in
the first branch of the legislature of the United
States, and shall not be altered or amended by the
second branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the
publick treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations to
be originated by the first branch.

XI. RESOLVED, That in the second branch of the
legislature of the United States, each state shall have
an equal vote.

July 26. XII. RESOLVED, That a national executive be instituted,
to consist of a single person; to be chosen by the
national legislature, for the term of seven years; to be
ineligible a second time; with power to carry into
execution the national laws; to appoint to offices in
cases not otherwise provided for; to be removable on
impeachment, and conviction of mal-practice or neglect
of duty; to receive a fixed compensation for the
devotion of his time to the publick service; to be paid
out of the publick treasury.

July 21. XIII. RESOLVED, That the national executive shall have a
right to negative any legislative act, which shall not
be afterwards passed, unless by two third parts of each
branch of the national legislature.

July 18. XIV. RESOLVED, That a national judiciary be established,
to consist of one supreme tribunal, the judges of which
July 21. shall be appointed by the second branch of the national
July 18. legislature; to hold their offices during good
behaviour; to receive punctually, at stated times, a
fixed compensation for their services, in which no
diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons
actually in office at the time of such diminution.

XV. RESOLVED, That the national legislature be empowered
to appoint inferior tribunals.

XVI. RESOLVED, That the jurisdiction of the national
judiciary shall extend to cases arising under laws
passed by the general legislature; and to such other
questions as involve the national peace and harmony.

XVII. RESOLVED, That provision ought to be made for the
admission of states lawfully arising within the limits
of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction
of government and territory, or otherwise, with the
consent of a number of voices in the national
legislature less than the whole.

XVIII. RESOLVED, That a republican form of government
shall be guarantied to each state; and that each state
shall be protected against foreign and domestick
violence.

July 23. XIX. RESOLVED, That provision ought to be made for the
amendment of the articles of union, whensoever it shall
seem necessary.

XX. RESOLVED, That the legislative, executive, and
judiciary powers within the several states, and of the
national government, ought to be bound, by oath, to
support the articles of union.

XXI. RESOLVED, That the amendments which shall be
offered to the confederation by the convention ought, at
a proper time or times after the approbation of
Congress, to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies
of representatives, recommended by the several
legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the people to
consider and decide thereon.

XXII. RESOLVED, That the representation in the second
branch of the legislature of the United States consist
of two members from each state, who shall vote per
capita.

July 26. XXIII. RESOLVED, That it be an instruction to the
committee, to whom were referred the proceedings of the
convention for the establishment of a national
government, to receive a clause or clauses, requiring
certain qualifications of property and citizenship, in
the United States, for the executive, the judiciary, and
the members of both branches of the legislature of the
United States.

With the above resolutions were referred the propositions offered by M^r C. Pinckney on the 29^{th} of May, & by M^r Patterson on the 15^{th} of June.[15]

[15] "Aug 1. 1787 WILLIAMSB.

"DEAR COL.

"We are here & I believe every where all Impatience to know
something of your conventional Deliberations. If you cannot
tell us what you are doing, you might at least give us some
Information of what you are not doing. This w^d afford food
for political conjecture, and perhaps be sufficient to
satisfy present Impatience. I hope you have already
discovered the means of preserving the American Empire
united--& that the scheme of a Disunion has been found
pregnant with y^e greatest Evils--But we are not at this
distance able to judge with any accuracy upon subjects so
truly important & interesting as those w^{ch} must engage
you at present--We can only hope, that you will all resemble
Cæsar, at least in one particular: 'nil actum reputans si
quid superesset agendum';--& that your Exertions will be
commensurate to y^e great Expectations w^{ch} have been
formed...
"J. MADISON."[A]

[A] President of William and Mary College, and the
first Bishop of the Episcopal Church in
Virginia. He was a second cousin of James
Madison, of Orange.
(Mad. MSS.)

"RICHMOND Aug^t 5. 87.

"DEAR SIR,

"I am much obliged to you for your communication of the
proceedings of y^e Convention, since I left them; for I feel
that anxiety about y^e result, which it's Importance must
give to every honest citizen. If I thought that my return
could contribute in the smallest degree to it's Improvement,
nothing should Keep me away. But as I know that the talents,
knowledge, & well-established character, of our present
delegates have justly inspired the country with y^e most
entire confidence in their determinations; & that my vote
could only _operate_ to produce a division, & so destroy y^e
vote of y^e State, I think that my attendance now would
certainly be useless, perhaps injurious.

"I am credibly inform'd that M^r Henry has openly express'd
his disapprobation of the circular letter of Congress,
respecting y^e payment of British debts; & that he has
declared his opinion that y^e Interests of this state cannot
safely be trusted with that body. The doctrine of three
confederacies, or great Republics, has its advocates here. I
have heard Hervie support it, along with y^e extinction of
State Legislatures within each great Department. The
necessity of some independent power to controul the Assembly
by a negative, seems now to be admitted by y^e most zealous
republicans--they only differ about y^e mode of constituting
such a power. B. Randolph seems to think that a magistrate
annually elected by y^e people might exercise such a
controul as independently as y^e King of G. B. I hope that
our representative, Marshall, will be a powerful aid to
Mason in the next Assembly. He has observ'd the actual
depravation of mens manners, under y^e corrupting Influence
of our Legislature; and is convinc'd that nothing but y^e
adoption of some efficient plan from y^e Convention can
prevent anarchy first, & civil convulsions afterwards. M^r
H----y has certainly converted a majority of Prince Edward,
formerly y^e most averse to paper money, to y^e patronage of
it....

"Your friend & humble serv^t.
"JAMES MCCLURG."
(Mad. MSS.)

MONDAY AUGUST 6^{TH}. IN CONVENTION

M^r John Francis Mercer from Maryland took his seat.

M^r Rutlidge delivered in the Report of the Committee of detail as follows: a printed copy being at the same time furnished to each member[16]:

[16] Madison's printed copy is marked: "As Reported by Com^e of
Detail viz of five. Aug. 6. 1787." It is a large folio of
seven pages. In the enumeration of the Articles by a
misprint VI. was repeated, and the alterations in Article
VII. and succeeding articles were made by Madison. In Sect.
II of Article VI., as it was printed, it appeared: "The
enacting stile of the laws of the United States shall be.
'Be it enacted and it is hereby enacted by the House of
Representatives, and by the Senate of the United States, in
Congress assembled,'" which Madison altered to read: "The
enacting stile of the laws of the United States shall be.
'Be it enacted by the Senate & representatives, in Congress
assembled.'" The printed copy among the Madison papers is a
duplicate of the copy filed by General Washington with the
papers of the Constitution, and Sec. II is there given as
actually printed.--_Journal of the Federal Convention_, 219.
(Const. MSS.)

Madison accurately transcribed the report for his journal
and it is this copy which is used in the text.

"We the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare,
and establish the following Constitution for the Government of
Ourselves and our Posterity.

ARTICLE I

The stile of the Government shall be, "The United States of
America."

II

The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive,
and judicial powers.

III

The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress, to consist
of two separate and distinct bodies of men, a House of
Representatives and a Senate; each of which shall in all cases
have a negative on the other. The Legislature shall meet on the
first Monday in December in every year.

IV

Sect. 1. The members of the House of Representatives shall be
chosen every second year, by the people of the several States
comprehended within this Union. The qualifications of the
electors shall be the same, from time to time, as those of the
electors in the several States, of the most numerous branch of
their own legislatures.

Sect. 2. Every member of the House of Representatives shall be
of the age of twenty five years at least; shall have been a
citizen in the United States for at least three years before his
election; and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident
of the State in which he shall be chosen.

Sect. 3. The House of Representatives shall, at its first
formation, and until the number of citizens and inhabitants
shall be taken in the manner hereinafter described, consist of
sixty-five Members, of whom three shall be chosen in
New-Hampshire, eight in Massachusetts, one in Rhode-Island and
Providence Plantations, five in Connecticut, six in New-York,
four in New-Jersey, eight in Pennsylvania, one in Delaware, six
in Maryland, ten in Virginia, five in North-Carolina, five in
South-Carolina, and three in Georgia.

Sect. 4. As the proportions of numbers in different States will
alter from time to time; as some of the States may hereafter be
divided; as others may be enlarged by addition of territory; as
two or more States may be united; as new States will be erected
within the limits of the United States, the Legislature shall,
in each of these cases, regulate the number of representatives
by the number of inhabitants, according to the provisions herein
after made, at the rate of one for every forty thousand.

Sect. 5. All bills for raising or appropriating money, and for
fixing the salaries of the officers of Government, shall
originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be
altered or amended by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from
the Public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations that
shall originate in the House of Representatives.

Sect. 6. The House of Representatives shall have the sole power
of impeachment. It shall choose its Speaker and other officers.

Sect. 7. Vacancies in the House of Representatives shall be
supplied by writs of election from the executive authority of
the State, in the representation from which they shall happen.

V

Sect. 1. The Senate of the United States shall be chosen by the
Legislatures of the several States. Each Legislature shall chuse
two members. Vacancies may be supplied by the Executive until
the next meeting of the Legislature. Each member shall have one
vote.

Sect. 2. The Senators shall be chosen for six years; but
immediately after the first election they shall be divided, by
lot, into three classes, as nearly as may be, numbered one, two
and three. The seats of the members of the first class shall be
vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second
class at the expiration of the fourth year, of the third class
at the expiration of the sixth year, so that a third part of the
members may be chosen every second year.

Sect. 3. Every member of the Senate shall be of the age of
thirty years at least; shall have been a citizen in the United
States for at least four years before his election; and shall
be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State for
which he shall be chosen.

Sect. 4. The Senate shall chuse its own President and other
officers.

VI

Sect. 1. The times and places and manner of holding the
elections of the members of each House shall be prescribed by
the Legislature of each State; but their provisions concerning
them may, at any time, be altered by the Legislature of the
United States.

Sect. 2. The Legislature of the United States shall have
authority to establish such uniform qualifications of the
members of each House, with regard to property, as to the said
Legislature shall seem expedient.

Sect. 3. In each House a majority of the members shall
constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day.

Sect. 4. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns
and qualifications of its own members.

Sect. 5. Freedom of speech and debate in the Legislature shall
not be impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of the
Legislature; and the members of each House shall, in all cases,
except treason felony and breach of the peace, be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at Congress, and in going to
and returning from it.

Sect. 6. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings;
may punish its members for disorderly behaviour; and may expel a
member.

Sect. 7. The House of Representatives, and the Senate, when it
shall be acting in a legislative capacity, shall keep a journal
of their proceedings, and shall, from time to time, publish
them: and the yeas and nays of the members of each House, on any
question, shall at the desire of one-fifth part of the members
present, be entered on the journal.

Sect. 8. Neither House, without the consent of the other, shall
adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than
that at which the two Houses are sitting. But this regulation
shall not extend to the Senate, when it shall exercise the
powers mentioned in the ---- article.

Sect. 9. The members of each House shall be ineligible to, and
incapable of holding any office under the authority of the
United States, during the time for which they shall respectively
be elected: and the members of the Senate shall be ineligible
to, and incapable of holding any such office for one year
afterwards.

Sect. 10. The members of each House shall receive a compensation
for their services, to be ascertained and paid by the State, in
which they shall be chosen.

Sect. 11. The enacting stile of the laws of the United States
shall be, "Be it enacted by the Senate and Representatives in
Congress assembled."

Sect. 12. Each House shall possess the right of originating
bills, except in the cases beforementioned.

Sect. 13. Every bill, which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law,
be presented to the President of the United States for his
revision: if, upon such revision, he approve of it, he shall
signify his approbation by signing it: But if, upon such
revision, it shall appear to him improper for being passed into
a law, he shall return it, together with his objections against
it, to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall
enter the objections at large on their journal and proceed to
reconsider the bill. But if after such reconsideration, two
thirds of that House shall, notwithstanding the objections of
the President, agree to pass it, it shall together with his
objections, be sent to the other House, by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of the
other House also, it shall become a law. But in all such cases,
the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays;
and the names of the persons voting for or against the bill
shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If
any bill shall not be returned by the President within seven
days after it shall have been presented to him, it shall be a
law, unless the legislature, by their adjournment, prevent its
return; in which case it shall not be a law.

VII

Sect. 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have the
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises;

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States;

To establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the
United States;

To coin money;

To regulate the value of foreign coin;

To fix the standard of weights and measures;

To establish Post-offices;

To borrow money, and emit bills on the credit of the United
States;

To appoint a Treasurer by ballot;

To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

To make rules concerning captures on land and water;

To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and the punishment of counterfeiting
the coin of the United States, and of offences against the law
of nations;

To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application of its
legislature;

To make war;

To raise armies;

To build and equip fleets;

To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the
laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and
repel invasions;

And to make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other
powers vested, by this Constitution, in the government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof;

Sect. 2. Treason against the United States shall consist only in
levying war against the United States, or any of them; and in
adhering to the enemies of the United States, or any of them.
The Legislature of the United States shall have power to declare
the punishment of treason. No person shall be convicted of
treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses. No attainder
of treason shall work corruption of blood, nor forfeiture,
except during the life of the person attainted.

Sect. 3. The proportions of direct taxation shall be regulated
by the whole number of white and other free citizens and
inhabitants, of every age, sex and condition, including those
bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all
other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description,
(except Indians not paying taxes) which number shall, within six
years after the first meeting of the Legislature, and within the
term of every ten years afterwards, be taken in such manner as
the said Legislature shall direct.

Sect. 4. No tax or duty shall be laid by the Legislature on
articles exported from any State; nor on the migration or
importation of such persons as the several States shall think
proper to admit; nor shall such migration or importation be
prohibited.

Sect. 5. No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion
to the Census hereinbefore directed to be taken.

Sect. 6. No navigation act shall be passed without the assent of
two thirds of the members present in each House.

Sect. 7. The United States shall not grant any title of
Nobility.

VIII

The acts of the Legislature of the United States made in
pursuance of this Constitution, and all treaties made under the
authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the
several States, and of the citizens and inhabitants; and the
judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their
decisions; any thing in the Constitutions or laws of the several
States to the contrary notwithstanding.

IX

Sect 1. The Senate of the United States shall have power to make
treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme
Court.

Sect. 2. In all disputes and controversies now subsisting, or
that may hereafter subsist between two or more States,
respecting jurisdiction or territory, the Senate shall possess
the following powers. Whenever the Legislature, or the Executive
authority, or lawful agent of any State, in controversy with
another, shall by memorial to the Senate, state the matter in
question, and apply for a hearing; notice of such memorial and
application shall be given by order of the Senate, to the
Legislature or the Executive authority of the other State in
Controversy. The Senate shall also assign a day for the
appearance of the parties, by their agents, before the House.
The Agents shall be directed to appoint, by joint consent,
commissioners or judges to constitute a Court for hearing and
determining the matter in question. But if the Agents cannot
agree, the Senate shall name three persons out of each of the
several States; and from the list of such persons each party
shall alternately strike out one, until the number shall be
reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven
nor more than nine names, as the Senate shall direct, shall in
their presence, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose names
shall be so drawn, or any five of them shall be commissioners or
Judges to hear and finally determine the controversy; provided a
majority of the Judges, who shall hear the cause, agree in the
determination. If either party shall neglect to attend at the
day assigned, without shewing sufficient reasons for not
attending, or being present shall refuse to strike, the Senate
shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each State, and
the Clerk of the Senate shall strike in behalf of the party
absent or refusing. If any of the parties shall refuse to submit
to the authority of such Court; or shall not appear to prosecute
or defend their claim or cause, the Court shall nevertheless
proceed to pronounce judgment. The judgment shall be final and
conclusive. The proceedings shall be transmitted to the
President of the Senate, and shall be lodged among the public
records for the security of the parties concerned. Every
Commissioner shall, before he sit in judgment, take an oath, to
be administered by one of the Judges of the Supreme or Superior
Court of the State where the cause shall be tried, "well and
truly to hear and determine the matter in question according to
the best of his judgment, without favor, affection, or hope of
reward."

Sect. 3. All controversies concerning lands claimed under
different grants of two or more States, whose jurisdictions, as
they respect such lands, shall have been decided or adjusted
subsequent to such grants, or any of them, shall, on application
to the Senate, be finally determined, as near as may be, in the
same manner as is before prescribed for deciding controversies
between different States.

X

Sect. 1. The Executive Power of the United States shall be
vested in a single person. His stile shall be, "The President of
the United States of America;" and his title shall be, "His
Excellency." He shall be elected by ballot by the Legislature.
He shall hold his office during the term of seven years; but
shall not be elected a second time.

Sect. 2. He shall, from time to time, give information to the
Legislature, of the state of the Union: he may recommend to
their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary,
and expedient: he may convene them on extraordinary occasions.
In case of disagreement between the two Houses, with regard to
the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he
thinks proper: he shall take care that the laws of the United
States be duly and faithfully executed: he shall commission all
the officers of the United States; and shall appoint officers in
all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution. He
shall receive Ambassadors, and may correspond with the supreme
Executives of the several States. He shall have power to grant
reprieves and pardons; but his pardon shall not be pleadable in
bar of an impeachment. He shall be commander in chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
several States. He shall, at stated times, receive for his
services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor
diminished during his continuance in office. Before he shall
enter on the duties of his department, he shall take the
following oath or affirmation, "I ---- solemnly swear, (or
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President
of the United States of America." He shall be removed from his
office on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and
conviction in the Supreme Court, of treason, bribery, or
corruption. In case of his removal as aforesaid, death,
resignation, or disability to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the President of the Senate shall exercise those
powers and duties, until another President of the United States
be chosen, or until the disability of the President be removed.

XI