Chapter IV: Front Matter (4)

Sect. 1. The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested
in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall, when
necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature
of the United States.

Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the Inferior
Courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour. They
shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.

Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to
all cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the
United States; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public
Ministers and Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of officers
of the United States; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more States,
(except such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction) between
a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of
different States, and between a State or the Citizens thereof
and foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases of
impeachment, cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, this
jurisdiction shall be original. In all the other cases
beforementioned, it shall be appellate, with such exceptions and
under such regulations as the Legislature shall make. The
Legislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction
abovementioned (except the trial of the President of the United
States) in the manner, and under the limitations which it shall
think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute
from time to time.

Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except in cases of
impeachments) shall be in the State where they shall be
committed; and shall be by Jury.

Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of Impeachment, shall not extend
further than to removal from office, and disqualification to
hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust or profit, under the
United States. But the party convicted shall, nevertheless be
liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment
according to law.

XII

No State shall coin money; nor grant letters of marque and
reprisal; nor enter into any Treaty, alliance, or confederation;
nor grant any title of Nobility.

XIII

No State, without the consent of the Legislature of the United
States, shall emit bills of credit, or make any thing but specie
a tender in payment of debts; nor lay imposts or duties on
imports; nor keep troops or ships of war in time of peace; nor
enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with
any foreign power; nor engage in any war, unless it shall be
actually invaded by enemies, or the danger of invasion be so
imminent, as not to admit of a delay, until the Legislature of
the United States can be consulted.

XIV

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States.

XV

Any person charged with treason, felony or high misdemeanor in
any State, who shall flee from justice, and shall be found in
any other State, shall, on demand of the Executive power of the
State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the
State having jurisdiction of the offence.

XVI

Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the
Legislatures, and to the records and judicial proceedings of the
Courts and magistrates of every other State.

XVII

New States lawfully constituted or established within the limits
of the United States may be admitted, by the Legislature, into
this government; but to such admission the consent of two thirds
of the members present in each House shall be necessary. If a
new State shall arise within the limits of any of the present
States, the consent of the Legislatures of such States shall be
also necessary to its admission. If the admission be consented
to, the new States shall be admitted on the same terms with the
original States. But the Legislature may make conditions with
the new States, concerning the Public debt which shall be then
subsisting.

XVIII

The United States shall guaranty to each State a Republican form
of Government; and shall protect each State against foreign
invasions, and, on the application of its Legislature, against
domestic violence.

XIX

On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
States in the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the
Legislature of the United States shall call a convention for
that purpose.

XX

The members of the Legislatures, and the Executive and Judicial
officers of the United States, and of the several States, shall
be bound by oath to support this Constitution.

XXI

The ratification of the Conventions of ---- States shall be
sufficient for organizing this Constitution.

XXII

This Constitution shall be laid before the United States in
Congress Assembled, for their approbation; and it is the opinion
of this Convention, that it should be afterwards submitted to a
Convention chosen, under the recommendation of its legislature,
in order to receive the ratification of such Convention.

XXIII

To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this
Convention, that each assenting Convention should notify its
assent and ratification to the United States in Congress
assembled; that Congress, after receiving the assent and
ratification of the Conventions of ---- States, should appoint
and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a place, for
commencing proceedings under this Constitution; that after such
publication, the Legislatures of the several States should elect
members of the Senate, and direct the election of members of the
House of Representatives; and that the members of the
Legislature should meet at the time and place assigned by
Congress, and should, as soon as may be, after their meeting,
choose the President of the United States, and proceed to
execute this Constitution.

A motion was made to adjourn till Wednesday, in order to give leisure to examine the Report; which passed in the negative--

N. H. no. Mas. no. C^t no. P^a ay. M^d ay. Virg. ay. N. C. no.
S. C. no.

The House then adjourned till to-morrow 11 OC.

TUESDAY AUGUST 7.[17] IN CONVENTION

[17] Although the secrecy of the proceedings was guarded carefully,
the reason of the long adjournment was generally known
outside of the Convention.

"The Convention adjourned about three weeks ago and
appointed a Committee consisting of M^r Rutlege, M^r
Randolph, M^r Wilson, M^r Elsworth, & M^r Gorham to draw
into form the measures which had been agreed upon--they
reassembled last Monday sen'night to receive the report--I
suppose we shall have the result of this great business in a
few weeks more."--Edward Carrington to Monroe, August 7,
1787.
Monroe MSS.

_Cf._ King's account of the debate confirming the accuracy
of Madison's report (King's _Life and Correspondence of
Rufus King_, i., 617).

The Report of the Committee of detail being taken up,

M^r Pinkney moved that it be referred to a Committee of the whole. This was strongly opposed by M^r Ghorum & several others, as likely to produce unnecessary delay; and was negatived, Delaware Mary^d & Virg^a only being in the affirmative.

The preamble of the Report was agreed to nem. con. So were Art: I & II.

Art: III considered. Col. Mason doubted the propriety of giving each branch a negative on the other "in all cases." There were some cases in which it was he supposed not intended to be given as in the case of balloting for appointments.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to insert "legislative acts" instead of "all cases."

M^r Williamson 2^{ds} him.

M^r Sherman. This will restrain the operation of the clause too much. It will particularly exclude a mutual negative in the case of ballots, which he hoped would take place.

M^r Ghorum contended that elections ought to be made by _joint ballot_. If separate ballots should be made for the President, and the two branches should be each attached to a favorite, great delay contention & confusion may ensue. These inconveniences have been felt in Mas^{ts} in the election of officers of little importance compared with the Executive of the U. States. The only objection ag^{st} a joint ballot is that it may deprive the Senate of their due weight; but this ought not to prevail over the respect due to the public tranquility & welfare.

M^r Wilson was for a joint ballot in several cases at least; particularly in the choice of the President, and was therefore for the amendment. Disputes between the two Houses during & concern^g the vacancy of the Executive might have dangerous consequences.

Col. Mason thought the amendment of M^r Gov^r Morris extended too far. Treaties are in a subsequent part declared to be laws, they will therefore be subjected to a negative; altho' they are to be made as proposed by the Senate alone. He proposed that the mutual negative should be restrained to "cases requiring the distinct assent" of the two Houses.

M^r Gov^r Morris thought this but a repetition of the same thing; the mutual negative and distinct assent, being equivalent expressions. Treaties he thought were not laws.

M^r Madison moved to strike out the words each of which shall in all cases, have a negative on the other; the idea being sufficiently expressed in the preceding member of the article; vesting the "legislative power" in "distinct bodies," especially as the respective powers and mode of exercising them were fully delineated in a subsequent article.

Gen^l Pinkney 2^{ded} the motion.

On question for inserting legislative Acts as moved by M^r Gov^r Morris

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. C^t ay. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On question for agreeing to M^r M's motion to strike out &c.----

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. C^t no. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a ay.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Madison wished to know the reasons of the Com^e for fixing by y^e Constitution the time of Meeting for the Legislature; and suggested, that it be required only that one meeting at least should be held every year leaving the time to be fixed or varied by law.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out the sentence. It was improper to tie down the Legislature to a particular time, or even to require a meeting every year. The public business might not require it.

M^r Pinkney concurred with M^r Madison.

M^r Ghorum. If the time be not fixed by the Constitution, disputes will arise in the Legislature; and the States will be at a loss to adjust thereto, the times of their elections. In the N. England States the annual time of meeting had been long fixed by their Charters & Constitutions, and no inconvenience had resulted. He thought it necessary that there should be one meeting at least every year as a check on the Executive department.

M^r Elseworth was ag^{st} striking out the words. The Legislature will not know till they are met whether the public interest required their meeting or not. He could see no impropriety in fixing the day, as the Convention could judge of it as well as the Legislature.

M^r Wilson thought on the whole it would be best to fix the day.

M^r King could not think there would be a necessity for a meeting every year. A great vice in our system was that of legislating too much. The most numerous objects of legislation belong to the States. Those of the Nat^l Legislature were but few. The chief of them were commerce & revenue. When these should be once settled alterations would be rarely necessary & easily made.

M^r Madison thought if the time of meeting should be fixed by a law it w^d be sufficiently fixed & there would be no difficulty then as had been suggested, on the part of the States in adjusting their elections to it. One consideration appeared to him to militate strongly ag^{st} fixing a time by the Constitution. It might happen that the Legislature might be called together by the public exigencies & finish their Session but a short time before the annual period. In this case it would be extremely inconvenient to reassemble so quickly & without the least necessity. He thought one annual meeting ought to be required; but did not wish to make two unavoidable.

Col. Mason thought the objections against fixing the time insuperable: but that an annual meeting ought to be required as essential to the preservation of the Constitution. The extent of the Country will supply business. And if it should not, the Legislature, besides _legislative_, is to have _inquisitorial_ powers, which cannot safely be long kept in a state of suspension.

M^r Sherman was decided for fixing the time, as well as for frequent meetings of the Legislative body. Disputes and difficulties will arise between the two Houses, & between both & the States, if the time be changeable--frequent meetings of Parliament were required at the Revolution in England as an essential safeguard of liberty. So also are annual meetings in most of the American charters & constitutions. There will be business eno' to require it. The Western Country, and the great extent and varying state of our affairs in general will supply objects.

M^r Randolph was ag^{st} fixing any day irrevocably; but as there was no provision made any where in the Constitution for regulating the periods of meeting, and some precise time must be fixed, untill the Legislature shall make provision, he could not agree to strike out the words altogether. Instead of which he moved to add the words following--"unless a different day shall be appointed by law."

M^r Madison 2^{ded} the motion, & on the question

N. H. no. Mass. ay. C^t no. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out Dec^r & insert May. It might frequently happen that our measures ought to be influenced by those in Europe, which were generally planned during the Winter and of which intelligence would arrive in the Spring.

M^r Madison 2^{ded} the motion, he preferred May to Dec^r because the latter would require the travelling to & from the seat of Gov^t in the most inconvenient seasons of the year.

M^r Wilson. The Winter is the most convenient season for business.

M^r Elseworth. The summer will interfere too much with private business, that of almost all the probable members of the Legislature being more or less connected with agriculture.

M^r Randolph. The time is of no great moment now, as the Legislature can vary it. On looking into the Constitutions of the States, he found that the times of their elections with which the election of the Nat^l Representatives would no doubt be made to coincide, would suit better with Dec^r than May. And it was advisable to render our innovations as little incommodious as possible.

On the question for "May" instead of "Dec^r"

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Read moved to insert after the word "Senate," the words, "subject to the Negative to be hereafter provided." His object was to give an absolute Negative to the Executive--He considered this as so essential to the Constitution, to the preservation of liberty, & to the public welfare, that his duty compelled him to make the Motion.

M^r Gov^r Morris 2^{ded} him. And on the question

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Rutlidge. Altho' it is agreed on all hands that an annual meeting of the Legislature should be made necessary, yet that point seems not to be free from doubt as the clause stands. On this suggestion, "Once at least in every year," were inserted, nem. con.

Art. III with the foregoing alterations was ag^d to nem. con., and is as follows: "The Legislative power shall be vested in a Congress to consist of 2 separate & distinct bodies of men; a House of Rep^s & a Senate. The Legislature shall meet at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the 1^{st} Monday in Dec^r unless a different day shall be appointed by law."

"Article IV. Sect. 1. taken up."

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out the last member of the section beginning with the words "qualifications of Electors," in order that some other provision might be substituted which w^d restrain the right of suffrage to freeholders.

M^r Fitzsimons 2^{ded} the motion.

M^r Williamson was opposed to it.

M^r Wilson. This part of the Report was well considered by the Committee, and he did not think it could be changed for the better. It was difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the States. Unnecessary innovations he thought too should be avoided. It would be very hard & disagreeable for the same persons at the same time, to vote for representatives in the State Legislature and to be excluded from a vote for those in the Nat^l Legislature.

M^r Gov^r Morris. Such a hardship would be neither great nor novel. The people are accustomed to it and not dissatisfied with it, in several of the States. In some the qualifications are different for the choice of the Gov^r & Representatives; In others for different Houses of the Legislature. Another objection ag^{st} the clause as it stands is that it makes the qualifications of the Nat^l Legislature depend on the will of the States, which he thought not proper.

M^r Elseworth. thought the qualifications of the electors stood on the most proper footing. The right of suffrage was a tender point, and strongly guarded by most of the State Constitutions. The people will not readily subscribe to the Nat^l Constitution if it should subject them to be disfranchised. The States are the best Judges of the circumstances & temper of their own people.

Col. Mason. The force of habit is certainly not attended to by those Gentlemen who wish for innovations on this point. Eight or nine States have extended the right of suffrage beyond the freeholders. What will the people there say, if they should be disfranchised. A power to alter the qualifications would be a dangerous power in the hands of the Legislature.

M^r Butler. There is no right of which the people are more jealous than that of suffrage. Abridgments of it tend to the same revolution as in Holland where they have at length thrown all power into the hands of the Senates, who fill up vacancies themselves, and form a rank aristocracy.

M^r Dickinson. had a very different idea of the tendency of vesting the right of suffrage in the freeholders of the Country. He considered them as the best guardians of liberty; And the restriction of the right to them as a necessary defence ag^{st} the dangerous influence of those multitudes without property & without principle with which our Country like all others, will in time abound. As to the unpopularity of the innovation it was in his opinion chimerical. The great mass of our Citizens is composed at this time of freeholders, and will be pleased with it.

M^r Elseworth. How shall the freehold be defined? Ought not every man who pays a tax, to vote for the representative who is to levy & dispose of his money? Shall the wealthy merchants & manufacturers, who will bear a full share of the public burthens be not allowed a voice in the imposition of them. Taxation & representation ought to go together.

M^r Gov^r Morris. He had long learned not to be the dupe of words. The sound of aristocracy therefore had no effect on him. It was the thing, not the name, to which he was opposed, and one of his principal objections to the Constitution as it is now before us, is that it threatens this Country with an aristocracy. The aristocracy will grow out of the House of Representatives. Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who will be able to buy them. We should not confine our attention to the present moment. The time is not distant when this Country will abound with mechanics & manufacturers who will receive their bread from their employers. Will such men be the secure & faithful guardians of liberty? Will they be the impregnable barrier ag^{st} aristocracy?--He was as little duped by the association of the words, "taxation & Representation." The man who does not give his vote freely is not represented. It is the man who dictates the vote. Children do not vote. Why? because they want prudence, because they have no will of their own. The ignorant & the dependent can be as little trusted with the public interest. He did not conceive the difficulty of defining "freeholders" to be insuperable. Still less that the restriction could be unpopular. 9/10 of the people are at present freeholders and these will certainly be pleased with it. As to Merch^{ts}. &c. if they have wealth & value the right they can acquire it. If not they don't deserve it.

Col. Mason. We all feel too strongly the remains of antient prejudices, and view things too much through a British medium. A Freehold is the qualification in England, & hence it is imagined to be the only proper one. The true idea in his opinion was that every man having evidence of attachment to & permanent common interest with the Society ought to share in all its rights & privileges. Was this qualification restrained to freeholders? Does no other kind of property but land evidence a common interest in the proprietor? does nothing besides property mark a permanent attachment. Ought the merchant, the monied man, the parent of a number of children whose fortunes are to be pursued in his own Country to be viewed as suspicious characters, and unworthy to be trusted with the common rights of their fellow Citizens.

M^r Madison. the right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental articles of republican Government, and ought not to be left to be regulated by the Legislature. A gradual abridgment of this right has been the mode in which aristocracies have been built on the ruins of popular forms. Whether the Constitutional qualification ought to be a freehold, would with him depend much on the probable reception such a change would meet with in States where the right was now exercised by every description of people. In several of the States a freehold was now the qualification. Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty. In future times a great majority of the people will not only be without landed, but any other sort of property. These will either combine, under the influence of their common situation: in which case, the rights of property & the public liberty, will not be secure in their hands: or which is more probable, they will become the tools of opulence & ambition, in which case there will be equal danger on another side. The example of England has been misconceived (by Col. Mason.) A very small proportion of the Representatives are there chosen by freeholders. The greatest part are chosen by the Cities & boroughs, in many of which the qualification of suffrage is as low as it is in any one of the U. S. and it was in the boroughs & Cities rather than the Counties, that bribery most prevailed, & the influence of the Crown on elections was most dangerously exerted.[18]

[18] "Note to speech of J. M. in Convention of 1787, August
7^{th}.:

"As appointments for the General Government here
contemplated will, in part, be made by the State Gov^{ts},
all the Citizens in States where the right of suffrage is
not limited to the holders of property, will have an
indirect share of representation in the General Government.
But this does not satisfy the fundamental principle that men
cannot be justly bound by laws in making which they have no
part. Persons & property being both essential objects of
Government, the most that either can claim, is such a
structure of it as will leave a reasonable security for the
other. And the most obvious provision, of this double
character, seems to be that of confining to the holders of
property the object deemed least secure in popular Gov^{ts}
the right of suffrage for one of the two Legislative
branches. This is not without example among us, as well as
other constitutional modifications, favouring the influence
of property in the Government. But the U. S. have not
reached the stage of Society in which conflicting feelings
of the Class with, and the Class without property, have the
operation natural to them in Countries fully peopled. The
most difficult of all political arrangements is that of so
adjusting the claims of the two Classes as to give security
to each and to promote the welfare of all. The federal
principle,--which enlarges the sphere of power without
departing from the elective basis of it and controuls in
various ways the propensity in small republics to rash
measures & the facility of forming & executing them, will be
found the best expedient yet tried for solving the
problem."--Madison's Note.

* * * * *

"Note to the speech of J. M. on the [7^{th}.] day of
[August].

"These observations (in the speech of J. M. see debates in
the Convention of 1787, on the [7^{th}.] day of [August]) do
not convey the speaker's more full & matured view of the
subject, which is subjoined. He felt too much at the time
the example of Virginia.

"The right of suffrage is a fundamental Article in
Republican Constitutions. The regulation of it is, at the
same time, a task of peculiar delicacy. Allow the right
exclusively to property, and the rights of persons may be
oppressed. The feudal polity, alone sufficiently proves it.
Extend it equally to all, and the rights of property, or the
claims of justice, may be overruled by a majority without
property or interested in measures of injustice. Of this
abundant proof is afforded by other popular Gov^{ts} and is
not without examples in our own, particularly in the laws
impairing the obligation of contracts.

"In civilized communities, property as well as personal
rights is an essential object of the laws, which encourage
industry by securing the enjoyment of its fruits; that
industry from which property results, & that enjoyment which
consists not merely in its immediate use, but in its
posthumous destination to objects of choice and of kindred
affection.

"In a just & a free Government, therefore, the rights both
of property & of persons ought to be effectually guarded.
Will the former be so in case of a universal & equal
suffrage? Will the latter be so in case of a suffrage
confined to the holders of property?

"As the holders of property have at stake all the other
rights common to those without property, they may be the
more restrained from infringing, as well as the less tempted
to infringe the rights of the latter. It is nevertheless
certain, that there are various ways in which the rich may
oppress the poor; in which property may oppress liberty; and
that the world is filled with examples. It is necessary that
the poor should have a defence against the danger.

"On the other hand, the danger to the holders of property
cannot be disguised, if they be undefended against a
majority without property. Bodies of men are not less swayed
by interest than individuals, and are less controlled by the
dread of reproach and the other motives felt by individuals.
Hence the liability of the rights of property, and of the
impartiality of laws affecting it, to be violated by
Legislative majorities having an interest real or supposed
in the injustice: Hence agrarian laws, and other leveling
schemes: Hence the cancelling or evading of debts, and other
violations of contracts. We must not shut our eyes to the
nature of man, nor to the light of experience. Who would
rely on a fair decision from three individuals if two had an
interest in the case opposed to the rights of the third?
Make the number as great as you please, the impartiality
will not be increased; nor any further security against
injustice be obtained, than what may result from the greater
difficulty of uniting the wills of a greater number.

"In all Gov^{ts} there is a power which is capable of
oppressive exercise. In Monarchies and Aristocracies
oppression proceeds from a want of sympathy & responsibility
in the Gov^t towards the people. In popular Governments the
danger lies in an undue sympathy among individuals composing
a majority, and a want of responsibility in the majority to
the minority. The characteristic excellence of the political
System of the U. S. arises from a distribution and
organization of its powers, which at the same time that they
secure the dependence of the Gov^t on the will of the
nation, provides better guards than are found in any other
popular Gov^t against interested combinations of a Majority
against the rights of a Minority.

"The U. States have a precious advantage also in the actual
distribution of property particularly the landed property;
and in the universal hope of acquiring property. This latter
peculiarity is among the happiest contrasts in their
situation to that of the old world, where no anticipated
change in this respect, can generally inspire a like
sympathy with the rights of property. There may be at
present, a Majority of the Nation, who are even freeholders,
or the heirs or aspirants to Freeholds. And the day may not
be very near when such will cease to make up a Majority of
the community. But they cannot always so continue. With
every admissible subdivision of the Arable lands, a
populousness not greater than that of England or France will
reduce the holders to a Minority. And whenever the majority
shall be without landed or other equivalent property and
without the means or hope of acquiring it, what is to secure
the rights of property ag^{st} the danger from an equality &
universality of suffrage, vesting compleat power over
property in hands without a share in it: not to speak of a
danger in the meantime from a dependence of an increasing
number on the wealth of a few? In other Countries this
dependence results in some from the relations between
Landlords & Tenants in others both from that source & from
the relations between wealthy capitalists and indigent
labourers. In the U. S. the occurrence must happen from the
last source; from the connection between the great
Capitalists in Manufactures & Commerce and the numbers
employed by them. Nor will accumulations of Capital for a
certain time be precluded by our laws of descent & of
distribution; Such being the enterprise inspired by free
Institutions, that great wealth in the hands of individuals
and associations may not be unfrequent. But it may be
observed, that the opportunities may be diminished, and the
permanency defeated by the equalizing tendency of our laws.

"No free Country has ever been without parties, which are a
natural offspring of Freedom. An obvious and permanent
division of every people is into the owners of the soil, and
the other inhabitants. In a certain sense the country may be
said to belong to the former. If each landholder has an
exclusive property in his share, the Body of Landholders
have an exclusive property in the whole. As the Soil becomes
subdivided, and actually cultivated by the owners, this view
of the subject derives force from the principle of natural
law, which vests in individuals an exclusive right to the
portions of ground with which he has incorporated his labour
& improvements. Whatever may be the rights of others derived
from their birth in the Country, from their interest in the
highways & other parcels left open for common use, as well
as in the national edifices and monuments; from their share
in the public defence, and from their concurrent support of
the Gov^t, it would seem unreasonable to extend the right so
far as to give them when become the majority, a power of
Legislation over the landed property without the consent of
the proprietors. Some barrier ag^{st} the invasion of their
rights would not be out of place in a just and provident
System of Gov^t. The principle of such an arrangement has
prevailed in all Gov^{ts} where peculiar privileges or
interests held by a part were to be secured ag^{st}
violation, and in the various associations where pecuniary
or other property forms the stake. In the former case a
defensive right has been allowed; and if the arrangement be
wrong, it is not in the defense but in the kind of privilege
to be defended. In the latter case, the shares of suffrage,
allotted to individuals have been with acknowledged justice
apportioned more or less to their respective interests in
the Common Stock.

"These reflections suggest the expediency of such a
modification of Gov^t as would give security to the part of
the Society having most at stake and being most exposed to
danger. Three modifications present themselves.

"1. _Confining_ the right of suffrage to freeholders, & to
such as hold an equivalent property, convertible of course
into freeholds. The objection to this regulation is obvious.
It violates the vital principle of free Gov^t that those who
are to be bound by laws, ought to have a voice in making
them. And the violation w^d be more strikingly unjust as the
law makers become the minority. The regulation would be as
unpropitious, also, as it would be unjust. It would engage
the numerical & physical force in a constant struggle
ag^{st} the public authority; unless kept down by a standing
army fatal to all parties.

"2. Confining the right of suffrage for one Branch to the
holders of property, and for the other Branch to those
without property. This arrangement which w^d give a mutual
defence, where there might be mutual danger of encroachment,
has an aspect of equality & fairness. But it w^d not be in
fact either equal or fair, because the rights to be defended
would be unequal, being on one side those of property as
well as of persons, and on the other those of persons only.
The temptation also to encroach tho' in a certain degree
mutual, w^d be felt more strongly on one side than on the
other: It would be more likely to beget an abuse of the
Legislative Negative in extorting concessions at the expence
of property, than the reverse. The division of the State
into two Classes, with distinct & independ^t Organs of
power, and without any intermingled agency whatever, might
lead to contests & antipathies not dissimilar to those
between the Patricians & Plebeians at Rome.

"3. Confining the right of electing one Branch of the
Legislature to freeholders, and admitting all others to a
common right with holders of property in electing the other
Branch. This w^d give a defensive power to holders of
property, and to the class also without property when
becoming a majority of electors, without depriving them in
the meantime of a participation in the Public Councils. If
the holders of property would thus have a two-fold share of
representation, they w^d have at the same time a two-fold
stake in it, the rights of property as well as of persons,
the two-fold object of political Institutions. And if no
exact & safe equilibrium can be introduced, it is more
reasonable that a preponderating weight sh^d be allowed to
the greater interest than to the lesser. Experience alone
can decide how far the practice in this case would
correspond with the Theory. Such a distribution of the right
of suffrage was tried in N. York and has been abandoned
whether from experienced evils, or party calculations, may
possibly be a question. It is still on trial in N. Carolina,
with what practical indications is not known. It is certain
that the trial, to be satisfactory ought to be continued for
no inconsiderable period; untill in fact the non-freeholders
should be the majority.

"4. Should experience or public opinion require an equal &
universal suffrage for each branch of the Gov^t such as
prevails generally in the U. S., a resource favorable to the
rights of the landed & other property, when its possessors
become the minority, may be found in an enlargement of the
Election Districts for one branch of the Legislature, and an
extension of its period of service. Large districts are
manifestly favorable to the election of persons of general
respectability, and of probable attachment to the rights of
property, over competitors depending on the personal
solicitation practicable on a contracted theatre. And altho'
an ambitious candidate, of personal distinction, might
occasionally recommend himself to popular choice by
espousing a popular though unjust object, it might rarely
happen to many districts at the same time. The tendency of a
longer period of service would be, to render the Body more
stable in its policy, and more capable of stemming popular
currents taking a wrong direction, till reason & justice
could regain their ascendancy.

"5. Should even such a modification as the last be deemed
inadmissible, and universal suffrage and very short periods
of elections within contracted spheres, be required for each
branch of the Gov^t, the security for the holders of
property when the minority, can only be derived from the
ordinary influence possessed by property, & the superior
information incident to its holders; from the popular sense
of justice enlightened & enlarged by a diffusive education;
and from the difficulty of combining & effectuating unjust
purposes throughout an extensive country; a difficulty
essentially distinguishing the U. S. & even most of the
individual States, from the small communities where a
mistaken interest or contagious passion, could readily unite
a majority of the whole under a factious leader, in
trampling on the rights of the minor party.

"Under every view of the subject, it seems indispensable
that the Mass of Citizens should not be without a voice, in
making the laws which they are to obey, & in chusing the
Magistrates who are to administer them, and if the only
alternative be between an equal & universal right of
suffrage for each branch of the Gov^t and a confinement of
the _entire_ right to a part of the Citizens, it is better
that those having the greater interest at stake namely that
of property & persons both, should be deprived of half their
share in the Gov^t than, that those having the lesser
interest, that of personal rights only, should be deprived
of the whole."--Madison's Note.

Doc^r Franklin. It is of great consequence that we sh^d not depress the virtue & public spirit of our common people; of which they displayed a great deal during the war, and which contributed principally to the favorable issue of it. He related the honorable refusal of the American seamen who were carried in great numbers into the British Prisons during the war, to redeem themselves from misery or to seek their fortunes, by entering on board the Ships of the Enemies to their Country; contrasting their patriotism with a contemporary instance in which the British seamen made prisoners by the Americans, readily entered on the ships of the latter on being promised a share of the prizes that might be made out of their own Country. This proceeded he said from the different manner in which the common people were treated in America & G. Britain. He did not think that the elected had any right in any case to narrow the privileges of the electors. He quoted as arbitrary the British Statute setting forth the danger of tumultuous meetings, and under that pretext narrowing the right of suffrage to persons having freeholds of a certain value; observing that this Statute was soon followed by another under the succeeding Parliam^t subjecting the people who had no votes to peculiar labors & hardships. He was persuaded also that such a restriction as was proposed would give great uneasiness in the populous States. The sons of a substantial farmer, not being themselves freeholders, would not be pleased at being disfranchised, and there are a great many persons of that description.

M^r Mercer. The Constitution is objectionable in many points, but in none more than the present. He objected to the footing on which the qualification was put, but particularly to the _mode of election_ by the people. The people can not know & judge of the characters of Candidates. The worse possible choice will be made. He quoted the case of the Senate in Virg^a as an example in point. The people in Towns can unite their votes in favor of one favorite; & by that means always prevail over the people of the Country, who being dispersed will scatter their votes among a variety of candidates.

M^r Rutlidge thought the idea of restraining the right of suffrage to the freeholders a very unadvised one. It would create division among the people & make enemies of all those who should be excluded.

On the question for striking out as moved by M^r Gov^r Morris, from the word "qualifications" to the end of the III article

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d div^d. V^a no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not pres^t.

Adjourned

WEDNESDAY AUG^{ST} 8. IN CONVENTION

Art: IV. sect. 1.--M^r Mercer expressed his dislike of the whole plan, and his opinion that it never could succeed.

M^r Ghorum. he had never seen any inconveniency from allowing such as were not freeholders to vote, though it had long been tried. The elections in Phil^a, N. York & Boston where the Merchants & Mechanics vote are at least as good as those made by freeholders only. The case in England was not accurately stated yesterday (by M^r Madison). The Cities & large towns are not the seat of Crown influence & corruption. These prevail in the Boroughs, and not on account of the right which those who are not freeholders have to vote, but of the smallness of the number who vote. The people have been long accustomed to this right in various parts of America, and will never allow it to be abridged. We must consult their rooted prejudices if we expect their concurrence in our propositions.

M^r Mercer did not object so much to an election by the people at large including such as were not freeholders, as to their being left to make their choice without any guidance. He hinted that Candidates ought to be nominated by the State Legislatures.

On the question for agreeing to Art: IV--Sect, 1 it pass^d nem. con.

Art. IV. Sect. 2. taken up.

Col. Mason was for opening a wide door for emigrants; but did not chuse to let foreigners and adventurers make laws for us & govern us. Citizenship for three years was not enough for ensuring that local knowledge which ought to be possessed by the Representative. This was the principal ground of his objection to so short a term. It might also happen that a rich foreign Nation, for example Great Britain, might send over her tools who might bribe their way into the Legislature for insidious purposes. He moved that "seven" years instead of "three," be inserted.

M^r Gov^r Morris 2^{ded} the Motion, & on the question, all the States agreed to it except Connecticut.

M^r Sherman moved to strike out the word "resident" and insert "inhabitant," as less liable to misconstruction.

M^r Madison 2^{ded} the motion, both were vague, but the latter least so in common acceptation, and would not exclude persons absent occasionally for a considerable time on public or private business. Great disputes had been raised in Virg^a concerning the meaning of residence as a qualification of Representatives which were determined more according to the affection or dislike to the man in question, than to any fixt interpretation of the word.

M^r Wilson preferred "inhabitant."

M^r Gov^r Morris, was opposed to both and for requiring nothing more than a freehold. He quoted great disputes in N. York occasioned by these terms, which were decided by the arbitrary will of the majority. Such a regulation is not necessary. People rarely chuse a nonresident--It is improper as in the 1^{st} branch, _the people at large_, not the _States_, are represented.

M^r Rutlidge urged & moved, that a residence of 7 years sh^d be required in the State Wherein the Member sh^d be elected. An emigrant from N. England to S. C. or Georgia would know little of its affairs and could not be supposed to acquire a thorough knowledge in less time.

M^r Read reminded him that we were now forming a _Nat^l_ Gov^t and such a regulation would correspond little with the idea that we were one people.

M^r Wilson. enforced the same consideration.

M^r Madison suggested the case of new States in the West, which could have perhaps no representation on that plan.

M^r Mercer. Such a regulation would present a greater alienship among the States than existed under the old federal system. It would interweave local prejudices & State distinctions in the very Constitution which is meant to cure them. He mentioned instances of violent disputes raised in Maryland concerning the term "residence."

M^r Elseworth thought seven years of residence was by far too long a term: but that some fixt term of previous residence would be proper. He thought one year would be sufficient, but seemed to have no objection to three years.

M^r Dickinson proposed that it should read "inhabitant actually resident for ---- years." This would render the meaning less indeterminate.

M^r Wilson. If a short term should be inserted in the blank, so strict an expression might be construed to exclude the members of the Legislature, who could not be said to be actual residents in their States whilst at the Seat of the Gen^l Government.

M^r Mercer. It would certainly exclude men, who had once been inhabitants, and returning from residence elsewhere to resettle in their original State; although a want of the necessary knowledge could not in such cases be presumed.

M^r Mason thought 7 years too long, but would never agree to part with the principle. It is a valuable principle. He thought it a defect in the plan that the Representatives would be too few to bring with them all the local knowledge necessary. If residence be not required, Rich men of neighbouring States, may employ with success the means of corruption in some particular district and thereby get into the public Councils after having failed in their own State. This is the practice in the boroughs of England.

On the question for postponing in order to consider M^r Dickinsons motion

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d ay.
V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On the question for inserting "inhabitant" in place of "resident"--ag^d to nem. con.

M^r Elseworth & Col. Mason move to insert "one year" for previous inhabitancy.

M^r Williamson liked the Report as it stood. He thought "resident" a good eno' term. He was ag^{st} requiring any period of previous residence. New residents if elected will be most zealous to conform to the will of their constituents, as their conduct will be watched with a more jealous eye.

M^r Butler & M^r Rutlidge moved "three years" instead of "one year" for previous inhabitancy.

On the question for 3 years,

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.
V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On the question for "1 year"

N. H. no.--Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no.
M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Art. IV. Sect. 2. as amended in manner preceding, was agreed to nem. con.

Art. IV. Sect. 3. taken up.

Gen^l Pinkney & M^r Pinkney moved that the number of Representatives allotted to S. Carol^a be "six." On the question,

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Delaware ay.
M^d no. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The 3. Sect of Art: IV, was then agreed to.

Art: IV. Sect. 4. taken up.

M^r Williamson moved to strike out "according to the provisions hereinafter made" and to insert the words "according to the rule hereafter to be provided for direct taxation."--See Art. VII. Sect. 3.

On the question for agreeing to M^r Williamson's amendment

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay.
V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r King wished to know what influence the vote just passed was meant to have on the succeeding part of the Report, concerning the admission of Slaves into the rule of Representation. He could not reconcile his mind to the article if it was to prevent objections to the latter part. The admission of slaves was a most grating circumstance to his mind, & he believed would be so to a great part of the people of America. He had not made a strenuous opposition to it heretofore because he had hoped that this concession would have produced a readiness which had not been manifested, to strengthen the Gen^l Gov^t and to mark a full confidence in it. The Report under consideration had by the tenor of it, put an end to all those hopes. In two great points the hands of the Legislature were absolutely tied. The importation of slaves could not be prohibited--exports could not be taxed. Is this reasonable? What are the great objects of the Gen^l System? 1. defence ag^{st} foreign invasion. 2. ag^{st} internal sedition. Shall all the States then be bound to defend each; & shall each be at liberty to introduce a weakness which will render defence more difficult? Shall one part of the U. S. be bound to defend another part, and that other part be at liberty not only to increase its own danger, but to withhold the compensation for the burden? If slaves are to be imported shall not the exports produced by their labor, supply a revenue the better to enable the Gen^l Gov^a to defend their Masters? There was so much inequality & unreasonableness in all this, that the people of the Northern States could never be reconciled to it. No candid man could undertake to justify it to them. He had hoped that some accommodation w^d have taken place on this subject; that at least a time w^d have been limited for the importation of slaves. He never could agree to let them be imported without limitation & then be represented in the Nat^l Legislature. Indeed he could so little persuade himself of the rectitude of such a practice, that he was not sure he could assent to it under any circumstances. At all events, either slaves should not be represented, or exports should be taxable.

M^r Sherman regarded the slave trade as iniquitous; but the point of representation having been settled after much difficulty & deliberation, he did not think himself bound to make opposition; especially as the present article as amended did not preclude any arrangement whatever on that point in another place of the Report.

M^r Madison objected to 1 for every 40.000 inhabitants as a perpetual rule. The future increase of population if the Union sh^d be permanent, will render the number of Representatives excessive.

M^r Ghorum. It is not to be supposed that the Gov^t will last so long as to produce this effect. Can it be supposed that this vast Country including the Western territory will 150 years hence remain one nation?

M^r Elseworth. If the Gov^t should continue so long, alterations may be made in the Constitution in the manner proposed in a subsequent article.

M^r Sherman & M^r Madison moved to insert the words "not exceeding," before the words "1 for every 40.000." which was agreed to nem. con.