Chapter XXXVIII: After the Victory

While the French troops were still around the walls of Kairwán, the Ministry of M. Ferry formally placed its resignation in the hands of the President of the Republic. Public opinion in France had of late been so severely exercised on the Tunisian Question, that even the dramatic announcement of the well-timed conquest of Kairwán failed to produce any other effect than ill-concealed hilarity. The unexpected surrender of the Government deprived the Tunisian debate of its natural interest, and its excessive dulness was only relieved by the credulous sentimentality of M. Ferry, the sarcasms of M. Clémenceau, and the unanswerable criticism of M. Le Faure.

Six months had brought about a remarkable change in French public opinion, and the very deputies who had cheered M. Ferry’s warlike utterances in May came only to gibe and jeer at his halting apologies in November. It was in vain for M. Ferry to strike his breast and declare that there was “the most perfect accord” between the Bey and the French. This bold assertion was received with undisguised merriment, and even created what is technically known as “an incident.” An eye-witness gives an amusing account of M. Ferry’s perplexities:—

M. FERRY said—I do not see why you should laugh at that. If you were patriots you should rejoice at it.

DUC DE FELTRE—Certainly, if it were true; but it happens not to be true.

M. FERRY—I beg your pardon; it is absolutely true.

DUC DE FELTRE—Prove it.

M. FERRY—I am going to prove it. The Tunisians are so much the auxiliaries of our men, that we pay them, and supply them with rations (loud cries of “Oh, oh,” and peals of ironical laughter from the Right).

This scene continued for some time longer. M. George Perin, of the Extreme Left, seizing the opportunity, said the massacre of the station- master and _employés_ at Oued Zerga, some of whom had been burnt alive, had been traced to those faithful allies the troops of the Bey. At this there was fresh uproar. In conclusion, M. Ferry denied that the Tunisian Expedition had interfered with the mobilisation of the army at home, and asserted that were it necessary to mobilise they would find the reserves, which formed the really defensive force of France, embodied in the _cadres_, which need not be numerous, without any difficulty or trouble. It had also been alleged that the Tunis Expedition had cost France her alliances. Why, only the previous day they had concluded a Commercial Treaty with Italy (cries of “Oh, oh,” on the Right). That treaty should be laid before the House; but an accord had been established between the representatives of the two Governments, and surely the signature of a Commercial Treaty was not the sign of a misunderstanding between two neighbouring and friendly nations. The march to Kairwán had been a splendid achievement.

After three days of wrangle and recriminations M. Gambetta came to the rescue, by proposing an issue which nobody had ever raised or contested. On the 9th November the discussion was brought to a close by adopting the following resolution by 379 votes to 71:—“The Chamber, resolved on the integral execution of the treaty signed by the French nation on the 12th May 1881, passes to the order of the day.” M. Clémenceau’s motion for a Parliamentary Inquiry into the whole matter was rejected, but his bold indictment of the Tunisian Expedition is certainly entitled to a prominent place amongst the state papers connected with the latest Punic War. It ran thus:—

Whereas, on the 7th of April 1881, the Government asked of the Chambers the opening of two credits, amounting together to 5,695,276f., to repress acts committed on Algerian territory bordering on Tunis. Whereas, these credits were inserted in the Budget under the head of military operations on the Tunis frontier. Whereas, these credits were solicited by the Government and voted by the Chambers only for a special object—that of the repression of the Kroumírs. Whereas, the Minister of Foreign Affairs even told the Senate that it was almost one of those repressions with which the gendarmerie could be intrusted, yet the Prime Minister declared, in the discussion of the 5th of November, that the aim of the Government was the submission of the Regency. Whereas, the Government had disclaimed all idea of conquest and annexation, yet the Prime Minister, on the 5th of November, spoke for the first time of our Protectorate over Tunis, an idea expressly repudiated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Senate on the 25th of July. Whereas, the Prime Minister’s declarations show that the repression of the Kroumírs was only the pretext for French intervention in Tunis, and that consequently the Government deceived the Chambers. Whereas, the march of General Bréart on Tunis, the Treaty of Protectorate imposed on the Bey, the bombardment of the Tunisian towns, the occupation of the capital of the Regency, and the present military operations can in no wise be deemed simple measures of repression against the frontier tribes, and really amount to war. Whereas, the Chamber ratified the Treaty of Kasr-es-Said, and, on the 15th of June, the Chamber voted the sum of 14,226,000f., which, according to the declarations of the Minister of War, were to suffice for the expenses incurred, and even for the opening of means of communication, which are the most powerful means of pacification. Whereas, the Chamber believed it had an accomplished fact to deal with, and thought it was setting up an expedition which was terminated, while it was deceived by the Government, which submitted the treaty of Kasr- es-Said to it as the final pacification of the Regency; while, on the contrary, that treaty was the starting-point, for new expenses were incurred. Whereas, in these conditions it is not possible to regard the vote of the Chamber as even an implied authorisation to undertake and pursue the present military operations, which amount to a positive state of war. Whereas, it is impossible to allow the Government with impunity to embark France in a surreptitious manner in a military enterprise invested with all the character of a war, and which might result in jeopardising the interests of our country. Whereas, this would be a dangerous precedent, and if the Government were not stopped in this path by Parliamentary action the security of France might be irremediably compromised without Parliament being able to enforce in time the will of the country. Whereas, therefore, it is proper to consider whether the article of the Constitutional Law of the 18th of July 1875, has not been violated, to ascertain the individual or collective responsibilities of any kind incurred, to see whether the Ministry is guilty only of incapacity, or whether there is ground for enforcing Ministerial responsibility in the way prescribed by the Constitution—viz., by impeaching the Ministers. Whereas, in present circumstances the origin of the expedition is not sufficiently known. Whereas, the declarations of the Government are conflicting, especially as to the Enfida affair. Whereas, as private speculations are mixed up with the Tunis Expedition, it is important to know whether one of the agents of the Government obeyed wittingly or unwittingly the pressure exerted on him by private interests. Whereas, it is important to know with precision what questions were pending at Tunis between France and the Bey’s Government at the date of the expedition, so as to ascertain the real grounds for the crisis which the expedition was designed to adjust. Whereas, there exist at the Ministry of Finance reports of financial inspectors on the management of the Financial Commission, which might be advantageously consulted on this point. Whereas, it ought to be known what use has been made of the French Protectorate at Tunis by the French Consul, and whether an examination of his acts would tend to enlighten Parliament on the causes and object of the expedition. Whereas, the Government has not met the necessities of the expedition, but, to avoid a mobilisation, which would have disclosed the real bearing of its enterprise, recruited the expeditionary corps in a way jeopardising our military organisation and seriously impairing our means of defence. Whereas, after the Kasr- es-Said Treaty the troops were recalled to France at the very moment when their presence was about to become necessary, so that a fresh and larger army had immediately afterwards to be sent to Tunis, a signal proof of the incapacity of the Ministry. Whereas, the military administration has been notoriously unequal to its task, and a good medical service has been entirely wanting. Whereas, the information furnished by the military authorities on the mortality of the troops, as well as on the organisation of the medical service, has been positively contradicted by competent men, without a satisfactory reply to the grave accusations made having been given. Whereas, contrary to the declarations of the Minister of War, the last votes of credit have again turned out insufficient in consequence of the new military operations undertaken in Tunis. Whereas, the Government, having by the manœuvre of early elections caused two Chambers of Deputies to co-exist for nearly two months, did not deem it proper to convene Parliament, and did not hesitate to resort to a financial proceeding distinctly condemned by the law by carrying to the costs of the Tunis Expedition money provided for the support of the troops in time of peace. Whereas, the Government is the less excusable, seeing that it asserts that it foresaw an autumn campaign. Whereas, the Tunisian Expedition has been a source of disturbance and agitation in the Mussulman world. Whereas, it has not attained the object indicated by the Government, which was to ensure the tranquillity of our Algerian possessions, and has deeply modified the political situation of France in Europe in a sense unfavourable to our interests. Whereas, a Parliamentary debate, however extended, is powerless to throw complete light on all the above questions on account of the documents which must be produced and closely examined, as well as verbal statements, the correctness of which it may be necessary to verify. Whereas, the country has a right to know the truth and the whole truth, both as to the real causes of the expedition and as to the circumstances which accompanied it, its results and consequences, as well as the manner in which it has been conducted. Whereas, it is the duty of Parliament to seek that truth, both in order to ensure the exercise of ministerial responsibility in the conditions in which it has been organised by the Constitution, and to prepare the elements of a good solution of the Tunisian question. The Chamber resolves that a committee of investigation of twenty-two members shall be nominated in the Bureaux, in order to present a report on the causes, results, and consequences of the Tunisian Expedition, as well as on the conduct of the military operations, and to make any proposals which may be suggested to it by the interests of the country and the maintenance of the rights of Parliament.

The deceptions and contradictions of MM. Ferry and Saint-Hilaire now brought their own reward; the Cabinet to which they belonged died of Tunis-on-the-brain. Its requiem was written appropriately enough by one who had been himself woefully deceived:—

As to the now defunct Ministry (telegraphed M. De Blowitz on the 10th November to the _Times_), it might be styled the Roustan Cabinet, or the “Cabinet des Naïfs.” M. Ferry was simple enough to believe that M. Gambetta would accept office on the eve of the session, and would be forced to retain him in his Cabinet. He was simple enough to credit M. Roustan’s assurances that the subjugation of Tunis would be a military promenade. He is simple enough himself to believe, or expect the Chamber to believe, that the Marseilles financiers, from pure patriotism, rejected a bonus of half a million francs for the sale of the Enfida property, that France is stronger with Tunis on her hands than without it, and that expenditure has not been incurred without constitutional sanction, because the money has not yet been debited against any Parliamentary vote. M. Saint-Hilaire was simple enough to think Prince Bismarck egged on France in the Tunis Expedition out of pure friendliness, and he was simple enough to picture Tunis as about to become a perfect paradise under French patronage. General Farre is simple enough to believe, or at least to say, that soldiers do not get acclimatised in the field, and that the science of war consists in bringing back one set of raw levies and sending out another. The whole Cabinet were simple enough to think Parliament would regard the conclusion of the May Treaty on the eve of re-assembling after Easter, and the occupation of Kairwán on the eve of the meeting in October, as pure coincidences, not as theatrical strokes, analogous to an instalment of a novel, leaving off at a thrilling point. Nobody suspects the late Ministers of any dishonourable motives. Nobody imagines that they plunged into the Tunisian hornets’ nest from any complicity in Bourse speculations. Even their little artifices in accelerating the elections and meeting Parliament with a bulletin from Kairwán are matters for a smile rather than for grave reprehension. They have simply been the dupes of their own sanguineness, and perhaps of the craft of others.

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At Tunis, however, M. Roustan was pleased to consider the result of the vote on M. Gambetta’s order of the day as a personal victory of his own. Early on the following morning the “approval of the Tunisian Expedition” was placarded all over the city, and four days later, when the local Cleopatra returned to Tunis from a visit to Paris, the Bey’s gilded barge was made ready to convey her to the shore, while eager deputations represented both the legendary colony and the financial associations, and the Pro-Bey fondly believed that his position was now secure.

In the meantime Generals Saussier and Forgemol were conducting one of the Kairwán columns back to Tebessa, while General Logerot was hopelessly endeavouring to track the Arabs to their lairs in the south. The seaport of Mehdia had been occupied without resistance on the same day as Kairwán, but the insurgents still continued their raids and attacks. In addition to the march of the column southward, troops under General D’Aubigny and Colonel La Roque were operating in the north of the Regency, with the hope of surrounding the remaining followers of Ali Ben Amar.

Nothing of any particular moment occurred at Tunis during the weeks which immediately succeeded the occupation of Kairwán. On the 14th November, another Arab was accused of an attempt to endanger the safety of passengers on the French line, by putting a stone on the rails. I am unable to enter into the merits of the case, but the man pretended he was merely running after his goat which had accidentally broken its tether. The poor fellow had only been married the day before, and still wore his wedding garment. He got a very short shrift, and was shot the same day in sight of the Bey’s palace-windows. The ladies of Kasr-es- Said were greatly alarmed, and were not reassured when a number of Arabs afterwards came close to the building, and shouted out uncomplimentary allusions to the diminished power and prestige of the descendants of Heussein Ben Ali.

Before General Logerot had fairly started on his road to Gabes, a band of the fugitives from Kairwán attacked the Arabs who refused to join them, near the El Djem ruins between Susa and Sfax. Two men were killed and thirty wounded in the _melée_, and the assailants made good their retreat with a rich booty. Renewed _razzias_ were reported almost daily from Susa and Sfax, and the inhabitants of Mahres proved so refractory, that a French gunboat had to be sent to shell their village.

The French now began to exact a very heavy contribution from those tribes which were willing to submit—forty francs and a gun from every adult sometimes represented the whole wealth of the possessor, and the payment often entailed misery if not absolute beggary. These proceedings interfered considerably with the progress of any attempt at pacification. Another great mistake was committed; the clans which asked and received _aman_ were at once deprived of their arms; the result of this step was quickly felt, for the “submitted tribes” were soon defeated by their armed co-religionists, or again compelled to join in the rising. A third and more important blunder was the appointment of “Colonel” Joseph Allegro to the _Caidat_ or Governorship of Southern Tunis. The part he had played in the Khamír rising, while ostensibly receiving the Bey’s pay (or as the Arabs have it, eating the Bey’s salt) at Bone, was now notorious, and its effect on the minds of the Tunisians could not be effaced, even by his ostentatiously embracing the Moslem faith, as he did shortly afterwards. Apart from personal courage, this man had no single qualification for a place of trust and responsibility, and his very presence amongst the Arabs afforded a continued provocation to fanaticism and resistance.

On the 21st November the news reached Tunis that the elaborate concentric movement of Generals Philibert and D’Aubigny and Colonel La Roque had ended in the escape of Ali Ben Amar, who with a chosen band of followers evaded their pursuit, and after joining Ali Ben Hlifa, finally made good his retreat to Tripoli.

The doubtful wisdom of several of the steps taken by the French authorities during the marches into Southern Tunis, to which I have previously alluded, now seems to have culminated in a manifesto published by “Giannino,” the French Vice-Consul and Pro-Roustan of Sfax. On the 20th November he issued a circular “calling the attention of the consular agents to the approach of the French column from Kairwán, and to the _razzias_ which it might be necessary for the French troops to execute against the Arabs during the march, and requesting the Europeans to withdraw all their property from the interior, in case it should otherwise be destroyed along with that of the natives!” As no European had been able to reach the districts in question during the past six months, this demand can only be qualified as a _mauvaise plaisanterie_.

As I was now anxious to meet the _colonne Logerot_ on its arrival at Gabes, I left Tunis on the 26th November to journey along the Sahel to Susa, Sfax, Gabes, and afterwards to Tripoli, which had now, according to the _Agence Havas_, supplanted Kairwán as “a focus of Moslem intrigue and sedition.”